An historical and psychoanalytic investigation with reference to the bride-in-white by Williams, Gavin
 1	  
 
 
 
An historical and psychoanalytic investigation 
with reference to the bride-in-white 
 
 
 
Gavin Williams 
Student No. 22011083 
Submitted for the degree of M.Phil. Psychoanalytic Studies 
 
 
 
Goldsmiths College, University of London 
Department PACE: Professional and Community Education 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 2	  
Contents 
Frontispiece - The group blesses the new union……………….…………...….…after p4 
Abstract………………………………………….………….………………..……..….p5 
Acknowledgements………………………………………….……………..…….…….p6 
Author’s note………………………………………….…………………………….….p7 
Introduction………………………………………….………….……………..……….p8 
 
PART ONE 
Locating the bride:  
in history, through ritual and with reference to psychodynamics 
 
1.1 Locating the bride-in-white……………………………….…………………..…..p17 
1.2 Clothed in white, Christian ritual and the significance of purity…………..……..p19 
1.3 Ideals: virginity and purity in philosophical, religious and physical terms…..…..p27 
1.4 Between life and death: white, virginity and purity in practice…………………..p48 
1.5 Virginity and purity from a psychological perspective…………….…………….p59 
1.6 The exchange of women……………………………………………….………….p65 
1.7 The institution of marriage: monogamy versus polygamy…………….…………p77 
1.8 Victorian values: the phenomenon of the bride-in-white……………………....…p85 
1.9 Freud and psychoanalytic theory…………………………………..……………..p89 
1.10 Psychoanalytic practice and the brides’ experiences…………………………….p93 
1.11 To aspire to an ideal: the psychology of the ego ideal and idealisation…………p96 
1.12 Clothing the body: a psychological interpretation of exhibitionism…………...p103 
1.13 In search of a satisfactory object: psychological understanding of repudiation..p110 
1.14 To aspire to become…a psychological interpretation of transformation……....p116 
1.15 Summary of Part One…………………………………………………………..p122 
 
PART TWO 
Methodology and methods: theory and practice 
 
2.1 Methodology…………………………………………………………………….p127 
2.2 Theory of data analysis……………………………………………………….…p130 
2.3 Theory: in search of truth and knowledge………………………………………p132 
2.4 Practice: methods of data collection and interviewing process…………………p156 
2.5 The group of participants……………………………………………………….p167 
2.6 Practice: applying phenomenological hermeneutics…………………………….p174 
2.7 Limitations of the study…………………………………………………………p175 
 3	  
PART THREE 
The infant girl’s psychological development 
 
3.1 A Freudian and post-Freudian model with relevance to the bride’s experience...p176 
3.2 Seeing and being seen: the veiled bride and the primal scene………………..…p198 
3.3 A sacred walk with father: Part A - unconscious incestuous desire………….…p208 
3.4 How the bride psychologically uses clothes to process change…………….…...p225 
 
 
PART FOUR 
Interpreting the marriage ceremony  
with reference to the bride-in-white’s ‘felt’ experience 
 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….…..p233 
4.2 Psychoanalytic interpretation………………………………………………...….p234 
4.3 Interpreting the ceremony in Oedipal terms: chaos or order……………………p238 
4.4 The mother’s relation to the bride and the bride’s response to the mother…...…p250 
4.5 A sacred walk with father: Part B - the bride’s intermediate locus of desire…....p267 
4.6 Transformation inside the Church……………………………………………….p276 
4.7 On relating to the non-incestuous other……………………………………….…p293 
4.8 Processing change: separation anxiety and the use of a ‘transitional object’……p301 
4.9 Summary of Part Four…………………………………….………………..……p321 
 
 
PART FIVE 
Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction………..……………………………………………………..……...p325 
5.2 The ego ideal: purity, perfection and faultlessness in practice………………….p332 
5.3 Wearing wedding white as an ideal……………………………………………..p333 
5.4 On being the centre of attention: exhibitionism…………………………………p334 
5.5 Striking out to form a new union: repudiation…………………………….…….p335 
5.6 The transformation into ‘passive aims’………………………………….………p336 
5.7 The ‘transitional object’: an aide-mémoire and the use of illusion……….……..p337 
 4	  
List of illustrations…………………………………..………….………….………..p340 
Plates……………………………..……………….…….…………...…………after p340 
Appendix A – Participant Consent Form…………………………………...….……p341 
Appendix B – Questionnaire……………………………………….…………..……p342 
Appendix C – Sample data………………………………..…….….…………..……p344 
Appendix D – Searching for themes and establishing themes…………..……..……p345 
 2.6 Theory and practice of theme analysis………………………………......p345 
 2.6.1 The science of psychoanalytic interpretation……………………….…p345 
 2.6.2 The hermeneutic circle of enquiry………………………………….…p351 
 2.6.3 Theory and practice of phenomenological analysis…………………...p355 
 2.6.4 Applying phenomenological analysis…………………………………p362 
 2.6.5 Case Studies……………………………………………………………p367 
  A general reading of the data supplied by Sue……………………....p368 
  A general reading of the interview with Sis……………………..…..p374 
  A general reading of Liz’s narrative………………………………...p377 
  Using metaphor: an overview reading of Rose’s interview………....p383 
  Asking ‘what was not said’, an overview of Francis’ interview….....p387 
  Patterns of behaviour during a general reading of Ann’s interview…p391 
 2.6.6 Analysis, so far…………….……………………………………….….p395 
 2.6.7 Data analysis generated by indexing the whole data…………………..p399 
 2.6.8 Data, analysis and the emergence of overarching themes……………..p407 
  Interview with Ann: a closer reading and trial analysis……………..p413 
  Applying concepts in practice………………………………..……...p414 
 Bibliography to Appendix D………………………………………………...p422 
Appendix E – Whole interviews and interpretation………………………...……….p424 
1. Interview and interpretation – Sue………………………………….…...p424 
2. Interview and interpretation – Rose……………………………………..p429 
3. Interview and interpretation – Francis……………………………….….p435 
4. Interview and interpretation – Liz and Freesia………………………….p445 
Bibliography ……………………..…………………………………………….……p455 
 5	  
Abstract 
Asking how the subjective experience of the bride-in-white, who marries in an Anglican 
Church, can best be understood led to an historical exploration of the importance of 
virginity, the efficacy of wearing white and Church authority. From a religious 
perspective, in contrast to Eve’s disobedience and ejection from God’s presence, the 
Virgin Mary points towards a need to appear spotless and obedient. 
 
Although the historical investigation offers evidence to ‘when and where’, often it does 
not address ‘why’, so attention was turned to psychoanalysis and the junction between 
‘the child’ and ‘the adult’. Key to psychoanalytic understanding suggests that childhood 
memories become repressed and emerge in adulthood. This thesis argues that 
recognised psychoanalytic concepts offer indications for the unconscious motivations of 
the bride. These include that the infant sets up both their own ideals and also idealises 
others. In infancy there can be a sense of exhibitionism without shame. That 
experienced during the Oedipus complex the infant negotiates separation from the 
mother, allowing the father to become a whole object, and in repudiating their authority 
finds independence. Later under the influence of envy of the mother’s relationship to 
the father, the infant girl develops femininity. 
 
Interviews indicate that, although the bride has a need to appear spotless like a virgin, 
submit to Church authority, rather than a civil ceremony, that sometimes repudiating 
parental authority can be problematic, on occasions ‘penis envy’ could not be resisted 
prior to marriage. While the bride by wearing wedding white receives maximum 
attention, surprisingly the warmth generated from the familial group seems paramount. 
That is, the bride-in-white who marries in Church, appearing like a virgin, submitting to 
ecclesiastical and patriarchal authority, receives the familial group’s acceptance of her 
new union. A selection of plates, illustrate the themes under investigation. 
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to be good, and in the worse case, it fills the mind with divisive and degrading nonsense’ (Metro 
Newspaper, Wednesday 27.04.2011, p18). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine, if you would, one Saturday afternoon hearing the Church bells ringing. 
Curiosity draws you to observe a social spectacle. The ‘couple’ emerge from the 
limousine, the veiled bride resting her left hand on her father’s right arm and together 
they approach the Church. As you draw closer, organ music is heard. Father and bride 
walk inside and together they ceremoniously process down the aisle as the group of 
friends and family look in awe at her beauty and radiance. When inside, the father and 
the bride become subject to the minister and Church authority. Through a sacred rite the 
ceremony and vows are enunciated. You witness the father giving his daughter away to 
another man, the minister blesses their union and the new couple sign the Church 
register. After the ceremony the new couple together with their family and friends, with 
joy on their faces, emerge from the Church, the photographs are taken and the confetti 
thrown, before the whole group make their way to the reception. What we do not know 
about are the years it has taken for the bride to reach this moment in her life, the 
wedding day preparations, and what the bride’s expectations are concerning this new 
alliance. 
 
When I began to seriously research the phenomenon of the bride-in-white I was a 
professional wedding photographer in London and the Home Counties where my 
ambition was to capture ‘happy memories’. Concurrently I was conducting my Master’s 
research and training as a psychotherapist. I have continued my interest in this topic, 
investigating in more depth both psychoanalytic theory and the practice of interpreting 
the subjective experience.  
 
Certain questions, however, always arose. Why did the bride often cry when I thought it 
was a happy occasion? Why was it so important that the bride’s dress remains pristine? 
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Why did the bride almost ‘glow’ in her wedding dress? Why did fathers give their 
daughters away? What was significant about a Church ceremony? Thus I combined my 
photographic eye with my experience as a psychodynamic psychotherapist, by asking: 
what is it like to be a bride-in-white who marries in an Anglican Church? It is the search 
for the answers to these questions that comprise the focus of this research. 
 
My own project, represented in this research, continues to be ongoing investigation into 
what, how and why do bride’s-in-white experience. I have attempted to engage and 
weave together strands of history and of psychoanalysis, but my views have changed in 
both historical and psychological terms. During the early part of this investigation I 
believed that the project involved a close examination of the bride-in-white’s subjective 
experience and by drawing on psychoanalysis, in some sense the creation of a single 
individual. But gradually by exploring the historical context, my views have broadened. 
Now when I think of the bride-in-white, I understand her experience in more holistic 
and pluralistic terms. This project has opened a web of social, psychological, and 
cultural relations, dynamics, practices, identities, and beliefs, in which we can locate the 
phenomenon of the bride-in-white. Psychoanalysis contributes, to this multiplex web of 
sexual development and identity, concepts like patriarchy, or the law of the father. 
 
This project concerns both theory and practice to which I am professionally committed 
as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist. It is recognised that psychoanalysis comprises a 
complex of theories and concepts, and psychotherapy practice is difficult and 
challenging as each client has a unique life experience and wants to better understand 
themselves in a way that resonates for them. I will now present a brief overview of how 
this research has been structured. 
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Part One gives the opportunity to investigate historical, philosophical and religious 
literature that illuminates the bride-in-white. I also introduce discrete psychoanalytic 
concepts that seem relevant to the subjective experience of the bride-in-white. In Part 
Two I discuss the methodology that frames this research. Part Three considers the 
dynamic of the infant girl’s relationship to primary objects, which when combined, 
forms the classical Freudian triangular complex of Oedipus. In Part Four psychoanalytic 
concepts are applied to the bride’s statements through an understanding of ritual. Under 
the task of the analytic work, the aim will be to uncover from the adult statements 
indications of the unconscious motivations of the bride-in-white. Let us consider more 
closely how the research themes are integrated into a cohesive study. 
 
Psychoanalytic theory becomes enriched through the study of the biological and social 
sciences, group behaviour, history, philosophy, art and literature, therefore in Part One 
topics relevant to the bride-in-white’s subjective experience are investigated. I introduce 
a historical and ethical perspective to the subject of the bride-in-white. In historical 
terms the Bible records how significant being a pure virgin has been and depicted in the 
iconographic imagery of the Virgin Mary. In ethical terms Christian teaching advocates 
that a quality of sexual restraint is desirable, reinforcing it by using the symbolism of 
white to denote purity, and in ritual during rites of passage.  
 
In psychoanalytic terms there can be anxiety and fear associated with the defloration of 
a virgin with the potential horror of blood and the women’s subsequent resentment 
towards men, since the woman may harbour narcissistic wounds. In contemporary 
socio-historical terms, Queen Victoria set precedence in British royal circles, emulating 
French fashion, by wearing a white wedding dress. Since then marrying in white has 
become installed in socio-cultural terms, classically indicating that the bride personifies 
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a virgin and that the bride takes the marriage process seriously. In nineteenth century 
England if the bride did not wear a white dress it indicated that she was not a virgin. 
Being, or being seen to be, a virgin was clearly a significant physical state. My research 
into the history and social concepts of white, virginity and purity leads me to explore 
these socially constructed themes and the construction of the phenomenon of the bride-
in-white. 
 
Psychoanalysis, developed by Freud in the late nineteenth century has become a 
comprehensive theory of the human mind, motivations, behaviour and development, 
and also a practical method for understanding dynamic relationships between one 
person and another, and between body and mind. Psychoanalysis recognises that each 
individual is unique, there are factors outside ready awareness, i.e., unconscious 
phantasies and desires, influencing thinking patterns, emotions and actions, and that the 
past informs the present. 
 
In Part One, therefore, I introduce possible psychoanalytic concepts that may be 
applicable to the subjective experience of the bride-in-white. I become concerned how 
Chasseguet-Smirgel explores the unconscious dynamics of the ego-ideal. While Freud’s 
use of the ego-ideal had become absorbed into the super-ego and heir to the Oedipus 
complex, Chasseguet-Smirgel, in contrast, situates an aspect of the ego-ideal earlier as a 
formation of narcissism. The ego-ideal, becomes therefore a substitute for primary 
narcissistic perfection and fusion from which the ego is separated. However the ego 
continually searches for complete satisfaction and the abolishment of separation, that 
will never be achieved. I then turned my attention to Rycroft’s proposition that 
exhibitionism emanates from behaviour which is motivated by the pleasure of being 
looked at. Whereas Freud situates exhibitionism as a normal component of infantile 
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sexuality, Rycroft points out that exhibitionism in women may be interpreted as the 
evidence of penis envy. Freudian theory also formulates the concept of a series of 
repudiations experienced by the infant girl. That is, a severing of familial ties prior to 
the bride giving her allegiance to her husband. Also relevant to the bride’s experience, 
as Freud suggests, is the girl’s transformation of instincts, to renounce ‘active aims’ in 
favour of ‘passive aims’, in order to achieve femininity.  
 
This project concerns the making sense of the human experience through storytelling. 
Like other documented storytelling contained in Biblical text’s, Greek myths, and fairy 
tales, texts often communicate accumulated knowledge from one generation to another, 
indicating ways in which human behaviour can be better understood. On one level, as in 
Part One, we can investigate social and religious issues such as the history of marriage, 
traditions of the wedding dress across cultures, how the white wedding appears to 
celebrate heterosexuality, the history of women in Europe, or how Biblical texts frame 
marriage. On another level, we can ask the bride-in-white to describe her experience as 
fully as possible. By interpreting the bride’s statements through a psychoanalytic lens 
offers us the opportunity to understand better the bride’s conscious and unconscious 
motivations. Thus this project asks the bride-in-white to tell her story within a 
methodological frame.  
 
In Part Two I will discuss the quality of a potential outcome to this project, where 
‘truth’ may be measured in several ways. I ask: will an accumulation of knowledge 
suffice? The method of investigation also asks, whether or not a number of significant 
and well-used psychoanalytic concepts are sufficiently systemic to answer questions 
about the bride-in-white’s psychological motivation. The methods governing the 
process of the research are therefore addressed, including the philosophical frame in 
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relation to the ontological, epistemological and methodological limits. I seek to relate 
these to the ethical issues concerning the search for ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’, in order to 
understanding how the subjective experience informs the conduct and purpose of the 
work. I then describe and discuss the research process in practice, focusing on methods 
of data collection, the group of participants, the practice of data analysis, and the 
research limitations. 
 
Although the wedding-day experience can be analysed as a group event, the focus here 
concerns the participant and how the individual experiences being a bride-in-white. In 
Part Two I introduce the seventeen brides from two different generations, who have a 
ready recall of their experience. In choosing two different generations I ask, does the 
contemporary bride respond differently, to the ‘older’ group? Or can we conclude that 
the Oedipus complex comprises a phylogenetic endowment on all eras, as British 
society has moved from the ‘Victorian’ era, towards changed sexual mores and greater 
female emancipation? 
 
In Part Two I will discuss how I selected each bride at random stressing that although a 
prepared questionnaire would be used they had the freedom to respond in any 
appropriate way. I met each participant separately for the interview, except for one 
interview with a mother and daughter. There was no discussion at the time of the 
interview with them about their responses and no subsequent discussion about their 
contribution. Meeting as a group may be a project for further research. I use, as far as 
possible, in Part Four verbatim quotes. The participants’ reports then become indicators 
of these brides’ experiences. I am not, however, claiming that this group of brides 
represent a definitive sample.  
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In Part Three the focus turns towards an examination of the infant girl’s psychological 
development from infancy to adulthood, using classical Freudian psychoanalytic theory. 
The object under investigation is not the infant per se, but how adult experience touches 
on infant experience, which may have less to do with the question of what really 
happened to the subject in infancy. That is to say, the focus of investigation is the 
subject’s ‘inner world’ as it concerns relatedness. Part Three also offers the opportunity 
to introduce the transferential relationship between the infant girl and the mother. The 
dynamic between the infant girl and the father where unconscious incestuous desire can 
be transferred by both parties which requires tempering by moral restraint, will be 
explored. From this theoretical base I will examine the bride-in-white’s statements, 
looking for indications of the nature of the bride’s unconscious processes. In Part Four 
the bride’s personal experiences will be explored. 
 
In Part Four the participants’ statements are interpreted through a psychoanalytic lens. 
The bride-in-white, who marries in Church, although can be understood as a lone 
subject of investigation, as already mentioned, becomes better understood in the context 
of the family in which she grew up and now leaves for another. The context becomes 
the ‘container’ in which this process is achieved. Achieving this process comes about 
through a ritualised rite of passage supported by significant family members, the wider 
familial friends, and the religious ceremony. 
 
In Part Four the participants’ statements are selected and presented to reflect the 
sequence of events, and the bride’s interaction with significant others. This selection 
process enables comparisons to be made between the different participants’ experience, 
offering a triangulation and revealing indications of similarities and differences. What 
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may be revealed through interpretation may not be hard scientific irrefutable ‘truth’, but 
aims at psychoanalytic coherence and resonance with the participants’ statements. 
 
During the interviewing process that forms the data or statements that are interpreted in 
Part Four, what gradually emerges is the pertinence of how powerful the emotional 
content of the responses were, particularly concerning the bride’s experience with her 
father. Classically, it is the clinical encounter that becomes the empirical basis for 
psychoanalytic information, therefore the interviews that will inform this project are not 
intending to masquerade as a substitute for the psychoanalytic session. Being aware, 
however, that within the ‘free associations’ of childhood dreams, later recalled by the 
adult, and where the present is continuously being interpreted, as useful. Being aware, 
that stories which are told sometimes indicate that the teller is perhaps resisting 
revealing part of the full implications, is also pertinent. Drawing upon and applying 
hermeneutics alongside psychoanalytic theory, offers credibility to the accumulation of 
knowledge in relation to the magnitude of wish fulfilment and the dynamic movement 
of unconscious processes.  
 
Following the analysis of the seventeen participants’ experiences in Part Four, the 
conclusion drawn in Part Five suggests that the four overarching psychodynamic 
themes of ego ideal and idealisation, exhibitionism, repudiation and transformation may 
be usefully employed to illuminate the bride-in-white’s experience, but are not 
necessarily the only ones. 
 
Appendix D forms part of the methodology research of Part Two, where I take the 
opportunity to analyse in-depth participants’ statements in search of themes. 
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In Appendix E, I explore five whole interviews in a case-study format offering some 
interpretation but allowing space for the reader to make their own interpretation, the aim 
being to guard against researcher bias. 
 
 17	  
PART ONE 
Locating the bride-in-white:  
in history, through ritual and with reference to psychodynamics 
 
1.1 Locating the bride-in-white 
In the introduction, I discussed, in general terms, the world in which the bride-in-white 
may inhabit, its context, existing knowledge and theory. I aimed to set out the 
parameters of this study and identify the research question.  
 
Brides may wear a white dress and marry in an Anglican Church for a variety of 
reasons. The bride may identify as Christian and belong to an Anglican Church 
congregation, a white dress may symbolise an ideal virgin status, or the group may like 
the bride to appear like a virgin. The bride may wish to stand out visually within the 
group, white may symbolise death to a previous way of life and represent new life, and 
the bride may wish to be conveyed safely from one family to another. Victorian ideals 
may reflect purity and chastity. The Church and the group may offer blessings on the 
new relationship, that white may be considered ‘traditional’, or there may be other 
motivations. Let us consider these issues from a social and religious perspective before 
examining them through a psychoanalytic lens. 
 
As the focus of this investigation aims to understand the bride-in-white’s personal 
experience and motivations let us now investigate the provenance of the bride-in-white 
who marries in an Anglican Church by exploring religious and social texts. Empirical 
evidence suggests that in the Western economy, dominated by Christian thought, brides 
who marry in Church since circa 1840 predominantly wear a white wedding dress 
(Monsarrat, 1973) and (Tobin, 2003). We will therefore begin by examining Christian 
rituals where the wearing of white clothing predominates. The wearing of white apparel 
implies that the colour may signify some meaning, therefore, I will explore how 
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Biblical text assumes qualities of virginity and purity. I will then subject these concepts 
to the scrutiny of social practice, and consider how virginity and purity may be 
understood psychologically. 
 
As empirical evidence indicates, the crux of the wedding-day experience happens after 
the family group have gathered in the Church and the bride-in-white is ‘given away’, 
therefore, I will examine the theory and practice of the ritual. I will then discuss how 
and when the phenomenon of the bride-in-white emerged. I will then investigate four 
possible psychoanalytic concepts that seem to relate to the personal experience of the 
bride-in-white, through a psychodynamic reading of how ideals and idealisation 
operates; why a psychological interpretation of exhibitionism may be considered apt in 
order to understand better the psychodynamics of separation by discussing the concept 
of repudiation; and how psychoanalysis may interpret the transformative process 
undertaken during the bride-in-white’s experience. I will conclude that a psychoanalytic 
understanding may go some way to inform us why the bride-in-white seems to have 
become a religious, social and personal phenomenon. 
 
The aim of this approach is threefold: to assist in establishing objectivity, to offer a 
rounded view of the phenomenon of the bride-in-white and to allow space for 
sensitivity to what may have been missed in the literature. As the bride, in this study, 
wears a white wedding dress let us now consider some early and contemporary 
Christian rituals where the wearing of white apparel seems to dominate. 
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1.2 Clothed in white, Christian ritual and the significance of purity 
The fabric of white imagery and the concepts of Christian purity and sanctity appear to 
be linked with rites of human passage that convey the subject from one state to another 
endowing them with new attributes. Such ceremonial occasions of initiation, or rites of 
passage include baptism, First Communion especially for Roman Catholic girls, 
marriage and death. At such events, being clothed in white arguably symbolises the 
subject’s outer ideal state but also may also signify an inner ideal. Let us examine the 
context behind baptism, as a foundational Christian sacrament. 
 
After Adam and Eve had eaten of the forbidden fruit ‘of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil’ (Genesis,2v17) they discovered that they were ‘naked’ (Genesis,2v10). 
Because of their disobedience ‘the Lord God drove them out of the Garden of Eden’ 
(Genesis,3v23,24), a place of idealised symbolic union with ‘man’s’ creator. Having 
experienced ejection from God’s paradise, ‘The Fall’ from grace, man has attempted to 
be reconciled with, become acceptable to, and regain that once favoured intimate 
relationship with God. Under renewed circumstances man believed that he could 
receive God’s blessing again (Genesis,1v28). Significant psychodynamic affects in this 
scene include: desire, separation, fear, and the shame of sexuality. These issues 
arguably comprise some of the driving forces in ‘man’s’ effort to regain his position in 
that once paradisiacal relationship with his maker. 
 
The Old Testament records2 that ritual cleanliness, purification and atonement were 
understood as being regular parts of everyday life. Aaron the High Priest, for example, 
would bathe before he put on his ‘sacred linen tunic’, prior to taking ‘from the 
community…two he-goats for a sin-offering…and make expiation for himself and his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Old Testament records ancient sacred Hebrew texts, prior to Christianity. 
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household’. One of the goats ‘on which the lot…has fallen shall be made to stand…for 
expiation to be made over it before it is driven away into the wilderness to the 
Precipice’ (Leviticus,16v4-10). Aaron performs the ritual cleansing of himself, arguably 
to appear acceptable to God, before performing the sacred duty on behalf of the group 
in order that the group too may become acceptable. Aaron symbolically projects the sin 
of the community onto the chosen he-goat which then becomes the expiation, a virtual 
reality, a stand-in, or scapegoat, who was then chased over a precipice, never to be seen 
again, carrying away the sins of the community. Later, Jesus was to become ‘the 
expiation for our sins’ (Romans,3v25), or ‘the propitiation for our sins’ (Book of 
Common Prayer 1662:272). 
 
The Old Testament Psalmist implores God:  
wash away all my guilt and cleanse me from my sin; wash me, that I may 
become whiter than snow…blot out all my guilt…create a pure heart in 
me…do not drive me from thy presence. (Psalms,51v2-11)  
 
God later replies: 
Though your sins are scarlet, 
they may become white as snow; 
though they are dyed crimson, 
they may yet be like wool. (Isaiah,1v18) 
 
It can be argued therefore that some ritual may be understood as being the symbolic 
warding off of bad spirits3, and that inner purity becomes necessary for performing an 
act of worship. Similarly, the bride-in-white submits to Christian ritual, as we will 
discuss later, whose critical enunciation of the words and efficacy of rite is paramount.  
 
Whereas Aaron performs cleansing on behalf of the group, baptism can be understood 
as a freely chosen personal act of cleansing. Baptism being a pivotal sacrament, initiates 
the Christian into the Church community prior to partaking Holy Communion. The 
Church ordains within the Public Baptism of Infants to ‘sanctify this Water to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ‘Bad spirits’ or the ‘evil eye’, may be considered synonymous. 
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mystical washing away of sin’ in order ‘to release him of his sins [and] to sanctify him’ 
(Book of Common Prayer 1662:282-90). The water now becomes the purifying agent or 
sign, in place of the he-goat of the Old Testament. 
 
A Jesuit priest, whose interest lies in seeking common ground between Catholic and 
Anglican doctrine, Edward Yarnold examines the act of purification through baptism 
through the eyes of the fourth-century Church Fathers: Cyril, Ambrose, Chrysostom and 
Theodore. The process of baptism becomes worthwhile examining closely, as this is the 
subject’s first rite of passage where they are adorned in white, exemplifying a degree of 
purity signalled by the colour. In investigating adult baptism, Yarnold claims that 
during a three-year period of instruction the ‘catechumen’ is interrogated by the bishop 
while undergoing daily exorcism, self-searching and repentance. Then during Lent, the 
six-week period leading to Easter becomes a time for purification, spiritual 
enlightenment and a normal time for baptism.  
 
Yarnold cites Zeno of Verona who lists some physical and emotional symptoms which 
candidates might exhibit at exorcism, such as ‘turning pale, gnashing teeth, foaming at 
the mouth, shaking, and weeping’ (Yarnold, 1971:11). Yarnold suggests that ‘the 
bishop scrutinises the candidate to ascertain that none of these phenomena are present, 
as they would indicate a continuing diabolic influence’ (Yarnold, 1971:12). This 
examination arguably implies that some are chosen while others are not. Yarnold 
explains that having renounced sin and the devil the next stage in the baptism 
preparation is that of washing. So one might argue that both inner and outer, physical, 
spiritual and mental cleanliness were considered of equal importance as the whole 
person is addressed. After old clothes are removed the candidate becomes anointed at 
‘three different points’ with the ‘oil of exorcism’ (Yarnold, 1971:22).  
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Yarnold adds that as the neophyte comes out of the water the godparents are urged to 
bring the ‘unstained’ ‘baptismal garment of white’ and assist putting it on the newly 
baptised person, symbolising having ‘put on’ Christ (Galatians,3v27) (Yarnold, 
1971:31). Yarnold asserts that all four Church Fathers referred to ‘these white robes [as] 
a symbol of the life of the resurrection to which the new Christians had now passed, and 
of the innocence that should now distinguish them’ (Yarnold, 1971:31). Yarnold cites 
Cyril who asserts that this symbolism is grounded in the Old Testament: 
 
He has robed me in salvation as a garment  
   and clothed me in integrity as a cloak, 
like a bridegroom with his priestly garland, 
   or a bride decked in her jewels. 
                                             (Isaiah,61v10)4  
 
In other words, through a ceremonial purification of mind and body the new member of 
the church community becomes transformed. 
 
Yarnold suggests that the white garment reminds Ambrose of the ‘shining garments of 
the transfigured Christ’ (Matthew,17v2) (Yarnold, 1971:32), John the Deacon connects 
the white garment with the ‘wedding-garment’ (Yarnold, 1971:32), while it reminds 
Chrysostom of the ‘wedding-robe which is worn for a marriage-feast’ (Yarnold, 
1971:33), and it reminds Zeno of the ‘fleece of Christ the Lamb’ (Yarnold, 1971:32). 
Yarnold points out that when the Emperor Constantine (I) marked his conversion from 
Sun-worship to Christianity by being baptised, in 337AD, ‘in addition to his white 
garments, he had his throne draped in white’ (Yarnold, 1971:33). 
 
Yarnold claims that ‘in some places a white linen cloth was also spread over the 
candidate’s head’, and adds that Theodore understood that the white linen cloth was 
considered to be ‘a mark of freedom’, as slaves ‘have to uncover their heads’ (Yarnold, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Other verses are also used: Psalms,51v2, Isaiah,1v18, Ecclesiastes,9v8, Matthew,5v16, Matthew,13v43. 
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1971:33). John the Deacon believed that the white veil symbolised ‘the ‘priesthood’ and 
‘for the priests of that time always wore on their heads a mystic veil’, while Saint 
Augustine took the opposite view to Theodore: ‘it is unveiling that symbolises freedom’ 
(Yarnold, 1971:33). That is to ask: is the wearing of a veil a sign of freedom, a sign of 
being set aside, or does it signal submissiveness, and is the unveiling liberating? 
 
It could be argued therefore, that the initiation rite of baptism of adults, based on fourth-
century Church Fathers’ homilies, currently practised today with many of the same 
visual and metaphorical symbols5, illustrates the stark contrast between being sinful and 
sinless, that which is either displeasing or acceptable to God. Through the act of 
penance, part of the purification process which involves the physical discomfort of the 
body by wearing significant clothing: by standing on, or wearing ‘sack-cloth’, the 
candidate is marked out. Marked out not only by the invisible sign of the cross on the 
forehead, an internalised attachment of the soul, but later by being robed in fine white 
linen and exhibiting himself before the rest of the church who acknowledge the 
candidate’s new status. The robe becomes the external concretised evidence of their 
new attachment to Christ’s promised legacy for those who are ‘pure’. So through the 
process of renunciation of sins and baptismal washing the candidate is made innocent 
and pure, which is signified by the outer white garment. 
 
Yarnold insists that these awe-inspiring experiences are ‘calculated to sink into the 
depths of the candidate’s psyche and to produce a lasting transformation’ (Yarnold, 
1971:x). Yarnold concludes that ‘people were not content with a promise of such 
salvation, they felt the need of a ‘sacrament’ that would guarantee it’ (Yarnold, 
1971:66). Arguably this visual enactment of being clothed in white at subsequent rites 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Underlying these symbolic acts ‘is the Platonic assumption that the symbol is less real than the thing it 
symbolises, but shares in its reality’, i.e., the symbolic act of washing of hands represents the reality, 
freedom from sins (Yarnold, 1971:96). 
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of passage, like the girl’s First Holy Communion, [Figure 3], and later at her wedding, 
is an allegory of this pivotal baptismal initiation where the symbol of purity and 
acceptability becomes reinforced during a process of sanctification. 
 
Having discussed how white clothes in the ritual of baptism originate, let us now 
consider other areas where being adorned in white appears significant. In the Book of 
Exodus, we read how Aaron receives God’s instructions on Mount Sinai to make a 
sanctuary in which he promises ‘I will dwell’ (Exodus,25v8). The sanctuary6, a womb-
like place, arguably, is the space in which both man and God may dwell together in 
harmony. This seems to be an offer by God of partial re-merging, re-uniting in a 
Paradisiacal realm. The Byzantine church, Sant’ Apollinare Nuovo at Ravenna, built 
under the sponsorship of Emperor Constantine I, may be such a Paradisiacal sanctuary 
in which may be seen the mosaic of The Holy Virgins7, in nuptial attire. The Byzantine 
art historian Otta von Simson claims that these virgin martyrs could well be likened to 
the ten virgins who went out to meet the bridegroom (Matthew,25v1-13) and in the 
words of the Psalmist the heavenly king ‘desires your beauty’ (Psalms,45v11) (von 
Simson, 1948:83). The images of the Holy Virgins adorning the walls of this sanctuary 
may be seen as representing brides of Christ dressed in white and bejewelled in their 
bridal robes ready for the heavenly wedding. 
 
In examining the parable of the wedding-feast (Matthew,22v1-14) it will be noticed that 
‘though many are invited, few are chosen’ is based on their wearing the correct 
‘wedding clothes’ (Matthew,22v14). Saint John’s apocalyptic vision of heaven depicts 
‘His bride has made herself ready, and for her dress she has been given fine linen, clean 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The ‘sanctuary’ or church may also be a metaphor for the human soul. 
7 See The Holy Virgins, after 526AD. Mosaic in the Nave, Sant’Apollinare Nuovo, Ravenna. in. Grabar, 
Andre (1953) Byzantine Painting: Historical and Critical Study, Geneva, Skira, p54. 
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and shining’ (Revelation,19v8). These two images point towards the kingdom of 
Heaven, a promise of what is to come, as long as one presents oneself correctly. Von 
Simson argues that the Roman church ‘conceived the Eucharistic sacrifice under the 
image of that heavenly feast to which only those are admitted who wear a wedding 
garment, who have washed their robes white in the blood of the Lamb’ (von Simson, 
1948:83), and that the sanctuary is the ‘beauteous bride-chamber He has fitted on earth 
for a type of that which is above’ (von Simson, 1948:102). 
 
The art historian A. M. Cetto argues that the Christian mosaics at Ravenna, executed 
between 402 and 675, at the dawn of the Middle Ages, may be said to ‘rival or surpass 
those of Rome’ (Cetto, 1961:3+9). Apostle Peter8, depicts the martyred Apostle robed 
in white, which arguably represents a sign of heavenly purity. Cetto explains: ‘the 
apostles are clothed in white robes—the tunic with dark stripes (clavi)’—refer to the 
biblical verses that this image echoes, in the words of Saint John the Divine: 
Men that are robed in white…have washed their robes and made them white 
in the blood of the Lamb. They stand before the throne of God and minister 
to him day and night in his temple; and he who sits on the throne will dwell 
with them. (Revelation,7v14-15) (Cetto, 1961:12-13)  
 
In other words, being robed in white can symbolise purity and God’s acceptance, thus 
resulting in a reunion and dwelling together in harmony.  
 
Evidence indicates that Popes have continued this symbolism by wearing a full-length 
white cassock. This may be seen in images, for example, Raphael’s painting of Pope 
Julius II in 1511, Titian’s rendition of Pope Paul III c1545, and Velazquez’s picture of 
Pope Innocent X in 1650. More recent images Thomas Lawrence’s painting of Pope 
Pius VII (1742-1823), considered to be the ‘most famous Pope of the nineteenth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See The Apostle Peter in. Cetto, A. M. (1961) The Ravenna Mosaics. Berne: Hallwag, pp12/13. 
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century’ (Lloyd, 1991:184-5), is depicted wearing a red cape over white robes that 
cover him from neckline to ankle. Yousuf Karsh’s world famous photograph of Pope 
John Paul II [Figure 1] captures him wearing all white, cape, cap and cassock (Karsh, 
1983:26). The outer adornment of white (similar to the robe worn in Roman times) 
arguably reflects the reassurance of an inner purity, as in the promise of sins forgiven 
and in the hope of reunion with God and one’s maker.  
 
It could be argued, therefore, that the phenomenon of white imagery, predominantly 
carried through the life-cycle by babies, girls and women during specific religious rites 
of passage, originates in the purification of the body and soul at baptism. On subsequent 
occasions when the subject is dressed in white it may reflect this process of purification, 
encapsulated in an ideal. When the congregation vocalises the Nicene Creed9 during the 
Holy Communion service, they affirm their belief in ‘one Baptism for the remission of 
sins’ (Book of Common Prayer, 1662:260), thus affirming their belief that through the 
act of baptism purity will be bestowed. Let us now explore in biblical, philosophical and 
cultural terms how purity becomes understood in terms of an ideal and significantly 
through virginity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This was the result of the first Ecumenical Council at Nicea in 325AD and expanded at the Second 
Ecumenical Council at Constantinople in 381AD. Geographically Byzantium, or Constantinople, was the 
capital of the Christian state between 330 and 1453 (Grabar, 1953:11).  
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1.3 Ideals: virginity and purity in philosophical, religious and physical terms 
We saw in the previous section how for the ancient Hebrews, and the Church Fathers, 
purity, through the ritual of baptism and wearing white, signalled acceptability to God 
and the group. Before we consider another way of understanding purity, through the 
idea of virginity let us explore how these concepts have been moulded by philosophical 
argument and Christian interpretation. We will also consider how these concepts have 
been influenced by iconography and ecclesiastical authority into a human state that 
desires an ideal, even though that ideal may seem unattainable.  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that the concepts of virginity and purity concerned the Old 
Testament Hebrews as they have become inscribed in law. Among ‘The law of 
holiness’ in the Pentateuch, given to the priestly sons of Aaron, are instructions to 
remain ‘holy to God’ (Leviticus,21v7) so that ‘dishonour’ (Leviticus,21v15) should not 
fall on the family group. Instructions that focus on the woman’s sexual status include: 
‘He shall marry a woman who is still a virgin. He shall not marry a widow, a divorced 
woman, a woman who has lost her virginity, or a prostitute, but only a virgin from his 
father’s kin’ (Leviticus,21v13-14). Arguably, any identity crisis between the Hebrews 
and the Gentiles was resolved by preserving purity amid paganism by maintaining a 
very strict obedience to detailed religious laws. Before considering further how New 
Testament Christians linked virginity and purity, let us consider philosophical 
influences on Christian thinking.  
 
In chronological sequence, Old Testament text already existed prior to Plato’s 
philosophical dialogues, but the New Testament had not come into existence. Diarmaid 
MacCulloch, contemporary historian and Fellow of St Cross College, Oxford, follows 
the ancient Greek tradition of understanding the world by studying the past, suggests 
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that Plato’s philosophy influenced Christianity profoundly. Plato’s view of reality and 
authenticity propelled one basic impulse in Christianity, to look beyond the immediate 
and everyday to the universal or ultimate. Plato offers an impressive allegory, in the 
Republic that contrasts the perceptible world and the world of Forms. It is as if human 
life is imprisoned in a cave and that we perceive our lives as shadows of an ideal 
‘Form’. These shadows represent truer and higher versions of reality than the ones 
which we can readily know. It is as if Plato entreats us not to be content with the 
shadows, but search for ideal ‘Forms’ of [arête] excellence or virtue in the Forms of a 
Supreme Soul or God (MacCulloch, 2009:31). 
 
MacCulloch suggests that another of Plato’s major contributions to Christian discussion 
was his conception that God’s nature encompasses oneness and goodness. This view of 
divinity and virtue seems in direct opposition to the Greek gods behaviour of the 
‘pantheon’. In Hesiod’s (c.735BC) Theogony the Olympian gods are depicted as lacking 
moral responsibility, pity or compassion (MacCulloch, 2009:31). The ancient Greeks 
believed that out of Chaos (the night) are spawned Gaia, the Earth, Ouranos (the sky) 
incestuously mates with his mother and together they have twelve children who he 
forces back into Gaia’s womb. Gaia’s son Kronos castrates his father, Ouranos, before 
committing incest with his sister and attempting to murder all their children. Plato in 
Timaeus paints a different picture where the Supreme Soul of God and the Christian 
Trinity, are envisaged as good, and God was not fickle, jealous or quarrelsome, but was 
distanced from human emotion, while representing the nature of perfection that cannot 
change. The difficulty with Plato’s God is the correlation with the changeable, 
imperfect world in which we live (MacCulloch, 2009:32). 
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Christopher Stead, Ely Professor of Divinity Emeritus in the University of Cambridge, 
claims that Christians have often been influenced by contemporary philosophical 
debate. The Old Testament Hebrews picture God as having a body and mind, though 
transcending humanity in the splendour of his appearance, power and wisdom. But 
Philo of Alexandria (25BC-AD45), a Greek speaking Jew, adds a metaphysical 
dimension, now God becomes depicted without bodily form or human passions; one 
who is unchangeable, unfathomable, ‘He who Is’ (Exodus,3v14), in the present tense. 
Later ‘God’ becomes subject to the doctrine of the Trinity: three coequal Persons united 
in a single Godhead. Even Plato’s Forms, conceived as ideal standards, pure Being and 
pure Goodness, Plato recognises that these Forms contained difficulties, by on 
occasions eliminating the most awkward cases such as sickness or arranging them in 
order of increasing generality (Stead, 1994:120). Let us consider these issues further. 
 
Stead clarifies that ‘Christian theology begins with the New Testament’ and suggests 
that Plato, probably the greatest of the Greek philosophers, without question made a 
worthwhile contribution to Christian theology (Stead, 1994:14). Stead argues that Plato 
did not set out to expound a doctrine, rather Plato’s genius lay in raising profound 
questions, particularly in regard to the difficulty of attaining the whole truth, and a 
dislike of premature solutions. Christians quoted Plato solely, where he appeared to 
confirm established doctrines of the church; the reality of God, his creation and 
providence, the heavenly powers, the human soul, all could be upheld by appropriate 
choice of Platonic texts. Although Plato left a large corpus of writings, Plato preferred 
the exchange of ideas viva voce, in conversation or ‘dialectic’, following his master 
Socrates (Stead, 1994:14-15). 
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Plato’s theory of Forms, in the Phaedo, attributed to Socrates’ belief in the survival and 
immortality of the soul, greatly interests Christians. Socrates, however, seems to 
deprecate the body, with its perceptions and feelings, but rather advocates ‘the survival 
of a fully conscious and active personality’ (Stead, 1994:17). Plato’s distinctive theory 
of Forms or ‘Ideas’, not ‘thoughts’, but eternal objective realities, make up an 
intelligible system or world. Whereas Socrates asks, for example, ‘what is’ piety, 
courage, beauty or justice and how can they be defined, Plato takes the question further 
by wanting you to know ‘what x is, does or its function’. For example, Plato thinks of 
the Form of justice, although applying to a single word, with multiple actions, as being 
always just and perfectly just, i.e. conceiving of an ideal standard (Stead, 1994:18-19). 
 
 
Plato appreciated the dimensions of beauty, but physical beauty is insignificant unless it 
is accompanied by beauty of character. And in Gorgias Plato suggests that moral beauty 
can be understood–that it is preferable to suffer wrong than to do wrong, since the man 
who does wrong injures his most precious possession, his own soul (Stead, 1994:22). In 
Timaeus Plato describes a beauty which our souls enjoyed in the forgotten ages before 
we were born, and to which we may hope to return (Stead, 1994:28). Plato during his 
middle period suggests that ‘the soul became acquainted with the Forms in the previous 
existence which we have forgotten; the discovery of such truths is in fact a recollection 
(amamnêsis), as if we recollect a previous ideal existence (Stead, 1994:23) or ideal self 
or in Christian terms a guardian angel, or in terms of a Form the individual soul (Stead, 
1994:28). Plato’s Symposium indicates a continuity between erotic impulses and 
devotion to eternal beauty (Stead, 1994:145). 
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Plato’s doctrine of the ideal Good, The supreme principle of pure Unity, pure Goodness, 
on which every other reality depends, the world order is fixed and eternal (Stead, 
1994:75).  Stead argues that Aristotle broke away from Plato’s influence, founding the 
Lyceum, criticising Platonic arguments because they prove too much; they entail 
consequences, which are known to be false, and fail because they lead to an infinite 
regress. Hence Aristotle can say ‘The Forms do not exist’, by introducing the subject of 
change (Stead, 1994:33-34). 
 
Returning to Plato: ‘God, being generous, desires that all things should be good’ 
(Timaeus: 29c-30a) (Stead, 1994:69). It seems that Plato draws on the Old Testament: 
‘God saw that all he had made…was good’ (Genesis,1v31). In Plato’s Laws (10.899-
903) we see that God cares for small things as well as great. This can be seen in Jesus’ 
teaching regarding the hairs on my head, and for the sparrows (Matthew,10v29-31, 
Luke,12v6-7). The obverse side of God’s care is the disorder in the world, natural 
catastrophes and the prosperity of the wicked, illustrated in the Book of Job, to which 
Stead confesses that there seems no convincing answers, except that evil becomes 
understood as ‘the absence of good’, or as Stead prefers, evil ‘can be seen as the 
corruption of what is potentially good’ (Stead, 1994:147). Thus adhering to Plato’s 
principle that God represents an ideal Form of Good. 
 
Continuing to explore how God is described, while Christians excepted Jesus teaching 
concerning the apprehension of God as a loving Father, drawn from Plato’s 
Republic:382e, whose attributes include goodness, (Republic 379c), generosity, 
(Timaeus:29c), and creative wisdom (Sophist:265d). There remains, however, the 
problem that the Old Testament depicts a passionate God, one who can be jealous, 
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cruel, and vengeful. This different side of God’s personality can be interpreted in terms 
of allegories conveying good and moral spiritual teaching (Stead, 1994:143). 
 
In the Phaedo Plato contrasts body as destructible and soul as indestructible (Stead, 
1994:21). Stead suggests that Christians accepted Plato’s opposition of body and soul, 
and his insistence that the soul is principally responsible for our intellectual and moral 
life. Christians welcomed Plato’s belief that the soul retains powers of consciousness 
after the death of the body, but Plato did not accept the biblical doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body. Christians, however, did accept Plato’s adumbrations of a 
divine judgment assigning rewards and punishments after death (Stead, 1994:29). 
 
Plato, in the Republic, Phaedrus, and Timaeus understands the mind or soul as being 
composed of three aspects: appetitive, emotional, and rational. In the Phaedrus myth 
Plato represents these three aspects of the human soul as a chariot driven by a charioteer 
(its reason), and drawn by two horses, one of which (representing ‘desire’) is ill 
tempered and hard to control. Therefore human desires for excessive food, drink and 
sexual satisfaction could be regarded as the enemies of reason and virtue par excellence, 
whereas anger and aggression, symbolised by the relatively tractable horse, were not so 
condemned. Stead suggests that ‘this Platonic division of the soul led by a somewhat 
indirect route to the later Christian division of the human personality into flesh, with his 
‘carnal’ desires, soul (i.e. unreformed soul) and the (God-given) mind or spirit. This 
prompted many Christians to regard the flesh not as a God given instrument for the soul 
but as intrinsically a source of temptation (Stead, 1994:22). 
 
 
Jonathan Barnes, Fellow of Balliol College Oxford, suggests that ‘the basis of Plato’s 
tripartition is logically dubious, and it is not clear if the tripartition is meant to be 
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exhaustive or even inclusive’, as in the Republic Plato assigns appetites to the rational 
part. Barnes argues that Plato’s principle interest concerning the mind or soul centres on 
its role as a source of human behaviour and moral action, he clarifies that the ‘rational 
part’ being morally superior ought to govern our actions. Plato’s tripartition has been 
compared to Freud’s distinction between the id, ego and super-ego (In. Gregory, 
1987:628-9). It can also be argued that Freud follows Plato’s insistence, drawn at 
Socrates trial, that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ (MacCulloch, 2009:30). 
 
 
Plato has therefore been valued by both pagan and Christian alike as a moral and 
religious teacher (Stead, 1994:22). Neither Plato (427?-8-347?-8BC) nor Aristotle (384-
322BC) heard the name of Jesus Christ (MacCulloch, 2009:33-34). Aristotle, unlike 
Plato, pursued all branches of knowledge attempting to describe every facet. Rather 
than Plato’s ideal tree, Aristotle classified different sorts of tree. However, the Christian 
church was suspicious of Aristotle’s physical world, preferring the otherworldliness of 
Plato’s thought (MacCulloch, 2009:33-34). Stead suggests that although much of 
Plato’s dialogues were widely accepted, the rejection of marriage in the Republic, with 
its proposal that children should be communally brought up, homosexual love tolerated, 
and the rigid division of society based on intellectual ability, was rejected (Stead, 
1994:28). Although Plato does not discuss bodily virginity, arguably Plato refers to the 
ideal Form of Beauty where virginity would be considered the higher ideal. 
 
Resonating from Plato, for psychoanalytic theory and practice we can see in Plato’s 
‘dialogues’, Freud’s ‘free associations’. Plato’s charioteer may be likened to the 
Freudian ego, Plato’s wayward horse likened to the almost uncontrollable id instincts of 
human appetites, while the tractable horse offers restraint like the superego. Plato’s 
shadows projected onto the homely or prison-like cave walls can be understood as 
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contrasting the shadows of phantasy and dreams with the search for truth and reality. 
While Plato’s ideal Forms can offer understanding to the psychological formation of the 
ego ideal, feeling or being beautiful. Knowing instantly when one has found the ideal 
object or one’s ideal other-half resonates from Plato’s Symposium, where Plato 
describes the hermaphrodite, having been split in two, subsequently passionately 
searches for their other half. We may also see Freud’s theory of bisexuality here. Plato’s 
philosophy may not get into the detailed analysis of Aristotle, but Plato may be 
understood as laying down some broad fundamental principles. We can see in Plato’s 
ideal Forms resonance for Christian thought, God’s goodness and unity despite living in 
a chaotic and incestuous world. Plato’s God can be seen as the ‘ideal Good Father’ who 
links us with past generations and endows the ‘ideal virgin bride’ with his Blessing. 
 
Let us now consider how New Testament Christians interpreted virginity and purity. 
Saint Paul couches his entreaty for women’s purity in terms of being an uncorrupt 
‘chaste virgin’ as if betrothed to Christ (2Corinthians,11v2). Paul’s insistence embraces 
the duality of body and spirit—‘the unmarried or celibate woman cares for the Lord’s 
business; her aim is to be dedicated to him in body as in spirit’ (1Corinthians,7v34). 
The iconographic figure of the New Testament who encapsulates the ‘chaste virgin’ in a 
corporeal representation has been the Blessed Virgin Mary. Before we explore Christian 
iconography, let us examine the figure of the Virgin Mary. 
 
From the outset, as recorded in the gospels of Luke and Matthew, a great deal of effort 
was made concerning, the virginity of Mary, the Immaculate Conception and 
miraculous birth of Jesus10 arguably Platonic ideal Forms. By the fourth century the 
doctrine of perpetual virginity was well attested by the Church Fathers, Augustine of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ‘The Theme of Mary’s Virginity’, in. Mary in the New Testament, Ed. By Raymond Edward Brown 
(1978), pp267-77. 
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Hippo11 and during the seventh century by the Lateran ecumenical Council12. The Greek 
term ‘Ever Virgin’, concerns perpetual virginity, including Mary’s own Immaculate 
Conception13. The Immaculate Conception of Jesus, and Mary’s continuing virginity, 
can be traced to liturgy used by the fourth century Eastern Orthodox Church, including 
the Catechism of the Catholic Church14.  
 
It is interesting that the Islamic Qur’an declares that Jesus was the result of a virgin 
conception and virgin birth, and that in Islam Jesus and Mary are the only two children 
not touched by Satan at the moment of their birth, because God placed a veil between 
them and Satan15. 
 
Keith Ward, Regis Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford, challenges the 
virgin birth and Mary’s perfection. Ward suggests that although Christian theologians 
consider that Christianity is rooted in historical facts, this history has been ‘embroidered 
and symbolically magnified’ (Ward, 1991:14). Ward argues that while there are some 
historical realities, we can no longer be sure of what they are, because the virgin birth 
exemplifies a mixture of fact ‘filled with symbolic and literary content, as angels, 
moving stars, wise men and shepherds, miraculous portents, dreams and wicked kings 
all play their part’ in the legends of strange births which also exist in many other 
religions (Ward, 1991:14). 
 
During the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation while Martin Luther endorsed 
Mary’s perpetual virginity, John Calvin neither accepted nor rejected it, considering the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopaedia By John C. Cavadini (1999), ISBN 080283843X, 
p544. 
12 The Blackwell Companion to Catholicism, by James Buckley, Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, and 
Trent Pomplum (2010), ISBN 1444337327, p315. 
13 Macula, in Latin means: ‘without any stain of original sin’. 
14 Catechism of the Catholic Church by the Vatican, 2002, ISBN 0860123243, p112. 
15 The Holy Qur’an: Maryam (Mary), Sura 19 (Translation by A. Yusuf Ali. 
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idea as ‘impious speculation’ based on Scripture stating that Jesus was Mary’s ‘first-
born’, born of a virgin, but mentioning brothers of Jesus, thus implying that Mary had 
other children16. Some Anglican reformers supported perpetual virginity as it was an 
earlier doctrine, but John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, was emphatic ‘…born of 
the blessed Virgin Mary, who, as well after as before she brought Him forth, continued 
a pure and unspotted virgin’17. Contemporary Protestants learn of the virgin birth of 
Jesus, without the emphasis being on Mary remaining a virgin for the rest of her life18. 
Let us now examine the scriptural Mary. 
 
The Virgin Mary appears to speak little except at the Annunciation19. The English 
scholar, Catherine Driscoll, argues that the Annunciation brings into focus the passion 
of virginity, and raises the issue of ‘action and will’ (Driscoll, 2002:143). Driscoll 
understands Mary as simultaneously facilitating the Annunciation and a feminine sexual 
discourse (Driscoll, 2002:143). Mary’s reply to the angel Gabriel as reported: ‘How will 
this be, since I am a virgin?’, ‘Behold the handmaid of the Lord, be it done to me 
according to thy word’ (Authorised Version, Luke 1v38) (Driscoll, 2002:143). This 
seems to pose the question of Mary having a choice either to accept or reject divine 
intervention, yet it is believed that Mary was pre-destined to accept.  
 
Let us now leave Christian Biblical entreaties and consider how virginity and purity 
were interpreted in iconography20. From an art historian’s perspective, André Grabar 
suggests that the feminine aspect of God becomes epitomised in the Christian images of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ‘Harmony of Matthew, Mark & Luke’, in Calvin’s Commentaries, tr. William Pringle, Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, (1949). 
17 The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, Volume 15, by John Wesley, Joseph Benson, Published by Thomas 
Cordeux, London (1812), page 110. 
18 What Every Catholic Should Know about Mary, by Terrence J. McNally (2009), ISBN 1441510516, 
page 170. 
19 In Mary’s response to Gabriel: Mary said ‘How can this be?’, ‘I am still a virgin.’ (Luke,1v34). And 
later, Mary said ‘Here am I,’, ‘I am the Lord’s servant; as you have spoken, so be it.’ (Luke,1v38). 
20 Iconography, a two-dimensional image, as opposed to a three-dimensional ‘graven image’ which was 
prohibited (Leviticus,26v1). 
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Christ’s mother21, who is depicted as a ‘shy youthful Virgin’ (Grabar, 1953:77). Grabar 
explains that the significance of Byzantine art owes its eminence to Emperor 
Constantine I, who, as already mentioned, in the fourth century converted to 
Christianity and became a patron to iconographical interpretation of Gospel themes. 
Grabar suggests that religious imagery was conceived as ‘microcosms, small-scale 
reproductions of the Cosmos—the Ideal Universe’ (Grabar, 1953:26). Worthy of note, 
is the Virgin Mary, wrapped in a blue22 mantle, apparently silent, protectively offering 
the Christ child for adoration by the Magi. 
 
The Blessed Virgin Mary’s facial expression has been the subject of much speculation. 
Driscoll argues that the tableaux representing the Annunciation23 is ‘dominated by both 
knowledge and reticence’ as the Virgin is depicted as one ‘who looks or draws away’ 
(Driscoll, 2002:143). The British psychoanalyst and art critic Tessa Adams suggests 
that a striking feature of Bellini’s Madonnas are ‘the Virgin’s gaze is paradoxically 
distracted in a melancholic distant glance’, juxtaposing the ‘absent gaze’ with ‘tactile 
intimacy’ (Adams, 2003:63). The British film analyst and cultural critic Richard Dyer 
claims that Mary’s face is evidence enough to indicate her purity and wholeness, while 
classically Mary’s face is virtually never shown partially, nor ‘in profile, in shadow or 
cut across by objects’, or ‘blemished by wrinkles or even streaked with tears’ (Dyer, 
1997:77).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 God gives instructions in the Book of Exodus for the colours used in the sanctuary in which He will 
dwell, to include gold, silver, copper, violet, purple and scarlet (Exodus,25:4). 
22 Blue, the colour worn by the Virgin, the Queen of Heaven. Florentine artists would have appreciated 
that the robe is painted with lapis lazuli, one of the most expensive pigments available. In other words, 
only the best is good enough for the Virgin Mary. (see Pesellino, Francesco (Francesco di Stefano) The 
Annunciation Diptych), 
(http://www.artandarchitecture.org.uk/stories/cumming_pesellino/cumming_pesellino0… 20/03/05). 
23 The day of Annunciation, ‘the holiday, which celebrates Mary’s learning from the angel Gabriel that 
she will give birth to the Messiah, always falls on March 25, precisely nine months before Christmas. 
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The Virgin appears to be shown as divinely immaculate, apparently forbidden to be a 
speaking social being but one who bears sorrows and sheds tears in silence. Arguably, 
the exemplary image of the Virgin Mary, following her encounter with the angel 
Gabriel (Luke,1v26-38), presents a serious knowing look, the container of a secret, the 
pregnant virgin, an ambivalent relation encompassing pollution and sanctity. 
Alternatively, Mary seems to reflect the quiet joy of the Magnificat (Luke,1v46-55) in 
which she uses personal pronouns such as ‘humble’ and ‘blesséd’, implying 
compliance. Or further, does Mary have premonitions of foreboding for her only Son? 
In considering facial expressions, the American psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel suggests 
that the ‘facial expression signifies an involuntary equivalent of affects which, by means 
of empathy, inform spectators of the nature of the subject’s feelings’ which, arguably, 
may be learnt as pre-verbal communications of inexpressible emotion (Fenichel, 
1945:319). 
 
In examining Figure 2, from the perspective of the Virgin Mary’s function, we can 
understand this in terms of her being an intermediary, one who bridges the void between 
Christ and the ‘other’, and one who intercedes. Driscoll suggests that the Virgin Mary 
‘symbolises relations between man and God, self and other, which is why she can be 
mother, bride, queen, and daughter of Christ all at once’ (Driscoll, 2002:144). It may be 
argued therefore that the iconographic image of the Virgin Mary has not only the 
potential to bridge the split, a gap between God and man, but also between earth and 
heaven that came about during the ‘Fall from Grace’. 
 
In Christian understanding, the New Testament Virgin Mary symbolises the Old 
Testament Eve. The Old Testament imagery of the Garden of Eden may once have been 
paradise but was also a place where expulsion was enacted. The Italian Renaissance art 
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critic John Hale claims that ‘if Eve is shown being expelled from the Garden of Eden 
while the angel of the Annunciation appears to Mary, it seems to illustrate that Mary’s 
grace redeems whom Eve’s sin had damned’ (Hale, 1977:18). It may also be argued that 
the Garden of Eden represents the location where the ‘Tree of Knowledge’ and the 
‘River of Life’ may be found, thus juxtaposing images of rejection from God with hope 
of reconciliation with God, which the Virgin Mary as intermediary offers.  
 
The New Testament Virgin Mary may not have spoken more than in compliance (Luke 
1v38) but through her body she becomes a vehicle for divine communication. Arguably, 
the significance of the Virgin is one of being submissive, an empty vessel, a container 
that is of no value to herself, except in relation to the other. Dyer suggests that Mary 
does nothing and indeed has no carnal knowledge, her purity (of which virginity is only 
one aspect) is given of her nature, not something achieved, but Mary ‘is filled with God’ 
(Dyer, 1997:16-17). The contemporary philosopher Kelly Oliver argues that the Virgin 
represents a woman whose entire body is an ‘emptiness through which the paternal 
word is conveyed’ (Oliver, 1997:172).  
 
The cultural historian Marina Warner suggests that ‘virginity was important to the 
Church Fathers not only because it signified absence of knowledge of sex but because it 
meant that the body was pristine and whole, as God had made it. Warner suggests that 
metaphors for a virgin’s body include, ‘seamless, unbroken, a literal epiphany of 
integrity’, and the Virgin Mary as a ‘closed gate’, a ‘spring shut up’, ‘a fountain sealed’ 
(Warner, 1976:73-74).  
 
The medievalist Kathleen Kelly suggests that the Church Fathers, such as Chrysostom, 
Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine propounded the necessity of both bodily and spiritual 
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integrity. Kelly, drawing on John Chrysostom’s statements in De Virginitate (c.380-
90AD), argues that they embrace both the political and theological spheres which bring 
about ecclesiastical regulation of virginity, purity, and the woman’s state of being 
unsullied, in order for her to reap rewards in heaven. Arguably, this implies that delayed 
gratification will be rewarded. 
 
Chrysostom warns that: 
 
Even if [a virgin’s] body should remain inviolate the better part of soul has 
been ruined: her thoughts”. “It is not enough to be unmarried to be a virgin. 
There must be spiritual chastity, the absence of wicked and shameful desire, 
the absence of ornaments, and unsoiled by life’s cares. (Kelly, 2000:3-4) 
 
Kelly suggests that Chrysostom’s formative document in an emerging policy, makes the 
Christian church the only institution with the power to define and reward virginity 
(Kelly, 2000:4). Kelly suggests that Chrysostom’s authority was only one voice in the 
struggle to consolidate the definitions of these concepts24. Key to the issue of virginity, 
in Kelly’s terms, ‘the conflict is not over the nature of virginity (which has no existence 
as a pre-cultural condition), but over the issue of who gets to speak it’, and adds ‘the 
early church aimed to create a monopoly on virginity’ that is, bodily and spiritual 
integrity (Kelly, 2000:3). It can be argued, therefore, that the Virgin Mary embodies a 
feminine ideal integrated in Christian teaching.  
 
The image of the Virgin Mary, although predominantly an icon venerated by Roman 
Catholics, nevertheless becomes significant for other Christian denominations. The 
cultural historian, Geoffrey Ashe, claims that Catholic Christianity has endowed the 
Virgin Mary25 with many epithets over the centuries, such as ‘Queen of Heaven; Our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Chrysostom considered that ‘the Jews disdained the beauty of virginity, the Greeks admired it in 
amazement, but only the church of God praises it’, thus contrasting Christian culture with its antecedents 
(Kelly, 2000:146). 
25 The Council of Ephesus in 431AD affirmed the Virgin Mary to be the Theotokos, or Mother of God. 
Warner asserts that ‘the Roman Catholic dogma of the Bodily Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary 
into Heaven was promulgated by the Pope in 1950. This dogma made official a popular tradition, which 
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Lady of Lourdes, Walsingham, Guadalupe, Czetochowa; Flower of Carmel; House of 
God; Ark of the Covenant’ (Ashe, 1976:1)26.  
 
The social historian, Kenneth Clark, claims that from the twelfth-century the cult of the 
Virgin had a civilising influence in Western Europe. From the time that Charlemagne’s 
grandson, Charles the Bald presented the actual tunic worn by the Virgin Mary to 
Chartres cathedral around 876AD, the vestment appears to have been associated with 
miracles. Following a fire which destroyed the cathedral in 1194 when this relic was 
found to have survived, it appealed to popular imagination. Clark also suggests that the 
Virgin Mary’s ‘womanly virtues of gentleness and compassion’ were juxtaposed in the 
crusading warrior’s own ‘masculine, courageous, physical’ psyche (Clark, 1969:58).  
 
Kelly claims that the Middle Ages were dominated by a period of faith. Roman Catholic 
monasteries were considered to be storehouses of learning until the rise of the 
universities in the thirteenth-century, and the image of the Virgin Mary seems to have 
been endowed with supernatural powers being used as a talisman. Kelly cites from Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight (c.1400) that ‘Gawain comes under the special grace and 
protection of the Virgin, whose image he has had painted on the inside of his shield 
(lines 647-49) (Kelly, 2000:115).  
 
The theologian, Frank Bottomley, argues that whereas the medieval cult of the Virgin 
Mary projects her as an intermediary [Figure 2], there was a shift during the 
Renaissance to the ‘concept of woman as a thing to be possessed’ and consequently, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dates from the third or fourth century and was elaborated in Medieval times’, Warner, Marina (1976) 
Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and Cult of the Virgin Mary, Weidenfeld+Nicolson: London. 
26 Other epithets include: ‘Madonna, patroness of countless Churches, spiritual mother of all the faithful, 
co-redeemer with her Son, entwined in an article of faith’ (Ashe, 1976:1), ‘Mother of Christ’, ‘Mother of 
God’, ‘the Great Mother’, ‘Queen’, ‘and Virgin Mother’ (Kristeva, 1987:239-50).  	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Virgin’s image becomes portrayed ‘with the inertia and passive qualities of an object’ 
(Bottomley, 1979:154).  
 
The contemporary German historian of Medieval literature, Anke Bernau, suggests that 
Martin Luther (1483-1546) and John Calvin (1509-64), amongst other German and 
Swiss reformers, recognised that practically the ‘vow of celibacy’ was not working and 
therefore made a ‘mockery both of virginity and marriage’ (Bernau, 2007:46, original 
emphasis), as sexual urges were satisfied outside of marriage. Bernau suggests that 
Luther in The Estate of Marriage (1522) advocates that ‘marriage is the universal 
condition that men and women have to conform to and if resisted fornication, adultery 
and secret sins’ result (Bernau, 2007:46). 
 
Bernau emphasises that whereas for the pre-Reformation Catholics ‘virginity itself, was 
elevated to the highest state’, for the post-Reformation Protestants there was a clear 
shift away from the manner in which the Virgin Mary was worshipped. Christ’s purity 
replaced the emphasis that had been on the Immaculate Conception and the Virgin Birth 
(Bernau, 2007:46). Thus the Middle Ages’ cult of the Virgin Mary with her virginal 
innocence made way for the emphasis on Christ’s redemption and Luther’s principle of 
‘salvation by faith, not works’ (Churchill, 1956:4). In other words the emphasis on 
celibacy, virginity and chastity gave way to marriage as a natural God-willed state, but 
Bernau argues that despite a change of emphasis ‘virginity per se did not loose it 
exalted status’ (Bernau, 2007:49). 
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By 1532, during the English Reformation, arguably there was a matrimonial crisis, 
involving both King Henry VIII27 and Thomas Cranmer. The politician28 and historian, 
Winston Churchill, tells us that Henry, eighteen, had married Catherine of Aragon, 
twenty-three, in 1509 ‘under a dispensation from the Pope due to degrees of affinity29 
prohibited by the Church’30 (Churchill, 1956:26). By 1532 Catherine had experienced 
five stillbirths before Mary was born. Because Catherine had only produced a daughter, 
Henry’s affections turned towards Anne Boleyn, who in the eyes of the Pope was 
considered ‘a concubine’, consequently Henry was threatened with ‘excommunication’ 
(Churchill, 1956:46). 
 
Churchill tells us that, when Archbishop Warham the principle opponent of Henry’s 
divorce died, Henry recalled Cranmer from Germany. ‘Cranmer had been married 
twice, in the new German fashion for priests’, but as ‘marriage of priests was still illegal 
in England…Cranmer’s wife was always hidden…and is said to have travelled with the 
luggage’ (Churchill, 1956:48). As the new Archbishop of Canterbury, Cranmer did not 
stand in the way of Henry marrying Anne Boleyn, but in the eyes of the Pope, Henry 
had committed bigamy as his marriage to Catherine had not yet been publically 
annulled. 
 
Churchill continues: in 1533, by Henry describing himself as “King and Sovereign 
recognising no superior in earth but only God, and not subject to the laws of any earthly 
creature”, the breach between England and Rome was complete (Churchill, 1956:49) 
and so Henry became the supreme head of the Catholic Church of England. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 King Henry VIII’s six wives: Catherine of Aragon, married 1509-1533, divorced; Anne Boleyn, 
married 1533-1536, executed; Jane Seymour, married 1536-1537, died; Anne of Cleaves, married 1540, 
divorced; Kathryn Howard, married 1540-1542, executed; Katherine Parr, married 1543-1547, widowed. 
28 British Prime Minister (1940-5, 1951-5). 
29  The ‘Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Relationship Act’ (1931) finally allowed marriage with nieces and 
nephews. 
30 Catherine of Aragon, Spanish and Catholic, married Arthur, Henry’s brother, on 14 Nov 1501. Arthur 
died six moths later. 
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position, Henry reinforced with brutality and many hundreds were hanged, 
disembowelled, and quartered if they did not swear their allegiance to the King 
(Churchill, 1956:51). In the same year Elizabeth was born to Anne Boleyn, but Henry’s 
second daughter frustrated him, as he desired a son and heir. In 1536, accused of 
adultery, Anne was beheaded (Churchill, 1956:55). In other words the Anglican Church 
of England was born out of King Henry’s desire for a son and heir and reinforced with 
cruelty by ‘a tyrant and heretic’ (Churchill, 1956:51). 
 
Having considered how the image of the Virgin Mary had impacted on the pre-English 
Reformation, let us now examine how post-English Reformation ideals were formed. 
Driscoll suggests that the Virgin has been and continues to be a ‘crucial component in 
Western philosophy, theology and iconography’, where the Enlightenment image of the 
Virgin is ‘both sexualised and distanced from sex’, but continues to be relevant to 
‘feminine adolescence in Modernity’ (Driscoll, 2002:142). Driscoll argues that ‘the 
Blessed Virgin should not be confused with any repression of feminine sexuality’, 
claiming that ‘the Blessed Virgin is an icon and an ideal that has been utilized to 
contextualize and evaluate images of and ideas about girls’, including the ‘daughter-
virgin-bride nexus’ (Driscoll, 2002:142). Thus the Virgin Mary may be seen to signify 
purity in a way that is unattainable to human kind, and as Driscoll suggests, ‘if virginity 
works as a statement of self-denial this, is not opposed to its image of integrity but part 
of its attraction’ (Driscoll, 2002:142). 
 
Dyer argues in a similar vein that ‘Mary…provides a model of behaviour to which 
humans may aspire’. These attributes include ‘passivity, expectancy, receptivity, [and] a 
kind of sacred readiness’ and are the ‘constituents of purity and a state of grace (but 
where these are absent, the memory of the other, pre-Christian female archetype, Eve)’ 
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exists (Dyer, 1997:17). Dyer claims that ‘Mary…is an ambiguous model, both 
exemplary and exceptional…one to aspire to’, yet ‘what one can never be’, setting up a 
dynamic of aspiration, in the face of impossibility (Dyer, 1997:17). ‘Such striving 
(which in women must also be passive) is registered in suffering, self-denial, and self-
control’ (Dyer, 1997:17). Let us now turn from considering a biblical, Christian and 
historical analysis of the Virgin Mary, to consider some unconscious processes that this 
iconographic image may evoke. 
 
As already discussed, the image of the Virgin Mary can seem to be both exemplary and 
exceptional yet out of reach, thus setting up a tension, which may also be understood as 
signifying an unconscious communication that resonates with an idea, image or desire, 
which has been repressed. The French psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva, proposes that the 
Virgin Mary encapsulates the phantasy of ‘consecrated motherhood’, and ‘the phantasy 
of a lost territory’, that is the ‘relationship that binds us to her…an idealisation of 
primary narcissism’ (Kristeva, 1987:234). Arguably this ‘lost territory’, which the 
infant once occupied, the pure, unblemished, idealised maternal realm, that has been 
repressed, may re-emerge in a phantasised form as being attainable. The image of the 
Virgin Mary may be idealised by the woman but does the image of the Virgin Mary 
reinforce the woman’s place in the patriarchal system of exchange? 
 
Kristeva argues that within the phantasy of the lost territory of motherhood, nurtured by 
the adult, the phantasy is less ‘the idealised archaic mother’, but rather ‘the idealisation 
of the relationship that binds us to her—an idealisation of primary narcissism’ 
(Kristeva, 1987:234). In other words, the image of the traditional representations of 
motherhood that the Virgin Mary and child conjures may be rejected or embraced. 
Kristeva suggests that ‘the humanity of the Virgin mother is not always obvious…in her 
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being cleared of sin, which is elevated by her most intense revelation with God’ 
(Kristeva, 1987:235). As an infant girl, the idealised mother may appear to be beyond 
humanity, sinless and sacred. Kristeva in echoing Chrysostom, suggests that the Virgin 
has the transitional function of ‘bond’, ‘medium’, or ‘interval’, which might be 
presumptuous and tantamount to ‘heretical identifications with the Holy Ghost’ 
(Kristeva, 1987:236).  
 
Drawing on Kristeva, the iconographic image of the Virgin Mary represents on the one 
hand an inaccessible goal31, while on the other symbolises the return of symbiosis—a 
merging with the mother’s body: where the psychological relationship is as if both are 
part of each other and are one. This feminine ideal may facilitate access, without 
becoming a nun or martyr, to the promised ‘jouissance’, a sensual, sexual pleasure of 
total joy, (Kristeva, 1977:16) or a symbiotic union of ecstatic communication. Kristeva 
contrasts the feminine ideal with:  
The woman who proves not to be a virgin with an unruly clientele. Rather 
than avoid the sexual act, they assume it but only as an impossible 
relationship, whose participants are condemned to a perpetual banishment 
that confines them with auto-eroticism, an insane, incestuous plunge. 
(Kristeva, 1977:151) 
 
Arguably the ideals which the Virgin Mary epitomises may be considered to be out of 
human reach, but equally energetically striven for, but in a modified form. The image of 
the Virgin Mary communicates on several unconscious levels, through paradox, 
metaphor and desire, but is never rejecting. A question that arises from the above 
discussion: is femininity to be disciplined and subdued to God’s command, or does 
Christian theology reflect woman’s psychological nature, a matter of passive acceptance 
as represented in the portrayed images of the Virgin Mary?  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Bernini’s sculpture, Ecstasy of St Teresa. 
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Having considered the impact of the Virgin Mary during Christian pre-Reformation 
times and its continuance post-Reformation, let us now consider how this has had 
practical implications. 
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1.4 Between life and death: white, virginity and purity in practice 
Having explored some biblical imagery relating to virginity and purity let us now 
investigate how for Christian and non-Christian alike the woman’s state of virginity 
appears to have been and seems to continue to be paramount. 
 
The philosopher in comparative religion and symbolism Jean Cooper suggests that: 
A white robe indicates purity, chastity or the triumph of the spirit over the flesh; it is 
worn in mourning in the Orient, in ancient Greece and Rome. White is associated with 
both life and love, death and burial. In marriage it symbolises death to the old life and 
birth into the new beyond. A woman robed in white also carries the love-life-death 
connotations, as with the Delphic Aphrodite of the Tombs, the Scandinavian Freyja or 
Frigg and the Teutonic Hel/Freya, ‘the Beloved’, goddess of death. White with black 
and red depicts the three stages of initiation. White with red is death. In alchemical 
terms, the femina alba, the White Lily, is woman, the feminine principle, the purity of 
undivided light and the second stage of the Great Work. In Christian terms white 
symbolises the purified soul; joy; purity; virginity; innocence; the holy life; light; 
integrity, as white is worn at all sacraments; baptism, confirmation, first communion 
[Figure 3], marriage, and, [as already mentioned] death. (Cooper, 1978:42, original 
emphasis) 
 
In other words, we may understand that white apparel, used on significant occasions 
throughout the life-cycle, may symbolise being ‘morally or spiritually pure, stainless, 
spotless’ and be ‘highly prized and precious’ (OED, 1989:262). White apparel may be 
contrasted with other ‘traditional’ colours such as red32 that many non-Christian brides 
throughout the world adorn. Cooper suggests that the colour red for the Hindu 
symbolises ‘activity, creativity and energy of life’ (Cooper, 1978:41). 
 
Let us consider how virginity and purity have concerned both the ancient and 
contemporary culture, spiritual and secular groups alike, by examining how these 
concepts have been addressed within a socio-historical context. In Leo Sherley-Price’s 
translation from the Latin, The Venerable Bede (673-735AD) extols the virtue of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Pictorial evidence illustrates that ‘traditional’ bridal wear is dominated by the colour red in large areas 
of the world such as in India, China, and Japan. 
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Abbess Ethelburga33’s ‘strict self-discipline’ that led to the epithet of ‘the glory of the 
perpetual virginity beloved by God’ (Bede, 1955:157). Bede asserts that the extent of 
Ethelburga holiness became apparent when her bones were being transferred to another 
church: ‘they found the body untouched by decay as if it had been immune from 
corruption of sinful desires’ (Bede, 1955:157). Arguably, Ethelburga’s holiness 
connects sexual self-restraint with spiritual purity. Bede records that before King Oswy 
defeated Penda in Mercia ‘he vowed, that if he were victorious, he would offer his 
daughter to God as a consecrated virgin and give twelve estates to build monasteries’ 
and dedicate his daughter Aelffled, ‘who was scarcely a year old’, to God’s service ‘in 
perpetual virginity’ (Bede, 1955:183-4). Arguably, King Oswy may have been 
influenced by the example of Ethelburga and the Virgin Mary. 
 
By 705AD, Bede tells us that Abbot Aldhelm wrote in De virginitate34, a ‘treatise 
against…things contrary to the orthodoxy and unity of the Church’ (Bede, 1955:298-
99). The medieval English scholar, who brings to life the virtually absent English 
Anglo-Saxon woman, Clare Lees argues that De virginitate is an ‘explicitly Christian 
work from the ‘golden age’ of Anglo-Saxon women’ (Lees, 2001:114). Lees asserts that 
the crucial question concerning the state of virginity can be seen in the contrast between 
the Barking nuns and rich aristocratic women’s relation to church authority. Crucially, 
in response to an audience of ‘divorced’ women’, who now ‘prefer the religious life’, 
Aldhelm attempts to find a flexible and inclusive category to encompass ‘those who 
have been formerly married’ (Lees, 2001:115). Lees points out however, that Aldhelm, 
in discussing nuns, asserts: ‘by giving currency to the view that women embody the 
temptations of the flesh, he effectively adds weight to orthodox pressures for the 
establishment of monastic separation’ (Lees, 2001:113). In other words Aldhelm argues 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Abbess Ethelburga of Barking, circa 647AD, may have been of royal decent and was associated with 
may miracles. 
34 On Virginity. 
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for the status quo, that physical virginity and spiritual purity are inseparable. Lees also 
notes that whereas Abbot Ælfric, in Lives of Saints (c998) focuses on ‘sanctity’, 
Aldhelm focuses on ‘virginity’ (Lees, 2001:127). Arguably, the inner spiritual saintly 
body and outer physical purity of Anglo-Saxon women are being equally emphasised 
within Christian ideology. 
 
Kelly draws attention to one example of virginity being physically verified, that at the 
fifteenth-century trial of Jeanne d’Arc35. Jeanne, who having been brought before King 
Charles VII of France36 and the Catholic church, underwent extensive physical 
examination. It was reported that ‘The said Maid was seen, visited and privately looked 
at and examined in the secret parts of her body…found no corruption nor mark of 
violence’, later Jeanne was declared ‘virgo intacta’ (Kelly, 2000:17, original emphasis). 
It was important to verify that the brave nineteen-year-old Jeanne was a virgin as this 
prevented her from being accused of witchcraft and provided the basis for sainthood. 
 
We might ask, why was virginity so highly regarded during the first millennia? The 
forgoing exploration concerning the importance of virginity arguably reveals that the 
Virgin Mary’s virginity elevated her above normal human experience, and this attribute 
may also be seen in Jeanne d’Arc’s case. On a practical note the social historian 
Lawrence Stone offers some non-elevated human practical reasons for the practice of 
virginity. Stone argues that as for the church in pre-Reformation England, ‘the ideal of 
virginity…provided the theological and moral justification for nunneries’ and these 
were populated by ‘upper-middle class girls’ whose fathers ‘avoid[ed] costly marriages’ 
(Stone, 1977:38). Stone claims that the church’s attitude was based on, for example, the 
teachings of Saint Jerome who considered ‘all sex was unclean’ (Stone, 1977:313). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Jeanne d’Arc, or ‘The Maid of Orléans’, 1412-1430, became a French and Roman Catholic saint. 
36 King Charles VII of France, 1403-1461. 
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Stone argues that during the Reformation attitudes towards sexuality were ‘tempered by 
the rejection of the ideal of virginity’ which gave way to ‘the substitution of holy 
matrimony’ (Stone, 1977:313), as already mentioned. Before considering more closely a 
Christian and biblical perspective of a driving force for purity let us consider a secular 
view of how purity has been enacted. 
 
Stone, in examining the marriage process in post-Reformation England between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries asserts that: 
Pre-marital female chastity in the marriage market of a hierarchal and 
propertied society was important [to] small property owners as virginity was 
linked to obviating legal doubts about legitimacy of heirs to property and 
title. In genteel circles, secular honour depended on the reliability of a 
man’s spoken word and a woman’s reputation for chastity. The 
consequences of accusing a man of being a liar could result in a duel, and 
accusing a woman of being unchaste, might result in a lawsuit for slander in 
an ecclesiastical court. (Stone, 1977:316) 	  
In other words, Stone suggests that ‘women have for millennia been regarded as the 
sexual property of men and the woman’s value diminished if it had been used by anyone 
other than the legal owner’ (Stone, 1977:316). Thus, ‘pre-marital chastity became a 
bargaining chip in the marriage game,’ counterbalancing ‘male property and status 
rights’ (Stone, 1977:401), whereas for the ‘landless rural labourer…virginity was not 
important’ (Stone, 1977:402).  
 
Juxtaposing Stone’s view, the sociologist Stephanie Coontz suggests that the 
significance of the ideals of purity and virginity are that they may have been ‘more 
common among the lower and middle-classes, anxious to improve their status, than 
among the elites’ (Coontz, 1986:145). Coontz adds that ‘in European history, insistence 
on female virginity and chastity was closely connected to a rising middle-class which 
also stressed conjugal love and co-operation’ (Coontz, 1986:145). Arguably, the ideals 
of virginity and chastity aimed at obviating public shame and potential humiliation for 
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both genteel and urban folk but were also connected with inheritance, property rights 
and status. Let us now consider other contexts where the wearing of white 
predominates. 
 
Mark Allen’s front cover illustration of First Holy Communion (2005) depicts Roman 
Catholic girls dressed like young brides [Figure 3]. Cardinal John Wright clarifies that 
at the first Eucharist there is the first Penance. Pope Pius X, in defining the ‘age of 
discretion’, in 1910, asserts that ‘to receive first Holy Communion requires a nearly 
complete knowledge of the Articles of Faith, therefore, extraordinary preparation is 
required. In effect, this means deferring First Communion for the riper age of twelve, or 
older’, but concludes that ‘the most suitable age seems to be seven to eight years’37. The 
age suggested for first communion implies puberty, an age before sexual relations 
commence, and therefore the candidate likely comes in a state of virginity and purity. 
 
As Cooper stated above, ‘white in death represents birth into the new life beyond’ 
(Cooper, 1978:41). Arguably therefore, funerary rites are rites of passage from one life 
into death and on to another form of life, but also life-giving rites. The enactment of the 
sacred drama of baptism, and the Eucharist, the initiate dies to self in order to be reborn, 
with the reward of eternal bliss. The first and significant Christian rite of initiation the 
catechumen emerges from being buried in the waters of the baptismal font and receives 
a white robe, symbolising purity both temporal and eternal. ‘White in death’, a mortuary 
symbol ultimately focuses on the reward of eternal salvation and future resurrection 
from the dead, illustrated by The Resurrection38. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 From the Vatican: 31 March 1977. Above was sourced from: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cclergy/documents/rc_con_clergy_doc_19770331_pen
ance-communion_en.html. 
38  see The Resurrection, c. 1324-5 (detail).painting by Ugolino di Nerio (active 1317-27, died 1339?) in. 
Bomford, David, Dunkerton, Jill, Gordon, Dillian, Roy, Ashok (1989) Art in the Making: Italian Painting 
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The anthropologist Mary Douglas adds that the church juxtaposes ‘the idea of woman 
as the Old Eve, together with fears of sex pollution’ with ‘the Second Eve, a virgin 
source of redemption crushing evil underfoot’, thus the ‘Second Eve’ becomes a potent 
new symbol (Douglas, 1966:195). Douglas asserts that purity may be equated with the 
sacred, where ‘things and places are to be protected from defilement’ and where 
‘holiness and impurity’, consecration and desecration, are opposed (Douglas, 1966:9). 
Douglas claims that ‘uncleanness’ concerns separation ‘a spiritual state of 
unworthiness’ (Douglas, 1966:14), and, arguably within Christian theology that of 
separation from God has been agonised over since Adam and Eve were banished from 
the Garden of Eden. Douglas suggests that ‘rituals of purity and impurity create unity in 
experience’ and adds that such rituals are ‘positive contributions to atonement’ as their 
‘symbolic patterns are worked out and publicly displayed’, which is where disparate 
experience is given meaning (Douglas, 1966:3). As already mentioned, the ‘Old Eve’ 
seems equated with impurity and ejection, while the ‘Second Eve’ symbolises holiness 
and redemption, and public rituals that address issues of purity and impurity create unity 
and positive experience. 
 
Let us now return to the ideal of virginity from a physical and secular perspective. One 
expectation projected onto the virgin may be the purity of her progeny. In historical 
terms the preferred progeny, the male heir, continues the family surname and inherits 
wealth and property; however this is not always so.  
 
Douglas, drawing on Edward Evans-Pritchard’s anthropological work with a Nilo-
Saharan tribe, offers an example of impure progeny by asserting that: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Before 1400, London: National Gallery Publications, Distributed by Yale University Press. Santa Croce 
Altarpiece, Florence, Plate 102, p118. 	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when a monstrous birth occurs, the defining lines between humans and 
animals may be threatened. If a monstrous birth can be labelled an event of 
a peculiar kind, the categories can be restored. So the Nuer treat monstrous 
births as baby hippopotamuses, accidentally born to humans and, with this 
labelling, the appropriate action is clear. They gently lay them in the river 
where they belong. (Douglas, 1966:49) 
 
Douglas suggests that ‘anomalous events [such as these] may be experienced as 
dangerous’ and feelings of anxiety are allayed by ‘attributing danger [so] putting the 
subject above dispute’ (Douglas, 1966:49), thus bringing order to anomaly and 
uncleanness. On a practical note, Douglas suggests that ancient rites concerning purity 
may have sound hygienic origins, simply reflecting the avoidance of contagious disease 
(Douglas, 1966:36).  
 
In attempting to define female physical purity the American sociologist Adrienne Rich 
argues that the virgin may be defined in ancient terms as ‘she-who-is-unto-herself’, the 
one who is ‘undeflorated’ and whose hymen is intact (Rich, 1976:249). The medievalist 
Kelly on the other hand argues that the concept or condition of virginity often ‘resists 
definition and verification’ and may be contingent upon cultural, rather than 
physiological criteria (Kelly, 2000:ix). Driscoll suggests that ‘virginity names a body 
prior to the construction of sexuality proper and gives a place to the misfit of feminine 
puberty’ (Driscoll, 2002:143) and that virginity epitomises ‘the (as yet) unfinished 
process of feminine adolescence’ (Driscoll, 2002:144). It seems, for Driscoll, that 
virginity is surrounded by ‘the ambiguity of the girl’s position as agent/object of sexual 
desire,’ setting up ‘visibly fraught…contradictory significations as the dissemination of 
feminine adolescence deferred resolution of that ambiguity in womanhood’ (Driscoll, 
2002:144). In other words, in modernity female adolescent generic images appear in 
advertisements, film or television, so whether explicitly referencing virginity or not, 
these images embody ‘an object of contemplation, disciplined observation, and desiring 
interpretation’, thus resisting complete knowledge (Driscoll, 2002:145). 
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As we have seen, virginity and purity appear in both the Christian and non-Christian 
spheres where ecclesiastical injunctions attempt to define and control, while on 
occasions ambiguity reigns. Virginity and purity are arguably less consciously valued in 
an increasingly secular British society, as are spirituality and salvation. In the Easter 
issue of The Sunday Times (27 March 2005:1-2), the journalist Bryan Appleyard’s 
article Beyond Belief not only argues that Britain is becoming more secular, but 
contrasts Britain with other parts of the world which are becoming strikingly spiritual. 
Appleyard asserts that ‘fewer than eight per cent of us go to church’ and defines 
secularity as ‘the destruction of conventional religion’. Secularly, Dyer suggests that 
‘whiteness, really white whiteness, is unattainable. Its ideal forms are impossible’ 
(Dyer, 1997:78). Conversely, spiritually, Christ at his resurrection exemplifies the 
unattainable pureness as he enters God’s presence. Having discussed the notions of 
white, virginity and purity within both a spiritual and secular context, and their 
iconographical and physical impact, let us now consider this physical aspect further in 
its relationship to the virgin prior to wedlock. 
 
Contemporary research within the Western economy indicates that the ancient concept 
of virginity continues to be highly valued by some groups where virginity may be 
recaptured through modern methods. Kelly, in considering the significance of the 
hymen asserts that:  
 
the hymen and its analogues [has] come to be used as a sign of woman’s 
difference and as an instrument of control. Because it is ‘there’ it must be 
safeguarded. In the case of the hymen, anatomy does indeed dictate destiny, 
however tautological. Though this thin ridge of venous tissue may be the 
one thing a woman has got that a man has not, the possession of it does not 
confer any status on a woman beyond that which the Law of the Father 
bestows. (Kelly, 2000:118) 
 
Kelly, although aware that some may claim for an unbroken chain of theories and 
practices from the Middle Ages to the present, suggests that ‘the idea of virginity and its 
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proofs transcends historical bounds: (and that) virginity may not be constructed as the 
same over time and according to place, but it is continually constructed all the same’ 
(Kelly, 2000:121). In other words, however constructed, virginity remains a constant 
force in Western culture and perhaps worldwide.  
 
The general practitioner and ethnographer Kristin Hendrickx discusses the attitudes of 
Islamic girls living in Belgium, by addressing ‘the importance of virginity at marriage’ 
(Hendrickx, 2001:1). Hendrickx suggests that ‘confronted with the virginity standard: 
sex before marriage is forbidden; the worth of a girl and the honour of her family is 
coupled with her virginity’ (Hendrickx, 2001:3). Hendrickx argues that for the 
Moroccan girl ‘virginity until marriage is a very significant issue [and] this 
preoccupation can lead to anxiety about loss of the hymen’ (Hendrickx, 2001:5). 
Hendrickx’ research reveals that ‘older Moroccans explain that the virginity standard is 
proof there has been no incest’ (Hendrickx, 2001:5) and that although the virginity 
standard may not be at the forefront of the younger generation’s mind, yet this standard 
creates ‘immense emotional tension’ (Hendrickx, 2001:5). Myths influence men who 
‘are expected to succeed in deflowering and showing the evidence’, and ‘the 
misconception that the hymen is something strong that has to be torn away’ causes 
anxiety in girls (Hendrickx, 2001:5). Hendrickx reports that for the girl who has had 
pre-marital coitus ‘doctors are engaged to perform hymen reconstruction surgery’39 and 
claims that there appears to be a ‘double morality’ involving premarital intercourse, 
leaving the girl denigrated (Hendrickx, 2001:5). Hendrickx found that doctors are under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ‘thelondonnews’, 15 November 2007, reports that Department of Health figures show that twenty-four 
women had surgical intervention for virginity repair funded by the NHS in 2005-6. ‘The operation mends 
a tear in the hymen’. Hymenoplasty is the surgical reconstruction of the thin, ring-like delicate skin 
membrane partially covering the opening of the vagina, known as the ‘hymen’. Figures released by the 
NHS, by courtesy of the Metro newspaper, state that there were ‘about one hundred and sixteen 
operations carried out between 2005 and 2009’, and ‘thirty NHS operations in 2009’. Doctors say 
‘patients are under pressure from future husbands or relatives who insist that they should be virgins on 
their wedding night’. ‘The woman fears that the husband will walk out, divorce or humiliate her all her 
life. There have been honour killings in extreme cases.’ 
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pressure ‘with requests for certificates for virginity and hymen reconstruction’ causing 
an ethical dilemma, as issues of STD40 and health behaviour influence the attitudes of 
girls to the virginity standard’ (Hendrickx, 2001:6).  
 
Taking a sociological perspective Sawitri Saharso in investigating the multicultural 
society of the Netherlands also discusses the request for surgical reconstruction of the 
hymen, which is based on a ‘cultural norm that young women, but not young men, stay 
a virgin until marriage’ (Saharso, 2003:199). Saharso argues that ‘it is not desirable to 
ban hymen repair’ as this maintains the capacity for autonomy which is ‘good 
feminism’ (Saharso, 2003:199).  
 
Let us now consider the idea of abstinence from sexual intercourse prior to marriage in 
America. The paediatrician Peter Loewenson discusses ‘reasons for choosing not to 
have sexual intercourse’, among two groups of American adolescents; the ‘virgins and 
already sexually experienced’ (Loewenson, 2004:209). Loewenson discovers that the 
reasons for abstinence include ‘fears about adverse consequences, such as STD’s, 
pregnancy, and parental disapproval’ (Loewenson, 2004:213). Other reasons include the 
‘values and beliefs’ of ‘wanting to wait until marriage’ influenced by religious beliefs 
(Loewenson, 2004:214). Loewenson, cites Barbara Duerst (1997) an American 
adolescent psychologist who suggests that adolescents recognise abstinence as having 
‘positive consequences’ through the negatives of ‘feelings of insecurity and potential for 
dissolution of a relationship’ (Loewenson, 2004:214). Kelly suggests that ‘the end of 
the twentieth century, disillusionment with the 60’s sexual revolution as well as the 80’s 
response to the AIDS crisis, have made abstinence (or, at least, selective abstinence) 
more attractive’ (Kelly, 2000:120).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Sexually Transmitted Disease, (STD’s). 
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We have seen a key shift during the Reformation from a life-long ideal for chastity 
which gave way to the ideal of sexual fidelity within marriage. We have also seen both 
in Belgium and America that there are not only physical pressures that may influence 
sexual abstinence and therefore virginity and purity, but also group implications such as 
denigration, honour and religious beliefs. Let us now give virginity and purity a 
different examination, by applying a psychological lens. 
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1.5 Virginity and purity from a psychological perspective 
The psychodynamics of virginity and purity arguably apply equally to both non-
Christian and Christian alike. Freud addresses these issues in The Taboo of Virginity 
where ‘taboos’ are regarded as originating in the ‘fear of some danger’ (SE11:198). 
Freud suggests that: 
The high value which the suitor places on a woman’s virginity seems firmly 
rooted. The demand that a girl shall not bring to her marriage…any memory 
of sexual relations with another man41 is a logical continuation of the right 
to exclusive possession of a woman, forming the essence of monogamy. 
Whoever is the first to satisfy a virgin’s desire for love, long and laboriously 
held in check…is the man she will take into a lasting relationship…creating 
a state of bondage which guarantees…holding at bay the polygamous 
tendencies which threaten monogamy. (SE11:193-4) 
 
Freud suggests that psychological fears surrounding virginity and the first act of 
intercourse resonate in both men and women, and argues that among the woman’s fears 
are ‘the pain which defloration causes a virgin’ (SE11:202), and ‘the horror of blood’ 
being spilt (SE11:196). There is also her ‘opposition to her womanly role and function’ 
(SE11:204), arguably a psychological change from the independence of adolescence to 
the responsibilities of married life and of potential motherhood. Freud argues that 
virginity and its loss for the woman, may include ‘hostility towards the man’ 
(SE11:207-8) claiming that these feelings of revenge may concern the woman’s 
‘narcissistic injury which proceeds from the destruction’ of the hymen which in turn 
leads to her feeling ‘a diminution of sexual value’ (SE11:202). Freud also considers that 
defloration may activate the woman’s penis envy by her ‘wish to castrate her husband 
and to keep his penis for herself’ (SE11:205). Freud argues that associated with her 
penis envy may be ‘the woman’s hostile bitterness against the man, which never 
completely disappears’, as she is no longer ‘emancipated’ (SE11:205).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 At the time of Freud’s writing this in 1918, it had already been reported that the young Queen Victoria 
had insisted, prior to her marriage in 1840, that she did not wish to marry a man who had had previously 
sexual relations with another woman, as will be discussed at section 1.8. 
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Freud’s penetrating analysis, considers one reason that man may fear virginity which 
may be connected with the ‘universal taboo of menstruation’ where the monthly flow of 
blood is associated with sadistic ideas or a mystical ‘bite of some spirit-animal’ 
(SE11:197). Freud suggests that primitive people consider that while the girl is 
menstruating ‘she is the property of [an] ancestral spirit’ (SE11:197); therefore this 
spiritual dimension is arguably another reason that man fears or creates taboos 
concerning women. Freud postulates that other reasons may concern that he will be 
‘weakened by the woman’ (SE11:198), ‘she will paralyse his strength 
(SE11:198)…causing flaccidity’ (SE11:199); her influence ‘over him through sexual 
intercourse’ (SE11:198); and the belief that women are ‘strange and hostile’ 
(SE11:198). Freud claims that through the fear of being weakened the woman appears 
to have some control or influence over the man through the fact that she ‘infects him 
with her femininity’ (SE11:198) and as a result he ‘shows himself incapable’ 
(SE11:199). Freud also links the man’s fear of a loss of potency and impotency with 
castration and ‘castrating’ (SE11:199). 
 
While Freud situates virginity biologically and psychologically in terms of fear, Freud 
also sees that the taboo may be purified through ritual. Freud locates the fear and taboo, 
prohibitions and restrictions associated with virginity within the polarities of ‘sacred’ or 
‘unclean’ (SE13:18)42. Freud postulates that a ‘taboo’ has two opposing meanings. On 
the one hand ‘sacred’, ‘consecrated’, and on the other ‘uncanny’, ‘dangerous’, 
‘forbidden’, ‘unclean’, and the opposite of ‘taboo’ meaning ‘common’ or ‘generally 
accessible’ (SE13:18). Freud explains that among the objects of taboo there appears to 
be two distinct categories, those aimed at ‘the protection of people’ and those ‘imposed 
in order to secure property’ (SE13:20). Freud goes further by suggesting that ‘the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Freud’s duality of ‘sacred’ or ‘unclean’ (1913), seems to resonate with Arnold van Gennep (1908), and 
Émile Durkheim (1912) duality of ‘sacred and profane’, which Mary Douglas (1966) refers. 
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violation of a taboo makes the offender taboo’, this facilitates the opportunity of 
averting the violation through ‘acts of atonement and purification’ (SE13:20) and offers 
the explanation that often ‘the source of taboo is attributed to a peculiar magical power’ 
which results in ‘the attempts to throw it off by suitable purificatory ceremonies’ 
(SE13:20). Freud claims that what is of concern here is that people ‘submit to 
prohibitions as though they were a matter of course and feel convinced that any 
violation of them will be automatically met with direct punishment’ (SE13:20).  
 
Drawing on the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, Freud suggests that taboos directed 
towards women include, as already mentioned, her time ‘during menstruation and 
immediately after giving birth’ and that if a taboo is violated, the person would be 
subjected to the ‘fear of demonic powers whose ‘vengeance must be averted’ (SE13:23-
4). This leads Freud to consider the relation between the concept of taboo to 
‘purification and sacrifice’ concluding that unconsciously taboos essentially concern 
‘touching’, not merely physical contact but also the metaphorical dimension of coming 
‘in contact with’ (SE13:25-7), including thoughts. Drawing from his own observations 
Freud claims that obsessional taboos ‘can be lifted if certain actions are performed’ 
including ‘acts of washing in water (‘washing mania’)’ (SE13:28). In other words, it 
appears that the unconscious dynamics associated with a moral violation appears to 
require neutralising by the enactment of ritual cleansing43. Let us now consider how 
first an anthropologist views the creation of purity and then how a psychoanalyst views 
the potential traumatic experience of loss of virginity. 
 
Douglas expounds this theme of taboo, by interpreting the biblical ‘The Laws of 
Holiness’ as exemplifying ‘completeness’ and ‘conformity’ as opposed to ‘confusion’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ritual cleansing resonates with the ritual of Christian baptism. 
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(Douglas, 1966:67). Douglas asserts that ‘holiness means keeping distinct the categories 
of creation’, and protecting order (Douglas, 1966:67). For Douglas, ‘holiness brings 
about separating the moral from the immoral’ including the sexual morality of incest 
and adultery (Douglas, 1966:67). Douglas, drawing on the French sociologist Émile 
Durkheim (1912), separates the sacred from the profane by asserting that ‘the sacred is 
the object of community worship’ which can ‘express its essentially contagious 
character’, while the profane is characterised as being secular behaviour (Douglas, 
1966:26). The sociologist, William Robertson Smith (1889) suggests that there is ‘no 
separation between the spheres of religion and ordinary life’ (Douglas, 1966:26). But 
for Durkheim the oppositions of sacred and profane are necessary couplets for social 
integration, between the individual and society. Douglas concludes that ‘rules of 
separation are the distinguishing marks of the sacred, the polar opposite of the profane’ 
(Douglas, 1966:26). Remaining with the focus on physical virginity, let us now consider 
some psychical indications. 
 
Freud suggests that woman’s fear of virginity may be just as acute as man’s but for 
different reasons. In a case study of eighteen-year-old Katharina, Freud makes a 
connection between ‘virginal anxiety’ and hysteria (SE2:127). In other words, 
Katharina had experienced her father’s sexual desire and unwanted incestuous advances 
which she had physically rebuffed, but had emotionally retained. Freud, in connecting 
the psychical mechanism of hysteria, claims that the penetrative ‘erotic experience’, 
when Katharina was fourteen was potentially a ‘traumatic moment’ (SE2:133). Freud 
illustrates this kind of trauma when over twenty-five years later he reveals that the 
‘sexual attempt’ on Katharina had been made ‘on the part of her own father’, after 
which ‘the girl fell ill’, a somatised conversion or splitting-off between the moral and 
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physical disgust into producing the hysterical or psychical phenomenon 
(SE2:131+134n2). 
 
Freud cites further evidence for the trauma of vaginal anxiety in a case-study of 
eighteen-year-old Dora (SE7:16) and interprets two of her dreams as reflecting her 
wishes and fears about defloration. The unconscious meaning of the first dream is ‘I 
must fly from this house, for I see that my virginity is threatened; I shall go away with 
my father…’ (SE7:85). Freud claims that Dora’s unconscious association with her 
father ‘presented the wish that her father should save her from danger’, even though 
‘her father had brought her into the danger’ (SE7:89). Freud suggests that ‘the hostile 
feeling against her father [is] her desire for revenge, which was suppressed’ (SE7:85). 
However the combination of associations ‘attributed to the motive forces of the second 
dream’ seem ambiguous (SE7:89). In the second of Dora’s dreams, Freud deduces a 
phantasy of defloration; that ‘of a man seeking to force an entrance into the female 
genitals’ (SE7:100). 
 
Research into the dynamic unconscious associated with these taboos seems to indicate 
that as they are accorded such high values that potentially there are multiple fears. Fear 
of shame and humiliation if not attained; fears of loosing the status they award; fears 
that may transcend the physical and enter a spiritual world, and fears that concern the 
most intimate parts of human sexuality. From this evidence what appears to be argued 
here is that the concepts of virginity and purity have both biological dimensions, such as 
being untouched, and spiritual dimensions, that of intention, both encompass a tension 
between physicality and the psychological, the outer and inner worlds of the conscious 
and the unconscious, desire and restraint. Before leaving the topic of physical or 
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imagery relating to virginity and purity, let us investigate how women undergo a rite of 
passage and why brides are exchanged by men. 
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1.6 The exchange of women 
Having, earlier, explored how the wearing of white apparel may have initially been 
influenced by the Christian ritual of baptism, and how virginity and purity may have 
become significant due to the imagery of the Virgin Mary, let us now consider how for 
the non-Christian and Christian alike the exchange of women is described by drawing 
on an ancient philosopher, records from the first historian, a British and a French 
anthropologist and an American cultural historian. 
 
Plato records the speech of Aristophanes who argues that humans were originally 
‘hermaphrodite’ (Plato, Symposium:62), that is the ‘body having been cut in two, each 
half [now] yearns for the half from which it had been severed’ (Plato, Symposium:61). 
Aristophanes substantiates his argument by observing that when two people meet and 
they throw their arms round one another their embrace indicates their longing to grow 
together again and that this innate love welds the two human beings into one, thus 
restoring and healing the wounds which humanity suffers (Plato, Symposium:61-2). 
Aristophanes concludes that ‘it is people like these who form lifelong partnerships’ 
(Plato, Symposium:63). Thus it is intimated that humans have a propensity to search for 
one another, and this search can, as we will discuss, take several forms. Having 
considered how, from a philosophical perspective, two people may be united, let us 
consider, from the same period, how, in a different way, one person finds another. 
 
In discussing ‘The Price of Beauty’ Miranda Harrison, draws on Edwin Long’s painting 
entitled Babylonian Marriage Market, first exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1875, 
which represents ‘the union of archaeology with art’ (Illustrated London News 1875). 
The painting illustrates what the Greek historian Herodotus of Halicarnassus (c.480-
425BC) describes as something that occurs ‘in every village once a year’ (Harrison, 
2004:5), and became a central attraction throughout ancient Babylonia. Herodotus  
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records that ‘girls of marriageable age are gathered together and auctioned in the market 
place according to their beauty. Marriage was the object of the transaction’ (Harrison, 
2004:5). Herodotus continues: ‘the money raised by the girls who fetched the highest 
price44, provided dowries for the less attractive, as some men prefer a plain wife with 
money, rather than a pretty one without’ (Book One, Chap 196). The main figure 
illustrated in the painting is of a woman whose head is veiled, and of a ‘male who 
stands guard over his meekly acquiescent spouse’ (Harrison, 2004:5-17). Thus we learn 
of an ancient custom and ritual of exchanging women through historical records and the 
interpretation of a Victorian artist. 
 
The significance of wearing the veil is discussed by the anthropologist Edwin James. 
James suggests that in primitive agricultural society ‘during ceremonies, or rites of 
passage facilitating the transaction from the single to the married state, which is 
surrounded by supernatural dangers, evil spirits and dangerous contagions, and 
surrounded with taboos, the bride is elevated to a ‘holy estate’. These mysterious forces 
are counteracted and thwarted by veiling the bride with bark-cloth and magic amulets 
(James, 1952:50). 
 
James suggests that marriage in pastoral society although women like ‘Sarah, the 
mother of nations’ (Genesis,17v16) or Huldah (2Kings,22v14) could attain considerable 
status, they were debarred from inheriting property, excluded from social intercourse, 
and in public were veiled (Genesis,24v65, Genesis,38v14) (James, 1952:62). Famed for 
his Bible concordance, Alexander Cruden, in contrast to James, suggests that: 
 
The use of the veil (or vail) in the East was not so general in ancient as in 
modern times, as much of the present custom dates from the time of 
Mohammed only. The veil was worn only as an article of ornamental dress, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 James suggests that ‘the bride-price, (mohar or mahr), represents compensation to the bride’s parents 
for the loss of a member of their family. In Islamic law it became a dowry given to the bride herself’ 
(James, 1952:72). 
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by betrothed maidens in the presence of their future husbands and at the 
wedding. (Cruden, 1930:718) 
 
James, drawing on the anthropologist Arnold van Gennep, suggests that in primitive 
society as ‘the head was regarded as the seat of the soul’ and therefore the ‘most 
vulnerable part of the body’, veiling ‘defended a sacred person or object from evil or 
profane influences’ (James, 1952:67-8) (van Gennep, 1908:240). Thus James argues 
that when the woman becomes veiled, this ‘symbolises female integrity and modesty’ 
(James, 1952:67-8).  
 
James argues that the ‘crowning of the bride and groom with crowns of gold and silver, 
or olive and myrtle,45 are common elements in both marriage and royal coronation 
ceremonies’ (James, 1952:53). In both rites these elements symbolise victory over the 
forces of evil and death at a critical transition in society. Because of the prominence of 
crowning in pagan cults crowning was initially disallowed by the church.46 The 
prohibition, however, was soon removed and in the oriental rite the ceremony, which 
followed the betrothal and the presentation, of two rings became known as the 
Euchologion, or ‘the crowning’.47 The parties repeat their consents and at the 
conclusion of the ceremony the priest places a crown on the head of each with the 
words, ‘the servant (or handmaid) of the Lord is crowned in the name of the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Ghost’. While their hands are joined the Deacon prays ‘crown them 
with Thy grace, unite them in temperance and dignity, bless them with old age, and with 
unshaken faith’.48 
 
James argues that in the West ‘the veiling’ took the place of ‘the Crowning’, and it’s 
earlier associations with protection against the evil eye and other malign influences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Tertullian, De Coronax iii. 
46 Tertullian, Apol. I, 42. 
47 Cf. Martène, De Antiquis Ecclesiae Ritibus (Venice, 1783), p609. 
48 Goar, Euchologion (Paris, 1647), p396 ff. 
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became a symbol of constancy, just as veils were worn also by widows who made 
profession of continency (flammens virginalis) (James, 1952:109). Later veils became 
part of the habit of nuns as the ‘brides of Christ’, consecrated to the service of their 
heavenly Spouse, as in pagan Rome the Vestal Virgins (as mentioned earlier) as sacred 
people had their heads covered with a hood (suffibulum) during the performance of their 
sacrificial functions, while a red veil distinguished a newly married woman. The veil, 
therefore, was associated with sacredness, originally being a means whereby sacrosanct 
people or objects were separated from the profane. Since of bride was in the process of 
passing into a new status in society, she required a supernatural aid and was herself a 
source of spiritual contagion. This widespread belief survived into the Christian era so 
that at the time of Tertullian the betrothal veil was worn by the bride from her espousal 
until the day of her wedding49 to symbolise the inviolable fidelity, typified by the 
relationship between Christ and his Church, to which the wife is bound by virtue of the 
nuptial contract. The veil became, therefore, a sign of consecration to the holy estate of 
matrimony comparable to the solemn clothing of nuns. As ‘taking the veil’ was virtually 
a sacramental sign of Religious Life and its obligations, so too Christian marriage was 
the dedication of man and woman in an indissoluble union representing all that the 
Pauline analogy50 implies (James, 1952:109-10). 
 
In other words, during the enactment of a critical ‘transaction’ in society, such as the 
exchange of women, women are veiled to protect them from the ‘forces of evil’ which 
may influence childbirth, child deformity, the woman’s barrenness or even death in 
childbirth. Therefore, veiling symbolises the elevation to a sacred status, and ‘rites’ are 
performed to signify victory over the forces of evil. Moving away from what the bride 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 de Virg. Velandis, xi. 
50 Genesis records: ‘A man leaves his father and mother and is united to his wife, and the two become one 
flesh’ Genesis,2v24. This sentiment continues in Saint Paul’s teaching: ‘they are no longer two 
individuals: they are one flesh’ Matthew,19v5-6, Mark,10v8, 1Corinthians,6v16. These sentiments appear 
reflected in Aristophanes’ speech, cited earlier. 
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may wear let us explore the act of exchanging women through the eyes of the French 
positivist, sociologist and anthropologist Arnold van Gennep whose work investigated 
primitive rites of passage, worldwide. 
 
Solon Kimbali in his introduction to van Gennep’s The Rites of Passage (1908) warns 
that ‘one dimension of mental illness may arise because of an increasing number of 
individuals are forced to accomplish their transitions alone, with private symbols’ (van 
Gennep, 1908:xviii). In other words this implies that incorporative rites of human 
passage effect not only the individual but also the whole group, therefore the wider the 
involvement of the social group the less traumatic it is on the individual and group, but 
equally separation rites, such as divorce, may also impact on the social group. 
 
Van Gennep emphasises that ‘rites of passage’ critically address problems of passing 
into a new status within the family. Instead of the individual being forced to accomplish 
the transition alone. These rites of passage become devices which society offers the 
individual to assist them achieve this adjustment because this transition of the individual 
concerns the group. Van Gennep distinguishes annual ceremonies associated with 
nature’s seasons, from ‘life crises’ ceremonies which happen once in a person’s life 
(van Gennep, 1908:ix). 
 
These ceremonial patterns of transition which van Gennep associates with an 
individuals’ ‘life crisis’ may be described as dynamic processes which can be 
distinguished by three major phases: ‘separation rites’, ‘transition rites’, and 
‘incorporation rites’ (van Gennep, 1908:vii). Although rites of separation are prominent 
in funeral ceremonies, they also occur from the beginning of life, including the period 
from adolescence prior to betrothal, and ‘transition rites’ during betrothal. 
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‘Incorporation rites’ apply to the marriage ceremony where there is a change of social 
position (van Gennep, 1908:10-11). 
 
Kimbali emphasises that ‘the dichotomy of the sacred and the profane is a central 
concept for understanding the transitional stage in which an individual or group may 
find themselves. The individual who enters a status at variance with the one previously 
held becomes ‘sacred’, while the others remain ‘profane’ (as referred to earlier by 
Durkheim). It is this new condition which calls for rites eventually incorporating the 
individual into the group. Van Gennep argues that these changes may be dangerous, 
and, at the least, they are upsetting to the life of the group and the individual. The 
transitional period is met with rites of passage which cushion the disturbance (van 
Gennep, 1908:ix). 
 
Kimbali points out that Chapple and Coon (1942) Principles of Anthropology, designate 
group ceremonies as ‘rites of intensification’ or ‘crisis’ which produce a disturbance 
within individuals or groups. The ‘group crisis’ being based on a change in human 
activities. In this vein van Gennep sees marriage as an ‘incorporation’ rite of the 
individual into a new status in the group (van Gennep, 1908:xiii). Van Gennep claims 
that: 
 
The goal of rites of passage is to insure a change of condition or a passage 
from one magico-religious or secular group to another, as such changes of 
condition disturb the life of society, thus dramatising rites of passage help to 
reduce their harmful effect, [that is why] marriage ceremonies include 
fertility rites. (van Gennep, 1908:11) 
 
Van Gennep suggests that ‘separation rites ’ help to relinquish ties with the former 
household, or familial ties, for the sake of the new association. Particular incorporation 
rites performed relating to the new group, include exchanges of tying, veiling and sitting 
together, sprinkling with rice and giving a ceremonial meal (van Gennep, 1908:40). Van 
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Gennep emphasises that ‘naming forms important parts of adoption, baptism and 
renaming in marriage, because an individual’s name indicates their place with reference 
to the various marriage or group hierarchies’ (van Gennep, 1908:39). And that the 
ceremonial meal at the wedding reception can symbolise that the two groups are at 
peace with each other and cements bonds of friendship (van Gennep, 1908:40). Thus the 
boundaries to separation and incorporation rites blur. 
 
Van Gennep, in discussing rites of exchange, thus ‘incorporation rites’, draws on the 
anthropologist Stanislaus Ciszewski who suggests that people of the Balkans and Russia 
recognise four major incorporation rights or uniting acts: ‘the symbol of naturae 
imitatio’ (van Gennep, 1908:29). ‘Eating and drinking together’ at the wedding 
reception, may be likened to ‘Christian communion’ (van Gennep, 1908:29). The ‘act of 
tying one to the other’, may arguably be witnessed during the marriage ceremony when 
the couple’s hands are joined by the minister who then wraps his stole of office around 
their hands tying a symbolic knot, before proclaiming ‘The Blessing’ [Fig. 9]. The 
couple are as if joined by an umbilical cord. ‘Kissing one another’ may be likened to the 
Minister saying to the groom ‘You may now kiss the bride’ (van Gennep, 1908:29-30). 
These ‘social fraternal bonds’, Ciszewski claims, ‘create a stronger relationship than 
natural consanguinity (van Gennep, 1908:32n2). 
 
Van Gennep suggests that one of the purposes of exchanging women is ‘to obtain more 
gifted and powerful children because of the mana inherent in all strangers’ (van 
Gennep, 1908:34). As it seems customary in England that the brides’ parents host the 
wedding reception, arguably we can understand the ‘stranger’ in the marriage being the 
bridegroom. In this context, we may understand better when Biblical text suggests that 
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‘the man leaves his family and cleaves unto his wife’ (Genesis,2v24, Matthew,19v5, 
Mark,10v7). 
 
Van Gennep suggests that ‘among the Bontok Igorot of the Philippines, and elsewhere, 
a girl cannot marry until she has borne a child and has thus proved that she is capable of 
reproduction. Among peoples who do not consider a marriage valid until after a child is 
born, the rites of pregnancy and childbirth constitute the last acts of the marriage 
ceremony, and the woman’s transitional period stretches from the beginning of her 
betrothal to the birth of her first child. Becoming a mother raises her moral and social 
position, instead of being just a woman she is now a matron, and legitimate wife’ (van 
Gennep, 1908:48). 
 
Van Gennep suggests that ‘amongst the Thompson Indians of British Colombia, girls 
were often betrothed while mere infants to men sometimes twenty years their senior. 
They were considered marriageable only after they had finished their seventeenth, 
eighteenth or twenty-third year’ (van Gennep, 1908:68). Van Gennep notes also that 
‘the Todas, who are polyandrous, are betrothed from the age of three (van Gennep, 
1908:70). From photographs published by the New York Times Magazine in 2006 this 
evidence suggest that girls aged eleven in Afghanistan are often betrothed to men of 
forty-years-old and marrying before their fifteenth birthday. 
 
Kimbali, writing in 1960 recognises that ‘psychoanalysis is the only discipline other 
than anthropology which concerns itself with life-crisis ceremonies’ in the centrality of 
the Oedipus complex, where libidinal desire causes a conflict between father and son 
over the possession of women (van Gennep, 1908:xv). From Kimbali’s perspective it 
seems as though ‘Freudian theorists have an intense desire to establish the legitimacy of 
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their position through proof from primal behaviour, and if it can be established that an 
act has become imbedded in the ‘racial memory’, not much opportunity for dissent is 
left. There is a double primacy if the act has been related to need and at the same time 
has left its ineradicable impress on future behaviour. Kimbali argues that Freud’s Totem 
and Taboo (SE13) attempts to establish this double primacy by positing that the original 
patricide arose from the son’s jealousy of their father because of his monopolization of 
the female’s. Subsequently, the act was commemorated by totemic rites which include 
taboos to prevent its recurrence (van Gennep, 1908:xv). 
 
Kimbali suggests that the psychological interpretation of the marriage ceremony 
supports the daughter’s sense of castration, resulting in penis envy and the unconscious 
incestuous desire for the father. Thus the marriage ceremony can be interpreted as a 
reinforcement of the incest taboo (van Gennep, 1908:xv). Van Gennep argues that, for 
instance, purification ceremonies may lift a taboo and by removing the contaminating 
quality, impart the quality of purity (van Gennep, 1908:12). 
 
Kimbali argues that although Bruno Bettelheim’s Symbolic Wounds (1955) accepts the 
primal castration anxiety and the envy of the opposite sex, and a desire to acquire its 
sexual attributes, Bettelheim believes that ‘ceremonies minimize sexual envy and a 
sense of castration’ (van Gennep, 1908:xv). In other words, rites may be efforts to free 
the individual of anxieties. 
 
Writing in 1908, Van Gennep makes an important observation which arguably seems to 
have been far-sighted. Van Gennep argues that: 
 
In an industrial-urban civilisation where extensive changes in the social 
system include increased secularisation and the decline in the importance of 
sacred ceremonialism, there is no evidence that a secularised urban world 
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has less need for ritualised expression of an individual’s transition from one 
status to another. (van Gennep, 1908:xvii)  
 
Arguably, this may be illustrated by the number of television programmes shown in 
Britain featuring a bride-in-white and the continued popularity of civil partnerships and 
Church wedding where the bride is veiled and dresses in white51. As we begin to 
appreciate, since the exchange of women during Babylonian times, rites of passage are 
enacted to ensure a safe passage from one state to another, and also happen in specific 
places, using an authorised form of words, vows and actions.  
 
The American anthropologist and ethnographer Catherine Bell throws light onto the 
significance of ritual being conducted within the confines of the Anglican Church. In 
considering these dynamics Bell suggests that as opposed to a ‘dispersed population’ 
the Church ‘centres’ the community, as people congregate together, come from different 
directions and situations to assemble at a specific place and time (Bell, 1992:101-2). 
These dynamics, Bell suggests, become ‘overlaid with a higher versus lower 
opposition’ with the ‘raised altar, lifting and lowering voices and eyes, as well as 
sequences of standing and kneeling, all generate a contrast between the higher spiritual 
reality and a lower mundane reality’. The dynamics are also overlaid by an ‘inner versus 
outer’, an internalised reality (Bell, 1992:102). 
 
Bell emphasises that, since Durkheim’s (1912) study, ritual demarcates the ‘sacred’ 
from the ‘profane’. This dichotomy is explored elsewhere when raised by Freud, 
Douglas and van Gennep. Douglas clarifies that Durkheim separates the sacred from the 
profane by asserting that ‘the sacred is the object of community worship’ which can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Bridezilla, Rich Bride, Poor Bride, My Big Fat Gypsy Wedding, "The Runaway Bride", The most 
beautiful bride in the UK, Don't Tell the Bride, Bridal Red Carpet, Bride of Frankenstein, Father of the 
Bride, Bulging Brides, Four Weddings, (in 2011). 	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‘express its essentially contagious character’, while ‘the profane is characterised as 
being secular behaviour’ (Douglas, 1966:26). Bell suggests that ‘binary oppositions 
almost always involve asymmetrical relations of dominance and subordination which 
generate hierarchically organised relationships’ (Bell, 1992:102). 
 
At the heart of the marriage ceremony, at the precise moment of exchange, are audible 
words. During the bride-in-white’s euphoric hour in Church, as she entertains sexual, 
spiritual and physical hopes, the bride-in-white articulates desire of total joy and 
ecstasy, in Kristeva’s terms ‘jouissance’ (Kristeva, 1977:16), as the bride voices ‘I do’, 
and the Minister proclaims ‘The Blessing’. Both vow and blessing are endowed with 
gravity, ambivalence and mis-understanding, or Plato’s ‘mysterious’ and 
‘incomprehensible’. Lacan links language to the dual planes on which language 
operates, that is the possibility ‘of using it in order to signify something quite other than 
what it says’ (Lacan, 1966:155 original emphasis). In other words it seems possible that 
both the vows and The Blessing have more than one meaning. That is, the intended 
meaning of the speaking subject, and how the hearer interprets what is heard. Kristeva 
reminds us that the ‘speaking subject’ is ‘a split subject—divided between unconscious 
and conscious motivations, that is between psychological processes and social 
constraints’ (Kristeva, 1977:6). 
 
Ritualisation makes ample use of speech. Bell points out that in the French sociologist 
Bourdieu’s analysis of ritual as communication he eschews all use of metaphor, 
metonymy and analogy in describing the operations of ritual practice, because ritual is 
discourse (Bell, 1992:112). Bell cites social and cultural anthropologist Roy Rappaport 
who notes that for the thirteenth-century French theorist William of Auxerre, it is the 
words themselves in the ritual of the Christian mass that turn physical matter into the 
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Sacrament of the body of Christ. The spoken word and certain actions are reflected in 
the doctrine of transubstantiation. Bell argues that we can therefore draw a parallel with 
the form of words used during the enunciation of the vows, the authority placed in the 
Minister to proclaim The Blessing and to tie the marriage knot, during the marriage 
ceremony as creating a significant transformation through words and actions (Bell, 
1992:112).  
 
Thus Bell challenges Bloch (1975) or Moore and Myerhoff (1977) who seem to 
advocate standardising ritualisation as a process of ‘traditionalisation’. Although 
ritualisation may construct a type of tradition, Bell suggests that ritual need not be 
understood as a ‘fixed structure, a closed grammar, or embalmed historical model’ 
(Bell, 1992:124). In other words, Bell defends the richness of ritual, as opposed to any 
reductionism, or that the wedding ceremony may be understood solely as ‘traditional’. 
 
As discussed above, the human search for companionship and the perpetuation of the 
social group takes several forms. What seems to have emerged from this exploration, is 
that the woman who is exchanged is elevated to a sacred position by being veiled and 
wearing white. This elevation in ancient terms can be understood as her protection from 
the ‘evil eye’. This elevation also involves the group’s protection and continuance of the 
group itself as if ‘to reflect the supremacy of the group over the individual’ (Bion, 
1961:110). Let us now move from considering an historical and anthropological 
position to discuss a more modern view of exchanging women. 
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1.7 The institution of marriage: monogamy versus polygamy  
In considering the three faces of marriage: legal, solace, and misery the American social 
historian Nancy Cott likens marriage to the Sphinx, which has both a ‘conspicuous, 
awesome, even marvellous side, while simultaneously hiding terrors’ (Cott, 2000:1). 
Cott suggests that recognisably, as an institution, marriage ‘creates families and kinship 
networks’, determining circles of intimacy’, ‘influencing individual identity, and 
becomes ‘a legal framework for handing down property’, thus bringing ‘solace’ but also 
potential ‘misery’ (Cott, 2000:1). In other words, marriage as an institution, may instil 
public common values, affirmation and public order together with relationships of 
private commitment, enshrined in legal doctrine.  
 
In considering marriage as a legal institution Cott emphasises that conspicuously, 
‘marriage requires legal sanction’ and reminds us that the person officiating at a civil 
ceremony declares: ‘By the authority vested in me by the… I now pronounce you 
husband and wife’ (Cott, 2000:3). In other words during the marriage ceremony, friends 
and family are both public and private witnesses to the couple’s reciprocal bond, and to 
some extent the witness group guarantees that the commitment, made according to 
prescribed requirements by both Church and state, will be honoured as something 
valuable, not only to the pair but to the community at large. Their bond will be 
honoured even by public force. The witness group sees itself and its own interest 
reflected in the couple’s action. Cott argues that ‘assumptions about the importance of 
marriage have been deeply implanted in public policy and political authorities expect 
monogamy on a Christian model to prevail’ (Cott, 2000:3).  
 
Cott, taking an American perspective, which arguably applies equally in England and 
other Western economies, suggests that ‘the Christian faith, adopted by political and 
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legal authorities aims to perpetuate nationally a particular marriage model and ideals’ 
(Cott, 2000:3). Arguably this implies stereotypically lifelong, faithful monogamy, 
formed by the mutual consent of a man and a woman, bearing the impress of the 
Christian religion and English common law in its expectations for the husband to be the 
family head and economic provider, and his wife being the dependent partner. Cott 
suggests that ‘complying with this model, brings with it public roles, turning men and 
women into husbands and wives and exert gender order, thus designating the ways in 
which both sexes act and their reciprocal relations’ (Cott, 2000:3). In other words, these 
roles seem to reinforce heterosexuality, heteronormativity and perpetuate male 
dominance and female dependency.  
 
The American sociologist and material feminist Chrys Ingraham suggests that while 
romantic and sacred notions of heterosexuality may maintain the illusion of tranquillity, 
then heterosexuality becomes taken for granted, remains unquestioned, and as an 
institution seems timeless (Ingraham, 1999:16). By drawing on the French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary, heterosexual ‘imaginary’ can 
be understood as a way of closing off, or denying, any critical analysis of 
heterosexuality as an organising institution which structures gender. Ingraham 
challenges ‘white weddings which permeate popular culture, a highly structured 
arrangement of institutionalised heterosexuality’ (Ingraham, 1999:2), by arguing that 
underpinning and normalising the white wedding is the presumption of 
heteronormativity which ‘constructs the standard for legitimate and expected social and 
sexual relations’ (Ingraham, 1999:17). Ingraham suggests that ‘if everyone, the ‘single’, 
‘married’, ‘divorced’, ‘separated’, ‘widow’, ‘never married’, is expected to situate 
themselves in relation to the status of marriage, those not participating in these 
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arrangements may think of themselves’ in Lacanian terms as ‘the unimaginable’ 
(Ingraham, 1999:17).  
 
Cott, in discussing marriage as a ‘cohesive institution’ suggests that ‘the approval or 
disapproval a couple may feel most intensely comes from the immediate community of 
kin, friends and neighbours’ (Cott, 2000:5). Arguably, this resonates with the Greek 
myth Oedipus whose final fate of exile was sealed by the group (Harvey, 1937:292), 
where the group represents the ‘super-ego’ (SE23:205). Cott argues that monogamy is 
in the public interest because it promotes ‘public order’, is a ‘unifying moral standard’, 
and ‘prescribes essential activities harnessing the vagaries of sexual desire52 by offering 
support for their consequences, dependent children also labour and property’ (Cott, 
2000:5-6).  
 
Cott asserts that: 
the marriage contract, although freely and consensually entered into, society 
sets the terms of the marriage, thus bringing predictable rewards and duties. 
In other words, husband and wife assume new legal status both in their 
relationship together, and within the community. Reciprocally with the new 
public status, if either party break the agreement it may offend the larger 
community, with implications for the law and the state, as much as 
offending the partner. (Cott, 2000:11) 
 
Cott suggests that ‘Christian doctrine advocates that in marriage ‘the twain shall be one 
flesh’53 thus having exclusive rights to each other’s bodies. Thus Christian doctrine 
promotes heterosexual desire to be satisfied exclusively within marriage and so 
demands sexual fidelity of both partners. The Bible also makes the husband the ‘head’ 
of his wife, his wife’s superior, as ‘Christ is the head of the church’54. During the 
marriage ceremony, frequently the new wife gives up her maiden surname, symbolising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 And, ‘ordained for the procreation of children’ and ‘for a remedy to avoid fornication’ (Book of 
Common Prayer 1662:320). 
53 Similarly, Plato envisions the splitting and amalgamation of two people, (Symposium p61). 
54 Saint Paul teaches: ‘wives, be subject to your husbands…for the man is the head of the woman, just as 
Christ also is the head of the Church’ (Ephesians 5v22). 
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a relinquishing of identity, and a new authority over her55, thus endowing the husband 
with responsibility for his wife. Cott suggests that ‘in legal terms, marital unity may be 
described as coverture, and the wife may be called a femme covert’. Cott clarifies that 
‘coverture in its strictest sense means that a wife can not use legal avenues such as suits 
or contracts, own assets, or execute legal documents without her husband’s 
collaboration’ (Cott, 2000:11). Let us now consider the tension between monogamy and 
polygamy. 
 
In contrasting monogamy and polygamy, as previously mentioned, the redactors of the 
Old Testament record that the Hebrews were tempted to follow the Canaanite customs 
of Sodom and Gomorrah where the ideal of monogamy was tested against polygamy. In 
other words, we can see that tensions between two differing life-styles and moral values 
become evident. Cott points to Christianity advocating the ‘Holy estate of matrimony’. 
Thus Cott argues that a ‘moral superiority of monogamy with mutual consent’ becomes 
advocated over the polygamist or marriage by capture. Thus Cott suggests that whereas 
‘fornication, cohabitation, and polygamy may offer intrigue, jealousy and distrust and 
the potential abasement of women and the neglect of children’, in contrast ‘monogamy 
offers happiness and social benefits’ (Cott, 2000:23).  
 
Cott draws on the French social commentator Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron 
Montesquieu’s novel Persian Letters (1728), in which he draws attention to the 
relationship between eunuchs and wives in a Persian harem. Montesquieu notes that if 
the wives in the harem were left, the wives could become riven with jealousies and 
intrigues so intense as to cause the tragic suicide of one of the wives. It seemed to 
Montesquieu that the harem was ‘motivated by fear and maintained by coercion, thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This refers to Freud’s concept of the ‘repudiation of parental authority’, which is discussed later in Part 
One. 
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embodying a spirit of despotism’. It seemed to Montesquieu that ‘the harem stood for 
tyrannical rule, corruption, elevation of passions over reason, selfishness, and hypocrisy 
– all the evils that virtuous thinkers wanted to avoid’. In contrast, thought Montesquieu, 
there could be a ‘liberal treatment of women’, where monogamous love could stand for 
consent and moderation (Cott, 2000:22). 
 
Cott suggests that ‘the stark contrast between the principles of monogamy and 
polygamy may be illustrated in the superiority of the minority position of Christian 
morality in the USA in the 1780’s’ (Cott, 2000:22). Cott suggests however that from the 
1790’s, inspired by the Welsh advocate for a utopian socialism Robert Owen in Britain 
and the social and moral philosopher Charles Fourier in France, ‘counter-culture 
communities, formed in America, shunned legal monogamy on the basis of slavery and 
exclusive pairing of couples’, in favour of liberal ‘free love’, eugenic reproduction 
called ‘stirpiculture’ and ‘complex marriage’ (Cott, 2000:71). 
 
Cott suggests that ‘Anglo-American Protestant religious revivals after 1800 highlighted 
the contrast between the benefits of Christian ‘lifelong monogamy and spousal 
obligation in Christian legal marriage’, in contrast to ‘the personal indulgence, the lack 
of manhood, and the sexual degradation of women’ in other models such as the 
American Indians who practiced ‘plural marriages’ (Debo, 1970:287). Cott argues that 
Americans in political and religious life espoused monogamous marriage, it’s ‘male 
headship of a family’, ‘gender expectations’ and ‘conventional sexual division of 
labour, property, and inheritance’: a ‘civilized life’ (Cott, 2000:26). Cott suggests that 
the early nineteenth century American political theorist, John Adams thought that 
monogamous marriage was the prime metaphor for ‘consensual union’, ‘voluntarily 
allegiance’, and ‘monogamous fidelity’ (Cott, 2000:21).  
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Cott suggests that ‘a systematic alternative to Christian monogamy was being practiced, 
on the basis of the guarantee of religious freedom’ in another part of America. By 1843 
the overtly polygamist community of Mormons under the leadership of Joseph Smith 
advocated ‘plural marriage’. Cott suggests that by 1852 ‘polygamy in Utah quickly 
evolved from a local scourge to a national embarrassment’, being equated with ‘political 
tyranny, moral infamy, lawlessness, and men’s abuse of women’. Christian monogamy, 
in contrast, represents ‘national morality and lawful authority where women enjoy 
respect from men, monogamous domesticity, and credited with immortal souls’. 
Whereas in non-Christian cultures: ‘seraglio, concubinage, polygamy, child marriage, 
female infanticide, bride sale, foot binding, and suttee could be found’. In other words, 
the non-Christian activities signal female degradation, whereas Christianity was 
portrayed as emancipatory (Cott, 2000:72-73+116). 
 
In discussing the changing face of monogamy Cott suggests that in the 1960’s Nelson 
Rockefeller’s publically known divorce became an impediment to his presidential 
nomination. A person was cast outside the pale of ordinary respectability by living 
coupled but unmarried or by having children outside of marriage. By the 1990’s, Cott 
suggests that, American President Bill Clinton’s sexual infidelity although became a 
matter of public record did not topple his political credibility ‘because of the way the 
majority of the people understood marriage at the end of the twentieth century’ (Cott, 
2000:200-202). Thus indicating a changing face of monogamy and national morality. 
 
A Channel Four documentary (30.03.2011) revealed that although it is suggested that 
voters were ‘pretty relaxed’ as to whether their politicians are married, arguably, Ed 
Miliband and his long-term partner and barrister Justine Thornton may have felt subject 
 83	  
to both legal and public pressure to marry despite their overt denial. After having lived 
together and having two children together but remaining unmarried ‘Ms Thornton found 
that she was ‘unable to add both parents’ names when she registered the birth’ and that 
Ed Miliband ‘was not listed as the father on his first son’s birth certificate’. Their 
wedding photograph, courtesy of The Guardian 27 May 2011, shows the bride wearing 
a cream coloured dress without a veil.  
 
Serial monogamy, that is the practice of having a succession of monogamous 
relationships, also implies multiple separations. For the third time Paul McCartney, 
sixty-nine, used a civil ceremony to marry, but this time to Nancy Shevell, fifty-one, on 
Sunday 9 October 2011. One wedding photograph shows the bride wearing a white 
dress and a white flower in her hair, while white confetti was thrown56. 
 
Cott concludes that: 
Despite sweeping reform reformulations in intimate relationships the 
position of legal marriage above comparable relationships resists toppling. 
Contestation over same-sex marriage has, ironically, clothed the formal 
institution with renewed honour with its promise of stable mutual 
commitment as a benefit to the couple as well as to society. (Cott, 
2000:224) 
 
In other words, despite challenges by other forms of union, because the exchange of 
women involves the social group, the ideal of a life-long monogamous relationship 
seems to have stood the test of time despite erosion by other forms of union. 
 
Let us now consider some emotional dynamics during the exchange of women. The 
bride-in-white may become emotionally overwhelmed by the act of exchange and 
become subject to forms of defensive narcissism, dissociation or denial. When the bride 
publically says her vows ‘til death do us part’ this may also seem to reinforce the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 http://www.popsugar.com/Paul-McCartney-Nancy-Shevells-Wedding-Pictures-19657363?more=true 
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gravity of the idealised intension of the vows, and the group’s idealisation of marriage. 
One may ask, is this idealisation on the part of the bride a defence against ideas of 
divorce? 
 
Arguably, the purpose of being or appearing to be a virgin, as discussed above, may be 
understood as synonymous with wearing a white dress. That is, to have been set apart 
from the group or elevated to a ‘sacred’ level, hedged round from the ‘evil eye’, and to 
appear to be the most desirable person one can possibly be. In Freudian terms appearing 
to be a virgin may assuage narcissistic wounds and the need to be loved. Arguably, 
since Babylonian times, women have been exchanged according to their beauty and 
value. The idealisation of the ‘bride-in-white’ could also be understood as a projection 
from the group onto the bride and the new couple to have an idealised relationship thus 
perpetuating the group and its values. Having considered monogamy as being taken for 
granted by some, and cohesive or leading to potential misery by others, let us now 
discuss how the phenomenon of the bride-in-white became socially installed. 
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1.8 Victorian values: the phenomenon of the bride-in-white 
I will argue, in this section, that the bride-in-white who marries in an Anglican Church 
represents a phenomenon. We may speculate on the aetiology of a phenomenon, i.e., a 
remarkable event or person that strikingly ‘affects our consciousness and senses, as 
distinguished from what it is in itself’ (Macdonald, 1972:1001). But arguably, a 
phenomenon comes into existence, in part, because it has been ‘waiting’ to appear. Let 
us therefore turn to gather evidence from Victorian Britain and around the world, which 
investigates Victorian mores, before we examine the first bride-in-white.  
 
Sociologically, in focusing on British nineteenth-century attitudes, Taeko Sakai argues 
that ‘virginity and purity were essential characteristics in the middle-class Victorian 
marriage market’, where the woman was supposed to provide a ‘haven of peace in the 
home’ (Sakai, 1995:109). The woman’s attitude towards her role was to be ‘pure both in 
mind and conduct’ with ‘a remnant of the innocence of Paradise’ (Sakai, 1995:109). 
Sakai cites Sewell who asserts that ‘paradisiacal innocence of the knowledge of good 
and evil disposed young women to preserve their chastity’ (Sakai, 1995:157) and ‘girls 
were assumed to be not only innocent of sensuality but ignorant of it. Genteel women 
were supposed to desire affection, not sensuality’ (Sakai, 1995:109). 
 
Sakai points to George Elgar Hicks’ painting Woman’s Mission: Companion of 
Manhood, exhibited in 1863 at the Royal Academy57, as epitomising a mid-Victorian 
idealised sense of feminine purity. Sakai argues that pure and innocent women were 
considered to be ‘gentle, submissive and devoted’; it is this ‘moral supremacy’ that 
qualifies her to ‘console her grieving husband’ (Sakai, 1995:110). In contrast, Sakai 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 see Woman’s Mission: Companion of Manhood, painting by George Elgar Hicks, exhibited at the 
Royal Academy, 1863. in. Macleod, Dianne (1996) Art and the Victorian Middle Class: Money and the 
Making of Cultural Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp216-7. 	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claims that, no impure whore, whose infidelity and adulterous behaviour led to the 
production of an illegitimate child, could do anything but ‘throw herself down at her 
husband’s feet in repentance’ as depicted in the painting by Augustus Egg ‘Past and 
Present No. 3’ (Sakai, 1995:110). 
 
Sakai became convinced that the ‘Victorian preoccupation with purity mercilessly 
associated impure women with miserable lives and morbid appearances, while it 
presented pure women peacefully established in cozy drawing rooms since they were 
gentle and submissive but implicitly asexual’ (Sakai, 1995:112). Sakai argues that the 
colour white was considered by the Victorians to be both ‘distinctive’ and of ‘genuine 
beauty’, and was regarded as a metaphor for ‘innocence’ and ‘moral supremacy’ 
embracing the ‘pure bride and a white dress’ (Sakai, 1995:112).  
 
Helen Foster and Donald Johnson, folklorist and textilist, claim that: 
 
symbolism of colour in the bride’s wedding dress seems almost universal. In 
Europe and North America, white, symbolising ‘purity’, remains the 
preferred colour, a reflection of the pervasive power of English Victorian 
society to impose its value system throughout many parts of the world. 
(Foster, 2003:2) 
 
It was nearly eighty years since Victoria’s paternal grand-mother, then seventeen-year-
old Princess Charlotte wore in 1761 a dress of ‘silver tissue…with a train of violet 
velvet laced with gold’ (Tobin, 2003:14). Tobin claims that during the eighteenth 
century although most dresses were of silver and white, ‘pink was suitable for young 
gentlewomen’ and blue was considered appropriate to youth and represented ‘purity and 
innocence’ (Tobin, 2003:18).   
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This parallels the Victorian image of the ‘virginal maid submissively yield[ing] to her 
husband on their wedding night’ (Sakai, 1995:112). Arguably, therefore, purity for the 
Victorian bride came at the cost of being compliant, submissive and the embodiment of 
heavenly innocence. Victoria, as Queen, encompassed the roles of Head of the Anglican 
Church, Head of State and submissive wife (Hibbert, 1984:62), and aesthetically 
morally pure by swearing ‘that she could never marry a man who loved another woman’ 
(Longford, 1964:139)58.  
 
Queen Victoria, head of the Church of England, broke with royal tradition by being the 
first British monarch to wear a white wedding dress. On Monday 10 February 1840, 
twenty years after her father died, the twenty-year-old Queen Victoria married wearing 
‘a pure white satin’ dress (The Times, 1840): and arguably the phenomenon of the 
‘bride-in-white’ was born [Figure 4]. Dress historians, Shelly Tobin and Margaret 
Willes, suggest that Victoria had departed from wearing ‘state robes’ similar to previous 
monarchs at their weddings and chose a gown reflecting ‘contemporary fashionable 
taste’ (Tobin, 2003:32). The white wedding dress Queen Victoria chose seems, in the 
minds of many, to embrace notions of youthfulness, purity and virginity. Tobin asserts 
that during the nineteenth century following Victoria’s marriage ‘royal weddings led the 
fashion’ for a marriage in high life (Tobin, 2003:38). 
 
Art historian, Christopher Lloyd, asserts that ‘at a time when photography was being 
perfected’ the eighteen-year-old Queen Victoria, seen at her first Council, described this 
painting ‘with characteristic forthrightness as “one of the worst pictures I have ever 
seen, both as to painting and likeness”’ (Lloyd, 1991:11). Whether this was a true 
likeness or not, the young queen is depicted dressed in innocent pure virginal white 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 This sentiment was echoed by Freud about seventy-eight years later when he asserts: ‘The demand that 
a girl shall not bring to her marriage with a particular man any memory of sexual relations with another’ 
(SE11:193). 
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contrasting with her male courtiers who appear dressed in black. Consciously or 
unconsciously this pure white virginal theme dominated Queen Victoria’s wedding 
attire. Arguably, the youthful Queen Victoria, using Freud’s words, ‘arouses envy on 
account of her privileges’ - ‘every [bride], perhaps, would like to be a queen’ 
(SE13:33): thus establishing the phenomenon of the ‘bride-in-white’.  
 
Arguably Queen Victoria, marrying in white not only symbolised royal perfection, but 
also an ideal that every bride desired to replicate. This ideal, arguably had been 
‘waiting’ to emerge as a contemporary concept since medieval times, when it was 
encapsulated in the unattainable idealised image of the Virgin Mary. Now the image 
that Queen Victoria brought into being came within reach of every bride’s dream. 
 
Above, we have investigated some philosophical, anthropological and ethnographical 
literature focusing on the exchange of women by drawing on ancient Babylonian, tribal, 
European ritual, the challenge to monogamy, and discussing how the phenomenon of 
the bride-in-white emerged. As psychoanalysis embraces the historical, religious and 
social context as well as the individual’s history let us now explore psychoanalytic 
theory and practice before tentatively suggesting some psychoanalytic concepts that 
might illuminate the bride-in-white’s subjective experience. 
 89	  
1.9 Freud and psychoanalytic theory 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory, suggests that ‘unconscious thoughts can be extracted 
from raw material’ of the subject’s free ‘associations’ of articulated experience and 
unconscious processes may be detected by the application of theoretical concepts 
(SE7:112). Indications for unconscious processes can therefore be deduced from an 
amalgamation of the topographical relation between the conscious, pre-conscious and 
unconscious, and the id, ego and superego59. On another level, indications for 
unconscious processes come through an understanding of psychological development, 
attachments and separation. Relating to significant others such as mother, father and 
siblings, during the pre-Oedipal, the Oedipal and the later periods of latency, puberty, 
adolescence, and adulthood, become the platform for psychoanalytic interpretation of 
dreams and desires. 
 
In exploring the relationship between the subjective experience and psychoanalytic 
theory Sigmund Freud suggests that one of the aims of psychoanalysis is ‘to strengthen 
the subject’s ego’ (SE23:220). Freud suggests that ‘by addressing resistances and 
defence mechanisms ‘the therapeutic effect depends on making conscious what is 
repressed, in the widest sense of the word, in the id’ (SE23:238). The child and adult 
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein suggests that ‘analysis only promotes sublimation’ (Klein, 
1975b:91).  
 
Other post-Freudians, such as the American lecturer in psychoanalysis Otto Fenichel, 
suggests that ‘the aim of psychoanalysis is to demonstrate to the person disturbing 
residues of the past in the present feelings and reactions, and to connect the present with 
the past…confronting the subject’s reasonable ego with irrational emotions within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Lacan (1966) proposes his own variants of psychological apparatus, as examined during the discussion 
on exhibitionism. 
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them’ (Fenichel, 1945:28). The British psychiatrist Charles Rycroft suggests that the 
aim of psychoanalytic interpretation is not primarily to make the unconscious conscious 
or to widen or strengthen the ego but to ‘re-establish the connection between the 
dissociated psychological functions’ (Rycroft, 1962:393). The British child 
psychotherapist Donald Winnicott suggests that psychoanalytic interpretation focuses 
on the interplay of conscious and unconscious forces of the containing environment of 
the good-enough mother which assists in ‘re-establishing continuity with whatever 
constituted the subject’s ‘personal beginning’ (Phillips, 1988:22). This suggests that 
psychoanalytic interpretations assist in helping the subject to think and speak 
differently, as opposed to ‘acting out’ destructively. Let us consider Freud’s personal 
background. 
 
It may be argued that Freud’s own life vividly coloured the concepts he later 
propounded. As the Israelites of the Old Testament, during the days of Joseph found 
themselves in exile, and outcast as Oedipus finally did, and as Odysseus searched on his 
voyages, the ‘Jews during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries fled to Cologne on the 
Rhine, and later migrated to Galicia, Austria’ (SE20:8), Freud’s father, Jacob, found 
himself, not so much houseless, but ‘homeless’ which may carry deep implications as to 
a person without social roots. The Freud family found themselves uprooted and may 
have felt in need of the ‘Secure Base’ (Bowlby, 1988), and after fleeing earlier 
homelands settled in Vienna, before settling in London in 1938. 
 
After first meeting Martha Bernays in 1882, his father Jakob now seventy-one and 
mother Amalié fifty, in 1886 Sigmund aged thirty settled in Vienna and married 
Martha, twenty-five. Sigmund recalled that Martha had been waiting for him for more 
than four years, while he continued studying at University (SE20:14). Falling in love 
and marrying someone from a different family suggests a desire to be with someone 
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else other than one’s parents, this arguably requires a level of maturity, social 
conformity and the ability to repudiate parental authority. Sigmund and Martha chose to 
undergo the transformation from being betrothed to being a married couple and by 
marrying arguably conformed to internalised collective heterosexual expectations and 
an identification with their parents. Jones suggests that ‘sixty-five years later Martha 
could still vividly recall how the official at the civil ceremony had commented on her 
signing her new name in the marriage register without the least hesitation’ (Jones, 
1953:100). Their libidinal desire for each other led Sigmund and Martha to have three 
sons and three daughters. What appears striking on reading Jones’ record of Freud’s six 
children, is that although all six dates of birth are included, only the boy’s names are 
mentioned, while the girl’s names remain omitted. This suggests that Freud was 
prepared to explore personal experiences often previously unbearable to discuss. In a 
similar manner to the brief glimpse of Freud’s origins, we may therefore relate this 
research to those women who chose to be brides-in-white and marry in Church.  
 
What appears to be Freud’s strength may also be considered a weakness. Freud, as we 
have seen, was born the eldest son of a Jewish immigrant family living during the mid- 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries mainly in Vienna, a period in Europe’s history 
covering two World Wars and during the Jewish holocaust. As we have seen, Freud 
keenly studied the Bible and classical literature. Thus many of the concepts that he 
wove into his understanding of human behaviour and the inner or unconscious workings 
of the mind, would have readily been familiar to him. The psychodynamic concept of 
the Oedipus complex, familiar in Greek mythology, and arguably experienced by Freud 
in his own familial group, become ‘a major axis’ for Freud’s psychopathology, a 
‘phylogenetic’ (SE23:99) and ‘universal’ concept (Laplanche, 1973:283). Another 
example, this time taken from the Bible, is the story of the devastation of Sodom and 
Gomorrah (SE12:31n1) resulting from orgiastic fertility rites conducted by Canaanite 
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cults and prohibited degrees for marriage (Genesis,13v10), arguably resulting in Freud’s 
emphasis throughout his writing on sexuality including the idea of conscious or 
unconscious ‘incestuous desire’ (SE23:155). Freud’s weakness60 may appear that ideas 
he used were not original61 but drawn upon because it suited his purposes, but the 
strength was in his ability to weave these themes into a new understanding of the 
motivations of human thought and behaviour. Let us now consider the relationship 
between psychoanalytic theory and the bride’s experience. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 It may be argued that Freud, a man of his time, presumed that heterosexuality was desired and 
‘normal’, as elaborated in his papers, Female Sexuality (1931) and Femininity (1933). 
61 Freud clearly draws on the Greek myth Oedipus making it a crucial working model for his theories. 
Equally, are Plato’s philosophy of Ideal Forms and Aristotle’s investigations of the mind. 
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1.10 Psychoanalytic practice and the brides’ experiences 
 
Freud attributes the origins of psychoanalytic theory and technique at least in part to 
five women. Dr Breuer’s work with Anna O refers to the process of talking about her 
moods as a ‘talking cure’ or ‘chimney sweeping’ (SE2:30)(SE11:13). Emmy von N, 
who suffered from psychosomatic ‘conversion’ (SE2:86), complained about Freud’s 
interrupting the flow of associations, and Elisabeth von R’s inability to respond to 
hypnosis (SE2:174) brought about a method of ‘free association’ (SE2:56). Miss Lucy 
R’s olfactory hallucinations such as an initial aversion to ‘burnt pudding’ (SE2:107), 
was then replaced by one concerning ‘cigar smoke’ (SE2:119). Freud did not 
immediately link this to his own habit. In retrospect this can be understood as a negative 
counter-transference. Freud’s work with Lucy assisted to conceptualise the trauma 
theory of individual symptom formation. Frau M Cäcilie shows Breuer and Freud how 
symbolic word associations can be transformed from a figurative ‘slap-in-the-face’ 
(SE2:181), indicating not only a literal physical facial neuralgia, but also an emotional 
expression. Freud detects a positive eroticised transference in Anna O’s experience of 
Breuer and also Breuer’s response or counter-transference to Anna O (SE2:40n). 
 
The approach adopted to facilitate this research has been based on psychoanalytic 
methodology. That is, having asked the participant a focused question, to allow the 
participant to ‘free associate’ in whatever way they wished, allowing them to convey 
their individual experience. The recorded statements then become the material that can 
be compared and contrasted with social, religious and psychoanalytic literature and 
between the participants. The participants’ statements also become the basis upon which 
unconscious processes can be interpreted.  
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Freud suggests that psychoanalysis emphasises that the statements given during the 
participants’ ‘free associations’, including the interpretation of the transference and 
counter-transference, that is the interpretation of unconscious processes, offers greater 
understanding of the participants’ experience. Having collected the participants’ 
statements, this research scrutinises them by subjecting them to the full range of 
psychoanalytic concepts, the aim being to offer greater understanding of the bride-in-
white’s subjective experiences. Hence, unlike the psychoanalytic ‘talking cure’, as 
mentioned above, for neurosis the participants to this study while not actively being in 
analysis, nevertheless divulge their life experiences to be analysed. 
 
Part of the participants’ life experiences will be contextualised in Part Three, when 
exploring the psychological development of the infant girl where pre-Oedipal, Oedipal 
attachments and separations will be discussed during infancy, puberty, adolescence into 
adulthood. Although Freud’s theory of the neurosis features the female, Freud being 
male, seems to have focused his attention, to a large extent, on the male, i.e. Oedipus’ 
development, thus leaving female development short of in-depth analysis62. 
 
As has been noted above, Freud being born of Jewish parents was expected to feel 
‘inferior’ at University due to his ethnic and religious origins, chose to be married by 
civil ceremony. Thus it may be argued that Freud had deeply internalised what it was to 
have Jewish ancestry with its religious overtones. The French psychoanalytic researcher 
Luiz Oliveriera suggests that ‘it is easy to conceive that Freud could wish for an 
Agnoszierung of the notion of unconscious, in order to rid it of any religious 
connotation’ (in Perelberg, 2005:110). In this research however we may find that some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Freud explores female development principally in just two papers: Female Sexuality (1931), SE21:225-
43, and Femininity (1933), SE22:112-35. 
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participants carry either complex or cursory religious conscious or unconscious 
connections. 
 
Let us move from considering Freud’s background to focus on the wedding day 
experience. Similar to the psychoanalytic encounter, during the research interviewing 
process, ‘cathartic’ responses may be expressed. Catharsis being the ‘intense expression 
of emotion’ or the ‘discharge of previously strangulated affects’ (SE7:249). The 
divulging of ‘truth’ is not considered to be the primary objective in this research, 
because what is being investigated is how each participant, through their ‘free 
association’ within the frame of a questionnaire, individually articulates their personal 
experiences. The methodology will be explored more fully in Part Two and in Appendix 
D. Having discussed psychoanalytic theory and practice let us now investigate the 
psychodynamics of what it is to aspire to an ideal. 
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1.11 To aspire to an ideal: the psychology of the ego ideal and idealisation  
The structure of this discussion follows having considered Plato’s ideal Forms, and the 
idealisation of virginity and is based on Freudian concepts that are established in 
Appendix D: that of aspiring to an ideal. Let us therefore investigate Freud’s concepts 
of the ego-ideal and idealisation. 
 
Freud asserts that ‘idealisation is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that 
of object-libido’ (SE14:94). In other words, idealisation concerns the subject’s and the 
other’s perceived qualities. Freud claims that ‘idealisation is a process that concerns the 
object; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandised and exalted 
in the subject’s mind’ (SE14:94, original emphasis), ‘or else what possesses the 
excellences which (s)he63 never had’ (SE14:101). The concept of idealisation may be 
considered under five headings. First, concerning the narcissistic self; second, as a 
defensive process; third, the projection of idealised attributes onto parents; fourth, the 
identification with an idealised independent other; and fifth, loss of the ideal. Let us 
now examine these five areas. 
 
Freud, in considering narcissism illuminates the megalomania, or ‘an over estimation of 
the power of their wishes’ or an ‘omnipotence of thoughts’ (SE14:75), of the infantile 
ideal ego as being a world possessed of every ‘narcissistic perfection’ (SE14:94). The 
primary ideal is arguably one of absolute satisfaction, pleasure without limits, an 
orgiastic ecstasy, without obstacle. Freud speaks of ‘a sensation of eternity, a feeling as 
of something limitless, unbounded…oceanic’ (SE21:64), ‘a feeling of an indissoluble 
bond, of being one with the external world as a whole’ (SE21:65). Freud declares that 
similar to the ‘primary ego-feeling’ (SE21:68) which does not distinguish self from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Because of Freud’s preponderant use of the masculine pronoun, if ‘he’ is selectively replaced by (s)he 
or ‘girl’, this may be more effective in shedding light on the girl’s development.  
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mother or breast, ‘at the height of being in love the boundary between ego and object 
threatens to melt away’, ‘"I" and "You" are one’ (SE21:66), in other words ‘the wish to 
return to the mother’s womb’ (Ferenczi, 1938:50). Arguably, maternal fusion and an 
undifferentiated world may be experienced as ideal, perfect, paradise. The French 
psychoanalyst, Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel continues the Freudian premise of the 
infant’s undifferentiated world of ‘complete satisfaction’ (SE11:188-9), and ‘happiness’ 
(SE21:76) by recognising that ‘when the infant took herself as her own ideal there was 
no unsatisfaction, no desire, no loss, and this time remains with us as an example of 
perfect, unending contentment and whilst the subject may chase endlessly after this lost 
perfection, she can never actually achieve it’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1975:5).  
 
Freud argues that because the primitive narcissistic state of the ideal ego is prone to 
disruption by the advent of the ‘not-me’, ‘parental criticism, and…of society’ 
(SE14:96), the destruction of the ideal ego world constructs a compensation by the 
formation of the ego-ideal. For Freud, idealisation concerns ‘the substitute for the lost 
narcissism of her childhood in which (s)he was her own ideal’ (SE14:94) and ‘will love 
what (s)he once was and no longer is’ (SE14:101). Freud understands that as the girl 
grows up the ideal infantile ‘narcissistic perfection’, as mentioned above, ‘is disturbed 
by the admonitions of others and the awakening of her own critical judgement, so she 
can no longer retain that perfection’ therefore ‘she seeks to recover it in the new form of 
an ego-ideal’ (SE14:94). Freud maintains that: 
the development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism 
and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is 
brought about by means of the displacement of libido on to an ego-ideal 
imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling this 
ideal. (SE14:100) 
 
Freud emphasises that ‘what (s)he projects before her as her ideal is the substitute for 
the lost narcissism of her childhood in which (s)he was her own ideal’ (SE14:94). 
Offering a post-Freudian understanding of idealisation the British psychoanalyst, 
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Neville Symington, adds that ‘the ego-ideal holds an ideal in front of the ego for the ego 
to strive after’ (Symington, 1986:150). Chasseguet-Smirgel warns, however, that the 
early efflorescence of infantile sexual life is doomed to extinction because its wishes are 
incompatible with reality’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1975:46). In other words, the infant 
initially experiences themselves as ideal, then due to critical voices substitutes 
themselves for a projected ego-ideal which becomes something to be aimed for but may 
never quite be accomplished. It is this process with these mechanisms that the infant 
adopts in an attempt to retain a sense of the ideal which will now be examined. 
 
A second aspect of idealisation may be understood as a mechanism of defence. In 
postulating unconscious phantasies relating to the very early phases of mental life 
Melanie Klein, uses ‘splitting’ as a metaphor for idealisation: splitting not just of good 
and bad, but between the bad and the idealised internal object. Klein argues that 
‘idealisation of the good breast’ becomes a defence against ‘the infant’s persecutory 
fear and therefore goes to increase the power of an all-gratifying object’ (Klein et al., 
1952:202). This is to suggest that in over idealising the object, the subject’s power 
becomes diminished. That is, in exaggerating the good aspects, persecutory fear may be 
allayed by exaggerating good aspects of the ‘inexhaustible and always bountiful 
breast—an ideal breast (Klein, 1946:7). 
 
Arguably, as a defence, idealisation of the object may be considered as tempering or 
modifying the subject’s anxiety. Synthesising psychoanalytic theories postulated by 
Freud, Klein and Winnicott, Donald Meltzer suggests that idealisation ‘implies a 
persecutory demand for perfection’ (Meltzer, 1973:129). Meltzer claims that 
idealisation becomes ‘the metamorphosis of the super-ego-ideal, through the 
abandoning of defences, splitting processes…the acceptance of integration and the 
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assimilation into the super-ego-ideal by introjection’ (Meltzer, 1973:78). The 
introjection and projection process will now be considered.  
 
Let us now turn from emphasising the subject’s inner representations and consider 
external representations. Focusing on a third aspect of idealisation, that of the 
‘idealisation of the parents’ which according to Jean Laplanche have ‘a vital part in the 
setting up of the ideal agencies within the subject’, but are ‘not synonymous with the 
formation of the subject’s ideals’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973:203). Laplanche claims 
that the ego-ideal represents ‘the coming together of narcissism (idealisation of the 
ego)’, with an internalised ‘identification with the parents, ‘their substitutes’, and 
‘collective ideals’, which combine the functions of prohibition and ideal’ (Laplanche 
and Pontalis, 1973: 144). The psychoanalyst Herman Nunberg (1932) offers a different 
perspective by arguing that ‘whereas the ego submits to the super-ego out of fear of 
punishment, it submits to the ego-ideal out of love’ (in Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1973:145). 
 
The mother and father representations arguably have significant influence upon the 
subject. Freud argues that within ‘the sexual phase dominated by the Oedipus complex’ 
there are the ‘normal positive’ and the ‘inverted negative’64 components of ‘a father-
identification and a mother-identification’ resulting in ‘four trends’ (SE19:34), leading 
away from ambivalent bisexuality (SE19:33). Freud suggests that these two 
identifications ‘in some way united with each other’, go towards ‘the forming of a 
precipitate in the ego’ modifying the ego by ‘confront[ing] the other contents of the ego 
as an ego-ideal or super-ego’ (SE19:34). Freud, in privileging the paternal prerogative 
claims that ‘the super-ego retains the character (especially) of the father’ (SE19:34) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See the overarching theme of Transformation and SE21:226. 
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which may be conceptualised in terms of the subject who ‘sets up an ideal in 
themselves by which they measure their actual ego’ (SE14:93, original emphasis). 
Kristeva, also tells us that ‘the young child of a Mother-Father in personal 
prehistory…guarantees [her] ability to idealise’ (Kristeva, 1995:122). Thus, Kristeva 
emphasises that the relationships with the mother and father are significant in 
influencing the quality of idealisation.  
 
Let us consider the father idealisation further. Freud argues that identifications may be 
found in the phallic images of ‘the primal father’, or ‘God’ (SE21:42), or with the 
projection ‘the little girl likes to regard herself as what her father loves above all else’, 
as opposed to her castrated reality and ‘the experience of painful disappointments’ 
(SE19:173). Kristeva speaks of the ego-ideal as emanating from ‘the archaic mirage of 
the paternal function’ and draws on Freud’s notions of ‘primary identification’ with the 
‘Father in personal prehistory’65 (Kristeva, 1995:121). Kristeva points not only towards 
the father, and his father, but arguably also to the already mentioned ‘Church Fathers’. 
Kristeva claims that the ‘father of individual prehistory’ provides the ‘seed of the ego-
ideal’ (Kristeva, 1987:374).  
 
Let us now examine a fourth aspect, that of idealising an independent other. Arguably, 
the parental internal representations may have initially been ideal, but later they are 
experienced as frustrating and disappointing. The subject therefore continues her quest 
for the lost narcissistic world of perfection, but now in another. Freud, alluding to ‘the 
aim of avoiding incest’ (SE11:183) postulates, ‘something in the nature of the sexual 
instinct itself is unfavourable to the realisation of complete satisfaction’, that is, of the 
first love-object, attributing this to ‘the barrier against incest’ (SE11:181). Freud 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  This refers to Freud’s phylogenetic model endowed by ‘the father of prehistoric times’ (SE21:131). 
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concludes that as a result, ‘the final object of the sexual instinct is never any longer the 
original object but only a surrogate for it’ (SE11:188-9). Arguably, the subject 
compromises their ego ideal to accommodate a surrogate. 
 
Freud suggests that ‘with the object type (or attachment type)’ (SE14:100), which is 
strictly ‘characteristic of the male’ (SE14: 88), the idealisation of an ‘independent loved 
object’, ‘an object…treated in the same way as our own ego, so that when we are in 
love a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows onto the object’ (SE18:112). 
This psychological mechanism ‘exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal’ (SE14:100) 
thus fulfilling the ‘infantile conditions for loving…is idealised’ (SE14:101). Freud 
proposes a formula: ‘what possesses the excellence which the ego lacks for making it an 
ideal, is loved’ (SE14:101). Arguably, at the point of the bride-in-white’s ritual 
enactment, it may be considered that the bride-in-white has a need to believe in the new, 
idealised ‘inexhaustible bountiful breast’ of the non-incestuous other, in order to 
assuage her feelings of separation from familial ties. Freud emphasises that ‘in addition 
to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, 
a class or a nation’ (SE14:101). Meltzer adds that post puberty and early adolescent 
‘idealistic’ ego-ideal aspirations include ‘the hero’, ‘the creative impulse’, ‘a wish to 
serve her child’, ‘broodiness and nest building’, and ‘long-range planning’ (Meltzer, 
1973:160). Arguably, these attributes go towards fulfilling the bride-in-white’s ideal 
with a non-incestuous other.  
 
Let us now consider a fifth aspect of idealisation, that is, the loss of the ideal. Freud 
asserts that ‘mourning is the reaction to the loss of…an ideal’ (SE14:243), arguably a 
paradise lost. On discussing the issue of mourning, child and adolescent psychotherapist 
Margot Waddell, in attempting to understand the growth of the personality, asserts that:  
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The process of mourning is one which is to do with managing to experience 
oneself as separate from the loved and, even if only temporarily, lost other. 
To let go of the phantasies and projections of what is, by turn, longed for, or 
feared, in the other person, and to appreciate whatever he and she actually 
is, as distinct from what they may have been needed to be. This may 
painfully involve giving up quite complex idealisations. (Waddell, 1998 
:69)  
 
Waddell argues that ‘the capacity to mourn what is felt to be lost or is having to be 
relinquished and to take responsibility for whatever part the self is felt to have played’ is 
‘central to any possibility of successfully negotiating complex triangularity’ (Waddell, 
1998 :68-9). The new triangularity for the bride arguably includes a repudiation of 
parental authority in favour of a new allegiance. 
 
Arguably, identifying with parental, substitutes, collective or personal ideals, has the 
potential to be open to disappointment and frustration. Focusing on the psychoanalytic 
understanding of feminism Juliet Mitchell argues that a feminine ego-ideal comprises 
the woman’s secondary narcissistic ‘wish to be loved’ (Mitchell, 1974:34). Mitchell 
reminds us that ‘ideals periodically fail and the predicament of Narcissus takes over’ 
(Mitchell, 1974:35). Mitchell cautions that ‘narcissus became stuck in his desire for the 
supra-real object (his reflection) and he could not accept it was imaginary, consequently 
he sank into fits of alternate melancholia and mania till he died, a virtual act of suicide’ 
(Mitchell, 1974:40). Mitchell suggests that the melancholic may be self accusatory with 
a sense of ‘utmost unworthiness’, where ‘the greatest sense of failure in enacting their 
ego-ideal, (s)he displays (her)self as a person beneath contempt’ (Mitchell, 1974:36). 
Let us now turn to a different aspect of idealisation, that of exhibitionism. 
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1.12 Clothing the body: a psychological interpretation of exhibitionism 
It is the experience of the bride wearing, and being seen in, a white wedding dress that 
is the focus of this section. A white dress is not only conspicuous, as white ‘absorbs the 
minimum amount of light’ (Macdonald, 1972:1555), but also the wearer arguably 
attracts the maximum amount of attention. Let us therefore examine Freud’s concept of 
‘normal’ female exhibitionism, distinct from the pathological exhibitionism of males 
who publically exhibit their genitals (Kahr, 2001). The component parts of which may 
be considered under three headings: independent of erotogenic impulse, during infancy; 
as a defence against the unconscious phantasy of castration; and, as a defence against 
the unconscious fear of loss of identity.  
 
Freud claims that ‘the sexual instinct’, struggles against the prominent resistances of 
‘shame and disgust’ which offer degrees of restraint, and being ‘composite’, are at ‘the 
convergence of several motive forces’ (SE7:162). Of these ‘component instincts’, which 
enhance the sexual aims, is exhibitionism (SE7:166). Exhibitionism may therefore be 
seen as a defence against the woman’s sense of being ‘permanently narcissistically 
injured’ (SE21:239). This is to suggest that, the woman may compensate for being 
narcissistically wounded by displacing her ‘lack’ onto her whole body, turning to 
attraction through clothing. 
 
Freud locates exhibitionism without shame in infantile sexuality by suggesting that  ‘we 
can observe how undressing has an almost intoxicating effect on many 
children…instead of making them feel ashamed…children frequently manifest a desire 
to exhibit’ (SE4:244). Freud recognises that the desire to be an exhibitionist of his 
genitals and for ‘exposure to children of the opposite sex’ becomes predominately a 
male characteristic (SE4:244). Freud acknowledges, however, that ‘this unashamed 
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period of childhood seems like Paradise’ where mankind (Biblically, in the form of 
Adam and Eve) was naked and ‘without shame in one another’s presence…until a 
moment arrived when shame and anxiety awoke, expulsion followed, and sexual life 
and the tasks of cultural activity began’ (SE4:245). 
 
Freud suggests that within infantile sexual life ‘in spite of the preponderating 
dominance of erotogenic zones’ the instinct of exhibitionism becomes ‘in a sense, 
independent’ of them (SE7:191-2). Freud recognises however, that exhibitionism does 
‘involve other people as sexual objects’, but this does ‘not enter into intimate relations 
with genital life until later’ (SE7:192). Freud, in considering the sadistic and 
masochistic impulses of looking and being looked at posits that the ‘erotogenic zones in 
the body…operate independently of one another in a search for pleasure and find their 
object for the most part in the subject’s own body’, in other words, forming a 
narcissistic relationship with the self (SE20:35). 
 
Freud suggests that the woman’s narcissistic relationship with exhibitionism may take a 
masochistic stance where the ‘exhibitionist shares in the enjoyment of [the sight of] 
(her) exposure’, as in the passive aim ‘to be looked at’ (SE14:127). Freud postulates 
that one of the components of this instinct, being ‘the eye, corresponds to an erotogenic 
zone’, which ‘assigns sexual significance’, attached to which are sensations, excitations, 
and changes in innervation (SE7:169, SE14:132). Reasons for this may be considered in 
terms of the sexual instinct. As already mentioned, Freud argues that the woman has a 
sense of being ‘permanently narcissistically injured’ (SE21:239). That is to say, in 
phantasy, the woman feels ‘castrated’, due to her ‘lack’ of the penis. Freud suggests that 
due to the narcissistic wound, the woman compensates by displacing her ‘lack’ onto her 
whole body, turning to attraction ‘in relation to clothes’ (SE8:98, SE14:127). Freud 
 105	  
argues that invoking attraction can be understood in terms of the scopophilic instinct, in 
that the woman gives up the object and turns the instinct towards her own body—a 
transformation to passivity setting up a new aim—‘of being looked at’ (SE14:127).  
 
Let us now consider how some post-Freudian psychoanalysts develop the understanding 
of exhibitionism. Elizabeth Wright understands that the active and passive positions of 
the scopophilic instinct become coded as the ‘activity with masculinity and the phallic, 
passivity with femininity and castration’ (Wright, 1992:448). Wright, drawing on the 
French psychoanalyst Jacque Lacan, claims that ‘as a drive, the gaze is always an 
excess over mere seeing…fundamentally orientated towards a lack’ (Wright, 1992:449). 
In other words, Wright seems to link feminine passivity with the woman’s drive to be 
gazed upon due to the woman’s phantasy of ‘castration’. The woman’s phantasy of 
castration may be reflected in the feminist cultural view of how Noreen Connell 
describes women who may feel ‘psychologically isolated from the larger society and its 
main avenues of power by an inbred sense of worthlessness’ (Connell, 1974:7). 
 
Exhibitionism may invoke both desired and undesired feelings, as mentioned above, in 
the desire to be looked at, with pleasure, through coercion, or teasing. John Steiner 
suggests that ‘being looked at…may result in feelings of pride, pleasure and 
gratification at being admired’, but can also ‘lead to the extremely uncomfortable 
feelings of embarrassment, shame and humiliation’ (Steiner, 2006:939). Robert Stoller 
recognises that the exhibitionist needs the ‘other’, by suggesting that the ‘exhibitionist 
coerces the other into becoming an accomplice…the willing seduced co-operation of an 
external object’ (Stoller, 1975a:134). The American object-relations theorist Otto 
Kernberg understands exhibitionism in terms of ‘sexual teasing’, where the promise of 
‘erotic desire’ is stimulated yet withheld. A seduction counterbalanced by frustration 
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linked with sadism, ‘the wish to excite and frustrate the significant other’ (Kernberg, 
1995:27).  
 
Fenichel suggests that ‘in women, the exhibitionism, displaced from the genitals, 
attempts to bring reassurance against a feeling of inferiority because of the lack of a 
penis’ (Fenichel, 1945:316). Fenichel claims that ‘in exhibitionism a denial of castration 
is attempted by a simple overcathexis of a partial instinct. The exhibitionist act is 
performed as a kind of magical gesture, meaning: ‘I show you what I wish you could 
show me’ (Fenichel, 1945:345). Ismond Rosen suggests that ‘exhibitionism is mainly 
linked with the phallic stage of experience’, that being the ‘absence of the penis in the 
woman being felt as a narcissistic injury’ (Rosen, 1964:308). Rosen also concurs with 
Freud by suggesting that in adulthood ‘exhibitionism is displaced onto the whole of the 
rest of the body, especially the breasts, and onto a show of attractiveness’ which goes 
towards supplanting the sexual aim (Rosen, 1964:294). Lothair Rubinstein however 
takes exhibitionism further by claiming that ‘the female clothing surrounding [the] 
whole body can represent the vagina’ (Rubinstein in Rosen, 1964:182). Chasseguet-
Smirgel argues that as a result of its origin, ‘exhibitionism remains more narcissistic 
than all the other component instincts. It’s erogenous pleasure is always linked to an 
increase in self-esteem’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1975:152).  
 
Peter Gay moves the argument regarding libidinal excitation by suggesting that 
exhibitionism ‘encourages the development of beauty in the sexual object’ (Gay, 
1989:251). Gay postulates that ‘the progressive concealment of the body which goes 
along with civilisation keeps sexual curiosity awake. This curiosity seeks to complete 
the sexual object by revealing its hidden parts’ (Gay, 1989:251). Gay argues that a 
degree of sublimation takes place when the ‘interest can be shifted away from the 
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genitals onto the shape of the body as a whole’ (Gay, 1989:251). Gay counterbalances 
this argument by claiming that ‘this is related to the fact, we never regard the genitals 
themselves, which produce the strongest sexual excitation, as really ‘beautiful’ (Gay, 
1989:251+n6). 
 
Facing the phantasy of castration, arguably, the girl continues to search for a sense of 
potency and positive affirmation of her identity, through exhibitionism. Charles Rycroft 
suggests that the unconscious process of exhibitionism compensates for ‘the need to 
prove one has something despite not having a penis’, becoming influenced by the 
‘manic defence against the fear of loss of identity’ (Rycroft, 1968:47). In other words, 
during the process of transformation the girl may fear a loss of self and seeks to 
reinforce her identity, sexual difference, and femaleness. Robert Stoller argues that the 
sense of femaleness concerns the genitals which ‘are the only way anatomy 
communicates the crucial differences of childhood sex assignment’, apart from the 
length of hair, the cutting of which may be ‘seen as a castration threat’, and for the adult 
woman are the breasts (Stoller, 1975a:100). The French psychoanalyst Gérard Mendal 
considers that a search for identity confirmation may be found in the other by asserting 
that:  
 
The activity accompanying such a sublimated act, [as exhibitionism], causes 
the whole to be genetically related to a phantasy acted out in front of 
parents, whereas integration, as an internalised phantasy activity, requires an 
identification with the observer. To show oneself, to see the reaction of the 
other, [is], to thereby gain a feeling of existing [and] to ensure the regulation 
of one’s self-esteem. (Mendal 1964 in Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1975:156-7) 
 
Exhibitionism may, therefore, take the form of relating to the internal representations, of 
mother, father or self, in the search for identity. On the one hand, Joyce McDougall is 
concerned with the subject’s own identity claiming that ‘one aim of exhibitionism in 
women is that she is waiting for the mother-figure to take notice of her daughter, [and] 
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to recognise her biological sex’ (McDougall, 1995:45). On the other hand, Otto 
Kernberg claims that as ‘the little girl undertakes in shifting her object choice from 
mother to father: exhibitionism can be a plea for sexual affirmation at a distance. 
Father’s love and acceptance of his little girl and her vaginal genitality reconfirms her 
feminine identity and self-acceptance’ (Kernberg, 1995:27). While, Kristeva considers 
that depression ‘affects subjective identity’ which in turn calls into question sexual 
identity through the perversion of exhibitionism (Kristeva, 1989:48, original emphasis). 
In other words, exhibitionism appears to operate on three levels. Through the need to be 
noticed as a daughter by the mother; through the infant girl’s need for sexual 
affirmation by the father; and, as an overcompensation through perversion.  
 
What is under scrutiny here is: does exhibitionism compensate for the woman’s 
phantasy of castration, as suggested by Freud? If we consider the woman who 
unconsciously feels castrated, unattractive or does not feel beautiful, exhibitionism may 
not work for her. The ‘unattractive’ woman may have internalised low self-esteem, self-
critical voices and deep feelings of shame and inferiority by emphasising her 
helplessness, weakness and misfortune. 
 
One way of understanding the degree of attention the bride-in-white draws towards 
herself is from the study of phallocentrism, an organising principle of Western 
patriarchy. Klein places between the pre-Oedipal and the Oedipal stages of the infant’s 
relationship with the mother, a ‘femininity phase’ in which the infant identifies with the 
all-powerful mother, whose body also incorporates the desired father’s phallus within it 
(Klein, 1975b:189-90). During this feminine, or differentiation phase, the infant 
distinguishes between the self and the object world (the me/not me distinction). In 
offering a feminist approach, Lorraine Gamman suggests that phallocentrism concerns 
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the simultaneous acceptance and denial of the castrated maternal phallus (Gamman, 
1994:95). 
 
The Lacanian model of psychoanalysis, returns to Freud using a structuralist and post-
structuralist concept of signification in language, but does not embody the father within 
the mother, like Klein (Mitchell & Rose, 1982:23). Initially the infant exists in the 
Imaginary, conceiving itself and the mother as one, ‘not a divided self’ (Mitchell & 
Rose, 1982:5), where there is no difference, no absence, only identity and presence 
(Gamman, 1994:100). The infant then enters the Mirror Stage, thus identifying with the 
image of itself in the mirror from the mother and others, where the primordial ‘I’ comes 
into being (Lacan, 1966:2). The Oedipal entry of the Father ruptures the infant-mother 
unity, thus the Imaginary becomes the unconscious through repression. For Lacan, it is 
the phallus that ruptures the infant’s dyadic relationship of plentitude, and wounds its 
precarious narcissistic image of self. As such, the phallus exists as a symbol of what the 
mother desires, rather than the actual penis (Gamman, 1994:100). For Lacan, the 
signifier of desire is the phallus and as the woman ‘lacks’, she becomes the phallus 
(Gamman, 1994:101), hystericising the phallus on her whole body, as the core of 
femininity (Gamman, 1994:103). 
 
Viewed in this manner the bride-in-white becomes the phallus, the object of desire for 
the Other. By wearing high heeled shoes, hidden under a full-length dress the bride’s 
femininity becomes accentuated, and the bride-in-white appears like a flower, attracting 
the maximum attention onto her whole body. This picture of the bride-in-white seems to 
make a composite image of being simultaneously castrated and phallic, which in turn 
may be understood as a defence against the enactment of separation or repudiation. 
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1.13 In search of a satisfactory object:  
        a psychological understanding of repudiation 
 
Let us now explore the processes of repudiation, starting with infancy. Repudiation, 
pivotal to Freud’s thesis of the development of femininity concerns a ‘turning away’ 
(SE21:231+4), however, the degree of ‘turning’ may be problematic. The infant girl, 
now faced with Freud’s ‘second task’ of psychic development, searches for ‘her final 
choice of an object’ (SE22:118-9). For Freud, this development becomes achievable by 
a series of repudiations. Let us examine six hurdles over which the infant girl may have 
to traverse.  
 
First, Freud maintains that from the outset the infant girl’s first object ‘must be her 
mother’ (SE21:228) who satisfies all her needs (SE21:236), with an ‘intense and 
passionate attachment’ (SE21:225). Freud claims that ‘with the discovery that her 
mother is castrated it becomes possible to drop her as an object’ (SE22:126), this 
becomes the ‘motive for turning away’ (SE21:231), thus the girl ‘repudiates her love for 
her mother’ (SE22:126). Freud argues that ‘the turning away from her mother is an 
extremely important step in the little girl’s development. It becomes more than a mere 
change of object’ (SE21:239). 
 
Freud suggests that, following the pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother, the infant girl 
accepts her own passivity and favours ‘the transition to the father-object’ (SE21:239). 
However the incest prohibition frustrates her search, ‘the libido abandons its 
unsatisfying position to find a new one’ (SE21:231). Freud cautions, the girl’s 
repudiation of the mother, results from ‘disappointments’ (SE21:231), likewise ‘her 
inevitable disappointments from her father drive her to regress into her early 
masculinity complex’ (SE22:130). In other words, the infant girl repudiates the mother, 
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then the father, due to both prohibition and disappointment, thus the infant girl 
oscillates between masculine and feminine aims.  
 
Second, Freud claims that the infant girl’s Oedipus complex plays a masochistic role, 
‘she acknowledges her castration…the superiority of the male and her own inferiority 
[and] rebels’ (SE21:229). In repudiating, both the mother- and father-representation, 
because they are unable to give her satisfaction, the infant girl repudiates their authority 
(SE7:227), thus overcoming an unconscious incestuous desire, and opening a path to 
find satisfaction from a non-incestuous phallic other.  
 
Freud, in discussing one of the transforming tasks of late puberty, asserts that:  
 
As incestuous phantasies are overcome and repudiated, one of the most 
significant, but also painful, psychical achievements of the pubertal period 
is completed: detachment from parental authority, a process that alone 
makes possible the opposition, which is so important for the progress of 
civilisation, between the new generation and the old. (SE7:227) 
 
In other words, Freud couches, ‘detachment from parental authority’, in terms of 
‘overcoming and repudiating’ incestuous phantasies, particularly ‘the daughter towards 
her father’, as ‘the child’s sexual impulses towards her parents are as a rule already 
differentiated owing to the attraction of the opposite sex’ (SE7:227). As suggested 
above, this process makes possible non-incestuous pro-creation. 
 
Third, the infant girl may undergo a period of  ‘repudiation of femininity’ (SE23:252) in 
a rejection of passivity by defensively regressing and re-entering the masculinity 
complex. Freud suggests that on the infant girl’s discovery of the anatomical difference 
between the sexes, a defence mechanism of ‘disavowal’ may becomes evoked 
(SE19:253). Freud claims that ‘in the female an envy for the penis—a positive striving 
to possess a male genital—[concerns] an attitude towards the castration complex…a 
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protest…[a] ‘repudiation of femininity’ (SE23:250) which concerns ‘the passive attitude 
[and] acceptance of castration’ (SE23:251). In other words, if the infant girl does not 
accept ‘passivity’ and protests against the phantasy of castration, then the masculinity 
complex may beckon. Freud suggests that there may be a number of psychical libidinal 
‘forces’ at work in the girl to sabotage her transformation towards a ‘normal’ object-
choice (SE18:167). Let us explore these ‘forces’. 
 
The first ‘force’, concerns the masculinity complex. Freud claims that from her 
childhood the girl may bring with her ‘a strongly marked ‘masculinity complex’ (SE18: 
169), which Freud characterises as her being ‘spirited, always ready for romping and 
fighting and not prepared to be second to her slightly older brother [the sight of whose 
genitals] developed a pronounced envy for the penis’ (SE18:169); Freud describes this 
character as being ‘feminist’. Freud maintains that the attitude of ‘girls should enjoy the 
same freedom as boys’ may lead her to ‘rebel against the lot of women in general’ 
(SE18:169). 
 
The second ‘force’ concerns the mother/daughter relationship. Freud suggests that 
daughters of nearly marriageable age, in identifying with their mothers, may be 
accompanied by a mixture of feelings of ‘compassion, contempt and envy’ (SE18:157). 
Freud suggests that ‘the mother, still youthful herself, sees in her rapidly developing 
daughter an inconvenient competitor, favours her sons, limits the girl’s independence, 
keeps a strict watch against any close relation between the girl and her father’ 
(SE18:157). This may impact on the daughter who ‘turns her back upon the faithless 
female sex and becomes a woman-hater’ (SE18:157). 
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The third ‘force’, and fifth repudiation, concerns the father/daughter relationship. Freud 
argues that the girl’s ‘repudiation of men’ (SE18:164) may follow ‘the disappointment 
she had suffered from her father’ which results in a ‘bitterness against men’ (SE18:164) 
and ‘the longing for love that springs from the Oedipus attitude at puberty’ (SE18:168). 
Unafraid to offer a psychoanalytic understanding of the girl’s predicament the French 
psychoanalyst André Green argues that there is ‘the widespread fear of penetration in 
women’ (Green, 1986:109). Green suggests that the ‘refusal to incorporate the penis is 
related to a double fear: fear for the penis and fear of the penis; fear of damaging or 
castrating the penis, but also a fear that the penis might injure and destroy the internal 
genitals and inside of the abdomen’ (Green, 1986:109, original emphasis). Green 
suggests, therefore, that ‘women have to find a compromise between the fear of object 
loss, which could lead to mourning of a depressive type, and dangerous incorporation 
which generates persecutory anxiety’ (Green, 1986:110). 
 
The fourth ‘force’ concerns the fear of loss of beauty. Freud argues that the girlish 
narcissism of the post-pubertal period with its ‘homosexual enthusiasms, and 
exaggeratedly strong friendships tinged with sensuality’ and ‘strong exhibitionist and 
scopophilic tendencies’ (SE18:168) together ‘with her pride in her good looks’ 
(SE18:169) may become a defence against the fear of ‘bodily disfigurement connected 
with the idea of pregnancy and child birth’ (SE18:169). This, in turn, may lead the girl 
to ‘repudiate her wish for a child, her love of men and the feminine role in general’ 
(SE18:158). Freud claims that ‘the renunciation of all narcissistic satisfaction and the 
preference for being the lover rather than the beloved’, by assuming the masculine 
attitude and taking a feminine love-object’ (SE18:154), whether out of ‘rivalry’ or 
‘retirement’ (SE18:159-60), disappointment or bitterness, may lead to a late-acquired 
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inversion to homosexuality, or a regression to the earliest narcissistic object-choice or 
taking the mother, her original homosexual object.  
 
Let us return to the series of repudiations. Fourth, as discussed above, Freud claims that 
‘in the female a positive striving to possess a male genital—[concerns] a protest…[a] 
‘repudiation of femininity’ (SE23:250) which concerns ‘the passive attitude [and] 
acceptance of castration’ (SE23:251). Freud argues, however, that what might sabotage 
this repudiation may be ‘an unconscious repudiation of sexuality’ (SE7:227) which may 
lead towards ‘sexual inhibition’ (SE22:126). Freud asserts that: 
 
girls with an exaggerated need for affection and horror of the real demands 
made by sexual life have an irresistible temptation to realise the ideal of 
asexual love in their lives and conceal their libido behind an affection which 
they can express without self-reproaches, by holding fast throughout their 
lives to their infantile fondness, revived at puberty, for their parents or 
brothers and sisters. (SE7:227-8) 
 
In other words, the girl may unconsciously ‘turn back her libido on to those whom she 
preferred in her infancy’ (SE7:228). For example, turning her libidinal strivings towards 
the parents or siblings as an ‘incestuous object-choice’, or project feelings of hate onto 
them.  
 
Fifth, the infant girl’s unconscious repudiation of sexuality may lead to her ‘repudiation 
of men’ (SE18:164) out of fear, as explored above, in ‘the third force’.  
 
Sixth, there may be the ‘repudiation of the external world’ (SE14:139), because of hate. 
Freud argues that in the sadistic-anal phase which is characterised by ‘an urge for 
mastery, injury or annihilation of the object is a matter of indifference’ as a form of hate 
(SE14:139). Freud claims that it is ‘not until the genital (phase) is established [that] love 
becomes the opposite of hate’ (SE14:139). Freud argues that hate, a ‘repudiation by the 
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ego-instincts…in the interests of the ego’ [which] derives from ‘the narcissistic ego’s 
primordial repudiation of the external world’, comes as a result of ‘its outpouring of 
stimuli’ (SE14:139). Freud cautions that ‘sexual and ego-instincts can readily develop 
an antithesis which repeats that of love and hate’ (SE14:139). Arguably, the degree of 
unpleasure and hate may go towards sabotaging pleasurable feelings and subsequent 
satisfaction. The active urge for emancipation comes to the fore, as we have seen above, 
already in early phases of the separation-individuation process. Let us now explore the 
concept of transformation from a Freudian perspective. 
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1.14 To aspire to become…a psychological interpretation of transformation 
The structure of this discussion is based on Freudian concepts which are established in 
Appendix D. The bride-in-white may become visually transformed by adorning 
‘wedding white’, socially transformed from daughter to wife through the rite of passage 
of patriarchal exchange, however, what concerns us here are the pressures under which 
the bride becomes subject to a group of psychological transformations. Arguably, 
having found a degree of independence from parental authority, the question here is: 
what may constitute driving factors for a woman in early adulthood to give up relative 
independence in favour of becoming married? 
 
Psychodynamically, the bride’s wish to become a wife and mother may indicate an 
unconscious desire to replace an ‘active’ for a more homely lifestyle. In terms of 
libidinal desire Freud argues that the quantitative concept of the libido serves ‘as a 
measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of sexual excitation’ 
(SE7:217) and in the ‘development and transformation’ of instinct (SE17:128), which 
concerns a bodily stimulus that directs the organism towards ‘its pressure, its aim, its 
object and its source’ (SE14:122). In other words, the libidinal instinct dynamically 
submits to an internal pressure to transform, governed by the influence of ideas or 
phantasies of desire, tempered by psychical conflict. 
 
Laplanche and Pontalis, suggest that the aim of an instinct (or drive) ‘is to eliminate a 
state of tension…at the instinctual source; and it is in the object that the instinct may 
achieve its aim’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973:214). Freud illustrates cases where the 
transformation of instinct occurs, however, suggests that ‘it is only a baby that makes 
the transition from narcissistic self-love to object-love’ (SE17:129). Other instincts that 
may be transformed include, an ‘idea’ into ‘affects…especially anxiety’ (SE14:153); 
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‘scopophilia into exhibitionism’ (SE14:127); ‘sadism into masochism’ (SE14:132); 
‘love into hate’ (SE14:127); ‘loving into being loved’ (SE14:139); and a group of 
instincts that are transformed at ‘puberty’ including feeling beautiful, attractive and 
sensual (SE7:207-30). Freud suggests that transformations may be considered in terms 
of the ‘reversal of an instinct into its opposite’ revolving around ‘two different 
processes: a change from activity to passivity, and a reversal of its content’ (SE14:127). 
 
Freud argues that following the infant girl’s innate libidinal ‘bisexuality’ (SE22:114) 
and the infant girl’s libidinal ‘masculinity’ (SE22:115), illustrated by her 
‘aggressiveness in the sadistic-anal phase’ (SE22:118). The little girl’s task, early in the 
phallic phase, concerns the ‘leading erotogenic zone’, found in the clitoris, and ‘with the 
change to femininity…should wholly or in part’ be transferred to the vagina 
(SE22:118).  
 
Freud suggests that the girl’s Oedipal task, involves the change of attachment from 
mother to father (SE22:118). Freud asserts that the ‘castration complex’ comes into 
being on the infant girl’s ‘discovery of female castration [and] develops a powerful 
masculinity complex’ (SE22:129) which becomes a means by which the girl avoids ‘the 
wave of passivity’ (SE22:130). Freud claims that the infant girl then ‘should take her 
father as an object for some time and enter the Oedipus situation…[but] as a result of 
her inevitable disappointment from her father, she is driven to regress into her early 
masculinity complex’ (SE22:130). Freud asserts that ‘striving to be masculine (the 
struggle against passivity)…then succumbs to the momentous process of repression 
whose outcome…determines…a woman’s femininity’ (SE23:251). Freud argues that 
during this transformation towards ‘the construction of her femininity…the appeased 
wish for a penis is destined to be converted into a wish for a baby and for a husband, 
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who possesses a penis’ (SE23:251). Freud claims that in phantasy, the infant girl 
through ‘an identification with her mother…substitutes activity for passivity’ 
(SE22:128) and that the girl ‘is driven out of her attachment to her mother through the 
influence of her envy for the penis…in the absence of fear of castration…demolishes 
[the Oedipus complex] late [or] incompletely’ (SE22:129). Freud argues that as 
‘spontaneous ideas, phantasies and symptoms’ are ‘products of the unconscious [they] 
are ill-distinguished from one another and are easily interchangeable’ (SE17:128). 
Freud applies this theory to the concepts ‘faeces (money, gift), baby and penis which 
are often treated as if they were equivalent and could replace one another freely’ 
(SE17:128, original emphasis).  
 
Let us consider Freud’s theory through which the girl goes towards achieving 
femininity in terms of her unconscious transformation of instinct from an ‘active’ to a 
passive attitude. Freud suggests that ‘in women…the sexual life is regularly divided 
into two phases’: ‘a masculine character’, followed by one ‘specifically feminine’ 
(SE21:228) where ‘the young woman’s narcissistic masculinity [becomes] changed into 
femininity’ (SE17:130). Let us consider this transformation in terms of unconscious 
processes transforming active aims into passive ones.  
 
One way of understanding the infant girl’s libidinal transformation to passivity may be 
through envy, as explored above. That is, to desire, with emulation or rivalry, that which 
another is perceived as having due to a sense of deprivation. Freud asserts that if ‘the 
infantile wish, ‘envy for a penis’, becomes repressed it may result in a ‘masculine 
disposition’, while in other women ‘the wish for a penis is replaced by a wish for a 
baby’ (SE17:129). Freud concludes that ‘the ultimate outcome of the infantile ‘envy for 
a penis’ may ‘change into the wish for a man, and thus puts up with the man as an 
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appendage to the penis’ (SE17:129, original emphasis). Freud argues that ‘this 
transformation, therefore, turns an impulse which is hostile to the female sexual 
function into one which is favourable to it. Such women are in this way made capable of 
an erotic life based on the masculine type of object-love, which can exist alongside the 
feminine one proper, derived from narcissism’ (SE17:129).  
 
Another way of understanding the transformation to passivity may be through the 
woman’s desire to feel attractive. As cited earlier, Freud argues that the ‘active aim’ of 
the scopophilic instinct, active looking, ‘encourages the development of beauty in the 
sexual object’ and ‘remains the most frequent pathway along which libidinal excitation 
is aroused’ (SE7:156). Freud suggests that exhibitionism, the passive aim—to be looked 
at’ has been transformed by ‘reversal of content’ from ‘the active aim—to look at’ 
(SE14:127). Freud claims that ‘a woman’s identification with her mother’ in the pre-
Oedipal phase is where ‘her affectionate attachment to her mother [precipitates in] 
taking her as a model’ (SE22:134) and ‘in this identification…she acquires her 
attractiveness to a man’ (SE22:134).  
 
Mitchell emphasises that ‘with the end of the pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother for 
the girl…the psychological recognition of the sexual differences consists of…being 
castrated’ (Mitchell, 1974:115). Mitchell suggests that ‘in order to enter into her 
Oedipal desire for her father the girl has to salvage what is left of her sexual drive and 
devote it, most actively, to this passive aim of being loved’ (Mitchell, 1974:115). 
Mitchell asserts that this ‘transition from an active mother-attachment to a mother 
identification and the passive aim of father-attachment is the narcissistic wish to be 
loved rather than to love’ (Mitchell, 1974:116).  
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A third way of understanding transformation is of ‘love into hate’ (SE14:127) due to the 
infant girl’s frustration and rivalry with the mother. Freud agrees with Bleuler’s 
definition that ambivalence may be distinguished emotionally as an ‘oscillation between 
love and hate’ (SE14:131n2), and that ambivalence may be illustrated by the dynamic 
process between activity and passivity (SE14:131). Freud claims that ‘not until the 
genital organisation is established does love become the opposite of hate. Hate, as a 
relation to objects, is older than love. It derives from the narcissistic ego’s primordial 
repudiation of the external world with its outpouring of stimuli’ (SE14:139). 
 
Freud argues that love and hate originate from the premise that the mother becomes the 
girl’s first love-object, and from this intense attachment emerge five reproaches or 
‘disappointments’. ‘Her mother did not give her a proper penis’; ‘[she] remained 
unsated, as though [she] never sucked long enough at her mother’s breast’; she 
compelled her to share her mother’s love with others’; she never fulfilled all the girl’s 
expectations of love’; and ‘she first aroused her sexual activity and then forbade it’, 
resulting in ‘the girl’s final hostility’: ‘a hatred’: the state of loving and hating—
affective ‘ambivalence’ (SE21:234-5). British child psychoanalyst Adam Phillips, 
suggests that ‘the mother can satisfy the child’s need, but she can never fulfil the 
insatiable demand for love’ (Phillips, 2006:168). 
 
Freud maintains that erotic libidinal types are characterised as ‘those whose main 
interest…is turned towards love…but above all being loved’ (SE21:218, original 
emphasis). Freud suggests that what dominates, is ‘the fear of loss of love and [their] 
dependence on others who may withhold their love from them’ (SE21:218), and argues 
that a factor for this fear may be ‘in proportion to the amount of aggressiveness present’ 
(SE21:218). Freud claims that the obsessional type experiences the ‘predominance of 
 121	  
the super-ego where their conscience seems dominated by fear, [and] instead of fear of 
losing love, they seem self-reliant’ (SE21:218, original emphasis). Freud claims that the 
narcissistic type ‘has a large amount of aggressiveness [with] readiness for activity 
[where] loving is preferred above being loved’ (SE21:218, original emphasis). Freud 
asserts that ‘the third antithesis of loving, the transformation of loving into being loved, 
corresponds to the operation of the polarity of activity and passivity’ (SE14:139-40): 
(the three being ‘indifference, ‘hating, or ‘being loved’) (SE14:135n1). Freud claims 
that one ‘psychical peculiarity of mature femininity’ concerns the woman’s narcissism, 
and effects her choice of object, is ‘that to be loved is a stronger need for them than to 
love’, and posits this to be as a consequence of penis-envy, which is also influential in 
woman’s ‘physical vanity’ and a compensation for their sense of ‘sexual inferiority’ and 
castration (SE22:132). 
 
An audible sign of transformation, at the heart of the wedding ceremony, the bride 
publically responds, ‘I do’. Levine, interpreting Kristeva, suggests that:  
 
Discourse is a complex psychical affair that cannot be reduced to the 
dimension of grammatical categories, a dimension Kristeva calls symbolic. 
It also comprises the semiotic, which is extraneous to language, but in which 
the psychical representatives of the facts unfold, and with them, the 
dramaturgy of the desires, fears, and depressions that make sense to the 
child but that do not manage to enter the coded signification of everyday 
language. (Kristeva in Levine, 1992:293) 
 
While the bride’s experience in Church may be unfamiliar, the gravity of the vow 
becomes loaded with dramatic signification. Using the first-person personal pronoun ‘I’ 
defines the person, and the subject comes into being. ‘I do’, being in the present and 
future tense, may indicate that the bride imagines herself in the now and after. At this 
pivotal stage of transformation, the bride’s metamorphosis becomes complete when the 
Minister proclaims that the couple ‘are husband and wife’. 
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1.15 Summary of Part One 
We discover from the literature which has been examined that, in religious terms, the 
subject seems to have a need to appear acceptable to God and the group, particularly at 
significant times during the life-cycle.  
 
The Old Testament Hebrew’s story of Eve’s ejection from God’s presence due to 
disobedience, and the punishment meted down to the Gnostic inhabitants of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, highlights the human need for reconciliation with God. Whereas Eve may 
symbolise disobedience and ejection, the Virgin Mary’s obedience and acceptance has 
been hedged round with miraculous signs. Thus physical abstinence and spiritual purity, 
encapsulated in the New Testament figure of the Virgin Mary has been idealised. The 
Virgin Mary also becomes a model for the perfect mother figure, passively saying little 
except in acceptance. Thus it appears that women carry a huge level of responsibility for 
their own body and mind and the group’s survival. 
 
We discover in the literature that the need to be found or appear to be acceptable, and 
conforming to God’s will becomes enacted at significant times, as Jean Cooper suggests 
during the life-cycle such as at baptism, confirmation, marriage and at death. These 
events focus the mind and demonstrate acceptable attributes. These events, marked by 
the subject appearing in an ideal form, i.e., robed in white, can be conceived as ‘life-
crises’, generally happening once in a person’s life, where both the human right of 
passage and the main player(s) are hedged round by public ritual. 
 
After a period of time during which the young woman exercises sexual abstinence, and 
in Plato’s terms searches for her ‘other half’, the woman may desire to marry. We 
discover in the literature, that physical restraint, i.e. remaining a virgin, becomes central 
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to marriage in Church. Kristin Hendrickx cites the importance, to some modern bride’s-
to-be, to have hymenoplasty to ‘prove’ that they are virgins. Because of the bride-to-
be’s virgin status, she can choose to wear a white wedding dress with confidence as 
white symbolises purity. Like the Babylonian bride, the modern bride may be veiled, 
and appears as Adrienne Rich suggests ‘she-who-is-unto-herself’. While the bride is 
veiled she can be considered to be, in Winnicottian terms, in a transitional space, and 
regarded as Émile Durkheim suggests, ‘sacred’, thus protected from the contaminating 
gaze of the group regarded as ‘profane’. The bride-to-be’s head may be crowned with a 
ring of flowers symbolising, as Edwin James suggests, victory over the forces of evil. 
Therefore the main player is separated from the group because they symbolise a pure 
state.  
 
As Mary Douglas suggests, rituals are conducted in sacred places (the Church), by 
sacred people (the Minister), and involve, as Nancy Cott reminds us, dedicated words 
and responses, but are conducted in the presence of the group who implicitly give their 
agreement to the ceremony taking place. The group not only finds the main player(s) 
acceptable because of the effort they have put into personal restraint and attainment of 
status, but also accepts the outcome of the ritual, recognising the person’s transformed 
state. 
 
In secular terms we discover from the literature that marriage, a human right of passage 
may be understood, as Arnold van Gennep suggests, comprises a complex series of 
processes, of separation, transition, and incorporation. As Cott suggests the bride 
consensually enters into a marriage contract, where her identity changes, and into a 
legal institution of monogamy which is seen as being cohesive, promoting public order 
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and moral standards. The idealised bride not only undergoes this ritual for herself, but 
legitimises her change of status within the group. 
 
Arguably, women have been given in marriage since time immemorial, but this research 
asks, why do women marry in an Anglican Church and why in white? In addressing the 
first part of this question, we might turn to history for an answer. As Edward Yarnold 
suggests, from the fourth century, when the Church Fathers brought the ancient Hebrew 
and new Christian teachings together, thus combining the Old and New Testaments, and 
pronouncing upon the Immaculate state of the Virgin Mary, ecclesiastical authority, as 
The Venerable Bede suggests, extolled physical virginity and spiritual discipline, thus 
the church became the authority to pronounce on the status of virginity and 
monogamous marriage. Since King Henry VIII’s matrimonial crisis and the split from 
Rome in 1533, the Anglican Church has been the state authority to pronounce on 
marriage. 
 
As we consider why brides wear a white wedding dress I believe that we need to turn to 
psychoanalysis. As we have discovered from the literature, prior to Queen Victoria’s 
wedding in 1840, brides may have worn a pale blue dress to signify purity, as lapis 
lazuli was associated with the Virgin Mary. However, since 1840 brides have 
predominantly worn white arguably signifying their physical state of virginity. 
Psychoanalysis suggests that this pure, spotless, unblemished state is found embedded 
in the infant’s earliest ideal ego, which becomes an ego ideal and is reinforced by the 
idealisation of others, and projected onto the figure of the bride-in-white in an idealised 
form.  
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Psychoanalysis suggests that during the girl’s physical development she is required to 
experience a transformation of instinct, during the genital phase, from the clitoris which 
implies masculinity and activity, to the vagina, which implies femininity and passivity, 
precipitating penis envy. Psychologically the bride desires to be transformed from 
daughter to wife and onward to mother. The desire to become a mother may originate 
through an identification with, or idealisation of, the Virgin Mary, her own mother, or 
other role model, and a transformation of instinct. 
 
Wearing a white wedding dress on a bright summers day may visually attract the 
maximum amount of attention during this public ritual. As psychoanalysis suggests, the 
woman lacks (a penis), thus exhibitionism becomes a compensation for narcissistic 
wounds and a sense of castration. Thus the bride who wears white may feel phallic and 
powerful in compensation for her ‘lack’. 
 
The bride-in-white in receiving the maximum amount of attention from the group 
facilitates her repudiation from parental authority together with ameliorating separation 
anxiety. The attention from the group also legitimises the bride-in-white’s 
transformation of social status and her forming a new identity. Arguably, women wear 
white, and not men, because it is the woman who bears the legitimate progeny who in 
turn inherits. 
 
The bride-in-white, although consensually leaves home to marry another due to the 
incest prohibition, this process of separation, and repudiation of parental authority, and 
incorporation may be both exciting and traumatic. Thus the Church, the group and the 
ceremony ‘contain’ her anxiety during this change of status. 
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As we have seen, Freud’s life experiences include being a ‘favoured’ son of his mother, 
moving home, identifying with role models, changing his name, marrying and having 
children. Freud describes, however, through male eyes, reflecting values of his era and 
cultural bias, his understanding that mature people will enter into a heterosexual 
relationship and desire to marry (SE22:132-3). Freud believes that due to ‘the fact of her 
castration’, the woman acknowledges ‘the superiority of the male and her own 
inferiority’ (SE21:229), which can be understood as perpetuating misogyny. Freud also 
believes that ‘paternity is more important than maternity’, illustrated by ‘the child bears 
their father’s surname and become his heir’ (SE23:118). 
 
Although references are made in this text to ‘the bride’, ‘the girl’, ‘the daughter’, ‘the 
mother’ or ‘the father’, I am aware that this rather singular unitary entity appears 
inflexible. This singularity, often criticised in Freudian writing, as Nancy Chodorow 
suggests, is not intended to be universalising but represents a plumb-line against which 
each individual may be a appreciated for their complex individuality and multiplicity 
(Chodorow, 1994:2). 
 
Thus I have argued that psychoanalysis adds a significant dimension to the 
understanding of the subject’s experience. Instead of understanding human experience 
in terms of ritual and location, psychoanalysis examines the aetiology behind the 
idealised ritual by asking how these ideals originate in infancy and are enacted in 
adulthood, thus illuminate what may be embedded in the unconscious. We can suggest, 
therefore, that theoretically the four key psychoanalytic areas of ego ideal and 
idealisation, exhibitionism, repudiation, and transformation go towards illuminating the 
bride’s subjective experience. 
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PART TWO 
Methodology and methods: theory and practice 
 
In Part One literature which was considered relevant to the subjective experience of the 
bride-in-white was examined. Topics such as: the incest prohibition leading to rules 
governing exogamy, the ideal of wearing white during Christian ritual, Marionology, 
hymenology, and moral purity were explored. Also the tension between the individual 
and the group within a social and religious context and how psychoanalysis offers 
insight into the bride-in-white’s motivations, were critically discussed. 
 
In Part Two, the methodology and methods which facilitate the rigours of data 
assemblage, authenticity and analysing the participants’ feelings are examined, as the 
aim of this project concerns the investigation of not only an understanding of the 
conscious world of the participant, but also towards an indication of unconscious 
processes. In exploring the methodology appropriate to psychoanalytic investigation, 
philosophical and theoretical frames will be discussed, before exploring how this can be 
applied in practice. This frame, relevant to macro- and micro- analysis of data and case 
study methods, will be discussed. The participant group, the production of truth and 
knowledge, methods of data production and analysis, will also be examined. Seven key 
questions aid this investigation: What ontological, epistemological and philosophical 
stance seems appropriate for this project? What methods of analysis can be employed? 
What truth can be revealed during an interview? What method of data collection seems 
appropriate? What can this group of participants be expected to further our knowledge? 
How can a method be applied to data in search of knowledge? And, what are the 
limitations of this study? Let us first consider an appropriate approach to take. 
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2.1 Methodology 
The methodological approach used for this research into the lived experience is 
qualitative, as explored in Appendix D. An ontological stance accepts that ‘people exist 
within multiple horizons of meaning, as they strive to make sense of their experience, as 
constructed by their cultural, and historical context, as engaged in dialogue’ (McLeod, 
2001:28). Let us explore more closely this stance by discussing the positivist and 
empiricist stance.  
 
If a predominantly positivist stance were adopted it would suggest that it is 
straightforward to describe the relationship between objects, events and phenomena and 
our understanding of them. In theory, positivism emphasises that ‘the external world 
itself determines absolutely the one and only correct view that can be taken of it, 
independent of the process or circumstances of viewing’ (Kirk, 1986:14). In practice, 
the positivist’s epistemology claims to produce objective knowledge that is unbiased 
without the researcher’s personal vested interest being involved. One of the limitations 
of taking this stance is that observation and description alone are by necessity selective 
and therefore infer the research’s partiality (Chalmers, 1999: in Willig 2001:3). 
 
Alternatively an empiricist view can be taken. Empiricism, closely allied to positivism, 
in theory has its foundation in the assumption that knowledge of the world can be drawn 
from ‘the facts of experience’ (Chalmers, 1999 Ch1: in Willig 2001:3). That is, that 
sense perception forms the basis for the acquisition of knowledge, through a systematic 
collection and classification of observations and experiments, giving rise to more 
complex ideas and theories. In other words, theory is constructed to make sense of the 
observed and collected data. In practice, however, limitations to taking this stance 
suggest that sense perceptions cannot provide uncontaminated ‘facts’, as the researcher 
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is inevitably selective in how they observe, so emphasis is placed on the collection, and 
the analysis being grounded in the data. In summary, the ‘empirisist’ claims that all 
knowledge is grounded in the data. An empirisist position is adopted for this project as 
the brides’ statements form the focus for and analysis in Part Four of this investigation. 
Having established a methodological stance, let us now explore which method can best 
suit this research into the narrative of human experience. 
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2.2 Theory of data analysis 
From a range of methods let us consider which method best suits the data analysis. In 
her research into qualitative epistemologies, Carla Willig suggests that limitations of the 
inductive processes found in positivism and empiricism can be compared to the theory 
that the Austro-British philosopher Karl Popper advocates - deductivism. Popper argues 
that by induction it can be observed when ‘a’ follows ‘b’, however this does not obviate 
the exception. Popper therefore proposes that scientific truth can rely better on the 
process of deduction and falsification. As well as searching for evidence that confirms 
existing theory, deductivism also searches for this disconfirmation, or falsification, in an 
attempt to establish a ‘truth’. One of the limitations to deductivism seems that it does 
not allow for the overturning of existing knowledge and for new theories to emerge 
(Willig, 2001:4). 
 
An epistemological stance regarding ‘how, and what, can we know’, rather than taking 
a predominantly positivist or empiricist view, considers taking a more social 
constructivist perspective (Burr, 1995). The social constructionist has the advantage of 
attending to ‘human experience, including perception, which is mediated historically, 
culturally and linguistically’ (Willig, 2001:7). The limitations to this perspective, 
however, are that we can never really know anything; rather, there are ‘knowledges’ 
more than ‘knowledge’ (Willig, 2001:7). 
 
In addition to the above epistemological stance, is a hypothesis-testing deductive 
approach through experimentation and case study during phenomenological analysis 
through the application of hermeneutic enquiry, as explored in Appendix D. The 
limitations to this approach are that this may exclude people who are not familiar with 
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the full repertoire of theories and systems of interpretation. Let us now consider what 
data represents, its degree of robustness, its validity and reliability to express a ‘truth’. 
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2.3 Theory: in search of truth and knowledge 
In considering what kind of truth and knowledge may be revealed from gathered data let 
us now explore what might be considered as ‘truth’. In propounding philosophical 
ideas, Ludwig Wittgenstein concerns himself with the concepts of ‘true and false’ and 
argues that ‘what engages with the concept of truth (as with a cogwheel), is a 
proposition’ where the schema and construction of an English sentence has a subject 
and a predicate (Wittgenstein, 1953:52-3, original emphasis). Wittgenstein distinguishes 
between what we ‘see’ and a ‘likeness’ (Wittgenstein, 1953:193) and illustrates this 
with an image of a triangle which… 
can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as 
standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as 
an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the 
shorter side of the right angle, as a half parallelogram, and as various other 
things. (Wittgenstein, 1953:200) 
 
Hence ‘truth’ may mean different things by being interpreted in different ways. 
Addressing the status of truth and falsity Chris Hart argues that ‘the problem is…that 
factual statements can look very similar to non-factual statements’ (Hart, 1998:140). 
‘Truth’, however, requires a context. 
 
From a sociological perspective, Malcolm Williams suggests that qualitative research is 
‘often characterised as being concerned with the daily actions of people and the 
meanings they attach to their environments and relationships’ (Williams, 1996:9). Hart 
argues that as people live within ‘institutional frameworks’ they tend to think within 
these frames and ‘some things are accepted as true and other things, that are outside that 
way of thinking, are regarded as false’ (Hart, 1998:140).  Wendy Hollway, reader in 
gender relations and Tony Jefferson, criminologist, also suggest that ‘people are socially 
constructed subjects’: ‘psychosocial’ beings (Hollway, 2000:13). The implication being, 
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that the social researcher is required to pay due regard to what is counted as ‘truth’, who 
is entitled to voice it and in what context it is expressed.  
 
Acclaimed French social scientist, Michel Foucault, claims that since the Lateran 
Council in 1215 ‘Western societies have established the confession as one ‘highly 
valued technique’ we rely on for the production of truth’ (Foucault, 1976:58-9). In other 
words, ‘truth’ is established by interrogation. Foucault asserts that: 
the confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also 
the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power 
relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual 
presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority 
who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it. (Foucault, 
1976:61)  
 
For Foucault truth emerges through struggles and power relations, where ‘power 
produces knowledge’ and ‘that power and knowledge directly imply one another’ and it 
is, therefore, ‘these power-knowledge relations [that] are to be analysed’ (Foucault, 
1977:27). In English Law ‘truth’ is established through advocacy where the ‘truth’ is 
presented via prosecution and defence and is ultimately decided by judge and jury. 
Principally, in England, since King Henry II, and the Assize of Clarendon in 1186, the 
system of judge and jury has been adopted. On hearing the evidence, the jury 
deliberates to consider a verdict66. Hollway, citing Stanley and Wise (1983), feminist 
ontologists and epistemologists, argues that the search for truth may exhibit ‘unequal 
power relations in the interview, whether these are based on gender, race, class and/or 
something else’ (Hollway, 2000:30-31). This appears to support the sociologist James 
Scheurich’s claim that ‘it is doubtful that [any] power-free truth-game has ever existed’ 
(Scheurich, 1997:35). Hence, the oral exploration of personal feelings and desires, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 W.L.Warren (1973) Henry II, University of California Press. 
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are underpinned by the power relations fabricated by discourse, pervade many aspects 
of everyday life. 
 
Following the above exploration into what counts as ‘truth’, let us now explore four 
aspects regarding the ‘truth-game’ of data and knowledge production before considering 
the implications this has on the production of truth and knowledge and the dynamics 
between researcher and participant for this project by asking: What kind of power is 
inherent in psychoanalysis? Does psychoanalysis offer some kind of scientific 
knowledge? What kind of knowledge is psychoanalytic knowledge given the centrality 
of the unconscious? And, what kind of knowledge is this thesis contributing?  
 
Let us consider what kind of power is inherent within the psychoanalytic encounter by 
examining the perceived power invested in the therapist, power invested in the client, 
power within the therapeutic relationship, the power dynamics between therapist and 
governing organisation, and the power released during the therapeutic catharsis of loss. 
First, let us examine a sense of power with which the client may invest the therapist. 
 
From a psychoanalytic perspective Phyllis Greenacre suggests that the therapist may be 
experienced by the client as having power derived from the therapist’s role and status as 
someone whose knowledge is being accessed for the client’s benefit (Greenacre, 
1953:60). Nancy McWilliams recognises that although power itself may be understood 
as being morally neutral the therapist’s power can be applied positively or negatively, 
from ordinary thoughtfulness to a minor lapse or calamity, and can generate love, fear 
or foster change (McWilliams, 2004:150). McWilliams suggests that ‘both the virtues 
and the dangers of psychoanalytic therapy lie in the fact that the therapist is in a position 
of substantial emotional power’ (McWilliams, 2004:150).  
 135	  
 
McWilliams suggests that the psychotherapist may draw power to themselves by 
attending repeatedly and selectively to the client’s preoccupation. One reason for this, 
McWilliams suggests, can be that if the therapist is to modify the very powerful 
unconscious pathogenic voices that haunt the client’s inner world, the therapist may 
accrue a degree of power comparable to the client’s internalised objects (McWilliams, 
2004:152). McWilliams warns that as the analyst’s temperament may be to identify or 
empathise with the weak and relatively powerless, the analyst may need to guard 
against their own narcissistic feelings of grandiosity, omnipotence and seductions of 
power by being a sensitive containing clinician. One who wields appropriate authority 
within professional boundaries (McWilliams, 2004:155-6). 
 
Taking a different perspective regarding the use or misuse of power, the American 
psychoanalyst, Otto Kernberg differentiates between authority and authoritarianism. 
Kernberg argues that the use of authority in a social situation, when invested in 
leadership is the necessary exercise of power to carry out a task by influencing others in 
an adequate and legitimate way. Kernberg decries authoritarianism when it can be the 
illegitimate exercise of power beyond what is required to carry out the task. Kernberg 
defends legitimate authority, when he asserts that ‘all task performance implies the 
exercise of power and authority. In the social realm, the exercise of authority without 
adequate power leads to impotence, paralysis, breakdown, or failure of leadership 
results in chaos’ (Kernberg, 2004b:210). Kernberg also raises the issue of the 
psychoanalyst’s interpretation, based on ‘facts’ in the psychoanalytic situation, 
becoming an authoritarian imposition of the analyst’s view. Arguably, there is not only 
power invested in the therapist but the client may also have a sense of power. 
 
 136	  
A client can develop a powerful transference towards the analyst by idealising the 
analyst and by endowing them with power. Thus, a primary identification with powerful 
people, when one is an innocent dependant infant, may result in feelings of 
powerlessness (McWilliams, 2004:155). McWilliams recognises that the power 
imbalance can be experienced as acute when the client is expected to trust the therapist 
with the intimate domains of experience while their therapist discloses little except that 
which the surroundings in which they meet reveal (McWilliams, 2004:151). Kernberg 
warns that the psychoanalyst, in perpetuating a sense of anonymity, may invoke 
idealisations in the psychoanalytic relationship, thus transforming the analyst from 
being a ‘person without personality’ into an image of perfection thus reinforcing 
idealisations and the splitting off of the negative transference towards other authority 
figures (Kernberg, 2004b:206). 
 
From a clinical supervisor’s position, Sue Wheeler suggests that the relationship 
between the therapist and the client may be governed by powerful interpersonal 
dynamics, but being asymmetrical is unlike a social relationship. The therapeutic 
relationship is characterised by mutuality, interdependence and by shared goals to meet 
shared needs through a professional relationship that is characterised by empathic non-
possessiveness. The focus always remains, therefore, on the needs of the therapist to 
meet the needs of the client. Thus, the power dynamic favours enabling the client 
(Wheeler, 2001:142). 
 
Wheeler points out that some clients may project onto the therapist a sense of the 
therapist being all good, all wise and all-knowing so that the client overvalues the 
therapist and is blinded to their shortcomings. It is as if the ‘passive’ client gives away 
all their power to the therapist, while at the same time anxiously wishing to feed from 
the therapist’s objective wisdom and experience. This perceived power imbalance 
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requires the client to experience themselves as responsible for their own development in 
conjunction with the therapist (Wheeler, 2001:183). 
 
The client in psychotherapy may gain a sense of power through the process of 
bereavement and grieving. Losses from the beginning of life include: the loss of the 
symbiotic dyadic relationship with the primal mother due to the intrusion of the father 
as a whole object. The client, however, may gain a sense of power through, for 
example, identification with the phallic father. Loss of power may also include the 
internalisation of critical, punitive voices. Making sense of unbearable loss, the client 
may gain a sense of power through mourning and reparation, by integrating the traumas 
of the past, by creating a past with which they can live, and reconciling the 
irreconcilable. Gaining power over past loss, the client may be able to move into a 
future and not become arrested by the past. Thus liberation and freedom comes out of 
loss. Through personal psychotherapy, power comes to the client by means of their own 
personal discovery and a deeper knowledge of themselves. The psychoanalyst gains 
knowledge of the client through the transference, this knowledge when shared with the 
client shares the knowledge equally. 
 
In the collaborative psychoanalytic encounter authority is delegated by the client to the 
analyst to interpret, while the analyst in turn delegates aspects of authority to the client: 
the rule of ‘free association’ (Kernberg, 2004b:210). John Forrester suggests that the 
fundamental rule of psychoanalysis is ‘say it out aloud, whatsoever comes into your 
head’, thus revealing dreams, phantasy, unconscious motivations of desire, guilt, anger, 
and compulsions. Thus we ‘produce a configuration of desire, power and knowledge 
that exists ‘within’ us. The rules of the contract are drawn up between the analyst and 
the client thus conforming to the canons of scientific discursivity implied by the notion 
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of Reason that Foucault finds in the purified form of confession (Forrester, 1990:306). 
The psychoanalytic investigator John Forrester argues that words are instruments of 
power, they shape our relations and are inherent in knowledge thus liberate repression. 
We may understand psychoanalysis as therefore being the purest embodiment of 
knowledge-power (Forrester, 1990:308-10). 
 
Wheeler clarifies that the therapeutic relationship is framed by an agreement between 
analyst and client by time, place and activity. Thus, the client’s compliance with the 
therapist and the therapist’s compliance with the client on these issues becomes 
essential. Powerful dynamics, however, have the capacity to affect people, situations 
and decisions. Holloway describes five forms of power dynamic: ‘reward power’, where 
both people look for reward; ‘coercive power’, where both people fear punishment; 
‘legitimate power’, where there is trust in the professional delivery of a service; ‘expert 
power’, which is attributed by the client to the therapist because of their perceived 
mastery of knowledge and skills; and ‘referent power’, derived from the respective 
interpersonal attraction (Holloway, 1995:32, in Wheeler 2001:62). Thus power is 
seldom one sided. 
 
Wheeler recognises the oscillating power dynamics between therapist and client in the 
client’s need to demonstrate that they are engaging in the process with the therapist 
(Wheeler, 2001:82). Wheeler indicates that the therapist can be understood as being 
invested with a great deal of power as the client responds to their interpretations of what 
the client can bear and work with in terms of reflecting on what might be happening in 
the therapeutic relationship. This potentially exacerbates the considerable authority and 
influence the therapist may appear to have by virtue of their experience or apparent 
position in the therapeutic relationship (Wheeler, 2001:82). In considering the issue of 
power in psychoanalysis, one feature may be to help the client to find, embrace, and 
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expand their own sense of power. By the analysts’ surviving the intensity of negative 
feelings, the analyst demonstrates that the client’s power is not necessarily destructive 
(McWilliams, 2004:156). 
 
The erotic transference, that is, selectively falling in love with one’s analyst or client 
may invoke powerful feelings representing part of the therapeutic relationship. The 
psychoanalyst Daniel Shaw suggests that ‘at the heart of the psychoanalytic 
endeavour…is a search for love, for the sense of being loveable, for the remobilization 
of thwarted capacities to give love and to receive love’ (Shaw, 2003:275, in 
McWilliams 2004:158). In contrast Winnicott suggests that many patients need to 
invoke the therapist’s sincere hate before they can tolerate the therapist’s love. Feeling 
hate, as well as love, can be a more realistic combination of both positive and negative 
qualities in the other (Winnicott, 1947). 
 
Kernberg is aware that in the therapeutic relationship there can be a feminist critique in 
the enactment of patriarchal power within the male analyst and the female client 
relationship. This may also have resonance in traditional assumptions of sexual 
orientation, cultural and political orientations between client and analyst (Kernberg, 
2004b:208). 
 
Another area where power may influence the production of ‘truth’ may be in relation to 
an organisation. Wheeler is aware that if the therapist feels that excessive pressure is 
exerted by an organisation to demonstrate that the work is efficient in giving emotional 
support and creativity to the client, the therapist may become defensive and withdrawn. 
Thus if anxieties are raised in the therapist, they may feel intimidated which may result 
in projecting a negative transference as if they are experiencing a ‘critical parent’ 
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(Wheeler, 2001:82). In conclusion, power is seldom one-sided. The core conditions 
advocated by the person-centred approach of Carl Rogers being ‘empathic’, 
‘congruent’, and giving ‘unconditional positive regard’, arguably dominate when 
searching for the various aspects of truth (Rogers, 1980). Implications of the power 
dynamics during the research interviewing process will be discussed later in Part Two 
when exploring the issues relating to the transference and counter-transference 
phenomena between researcher and participant. 
 
Bearing in mind the researcher’s search for knowledge through the interviewing process 
with the participant let us now consider a second area regarding knowledge production 
and how psychoanalytic hypotheses and theories can or cannot be understood in terms 
of being scientific. In examining a variety of human behaviour Freud’s observations and 
examinations of human reported experience are brought under a scientific system of 
universal theoretical categories. For example, ten years after The Interpretation of 
Dreams (SE4&5), Freud describes how people choose their love-object, and believes 
his observations serve to justify ‘extending a strictly scientific treatment to the field of 
human love’ (SE11:165). Freud hypothesises that, a man may be strongly influenced by 
‘the psychical constellation connected with the mother’ and fall in love with a ‘mother-
surrogate’ (SE11:169). 
 
Freud, in defending his position on instincts, in 1915, admits that science requires to be 
built on clear and sharply defined basic concepts. Freud recognises that no science 
begins with such clear definitions, but the true beginning of scientific activity consists 
rather in describing phenomena and then proceeding to group, classify and correlate 
them67. Such ideas, which will later become the basic concepts of the science, are still 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The description of phenomena in searching for themes will be adopted in a case study approach to the 
participants’ interviews, in Appendix D. 
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more indispensable as the material is further worked over. In other words, the material 
of observation in the nature of conventions, become the basic scientific concepts upon 
which progressively increased precision and modification become serviceable to the 
advancement of knowledge. Freud compares his psychoanalytic investigations and 
observations to the science of physics’ own basic concepts, which were first established 
and then altered (SE14:117). Let us consider how Freudian hypotheses developed 
throughout Freud’s life-long investigations. 
 
Freud, drawing on Shaw’s play Man and Superman (1903), and by extrapolating from 
his psychoanalytic inquiry into unconscious mental processes, hypothesises two 
principles of mental functioning. The pleasure principle, that of avoiding the arousal of 
unpleasure, and the reality principle based on real circumstances in the external world. 
Both principles, Freud claims, form a basis for understanding human behaviour 
(SE12:223, n1). 
 
We find that, by 1914, Freud claims the ‘right of psychoanalysis to be valued as a 
science’ (SE14:58-9). Freud vigorously defends his psychoanalytic theories against 
Adler’s system, which in Freud’s opinion appears to be founded exclusively on the 
aggressive instinct, by arguing that focusing exclusively on aggression leaves no room 
in it for love (SE14:51). By 1933, however, Freud describes the destructive instinct or 
death instinct as being the opposite of Eros which encourages the growth of emotional 
ties between people (SE22:211). Freud also disagrees with Jung for ‘pushing into the 
background the sexual factor in psychoanalytic theory’ (SE14:58). Freud describes 
these as ‘irreconcilable scientific disagreements’ (SE14:51). 
 
By 1914, Freud, in discussing his theory of how the ego develops from its initial erotic 
instincts towards narcissism, claims that observation is the foundation of psychoanalytic 
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science. Equally, as in physics, basic notions concern, centres of force, attraction etc., 
which are scarcely less debatable than the corresponding notions in psychoanalysis 
(SE14:77). Freud again, by 1933, compares psychoanalysis with physics and chemistry. 
Freud cites scientific advances such as: Kepler’s discovery of the three laws of 
planetary motion in 1609; Newton’s analysis of light into the colours of the spectrum in 
1675 and the theory of gravitation in 1666; Lavoisier’s discovery of the role oxygen 
plays in combustion in 1774; Darwin’s theory of the origin of species in 1859; and 
Pierre and Marie Curie’s discovery of radium in 1898 (SE22:173) all of which Freud 
argues start by using hypotheses and theories which are subsequently amended. 
 
Freud asserts that his ‘first important discovery’ in 1917, was to ‘understand neurotic 
disorders’ and the significance attached to the sexual instincts. In other words, Freud 
argues ‘that neuroses are the specific disorders of the sexual function’, and the quality 
of the libido, in terms of discharging it through satisfaction, influenced by the fixations 
the libido has undergone in the course of its development. Although Freud recognises 
that human beings have other interests besides sexual ones, Freud proposes a 
‘universal’, libidinal theory of the neurosis, which moves from primary narcissism and 
the illusion of omnipotence and ego-libido to object-love and object-libido, including 
narcissistic wounding. Freud suggests that if the development develops morbid states, 
or feels paralysed, then therapeutic measures are in place for relieving them. Freud 
argues that there appears to be a ‘compulsion to repeat’ (SE22:106), also hypothesises 
that through observation ‘the experience of anxiety at birth [can] sow the seeds of all 
later neurotic disturbances’ (SE22:143).Thus, psychoanalytic theory sets out to explain, 
disorders of the mind or mental forces both conscious and unconscious in terms of 
mental processes and their resistances (SE17:137-43).  
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Freud suggests in 1933, that psychoanalysis is ‘a specialist science, or psychology of 
the unconscious’ (SE22:158). Freud continues to maintain that the intellect and the 
mind are objects for scientific research in exactly the same way as any non-human 
activities. Freud argues that if the psychoanalytic investigation of the intellectual and 
emotional functions of human beings are not included in science, then it will be seen 
that nothing is altered in the attitude of science as a whole, that no new sources of 
knowledge or methods of research have come into being. Freud argues therefore for a 
‘scientific spirit’, by asserting that: 
 
[scientific thought] must not be restricted or excluded by any thought 
applied to it. Scientific thinking takes an interest in things even if they are of 
no immediate, tangible use; it is concerned carefully to avoid individual 
factors and affective influences; it examines more strictly the 
trustworthiness of the sense-perceptions on which it bases its conclusions; it 
provides itself with new perceptions which cannot be obtained by everyday 
means and it isolates the determinants of these new experiences and 
experiments which are deliberately varied. Its endeavour is to arrive at 
correspondence with reality–that is to say, with what exists outside us and 
independently of us and, as experience has taught us, is decisive for the 
fulfilment or disappointment of our wishes. This correspondence with the 
real external world we call ‘truth’. It remains the aim of scientific work even 
if we leave the practical value of that work out of account. (SE22:170) 
 
Freud, forty years after The Interpretation of Dreams, describes psychical energies as 
being comprised of forces, mainly libido, which serves the purpose of the preservation 
of the species. Freud also advocates the study of instinct, and nervous energy, and the 
interpretation of unconscious psychical processes. Freud insists that his scientific work 
in psychology consists in translating unconscious processes into conscious ones, thus 
filling in the gaps of conscious perception (SE23:282-6). Freud describes ‘the fact of 
consciousness’ and psychical phenomena of conscious processes the constituents being 
our perceptions, ideas, memories, feelings, thought-processes and acts of volition, all 
form part of what is psychical. Freud also points to physical or somatic processes which 
appear to have ‘psychical sequences’ and therefore also have unconscious implications 
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(SE23:157-9). Freud asserts that psychoanalysis is a part of the mental science of 
psychology, a natural science. In other words, the science of psychoanalysis involves a 
comprehensive range of hypotheses. 
 
Challenging psychoanalysis’ right to be considered a science are Popper, Jacobs, Lacan 
and Forrester. As mentioned earlier, Popper suggests that there are three criteria for 
scientific credibility. A theory needs to be based on observations which are made under 
controlled conditions, thus limiting the influence of external variables. A theory must 
use clearly specified and identifiable concepts and must present hypotheses that are 
capable of being tested by replication or observation. And, a theory must not only be 
capable of being shown to be correct, but also of being proved wrong or refutable 
(Popper, 1959 [1934]). Jacobs suggests that although we may ‘observe’ the forces of the 
life or death instinct, it may never be possible to test or refute Freud’s ‘scientific’ 
hypothesis (Jacobs, 1992:110-11). Lacan, when suggesting that ‘if psychoanalysis can 
become a science (for it is not yet one) and if it is not to degenerate in technique (and 
perhaps that has already happened), we must reconsider the sense of its experience’ 
(Lacan, 1966:57). Forrester also suggests that in Freud’s earliest writings on 
psychoanalysis, Freud drew the analogy, at a time when he believed that telling the 
story and putting experiences into words amounted to a discharge of what has been 
dammed up by repression, that psychoanalysis is more like a religion than a science 
(Forrester, 1990:300). Thus, Popper challenges the robustness of psychoanalytic 
hypotheses, Jacobs challenges observations and the inferences that may be drawn from 
them, Lacan challenges the validity of the psychoanalytic experience, while Forrester 
suggests that psychoanalysis may be more an indoctrination and a belief. 
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In summary, what Freudian hypotheses seem to propose are a set of methods by which 
to study human behaviour. These hypotheses suggest that both conscious deliberate 
human behaviour and ‘acting out’ due to unconscious forces can be studied by the 
application of a particular way of understanding the workings of the mind and by the 
use of a particular range of concepts. The emphasis that human behaviour, however 
varied, seems to consistently lead back to reconfirming a universality of these 
hypotheses suggests that these hypotheses and concepts build a basis upon which 
natural science can be studied. Given the centrality of the unconscious in Freudian 
theory let us now consider a third area regarding the production of knowledge and the 
later analysis and interpretation of the participants’ data by asking: what kind of 
knowledge is psychoanalytic knowledge purporting to be? 
 
For Freud’s neurotic person psychoanalytic knowledge purports to offer ‘insight’. That 
being, when insightful knowledge is obtained, and ‘the task of filling up the gaps in the 
memory of childhood are successfully brought to light’ (SE15:201), then the person in 
the possession of that knowledge can transform their neurotic understanding of 
themselves. This implies that knowledge is power. Child psychoanalyst, Adam Phillips 
argues, however, that: 
if the neurotic sufferer is suffering from something that totally eludes 
knowing, and presumes that the person has the capacity for knowledge of 
this kind, but currently the person’s understanding of themselves lacks a 
certain understanding, then the analyst enables the person to know, and put 
into words, what they already know but have only forgotten due to 
defensive forces. (Phillips, 1995:5) 
 
In other words, the analyst’s task comprises of listening and understanding in a 
particular way which when put into different words enables insight to emerge. 
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Child and adult psychoanalyst, Melanie Klein observed the infant’s need to know and 
believes therefore that there is an ‘epistemophilic impulse’: an instinct to know (Klein, 
1975b:190-91). In other words, a person may be obsessed with knowing and 
remembering, however, ‘the person who does not know, or refuses to think, and forgets 
may feel safer and protected by ignorance’ (Phillips, 1995:9). Phillips argues that 
‘psychoanalysis cannot enable the person to know what they want, the person can only 
risk finding out and bear forbidden knowledge’ (Phillips, 1995:6). Arguably, this could 
include the Freudian hypothesis of Oedipal unconscious incestuous desire, which will 
be examined more fully in Parts Three and Four. Phillips suggests that ‘with Freud’s 
description of the unconscious, the person is no longer in search of wholeness, rather 
they are in search of good ways of bearing incompleteness: there is no solution for 
unconscious desire’ (Phillips, 1995:7). This is to suggest that, psychoanalytic insight 
can only be understood under certain circumstances and recognising its limitations. In 
contrast with philosophy, psychoanalytic hypotheses attempts to make a coherent 
argument for certain human behaviours which can be understood and acceptable. 
Phillips suggests, however, that ‘the psychoanalyst becomes an expert on the truths of 
uncertainty’ (Phillips, 1995:8). Let us now consider a fourth area regarding the 
production of knowledge pertinent to the gathering of participant data, by asking: what 
kind of knowledge is this thesis contributing? 
 
There are three kinds of knowledge that this thesis contributes to: historical, material, 
and psychological. Historical knowledge, arguably, refers to the individual’s personal 
childhood history which the analyst through their work gradually reconstructs. The 
individual’s historical knowledge is based on their subjective experience and their own 
interpretation, which forms a system of beliefs and modes of thinking, which in turn 
influence the individual’s approach to life and to which they respond through affects 
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and rational process. Material knowledge, on the other hand, refers to objective 
knowledge. To the individual, this is unknown. Objective knowledge becomes 
accessible through the discovery of the distortion of historical knowledge. 
 
Psychological knowledge, arguably, may only be reached by the analysis and 
interpretation of the distortion. The individual is bound to the distortion because we are 
all born in a state of prematurity, depending on the love and protection of those who 
watch over us until we can free ourselves from them. Psychological knowledge should 
therefore give us access to material objective knowledge about the ego. For example 
how the ego undergoes the influence of forces, passions of love and hate, which go 
beyond the ego’s week power and compel it to make compromises which always imply 
an inevitable distortion. The French psychoanalyst, André Green argues that ‘it may not 
be mere chance if the ego’s power is at its best when trying to understand and master 
inanimate objects of reality’ (Green, 1986:28). In other words, the ego may be at its best 
during the process of mastering psychological knowledge. 
 
The physicist, or ‘hard’ scientist, may argue that only an element, like H2o, that can be 
recognised and proved universally, which counts as being recognised as scientific. The 
astrophysicist may discover new ‘facts’ through observation and measurement about the 
universe, such as the ‘big bang’ theory, initially based on earlier hypotheses that are 
now considered as hard scientific truths. In a similar manner, the nuclear scientist may 
rely on chemical elements to interact with each other in such a manner as to create a 
consistent reaction, so too psychoanalytic theory suggests that given a certain set of 
human circumstances a certain outcome may be evoked. The psychoanalyst, or ‘soft’ 
scientist, recognises however, that psychoanalytic hypotheses do not guarantee the same 
level of measurement or certainty that the nuclear scientist requires, as the 
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psychoanalytic outcome seems more fluid as outcomes are susceptible to a number of 
variable human factors. Nevertheless, in a Freudian vein, arguably variable outcomes do 
not need to discredit psychoanalytic hypotheses. Psychoanalytic hypotheses based on an 
analysis of a phenomenon of human behaviour, ascertained by observation and 
examination, gathered from a disparate group of participants’ reported experience, may 
therefore be legitimately considered as a contribution to psychoanalytic knowledge. 
 
Let us now return to the issue of investigating ‘truth’. In the case of psychoanalysis, the 
subject’s discourse becomes interpreted in order to elucidate defences and unconscious 
processes. The process of unburdening and liberating enables the individual to make 
sense of their truth. While the psychoanalyst David Smith claims that ‘Freud was 
sensitive to the disjunction between phantasy and reality’ (Smith, 1999:145), for Freud, 
scientific thinking: 
is concerned carefully to avoid individual factors and affective influences; it 
examines more strictly the trustworthiness of the sense-perceptions on 
which it bases its conclusions; it provides itself with new perceptions which 
cannot be obtained by everyday means and it isolates the determinants of 
these new experiences in experiments which are deliberately varied. Its 
endeavour is to arrive at correspondence with reality… This correspondence 
with the real external world we call ‘truth’. (SE22:170)68   
 
Freud found, however, that when the ‘neurotic’ was presented with ‘reality’ they would 
rather ‘flee’ from the truth and abandon themselves to their phantasies (SE7:110). In 
other words, within the complexities of unconscious process and phantasy, on 
occasions, a barrier or defence may be erected to prevent the full recognition of a ‘real 
truth’. 
 
Psychoanalysis deals with another form of ‘truth’, the dynamics of emotion. The kind of 
truth Freud analyses through case studies of human experience consists of a composite: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See Author’s Note. 
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dream, phantasy, reality and resistances, filtered through the prism of childhood 
memory. For example ‘when the child was scarcely yet capable of speaking, effects 
would be produced of a compulsive character without themselves being consciously 
remembered’ (SE23:130). Freud perceives that a patient would exhibit a ‘delusion’ and 
‘contradiction’ of reality. As mentioned earlier, historical knowledge for Freud, 
‘consists in liberating the fragment of historical truth from its distortions’ (SE23:268). 
In other words, the liberation of ‘truth’ comes through interpretation enhanced by using 
the different voices emanating from: dream, phantasy, reality and resistances, as well as 
the childhood and adult voice. 
 
As Freudian ‘truth’ may be problematic, as it encompasses distortion through 
repression, the social researcher is required to look beyond what is purely vocalised. 
The question that may be raised here, is reality truth and phantasy fiction? Freud argues 
that: 
The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as 
much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as 
incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world 
by the communications of our sense organs. (SE5:613, original emphasis) 
 
Freud argues that, however problematic, unconscious material does provide sufficient 
substance on which to base a hypothesis. Having explored some forms of ‘truth’ let us 
now consider to what extent ‘truth’ can be objective. 
 
Whereas Hollway suggests that the object of clinical psychoanalysis may be considered 
to be the individual, couple or group, where ‘truth’ emanates from their lived 
experiences, detached objectivity is contentious if a positivist epistemology is adopted 
to secure knowledge and ‘truth’ by direct correspondence with observed events 
(Hollway, 2000:78). McLeod argues that qualitative enquiry into human experience 
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assumes that ‘reality is constructed and that there are many alternative understandings 
of reality’ (McLeod, 2001:6). 
 
Hollway, however, critiques the reliability of objectivity in psychoanalysis by asserting 
that: 
psychoanalysis has largely conceded that interpretation is an art and not a 
science and therefore psychoanalysts have been prepared to theorise issues 
like intuition, use of the analyst’s subjectivity, the role of emotion in 
thinking and the use of unconscious dynamics as a tool for knowledge. This 
has resulted in a tolerance for paradox and uncertainty. (Hollway, 2000:78) 
 
We can therefore understand that objective truth becomes filtered through individuals’ 
articulated story and through their emotional reactions to circumstances, and in addition 
in psychoanalytic research Jennifer Hunt suggests ‘pay particular attention to…how 
unconscious processes structure relations between researcher, subject and the data 
gathered’ (Hollway, 2000:78). Thus, objective truth may be modified through multiple 
personal affects that colour the angle from which their ‘truth’ is seen, including the 
researcher’s own subjectivity in how the ‘truth’ may be interpreted, filtered through 
their transference and counter-transference. That is, filtered through the subject’s and 
researcher’s whole unconscious reactions to the material. 
 
Postmodern thinking recognises that ‘truth’ is flexible, pliable, unstable and forever in a 
constant process of change. From a social scientist’s perspective, David Lyon suggests 
that a postmodern search for truth concerns the production of ‘multiple realities each 
articulated as discourses’ (Lyon, 1999:15). To come to this conclusion Lyon draws on 
Foucault who suggests that knowledge and truth are not necessarily fixed or replicable, 
but are ‘circulating, pliable discourses’ (Lyon, 1999:16). Lyon also paraphrases 
Derrida’s argument: ‘cultural life involves texts we produce, intersecting with other 
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texts that influence ours in ways we cannot ever unravel’ (Lyon, 1999:18). Lyon sees 
Derrida’s world of textuality being where:  
boundaries between knowledge and world, text and interpretation, no longer 
exist; the mind is always renewing and redefining the texts it tries to 
contain. This implies that science can no longer presume on logical 
coherence or the discoverability of truth…including social science. (Lyon, 
1999:19)  
 
Thus, the task of ‘deconstruction’ is to ‘raise persistent questions about our own texts 
and those of others, to deny that any text is settled or stable’ (Lyon, 1999:18).  
 
Lyon, in his search for valid notions of truth, also turns to another social scientist, Mike 
Featherstone, who argues that ‘the cultural sphere is not decentred so much as recentred 
today’ (Lyon, 1999:112). Lyon suggests that from the sociological perspective of 
Zygmunt Bauman, ‘truth’ can be found in a world where ‘either a new kind of society is 
coming into being’, or from the anthropologist’s position of David Harvey, a ‘new stage 
of capitalism is being inaugurated’ (Lyon, 1999:10). Lyon concludes that ‘once the text 
is out in the open it becomes extended by others’ interpretations, spiralling endlessly 
beyond all efforts that might be made to tether the text to truth or to fix its meaning’ 
(Lyon, 1999:18). Arguably, postmodernity, with its ever changing power balances and 
fluid cultural and social texts, appears to have brought about a new dimension to 
understanding discourse by providing it with an authenticity rather than being 
constrained to a repeatable, verifiable scientific model.  
 
Having explored some criteria for ‘truth’ production let us now consider the discovery 
of original ‘truth’ in the form of data, the people involved in the data production, its 
reliability, verification and social context. Similar to psychoanalytic exploration, social 
research searches for a truth in order to make sense of the world. Unlike the privacy of 
the psychotherapy session, however, the process of validating social interaction 
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addresses the public world. From a sociological perspective, Lindsay Prior claims that it 
might be assumed that the researcher finds themselves in ‘the presence of what we 
might call a knowing subject’ where the respondent readily divulges raw data at the 
researcher’s request (Prior, in Silverman, 1997:63). Taking this sociological perspective 
further David Silverman suggests that participants are not merely ‘passive vessels of 
answers’ or, ‘repositories of facts and related details of experience’; but they, like the 
interviewer, are equally practitioners of everyday life situated within an environment 
(Silverman, 1997:116). Silverman claims that ‘classically’ the interviewing process 
aims to be ‘non-directional and unbiased’ producing ‘unadulterated facts and details of 
experience’ by ‘providing an atmosphere conducive to open and undistorted 
communication’ (Silverman, 1997:116). Silverman argues that between a non-
directional, unbiased, neutral researcher and respondent sensitive, accurate experiential, 
uncontaminated information may be gathered (Silverman, 1997:116). Both the 
researcher and the respondent are, however, culturally inscribed, perpetuating their 
individual social bias and their individual transference and counter-transference. 
 
Although this methodology is clearly not quantitative, reliability and validity concerns 
must be addressed. Researching how psychotherapy can be reliably evaluated and 
critically assessed, John McLeod draws upon ‘epistemological principles that transcend 
any single methodological approach’ (McLeod, 2001:183) when he cites the American 
psychologist George Howard’s, six core epistemic values to assess data: 
predictive accuracy, ‘although some degree of inaccuracy should be 
tolerated’; internal coherence, where ‘a theory should hang 
together…having no logical inconsistencies or unexplained coincidences’; 
external consistency, when ‘the theory must be consistent with other 
theories and with scientific expectation’; unifying power, that is ‘the ability 
to bring together hitherto disparate areas of knowledge’; fertility, where 
‘theories…make correct, novel predictions and make powerful extensions of 
our knowledge base’; and simplicity. (Howard, 1985:257-8, original 
emphasis)  
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McLeod argues that these six epistemological principles, however good a guideline they 
are, are insufficient in themselves if qualitative research is undertaken using theory 
grounded in the data together with an interpretive framework, as the triangulation of 
data validity also needs to be taken into account, in order to incorporate a sense of 
‘quality control’ and establish credibility checks (McLeod, 2001:184). Credibility 
checks via triangulation can include peer evaluation and critique. However, McLeod 
draws on Michael Bloor who suggests that this method can be open to the peer group 
being intimidated ‘by the authority’ of the presentation and ‘inhibited from expressing 
their doubts and criticisms’ (McLeod, 2001:187). Another means of checking validity is 
to triangulate the researcher’s interpretation against a different informant (McLeod, 
2001:187), while being open to the ‘corroboration’ of findings and their ‘contradictions’ 
(Bloor, 1997:39), thus suggesting plausibility and trustworthiness of the researcher’s 
interpretations. The researcher can therefore aim to triangulate tentative interpretations 
between participants’ reported statements in order to attempt a validity check. 
 
McLeod recognises that reliability is conceptualised as a procedure to which the 
researcher rigorously holds and which subsequent researchers may follow. Reliability, 
however, is not ‘defined in terms of the possibility of obtaining the same results on two 
different occasions with different researchers’, nor is ‘reliability’ reliant on others 
obtaining the same results within a certain error variance (McLeod, 2001:182). In other 
words, ‘reliability’ becomes based on the ability to follow the procedure, and apply a 
framework for interpreting the data which adheres to the six core epistemic values and 
is clear and persuasive. McLeod asserts that ‘the personal qualities of the researcher’s 
integrity, courage, honesty and commitment to the task of enquiry, actually make a 
difference’ (McLeod, 2001:188). It may therefore be deduced that guarding against 
unacknowledged power dynamics distorting the process of gathering data becomes 
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important. On the assumption that distortion can occur, it is important that the 
researcher engages in self-reflection by consistently returning to the basic principles of 
the procedure inscribed in the six core epistemic values, as cited above, plus being 
reliable, plausible, trustworthy, and unbiased (McLeod, 2001:188). Having considered 
how the application of a procedure offers a reliable framework for interpreting data, let 
us now consider the context for producing original data. 
 
As already established, the participants in the reproduction of ‘truth’ are contextualised 
within social constraints. From a sociologist’s perspective, Ken Plummer asserts that 
‘story telling and story reading are indeed social inventions, fictions, fabrications…’ 
(Plummer, 1995:168). Plummer observes that:  
none of this means that people are lying, deceiving, cheating (although they 
could be)’… (but what is being said is) ‘in full conviction that ‘the truth’ is 
being told; others are defences, denials, repressions, lies’, (while) ‘some 
may be ‘false memories’ many are ‘screen memories’. (Plummer, 1995:168) 
 
Plummer’s opinion suggests that the story telling process is a necessary social construct. 
Plummer suggests that psychoanalytic interpretation concerns ‘hearing stories in which 
some kind of historical truth is dug out’, whereas Donald Spence, a psychoanalytic 
psychologist, sees the value of ‘narrative truth’ as being ‘what people say in the here 
and now: the work of stories in lives in the present’ (Plummer, 1995:171). In other 
words, Plummer appears to allow for unconscious process to emerge, whereas Spence 
seems to take the narrative more at face value. 
 
Arguably, the telling of ‘truth’ has several powerful dynamics. Truth-telling of everyday 
experience may be constrained by the social construct of what is generally recognised as 
‘safe’ and aligned with the group’s consensus. The speaking subject also has a need to 
vocalise the story, which in turn sets up a power differential between the perceived one 
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who knows and the judgement of what truth is acceptable by the one who listens. Once 
the data, or kind of ‘truth’, has been gathered, some sense of it has to be made. We will 
consider how ‘truth’ may be framed within the hermeneutic model later in Appendix D 
when the practice of phenomenological hermeneutics is explored. Let us now address 
methods of data collection. 
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2.4 Practice: methods of data collection and interviewing process 
Having discussed the frame for truth and knowledge production through the oscillating 
dynamics of the interviewing process, let us now consider the methods by which 
original data may be gathered and the researcher/participant interaction.  
 
In experimental psychology, the standard model for research has been the hypothesis-
driven double bind, randomised, control study, measuring the effects and interactions of 
independent and dependent variables. In contrast, phenomenological psychologists do 
not begin with a research hypothesis to be tested and proved/disproved (Kvale, 1983, 
1994, 1996). Making inferences from the study sample regarding the population for the 
purposes of prediction and control are not among the aims of this methodology (Giorgi, 
1985). 
 
My initial aim was not to give each participant a sole voice as in an individual case 
study, however, becoming aware that a whole interview could be helpful, some have 
been included in Appendix E. Here the aim is to produce a first-person descriptive 
account of a particular experience, such as ‘on being veiled’, so that these descriptions 
constitute the data which is subjected to phenomenological interpretation aided by a 
hermeneutic stance of inquiry and meaning making. That is, the bestowing of meaning, 
or rendering the interpretation more explicit from the subject’s perspective within a 
cultural, religious, or psychoanalytic frame. Qualitative methodology, emphasises the 
uncovering of meaning of the ‘other’ by developing a deeper knowledge of a 
phenomena through, close examination of, and emerging in, the data and reflexivity 
(McLeod, 2001:3). The process of qualitative methodology being inductive, allows the 
theory to be grounded in, and emerge from, the participants’ data, following the 
fourteen steps for phenomenological hermeneutic interpretation suggested by McLeod 
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(2001:41-2), and modified by Erikson’s (1958) search for ‘patterns’ of thinking and 
behaviour in the interview as a whole. 
 
The aim of qualitative data production is to gather personal salient narrative of some 
richness and depth facilitated by the researcher’s curiosity. The method of interviewing 
being open-ended, rather than challenging and interrogative. Within the hermeneutic 
frame let us consider various forms of data production utilising different interviewing 
techniques that produce different levels of data. First, if we were attempting to make a 
nation-wide survey, with general prediction, the quantitative methodology that gives the 
same answer whenever and wherever the questioning is carried out, known as a ‘ticked-
box survey’ and ‘quantified on a Likert scale’, would be considered (Kirk and Miller, 
1986, in Silverman, 1997:117). Quantitative methods are not considered apt for 
investigating subjective experience. A second method of data production could be the 
‘dynamic interview’ where ‘the focus is on how meaning is constructed, the 
circumstances of construction, and the meaningful linkages that are made for the 
occasion’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995, in Silverman, 1997:113ff). A limitation of the 
dynamic interview, if mainly focusing on the transference phenomena, would represent 
only one aspect of this investigation. A third method that would produce original data is 
by conversation which investigates ‘talk-in-interaction’ (Emanuel Schegloff), and which 
Wittgenstein describes as an activity to untangle the ‘knots’ in our complex thinking 
and would be subjected to ‘conversation analysis’ (Silverman, 1997:207-8). A 
limitation of conversation interviewing can be that data seems not readily comparable 
across participants.  
 
A fourth method of data production, can be the ‘psychoanalytic research interview’ 
which aims ‘to understand the psychodynamic meaning of different behaviours, 
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psychological processes, social actions, and life situations’ (Cartwright, 2004:209). 
Cartwright suggests that the psychoanalytic interviewer aims to facilitate an interview 
that uncovers unconscious meaning and intrapsychic processes. Duncan Cartwright 
argues that the psychoanalytically informed interviewer ‘can yield useful 
psychoanalytic insights about a particular research subject within the space of a few 
interviews’. Cartwright warns, however, that basic hermeneutic principles, often used to 
understand the research interview, are insufficient to understand unconscious meaning 
and intra-psychic processes. Cartwright advocates the ‘careful attention to feeling states, 
in the search for core narratives, and the exploration of identifications and object 
relations’ are the key tasks in the interview analysis (Cartwright, 2004:209). It may be 
concluded that the psychoanalytic interview becomes a rich source of knowledge if the 
interviewer pays attention to the transference and the counter-transference. Cartwright, 
however, makes the point that ‘psychoanalytic insights’ may only develop ‘within the 
space of a few interviews’. This was not possible in the case in this research project, as 
only one interview was undertaken, so the transference and the counter-transference 
require careful understanding and could therefore only be experienced in the immediacy 
during the interviewing process. None of these methods are to be confused with 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy, in which ‘interviews’ take place between ‘four to six 
times a week’, uses a couch, rather than face-to-face (McWilliams, 2004:64). Let us 
now consider the aspects of transference and counter-transference in more depth. 
 
In considering the transference Freud refers to it as a ‘phenomena’ (SE11:51), which he 
considers to be essential to psychoanalysis. Freud argues that the transference represents 
a repetition ‘[which] replaces an old object relationship and for the most part are 
unconscious’ (SE7:116). Freud believes on the ubiquity of the transference, as ‘it is 
everywhere’ (SE11:51) and that transference reactions offer an invaluable opportunity 
 159	  
to explore the inaccessible past (SE12:108) and ‘stir up resistances’ (SE12:101). Freud 
argues that what is being transferred in the form of affect and phantasy offers a link 
between current and repressed infant feelings and experiences, thus can be understood 
as a ‘pressure’ or compulsion to repeat (SE2:105n). However the transference and 
counter-transference are experienced, by the researcher and participant, the aim of the 
research encounter is to co-operate in the question and answer session, so a working 
alliance is required. 
 
In ‘salesmanship’ it may be said that ‘it is the first three minutes that count’ in a 
customer/salesman interaction. In other words, during the first three minutes important 
impressions may be formed. In contrast, Greenson suggests that in the development of a 
regular neurotic ‘working alliance’ ‘signs of the working alliance [emerge] at about the 
third to the sixth month of analysis’ (Greenson, 1967:203). However long it takes to 
establish a working réport, developing a ‘working alliance’ is important for containing 
disturbing affects and phantasies, and because the working alliance becomes the façade 
for the transference neurosis’ (Greenson, 1967:203).  
 
Melanie Klein concurs with Freud’s view, that the transference is ‘everywhere’ by 
emphasising the pervasiveness of the transference being ‘from the very beginning and 
throughout life’ (Klein, 1975a:48). The transference can therefore be understood as a 
‘continuing interaction between unconscious phantasy, defences, and experiences with 
external reality both in the past and in the present’ and that ‘unconscious phantasy 
underlies all thought, rational as well as irrational’ (Bott-Spillius, 1988:6). Socio-
cultural and gender issues, influenced by the feminist movement, may be considered a 
factor to the transference: such as the researcher is male and the participant female. 
Following Kleinian tradition, Betty Joseph suggests that the concept of transference can 
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be used as a ‘framework, in which something is always going on, where there is always 
movement and activity’ (Joseph, 1985:156). 
 
In contrast to Freud, Klein and Joseph, the British psychoanalyst Joseph Sandler argues 
that ‘it is a misconception and a simplification to imagine that all the patient’s material 
is transference’, thus ‘not everything brought by the patient to the analysis should be 
regarded as transference’ (Sandler, 1973:51). While Sandler acknowledges that 
particular aspects of relationships, especially of past relationships will emerge, Sandler 
warns, however, that it is important to distinguish between these rather than regard them 
all as being repetitions of past relationships to important figures (Sandler, 1973:58). The 
Kleinian psychoanalytic therapist Roy Schafer adds that ‘a more balanced view of the 
transference phenomena is to regard them as multidirectional in meaning rather than as 
simply regressive or repetitive’ (Shafer, 1977:335-62). Greenson emphasises that 
‘transference reactions’ must not only be a repetition of the past but ‘always 
inappropriate to the present’ (Greenson, 1967:152). Therefore, we could see repetitions 
as creating the past in the present, in a special way and under favourable conditions. 
 
In summary, both the participants’ and the researcher’s experiences are revived and 
transferred during a live interview and recorded in the participants’ narrative and the 
researcher’s notes. Whether the researcher and the participant experience a positive or 
hostile transference (SE12:97-108) it is the way in which the transference is negotiated 
between the two parties that enables the ‘working alliance’ of the research interview to 
function in whichever way it does.  
 
The German psychoanalyst Peter Wegner suggests that one of the responsibilities and 
difficulties the interviewer has, particularly during the initial psychoanalytic interview, 
concerns the interviewer’s counter-transference. Wegner points out that ‘apart from 
 161	  
‘free floating attention’ and ‘free floating responsiveness’ the diagnostic factor of ‘free 
floating introspectiveness’ also becomes important particularly at the beginning of a 
psychoanalytic interview (Wegner, 1992:286). In other words, introspectiveness implies 
reflexivity on the part of the researcher. 
 
Spence, however observes that what is discovered in the psychoanalytic process is not 
the historical fact of the actual past but a story or narrative of experience (Spence, 
1982). Thus, the interviews and the gathered data are not to be construed as pristine 
historical reconstructions but as narratives assembled over time to provide meaning to 
the subject’s experience. Methods of data production can be implemented by the 
methods discussed above, and some can be augmented by the use of a semi-structured 
questionnaire.  
 
Having explored, above, four methods which could be suitable to produce original 
narrative I now consider a fifth, suggested by the social researcher Alan Bryman, the 
‘semi-structured’ interview. This method is based around a pre-determined group of 
questions (Bryman, 2001:321), or ‘focused’ questions (Bryman, 2001:113) which could 
generate a cynosure for participants’ memories and be a frame and container for 
unexpected emotions. The researcher’s previous experience concerning lone 
participation revealed a reluctance to comprehensively complete the questionnaire, 
while an active conversation approach could produce much unstructured data, and may 
be more difficult for comparison. Following Merton (1956), cited in (Bryman, 
2001:113), the semi-structured focused interview, using open questions, leads towards 
the topic under investigation, and also gives structure and later comparative qualities to 
the data.  
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The use of semi-structured interviewing for the purpose of gathering, recording and 
examining data is assessed. As the semi-structured questionnaire offers structure and 
potential ease of comparison let us explore more closely the advantages and 
disadvantages of using a semi-structured questionnaire. The purpose of an interview is 
to generate specific qualitative information from a sample of the population to relevant 
specific issues, i.e., to probe for what is not known, and gain a range of insights. Close-
ended questions, as in ‘yes/no’ or ‘tick box’, characteristic of quantitative research is 
considered inappropriate for this project, as opposed to open-ended questions which 
facilitate the exploration of subjective human experience giving paragraph answers. The 
disadvantage of interpreting a number of answers to open-ended questions, in which 
respondents may have used widely divergent terminology, can be technically 
challenging and time consuming.  
 
Because of the difficulty of obtaining or giving additional clarification and information, 
careful questionnaire development is essential to ensure that questions will elicit 
sufficient information, and that the questions are clear and unambiguous. In particular, it 
becomes essential that the researcher examine closely the researcher’s objectives to 
clarify what specific items of information are required that can be reasonably obtained 
through a questionnaire approach. Furthermore, development of a quality questionnaire 
requires knowledge of the area being questioned and of the capability of respondents to 
provide the information required. It also requires that the researcher has enough 
understanding of the respondents to word questions so that they will be understood. 
Important in planning the questionnaire is its length. Ideally, the questionnaire should 
not be too long in order that the respondent does not loose interest but is able to engage 
in answering. Semi-structured interviewing may be treated as a guide, matrix or 
 163	  
framework which can be prepared beforehand. Semi structured interviewing may start 
and end with general questions.  
 
Strauss suggests that by asking the same questions to each participant the researcher has 
‘the opportunity of making a systematic comparison’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:95), thus 
the researcher can plan how to analyse the data. Semi-structured interviews offer an 
open framework which may be experienced by the participant as being less intrusive 
and may facilitate sensitive issues being discussed. Face-to-face interviewing allows for 
focused, conversational, two-way communication; i.e., information can be given and 
received with the minimum of disruption and additional information may be gathered 
when answers seem to begin to generate new ways of understanding or questions 
require clarification. Face-to-face interviewing can lead to a more in-depth data 
generation. 
 
Face-to-face interviewing may be considered as time consuming in securing consenting 
participants, conducting the interview, and in its transcription. Some participants may 
misunderstand the questions, which may limit the answers that are given.  Some 
respondents may offer biased answers because they consider that they are not being 
given the chance to give their opinion, because ‘suggested’ answers are implied in the 
focus of each question. Strauss suggests that the researcher could also bring with them 
biases, beliefs and assumptions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:97). Other participants may not 
wish to answer the question but answer it for the sake of answering and finishing the 
questionnaire, which may result in the researcher’s inability to determine if the answers 
are valid or not. If the respondent does not comprehend the question, or the overall 
theme of the questionnaire, there may be a tendency that the respondent will give up 
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answering it or they may guess which could lead to misrepresentation or reveal novel 
material. 
 
The male researcher researching female participants may be perceived as an ‘outsider’, 
and thus more objective. The researcher recognises that using both individual and group 
interviews can optimize the strengths of both, however, during this project only 
individual interviews were conducted. A summary of the collected data has not been 
compiled or offered to the participants for their feedback. The semi-structured 
questionnaire in practice will be discussed later in this section. Having argued that the 
psychoanalytic research interview enhanced by the use of a semi-structured 
questionnaire is the approach chosen for this project, let us now consider issues 
concerning the researcher’s reflexive process and remaining objective. 
 
For this project, therefore, qualitative methods have been chosen since they are 
considered to be compatible with investigating the ethnographic narrative of human 
experience and its subsequent interpretation. Qualitative methods in empirical research 
present opportunities for psychoanalytic theorists to understand the data from a different 
perspective than that allowed by natural science quantitative methods.  
 
The interviews that have been conducted, unlike psychoanalytic psychotherapy sessions 
where the discourse may be considered in terms of forming a therapeutic alliance, 
although within a momentary relationship of trust, focus on data production whilst also 
being aware of the transference and counter-transference, as this phenomenon may be 
considered as being ubiquitous. The interview objective concerns the participants’ 
retrospective recollection of their experience, with minimal interaction from the 
interviewer.  
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On reflection I have become aware that as a man I bring to these interviews the prospect 
that I will receive perhaps a different response from my interviewee than if the 
interview had been conducted by a woman. Being a male researcher, the female 
participant may be reluctant to speak deeply about certain issues, and therefore may feel 
more guarded. What I have learned from the project so far is that a wide range of 
emotions may be overtly expressed during the interviewing process. I found it 
increasingly evident as the interviews proceeded that a spectrum of emotions exhibited 
by the informant in response to the penetrating questions caused affects, which I had not 
anticipated. I should not have been surprised at this as I am explicitly enquiring into 
each participant’s feelings, which may have been suppressed during their experience. 
Thus it has to be recognised that my personal involvement in the data collection could 
include an element of counter-transference dynamics.  
 
During the interviewing process aspects of life-stories that result from these encounters 
appear to be equally informed by unconscious dynamics. Problematic for the researcher 
is how to remain alert to these dynamics and how such alertness can enrich subsequent 
understanding, while remaining detached, objective, yet containing. One of the salient 
concerns the researcher meets is their capacity to tolerate, and reflect upon, the subject’s 
material which ranges from happiness and laughter to sadness and tears within the 
interview and yet retain objectivity. These concerns require investigation during the 
analysis of the data which will be safeguarded by combining a three methodology 
rationale, utilising the principles of phenomenology, with the hermeneutic circle, and 
psychodynamic interpretation. Speaking from a sociologist’s perspective Michael Roper 
asserts that:  
reflexive accounts are also alert to ways in which considerations such as 
age, ethnicity, race, gender or class shape interactions within an interview 
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while there are also elements of desire, memory, and primitive conflicts—
realms of the psychoanalyst and are a fundamental feature of any such 
encounter—the unconscious material which, on both sides, is being brought 
into the relationship. (Roper, 2003:21) 
 
Roper argues that within the oral history interview, as a personal encounter, the 
researcher needs to be sensitive to the interplay of unconscious dynamics between the 
two participants as the ‘interview usually involves the recollection of early experiences 
with primary figures such as parents and siblings, about whom there are often deep and 
unresolved feelings’ (Roper, 2003:21). Having considered some practical key issues 
concerning the collection of data and the process of interviewing, let us now examine 
the group of purposeful agents who supplied their statements. 
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2.5 The group of participants 
Having discussed how subjective experience can be described as having multiple 
meanings, be potentially biased, partial, and how sense perceptions may contaminate 
facts, let us now consider the consenting participants who contribute their pertinent 
subjective experience. 
 
As is customary in setting up an investigation, participants known as ‘purposeful 
agents’, as opposed to a randomised selection, are carefully selected, with the 
expectation that they will be able to provide data that is apposite to the research and are 
presumed to have certain experiences in common (McLeod, 2001:72). Thus, some 
participants known to me through my business as a wedding photographer were invited, 
together with some others. A number of other characteristics were common to all, the 
criteria of which was that the participants were brides, who purposely adorned ‘wedding 
white’, married in an Anglican Church, and either married within six months of the 
interview or over ten years previously. The ethnicity of the participants was not crucial, 
but the subjects who participated can be classified as being ‘White British’. 
 
Following McLeod, ‘a group of people…that exemplify different facets of the 
phenomenon’ were invited to participate, anticipating that the participants would be 
capable of producing in-depth material with the minimum of dependence upon the 
researcher’s interventions (McLeod, 2001:72). Each person had previously been asked 
in writing if they would be prepared to participate in this investigation and each person 
was informed that this investigation focused on their personal feelings as the aim was to 
collect information concerning their personal experiences on their wedding day. A form 
in duplicate was presented, requesting each participant to nominate a pseudonym, the 
interviewee signing an agreement to participate and the interviewer confirming the 
academic project and commitment to confidentiality (see Appendix A), the participant 
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retaining the duplicate. Freud suggests that a ‘pseudonym’, a mechanism of disguising 
and camouflaging aspects of the story in order to protect identity, seems an appropriate 
mechanism to safeguard confidentiality (SE7:21). That is, the use of disguise 
compromises neither participant nor scientific integrity. 
 
Based on McLeod’s suggestion that ‘research may be carried out on data-sets collected 
from eight to twenty informants’, this study adopts this approach (McLeod, 2001:72). 
Seventeen participants were interviewed and a phenomenological research strategy was 
employed to identify both thematic material and a general structure for the experience. 
It is expected that the participants’ experiences share many of the same features 
reflected in the literature review. Except for material gathered in the written responses 
of brides to a questionnaire conducted during my M.A. Psychoanalytic Studies 2001 
entitled The Process of the Bride-in-White Through a Psychoanalytic Lens, there 
appears to be an absence of previous surveys and studies from which to draw. The 
group of participants were chosen, first because they were a group I had previously 
studied during my M.A. studies and now wished to explore in greater detail. Second, as 
a group, they were readily available to me, a practicing wedding photographer, and each 
of the above participants was new to this project. 
 
A summary of the group of participants, using a reference number and pseudonym 
follows:  
 169	  
8 brides interviewed within six months of having been married:  
 
  Wedding Age on Wedding Year  
Pseudonym  Date   wedding day  location interviewed 
01Sue  08.01.2005 19  Sussex    2005 
02Louise 17.07.2004 22  Kent    2004 
03Lucy 26.06.2004 36  London   2004 
04Sis  21.05.2005 38  London   2005 
05Liz  14.05.2005 40  Kent    2005 
06Debbie 21.08.2004 43  Sussex    2004 
07Elizabeth* 19.06.2004 47  London   2004 
08Resaria* 24.04.2004 48  Kent    2004 
 
9 brides interviewed, over ten years after they were married: 
 
09Pam  25.03.1978 19  Essex    2004 
10Rose* …1962 21  West Midlands  2004 
11Francis 31.10.1960’s 21  Hertfordshire    2006 
12Ann* …1969 22  London   2004 
13Patricia …1966 22  London      2004 
14Margaret 05.10.1957 25  Surrey    2005 
15Freesia 30.03.1959 26  Cheshire   2005 
16AnnC 09.07.1994 30  Sussex     2005 
17Ros  27.07.1968 33  London      2005 
 
* Following the pilot interviews the questionnaire style was amended  
 
My initial concern was there could be a lack of homogeneity within this sample because 
although all the participants were women who wore a white dress and married in an 
Anglican Church in England, there may have been cultural differences that I was 
unaware of. As the French psychoanalyst Roger Perron in evaluating the effectiveness 
of treatments argues, ‘the illusion of homogeneity in a qualitative study, does not 
guarantee that the group of participants selected are actually comparable’ (Perron, 
2006:929). On reflection, the lack of homogeneity could be an advantage. Furthermore, 
a variety of approaches could add to the richness of the material, for example the use of 
comparison in order to generate dimensional levels and where a varied representative of 
people, places and times becomes the source for data (McLeod, 2001:187). From this 
selection of participants therefore generalisations may be drawn, comparisons made, 
and themes emerge from which to hypothesise how the bride-in-white feels. Founded 
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on deep levels of the psyche this may have resonance for other brides-in-white that 
typify conventional marriage ceremonies within the Western economy. 
 
The participants’ average age reflects evidence indicated by The Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) of those marrying in England and Wales. The participants’ average age 
in the first cohort is 36.6 years and in the second 24.33 years: ONS shows that in 2001 
(Marriages Series FM2 no.29:20) the ‘mode’, that is, the maximum number of 
instances, age was 27 years old, and in 1991 (Marriages Series FM2 no.19:12) the mode 
age was 23. ONS indicates that of the total of all brides of all ages marrying in 1991 
(Marriages Series FM2 no.29:58) (306,756), 33.5 per cent (102,840 brides) were 
married in the Anglican Church, compared with 50.7 per cent of all brides being 
married with a religious ceremony. 1992 was the first year when civil ceremonies 
(156,967) were greater than religious ceremonies of all kinds (154,597). ONS 
(Marriages Series FM2 no.29:58) indicates that of the total of all brides of all ages 
marrying in 2001 (249,227), 24.4 per cent (60,878 brides) were married in the Anglican 
Church, compared with 35.7 per cent of all brides being married with a religious 
ceremony, and 64.3 per cent brides choosing a civil ceremony. Having introduced the 
source of the data let us now examine the interviewing process. 
 
Of the eight brides who married within six months prior to interview, the initial contact 
was soon after their wedding: no personal characteristics seem to be common. Of the 
nine brides who married over ten years prior to interview, there was a more random 
sampling. Some of the participants were the mothers of recent brides, one was a 
counsellor, one a psychotherapist, three had attended Cambridge University, while 
others were acquaintances. The manner in which I have characterised these participants 
may or may not become a matter of relevance during the analysis in Part Four. Thus, a 
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wide cross section of participants became the source of this data. The reason for having 
two groupings was to look for a range of age, era and personal understanding of the 
experience and have the opportunity to develop a longitudinal analysis. This gives the 
opportunity to make comparison, while remaining open to finding that both groups have 
similarities, stark or subtle differences in cultural background. A small sample approach 
was used in order to develop a deep and intimate understanding of the topic. As already 
mentioned, quantitative statistical methods are not primarily employed as they are not 
considered appropriate for a small sample size. 
 
The interview opened with the researcher obtaining informed consent from the 
participant, after which the audio-recorder was turned on and the interviewer opened 
with the following statement: ‘Being a bride dressed in white and marrying in an 
Anglican Church, on your wedding day, is arguably a very emotional time. It is the 
memory of these emotions I would like to explore with you’. After setting the scene 
with the initial statement the interview proceeded using a framework based around the 
semi-structured open questions which were addressed in sequence to facilitate 
comparison and analysis, while remaining open to completely novel material should this 
arise. During the interviewing process the interviewer attempted to remain unobtrusive, 
asking questions to clarify, deepen or draw the participant back to themes already 
mentioned and asking for further thoughts, feelings or elaboration. The primary aim of 
the interviewer was to create an atmosphere of safety and curiosity in order for the 
participant to explore, in the greatest possible depth, her personal experience. Interviews 
lasted between forty-five and one-hundred-and-twenty minutes. The open-ended nature 
of the interviews was decided in advance to allow the participant to exhaust her account 
of the experience without feeling rushed or prematurely foreclosing the opportunity for 
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emerging data. The participant terminated interview when they determined that their 
experience had been sufficiently elaborated. 
 
The researcher made written notes immediately after each interview to record any 
observable non-verbal communications, and, where appropriate feelings and initial 
impression as to the value of the interview material. The following illustrates this:   
having made my first pilot, the interview felt spontaneous but somewhat 
unstructured and I wondered how the data could later be analysed. On 
reviewing the interview I felt sad over the degree of loss, separation and 
death which interplays in the bride’s experience. 
 
In this way a sense of strongly expressed emotion becomes apparent from the outset. 
 
Following the first interview, which was conducted in a conversational style, after 
reflection a semi-structured questionnaire was chosen in order to offer the chance to 
compare and contrast responses more readily. As already suggested, as the semi-
structured questionnaire offers structure and potential ease of comparison this approach 
was adopted for the production of original data and twenty-two questions were 
developed for use (see Appendix B).  
 
Following the first interview, a pilot study comprising four interviews, two from each 
era, allowed the interviewer to become alert to preconceptions or unexpected difficulties 
with the research questionnaire and interview technique, thus offering the opportunity to 
make corrections to the procedure. After completion and transcription of the pilot 
interviews and further reflection it was considered that if the questions were asked in a 
different sequence, at a slower pace, phrased and grouped differently the interview 
would produce a more coherent response from the participant, i.e. keeping all the 
questions associated with the dress together and leaving the question associated with 
‘white and purity’ until afterwards, further research subjects were approached. Data 
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from the pilot subjects are included in the thematic analysis. Again after the project was 
briefly explained, informed consent obtained and a pseudonym nominated by the 
participant, an audiotaped interview was conducted with each participant alone, in a 
confidential setting, except for one joint interview of a recent bride and her mother. 
Interviews were undertaken between 2004 and 2006, the former group having married 
in South-East England and the latter from a wider South of England catchment.  
 
The group of white British women that comprise the participants to this study married 
in one of ‘some 47,000 Churches in Britain, medieval embodiments of local identity 
and cultural heritage of a once vibrant faith’ (Leader, 2011, 16 April:2). Thus the 
chosen group of participants, marrying mainly in the South-East of England, may be 
understood as relatively conforming to or complying with local and national, cultural 
and historical British Anglican values and traditions. 
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2.6 Practice: applying phenomenological hermeneutics  
An examination of how phenomenological hermeneutics can be applied to the collected 
data in the search for, and establishing dominant, themes, will be explored in Appendix 
D, where the bride-in-white’s subjective experience will be examined. Six case studies 
will also be considered, as well as a closer reading of Ann’s interview. In order to guard 
against researcher interpretation bias, of fitting psychoanalytic concepts to the 
statements and making the statements fit psychoanalytic theory, further ‘whole 
interviews’ with some psychoanalytic interpretations are explored in Appendix E.  
 
 175	  
2.7 Limitations of the study 
As already discussed in Part Two, limitations of this study include accepting Freud’s 
descriptive, rather than predictive, theory of the unconscious, the id, the ego, the 
superego, the libido and defence mechanisms, despite not being able to prove them false 
using ‘hard science’. Critiqued, because Freud’s theories of female psychological 
development are limited to case studies and direct observations of mostly Viennese 
middle-class women during the late nineteenth century, coloured by Victorian values, 
his observations and interpretations, as we have explored, are open to bias and 
partiality. 
 
Limitations also include participant sample size and therefore restriction of participants’ 
experience, researcher participant selection bias, and researcher focal question bias. The 
sample size, however, gives the opportunity to examine more closely the data, as the 
aim of this project excludes making global prediction. Researcher interpretation has, to 
some extent, been limited by the use of triangulation, between participants’ data in 
Appendix D., E., and in Part Four, in order to increase confidence, credibility and 
plausibility. This study has also been limited to interpreting data that has not been 
subjected to the participant’s group reflections and critiques, which may offer increased 
insight. 
 
Part Two aimed to explore the methodology and methods by which analysis of the data 
may be made, taking into account issues of validity, reliability and resonance that form 
the basis of this psychoanalytic research. Part Three will investigate the infant girl’s 
psychological development, using Oedipal theory, to illuminate the structuring of the 
personality, the orientation of libidinal desire and unconscious dynamic processes which 
form a basis upon which psychoanalytic concepts can be used to inform interpretation. 
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PART THREE 
The infant girl’s psychological development 
3.1 A Freudian and post-Freudian model with relevance to the bride’s experience 
I will now investigate the infant girl’s psychological development. First, by examining 
Freud’s psychic structure of the mind, as this forms the foundation of Freudian thought. 
Second, in terms of the Oedipus complex as the essence of the Greek myth Oedipus 
forms the core of Freudian theory. Third, by exploring the use of clothes, as clothes are 
significant to both infant and adult. I am aware that by adopting this approach there may 
be some repetition from Part One, during the exploration of the overarching themes. 
This ‘inevitable repetition’ (SE21:227), however, can be understood as reflecting the 
application of hermeneutic theory and the oscillation that the infant girl experiences 
during her psychological development, particularly in relationship to her primary 
objects. Let us now investigate the psychoanalytic assumption of the psychic structure 
of the mind.  
 
Freud’s training disposed him to think of mental life in terms of energy or instinctual 
drives and their control or modification (vicissitudes), and his discoveries with patients 
confronted him with evidence concerning the psychic organisation which he describes 
under three main themes, dynamic, economic and topographical. Freud believes that the 
‘dynamic of mental processes concerns the instincts which are characterised as 
possessing an immense (somatic) store of power (i.e., the compulsion to repeat)’ which 
go towards a) Eros ‘which strives for an ever closer union’ and, b) Thanatos ‘which 
leads towards the dissolution of what is living’ (SE20:265, original emphasis). Freud’s 
view of the economic concerns ‘the mental representatives of the instincts have a charge 
of definite quantities of energy’ which are then hindered by defences and regulated by 
the ‘pleasure-unpleasure principle’, and in turn are modified by the ‘reality principle’ 
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when the subject ‘learns to postpone the pleasure of satisfaction’ and gains the capacity 
to tolerate unpleasure (SE20:266, original emphasis). Freud’s topographical structure of 
the mental apparatus distinguishes between unconscious, preconscious and conscious, 
and three agencies: ‘composed of an ‘id’, ‘das Es, ‘the It’, which is the repository of the 
repressed instinctual impulses; of the personable ‘ego’, which is modified by the 
influence of the external world; and of a part or subdivision of itself, the ‘super-ego’ 
which dominates the ego’ (SE20:266, original emphasis). Within this frame, Freud 
considers that the earliest moments of a child’s life have a lasting impact on the 
resulting adult (SE16:362). Freud asserts that ‘on the psychical side the process of 
finding an object…preparations have been made from earliest childhood’ (SE7:222) and 
the infant girl’s psychosexual journey to what Freud considers the ‘final normal female 
attitude’ is a complex and ‘circuitous’ one, (SE21:230), which arguably has brought the 
bride to the altar at this moment of exchange. Let us now examine Freudian libidinal 
theory. 
 
Freud argues that libidinally the infant is born with an innate ‘bisexual’ (SE7:143) and 
‘polymorphously perverse disposition’ (SE7:191)69 where the infant girl’s sexuality is 
without object and where she has ‘freedom to range equally over male and female 
objects’ (SE7:145n). Freud claims that ‘in childhood the sexual instinct is not unified 
and is at first without an object, (termed auto-erotic)’ (SE7:233). By forming an 
‘anaclitic attachment’ (SE14:87), leaning on the ego instincts, loving the one who feeds, 
cares for, and protects, the infant girl is able to experience, within a contained maternal 
environment, sadistic-anal impulses which do not destroy the object and where the 
infant girl is able to pursue erotic loving feelings. This is in contradistinction to a self-
centred, ideal ego, narcissistic object-choice (SE14:88). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Freud suggests that young children are, by nature, ‘polymorphously perverse’, which is to say, they can 
display inchoate sexual tendencies that adults would regard as perverse. Education however quickly 
suppresses infantile sexuality but it is retained in the unconscious mind, (source: The Freud Museum). 
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Freud suggests that sexual instinctual forces which power the libido predominate in 
three developmental phases, under the primacy of an erogenous zone: oral, anal and 
genital. Freud asserts that the first developmental phase comprises the oral-erotic 
organisation led by the mouth, with its ‘cannibalistic’ preoccupation of ‘the 
incorporation of the object’ which becomes ‘the prototype of a process which, in the 
form of identification’ later plays a significant psychological role (SE7:198). The oral-
sadistic phase is characterised by cannibalistic ‘devouring’ (SE14:250). Freud’s second 
pre-genital phase is the sadistic-anal organisation (SE7:198) where aggression becomes 
heightened following weaning, with excreta being the psychic vehicle of projection, and 
when repressed, leads to a masochistic passive aim characterised by being either 
expulsive or retentive70 (SE22:116). Freud suggests that character traits of anal erotism 
include being ‘orderly, parsimonious and obstinate’ (SE9:169). Freud argues that during 
the sadistic-anal phase the infant girl’s aggressive impulses display an ‘abundance and 
violence’ to such a degree it seems as though, ‘the infant girl is a little man’ 
(SE22:118). Freud indicates that a psychic bisexuality with active and passive aims 
comes about through the prolonged and intense daughter/mother relationship switching 
to the ‘woman’s strong dependence on her father’ (SE21:227). Freud’s third libidinal 
phase is the genital stage, where the sensitivity of the clitoris gives way to the vagina, 
(SE22:118) and ‘her clitoridal activity takes refuge in an identification with the phallic 
mother or father’ (SE22:130). This identification is dominated by envy for the father’s 
penis and jealousy over the mother’s sexual relation and possession of the father. Freud 
concludes that femininity is characterised as being ‘masochistic’ and ‘giving preference 
to passive aims’, as opposed to masculine active aims (SE22:115). Let us now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Karl  Abraham (1924) Short study of the development of the libido. In Selected Papers on Psycho-
Analysis, London 1927, Chap. 26. 
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investigate the psychoanalytic assumption of the infant girl’s Oedipal relation to the 
mother and the father. 
 
Oedipal theory can be understood in three parts, first, the pre-Oedipal phase, second, the 
Oedipal conflict and resolution, and third, due to its multi-layering, its effect into 
adulthood. While the infant girl’s pre-Oedipal phase is marked by an intense two-person 
attachment with the mother, the Oedipus complex is marked by hostility towards the 
mother and a turning towards the father. Let us now examine the infant girl’s 
relationship with her mother prior to the experience of triangularity. 
 
Freud’s Trieb instinct/drive theory and developmental stage model will be used to 
revisit the pre-Oedipal phase of principally a two-person relationship. The pre-Oedipal 
phase of infant development, which in Freudian terms is the ‘absence of the Oedipal 
triangle’ (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973:328), covers the oral and anal-sadistic phases of 
development lasting approximately up to three years of age. This phase, characterised 
by an interpersonal situation, develops from the biological mother-child interaction 
where initially the mother’s body seems to be experienced as an extension of the 
infant’s own. The infant girl’s maternal attachment is first understood as being of a part-
object status, i.e. ‘the mother’s breast’ (SE7:52), before experiencing the mother as a 
whole object. Influencing factors that contribute to this first relationship are the 
mother’s own nature, including her own repressed unconscious, the infant girl’s 
‘hereditary’ (SE7:173), instinctual and ego development, the maturation of the affects, 
early identifications with the mother and the mutual influence of all these factors. The 
prominent Dutch psychoanalyst and last survivor of Freud’s era Jeanne Lample-de 
Groot emphasises that ‘disturbances in the first mother-child relationship can result in 
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psychical fixation points, ranging from slight neurotic fears to grave inhibitions in 
instinctual, emotional, and ego development’ (Lampl-de Groot, 1952:335). 
 
Freudian theory of female development appears to privilege adult heterosexuality71. 
Freud’s use of the adjective ‘positive’ indicating a heterosexual object-choice, whereas 
‘negative’ indicates a homosexual object-choice. Freud suggests that during the pre-
Oedipal phase, or ‘negative complex’, the infant girl’s relationship is an ‘exclusive’, 
‘intense and passionate’ attachment to her mother, the infant girl’s ‘first love-object’ 
(SE21:225)72 and is decisive.  
 
The object-relations theorist Ronald Fairbairn73 seems to approach internalised object-
relations from a different perspective than Freud. Fairbairn maintains that ‘Freud 
adheres to the principle that the libido is primarily pleasure-seeking, i.e. that it is 
direction-less’ (Fairbairn, 1952:126). In contrast, Fairbairn advocates that ‘the libido is 
primarily object-seeking’ (Fairbairn, 1952:126). Phillips illustrates this by adding that 
‘the mother loves the baby before the baby loves the mother. No baby has ever loved 
the mother, but has wanted her, needed her, and in a certain sense desired her’ (Phillips 
in Bersani, 2008:90). That is, the subject predominantly seeks satisfaction through 
relationship to his/her objects (Fairbairn, 1952:60). Freud argues that ‘following a 
strong attachment to the mother’ through ‘the passive impulses of the phallic phase the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Freud, it appears, uses the phrase ‘heterosexual object-choice’ only once, then as a stage after the infant 
girl’s homosexual object-choice during the individual’s libidinal development (SE12:61). 
72 Freud emphasises that ‘the mother, the ‘first object’, through her influence has a ‘profound effect upon 
the choice of every later object’, that is on all subsequent relationships and remains an important inner 
object throughout her growing infant’s life’ (SE16:314). Ronald Fairbairn, psychoanalyst, considers the 
child’s relationship with its mother as a ‘foundation upon which all future relationships with love objects 
are based’, (Fairbairn, W. Ronald, D. (1952) Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, Tavistock 
Routledge: London. (In Chodorow, Nancy J. (1978) The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and 
the Sociology of Gender, University of California Press: Berkeley.). Meltzer suggests that ‘the internal 
mother is the foundation of all stable and healthy psychic structure’ (Meltzer, Donald (1973) Sexual 
States of Mind, Clunie Press, 1979: Perthshire. 
73 Object-relations theory places less emphasis on the drives of aggression and sexuality as motivational 
forces and more emphasis on human relationships as the primary motivational force in life. Klein, 
Fairbairn, Winnicott, Jacobson, Kernberg, Kohut and Bollas to varying degrees can be included in this 
group of theorists: i.e. Winnicott develops the idea of ‘transitional objects’. 
 181	  
mother may be internalised as the seducer’ (SE22:120). Because the pre-verbal infant 
girl baby-in-arms receives her first intense libidinal impulses or strongest sensations 
during toilet cleansing, the mother breaks into the infant girl’s pre-sexual universe. 
Freud claims that, later, when the girl turns away from her mother, she projects on to 
her father a ‘wishful phantasy’ as ‘sexual seducer’ (SE21:238). 
 
Paula Heimann, a Kleinian psychiatrist sensitive to the counter-transference, suggests 
that in object-relation terms, the early infant’s subjective experience with the ‘feeding 
mother’ begins with the ‘world and stimuli of bodily sensations’ (Heimann in Klein, 
1952:126). Heimann claims that ego-formation transpires ‘from experiences with the 
outer world’ (Heimann in Klein, 1952:128), that is to suggest that the mother, initially, 
serves as a supplementary ego. Edith Jacobson, a German psychoanalyst who considers 
drive-theory in the development of the child, offers an illustration of pre-Oedipal 
psychosomatic rituals by arguing that: 
when a mother handles the infant, cleans, sits them up in her arms and on 
her lap, rocks, strokes, kisses, feeds, smiles, talks and sings, she offers not 
only all kinds of libidinal gratifications but simultaneously stimulates and 
prepares the child’s sitting, standing, crawling, walking and talking. 
(Jacobson, 1964:37) 
 
Thus, arguably, in Winnicottian terms, the ‘environment-mother’ influences the infant’s 
ego-growth through internal and external transformations. Christopher Bollas, an 
American psychoanalyst who bases his object-relations theory on the ‘British School’, 
adds that ‘the mother is less significant and identifiable as an object than as a process 
that is identified with cumulative internal and external transformations’ and argues that 
thus the mother becomes ‘the transformational object’ which ‘is experientially 
identified by the infant with processes that alter self experience’ (Bollas, 1987:14). 
Phillips argues that we might conclude from Bollas’ remark that ‘the infant’s first 
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intimacy is with a process of becoming’, rather than with ‘a person’ (Phillips in Bersani, 
2008:114). 
 
Freud maintains that the infant girl’s pre-Oedipal ‘powerful attachment to the mother’ 
(SE22:121) gradually takes on an ‘ambivalent’ nature (SE22:124) and the father 
becomes a ‘troublesome rival’ (SE21:226). By phantasising the father as a libidinal 
object, the infant girl competes with the mother becoming a rival for the father’s love. 
Let us now consider the infant girl’s experience of triangularity. 
 
Freud’s Oedipus complex encompasses the infant girl’s unconscious relations with the 
two parents. The infant girl gradually realises that she has been born into the triangular 
psychodynamics of the patriarchal hegemonic ‘nuclear family’: ‘a basic social unit, 
consisting normally of father, mother and their children’ (Simpson, 1989:576), that is, 
people of more than one generation who live together. These psychodynamics consist of 
both real, that is external, and unconscious, that is internal. Freudian theory privileges 
unconscious biological drives of libidinal instincts and the Oedipal conflict 
encompasses a combination of loving, hostile and envious phantasies concerning the 
possession of one parent to the exclusion of the other. These dynamics often involve 
intense erotic and destructive—loving feelings and murderous rage, jealously and envy, 
as well as concomitant guilt and fear of reprisal, driven by the subject’s need to find 
satisfaction. In considering psychological processes Freud recognises that no rigid 
scheme is ever possible, however he developed a thesis of infantile sexuality, which he 
claims, develops primarily under the influence of a series of maternal, then paternal 
transformations under the influence of affect. Freud’s thesis of female psychosexual 
development appears to be based on biological determinism as he asserts that ‘anatomy 
is destiny’ (SE19:178).  
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Freud places the Oedipus complex, ‘a short period of sexual efflorescence’, between the 
ages of two to five years74 (SE7:232n2). Freud asserts that during the pre-Oedipal phase 
the infant ‘knows only one kind of genital: the male one’ (SE7:199n2), that is, ‘phallic 
primacy’ (SE20:37). As already mentioned in Part One, Freud suggests that the infant 
girl’s response to the puzzlement over the anatomical difference between the sexes 
(SE19:248ff), the momentous discovery of the male genital, heralds the infant girl’s 
phantasy of castration, that is, the presence or absence of the penis (SE19:241-58), ‘of 
possessing a penis’ or ‘castrated’ (SE20:37). The phantasy of castration leaves the 
infant girl feeling ‘seriously wronged’ (SE22:125). Chasseguet-Smirgel suggests that 
the girl’s ‘narcissistic wounds’ give rise to narcissistic rage, hate and enmity 
(Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1964:74). The infant girl then ‘falls a victim to ‘envy for the 
penis’’ (SE22:125). 
 
During the infant girl’s ‘castration complex’, the infant girl initiates a search for the 
desired penis, not because of her love for her father, but because of her ‘envy for the 
penis’. Freud maintains that the ‘castration complex always inhibits and limits 
masculinity and encourages femininity’ (SE19:256). The absence of a penis is 
experienced by the infant girl in three ways: ‘as a wrong suffered which she attempts to 
deny, to compensate for, or to remedy’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973:56) (See section 
on Repudiation in Part One which explores the process of ‘disavowal’). Freud suggests 
that as a consequence of the phantasy of castration the infant girl rebels against 
passivity, attempting to deny the ‘wrong’ by regressing to a ‘masculinity complex’ and 
asserts that: 
the infant girl clings with defiant self-assertiveness to her threatened 
masculinity. To an incredibly late age she clings to the hope of getting a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Kernberg suggests that ‘the height of the Oedipus complex, roughly from the age four to six extends 
into puberty and adolescence’ (Kernberg 1995:164). 
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penis [which] becomes her life’s aim; and the phantasy of being a man in 
spite of everything often persists as a formative factor over long periods. 
This ‘masculinity complex’ in women can also result in a manifest 
homosexual choice of object. (SE21:229-30) 
 
Horney (1926) describes this ‘masculine protest’, as ‘the girl’s primary penis-envy 
strengthens the masculine trend fends off her feminine impulses’ (SE21:229).  
 
Freud suggests that during the phallic period the infant girl ‘expresses a wish to get the 
mother with child and the corresponding wish to bear her a child’ (SE22:120). That is to 
say, the infant girl initially attempts to obtain what she desires from the phallic mother 
who the infant girl believes has a penis, this constitutes a point of entry into the Oedipal 
phase. In feeling castrated, the infant girl holds the mother responsible for her 
disadvantage and becomes hostile towards the mother, the hostility being fuelled by 
painful ‘disappointments’ (SE21:234-5) and (SE22:122), as already established in Part 
One. Freud suggests that the infant girl, confronted by her imagined deficiency, with 
reluctance ‘accepts castration, male superiority and female inferiority’ (SE21:229), and 
that ‘her mother too is castrated’ (SE22:126). A mother who ‘had 
introduced…pleasurable activity with the genitals’ now ‘forbids this pleasure’ 
(SE22:123) leading to the infant girl’s ‘accumulated hostility’ (SE22:124). In other 
words, those who offer satisfaction may also frustrate. Due to these disappointments 
and ‘accumulated hostility’ (SE22:124), the infant girl’s powerful attachment to her 
mother ‘ends in hate’ where ‘a hate of that kind may become very striking and last all 
through life’ (SE22:121). The infant girl turns away from the mother as the infant girl 
has an ‘immoderate demand for love’ and realises that it is ‘impossible for the mother to 
fulfil her sexual wishes’ (SE22:124). 
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Freud claims that during this Oedipal phase the infant girl identifies with her mother as 
a ‘model’ (SE22:134) with ‘passive aims’. Idealisation to the point of perfection, 
aggrandisement or being exalted may be transformed by identification, being a process 
that precedes object-choice and is distinct from it (SE14:242). The process of 
identification operates in three ways: first, ‘is the original form of emotional tie with an 
object’, described as the first relationship; second, ‘in an aggressive way becomes a 
substitute for a libidinal object-tie’; and third, when a ‘perception of a common quality 
is shared with some other person the partial identification may represent the beginning 
of a new tie’ (SE18:107-8). In parallel with her attachment to the mother, the infant girl 
in identification with, and hostility towards, the mother, ‘desires to take her mother’s 
place’, and under the influence of a sense of guilt for her hostility ‘expresses her object-
love towards her father’ (SE18:106).  
 
Chasseguet-Smirgel points out that ‘guilt’ can be understood from a ‘specifically 
feminine’ perspective, emanating from a frustration and compromise between the 
fulfilment of a desire and its punishment for the desire of the idealised mother’s or 
father’s attributes (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1964:97). Chasseguet-Smirgel offers three 
reasons (situated in the Oedipus complex) as to why women may feel guilt. First, for the 
girl’s aggression attached to the anal-sadistic component of sexuality towards the 
mother and for replacing the mother with an ‘idealisation’ of the father (Chasseguet-
Smirgel, 1964:97). Second, for the girl’s aggression towards the penis, attributed to 
penis envy, and in phantasy her ‘desire to incorporate the paternal penis and to keep it 
permanently’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1964:102), that is, aggressively ‘castrating the 
idealised father’ and ‘stealing the father’s penis’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1964:131). 
Chasseguet-Smirgel draws on Freud who claims that the infant girl’s ‘envy for the 
penis’, results in ‘the woman’s repressed wish to possess a penis like a man’ and ‘an 
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unmistakable wish in the woman to keep for herself the penis which she had felt [inside 
her]’ (SE17:129-30). This phantasy results in what Chasseguet-Smirgel describes as a 
masochistic feeling of guilt for ‘the genital Oedipal desire to engulf the father’s penis 
(like the mother did)’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1964:105), an ‘incorporation-guilt’ 
(Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1964:106). Third, for the girl’s ‘Oedipal guilt of surpassing the 
mother’, the Oedipal rivalry, which may mean the girl possesses ‘the father’s penis and 
has thus dispossessed the mother’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1964:106). In other words, the 
infant girl represses her aggressive instincts towards the father in order to allow an 
idealised projection onto the father, or the penis, following frustration and 
disappointment with the mother. In order to receive narcissistic satisfaction, the infant 
girl creates a sense of guilt towards the mother. When guilt is assuaged the subject’s 
desire of Eros allows uniting with the maternal object. 
 
As discussed in Part One, Freud suggests that the girl does not tend to ‘resolve’ her 
Oedipus complex, it is not entirely resolved, but she ‘remains in it for an indeterminate 
length of time…demolishes it late and, even so, incompletely’ (SE22:129). This is to 
suggest that the girl does not repress either her pre-Oedipal or Oedipal attachments. 
Either towards her mother, meaning that the girl can remain in the ‘negative’ Oedipal 
position of attachment to the mother for a long time, or to her ‘positive’ Oedipal 
attachment to the father. Freud claims that as the girl does not fear castration, she has no 
reason to renounce the Oedipus complex, nor to establish a strong conscience or super-
ego, however, in her desire for love, rather than her fear of punishment, ‘intimidation 
from outside threatens her with a loss of love’ (SE19:178). 
 
As a secondary formation the infant girl enters the ‘positive’ form of the Oedipus 
complex where the mother becomes the infant girl’s rival. Freud proposes that the 
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paternal function, facilitates the ‘positive’ outcome of the Oedipus complex due to the 
infant girl’s masculine wishes, and her desire for the penis, which she seeks from her 
father as its possessor and the father becomes idealised. Thus the infant girl’s search for 
a satisfying object is a reaction to the disappointments with the depriving mother. 
 
Freud suggests that ‘with the transference of the wish for a penis-baby on to her father, 
the girl enters the Oedipus complex’ ‘as though into a haven of refuge and a position of 
rest’ (SE22:129). In other words, we can see how the infant girl projects her desires for 
the penis and to bear a baby first onto the mother, and following ‘disappointments’ the 
infant girl projects that same desire onto the father. Freud suggests that what 
precipitates the infant girl’s turning towards her father is her unconscious ‘envy for the 
penis’ that her mother refused her, which she now expects from the father (SE22:128). 
For the infant girl, passivity now takes the upper-hand and sensations move to the 
vagina. Freud suggests that ‘the feminine situation is only established, however, if the 
wish for a penis is replaced by one for a baby, if, that is, a baby takes the place of a 
penis in accordance with the ancient symbolic equivalence’ (SE22:128). Freud suggests 
that ‘the infant girl likes to regard herself as what her father loves above all else: 
‘desires to receive a baby from her father as a gift—to bear him a child’ (SE19:173-9). 
The time comes, however, when she has to endure a harsh punishment from the father 
and she is cast out of her fool’s paradise’ (SE19:173). Gradually the infant girl realises 
that although the father is desired, he is unattainable as he belongs to the mother.  
 
Freud suggests that the outcome of the Oedipus complex, the Oedipal resolution, may 
be twofold, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, an identification with the mother or the 
father. Ambivalent passive attitudes of being affectionate and feminine contrast with 
active aggressive attitudes of hostility and jealousy, due to their bisexual origin, as the 
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infant girl makes her earliest object-choices and identifications. Seen from the infant 
girl’s perspective, the infant girl may behave with an ambivalent attitude towards her 
mother and an affectionate object choice towards her father. But at the same time the 
girl also behaves like a boy, displaying a masculine attitude to the mother and a 
corresponding jealousy and hostility towards her father. Freud suggests that the 
resultant outcome of this ambivalence, is the relinquishment of both object choices and 
the establishment of a new psychic institution: ‘this modification of the ego retains its 
special position; it confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego ideal’ or super-ego 
(SE19:33-4), as explored in Part One. Freud maintains that ‘regressive identifications 
derived from the dissolution of the Oedipus complex come to form the nucleus of the 
super-ego’ (SE14:242) 
 
Freud is aware that these phases of organisation, these stages of transition towards 
maturation, tempered by the reality principle and their unconscious roots, are both 
progressive and regressive. During the infant girl’s object relationship stages of ego 
development the infant girl has made the transition from auto-erotism and narcissism to 
‘allo-erotism’, that is, an ‘identification with the person loved’ (SE1:280), and the 
progression from part-objects to whole objects and to love-object. The infant girl has 
turned from the homosexual object of the mother figure towards the heterosexual 
paternal realm, accounting problems of ambivalence, of love and hate towards the same 
object. 
 
The girl’s Oedipal resolution involves an ambivalent narcissistic identification with the 
debased castrated mother. The ‘destruction’, ‘dissolution’, or ‘collapse’ of the infant 
girl’s Oedipus complex succumbs to repression, followed by what Freud terms the 
latency period (SE19:173). Freud maintains that the infantile part of the ‘diphasic’ 
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feature, that is, infant sexual development succumbs to repression ‘at about the fifth 
year’75 bringing about an amnesia (SE9:171). During latency there are no new 
observable organisations of sexuality. Let us now examine the girl’s experience of the 
influence of the Oedipus complex during the latency period. 
 
Freud argues that ‘libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part 
desexualised and sublimated (a transformation into an identification)…changing 
(libidinal trends) into impulses of affection. This process ushers in the latency period’ 
(SE19:177). In Oedipal terms, on emerging from the mixture of blissful and hostile 
maternal affects the assimilating, reassuring and transforming process of identification 
can be re-established. Once the infant girl’s hostility towards the mother has subdued 
the infant girl can conceive of an emotional tie or maternal identification. That is to say, 
where the mother becomes emulated the mother may become an ideal. 
 
Freud suggests that ‘the beginning of the latency period is characterised by the creation 
or consolidation of the super-ego and the erection of ethical and aesthetic barriers in the 
ego’ (SE20:114). Freud claims that the ‘fear of the super-ego…should normally never 
cease, since, in the form of moral anxiety, it is indispensable in social relations’ 
(SE22:88). Drawing on this theory, there seems to be an indication of the bride-in-
white’s internalisation of the super-ego in their conforming to the accepted tradition of 
the time which can be interpreted from the following reports from both ‘recent’ and 
‘older’ brides: 
 
The bridal shop had red, red and white, and gold coloured dresses, but I wanted to stay 
with tradition. I wouldn’t have married in any other colour than white (04Sis05). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 ‘From the completion of the fifth’ Freud, Sigmund (1908b) Character and anal erotism, (in. SE9:169-
75), or, ‘sixth or eighth year’ Freud, Sigmund (1917a) The development of the libido and the sexual 
organisations, (in. SE16:320-38). 
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I wore a white dress because it was traditional. Not particularly as a symbol of purity, I 
know that’s what it stands for, but that was secondary to the fact that it was traditional 
(14Margaret08). 
 
Freud suggests that another characteristic of the latency period is the acquisition of 
interpersonal skills. Freud asserts that ‘all through the period of latency children learn to 
feel affection and esteem (social feelings) for other people who help them in their 
helplessness and satisfy their needs, a love which is on the model of, and a continuation 
of, their relation as suckling to their mother’ (SE7:222-3). During this period 
desexualisation, owing to repression, undergoes a softening effect, which serves to 
reinforce the affectionate trend which inevitably contains an ‘erotic nature’ (SE11:181). 
 
From studying all the bride’s reports in connection with their expressions of affection 
some seem to be aimed towards their father, but seem conditional towards their mother, 
as illustrated by these statements: 
 
I felt very warm towards my father, giving me away. It was like being honoured by his 
right to give me away (11Francis10). 
 
I had a huge, amount of affection and gratitude towards my father. For me he was 
always a remarkable, wonderful man. He was very fond of me and it must have been a 
big day for him—his daughter getting married (13Patricia10). 
 
I am very fond of my mother, but she could be very difficult and embarrassing because 
she would tell people what she felt and what she thought of them to their face 
(14Margaret10). 
 
Freud suggests that a major aspect of the latency period concerns the sublimation of 
sexual instinct. Freud claims that during the period of partial latency, the energy of 
sexual instinctual forces are diverted from sexual aims by the ‘process of sublimation’ 
(SE7:178). Freud asserts that ‘the chief task during the latency period seems to be the 
fending-off of the temptation to masturbate and the sublimation of anal-erotic 
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components’ (SE20:116). The process of sublimation of sexual forces occurring on two 
levels, ‘sublimation and a sub-species of sublimation—reaction-formation’ (SE7:238). 
 
Freud explains that the ‘sublimation of sexuality finds an outlet in artistic activity’ 
(SE7:238) also ‘ceremonial actions appear extremely often in the latency period’ 
(SE20:147). The earlier infantile free development of sexuality, in latency, succumbs to 
‘the dams against the sexual instinct’ (SE21:60) thus restricting the flow of the sexual 
instinct. Freud describes how the ‘dams’ are erected:  
sexual impulses arising from erotogenic zones, deriving their activity from 
instincts, arouse unpleasurable feelings, and consequently evoke opposing 
mental forces (reacting impulses) which, in order to suppress this 
unpleasure effectively develop barriers, or build up the mental dams, such 
as disgust, feelings of shame and claims of aesthetic and moral ideals. This 
development is organically determined and fixed by heredity. (SE7:177-8) 
 
Let us now consider how these feelings of shame and aesthetics and ‘moral ideals’ can 
be illustrated in the bride’s responses. The impact on the infant girl’s mind, who later 
becomes a bride-in-white and marries in Church, arguably concerns shame, humiliation 
and mortification, as suggested by this report of a dream:  
Before the wedding I dreamt that the dress kept falling off when I was at the altar and 
that it wasn’t done up tight enough and I’d wake up, or, that I’d trip on the trail coming 
down the aisle. I kept getting those thoughts in my head. On the day, I realised it wasn’t 
a dream, I kept looking round to see if the dress was getting dirty. I would say it is 
really dirty. At first I got upset, but then I thought let it get dirty that’s what it’s there 
for, because I can’t stand anything getting dirty like that [laughter] (07Elizabeth06). 
 
The Italian psychoanalyst Antonino Ferro suggests that there are three dimensions to a 
dream:  
it demonstrates an openness to a deeper level of communication; it 
illustrates how much work has been already done during sleep; and, it 
constitutes a narrative of the waking dream thought of that particular 
moment, thus as it were permitting a ‘core sample’ to be drilled directly 
from the current emotional field. (Ferro, 2009:155) 
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07Elizabeth06’s spontaneous report, above, of a recent dream, may suggest that a sense 
of ‘falling’ and that something was not ‘tight enough’ both relate to her dress. This may 
be an indication of something coming undone, found out, or laid bear, issues of shame 
that would prevent her from achieving a narcissistic goal of being ideally presentable. 
 
Aesthetic ideals stemming from early childhood can be interpreted from the following 
report: 
When I was dressed with my hair and makeup done I felt really special. Feeling special 
is a feeling that I know I’ll probably never feel again. Well, I know I won’t get married 
again. It’s such a special day. It’s difficult to describe what ‘special’ means. When you 
are a little girl you dream of getting married in a white dress. I am 38 now and a few 
years ago I thought, "I can’t see it ever happening", because I’m an older bride. So 
getting married in white makes it extra special. It’s really hard to describe what I mean 
by special…just ‘special’ [laughter] (04Sis04). 
 
Moral ideals through ceremonial ritual can be suggested by the following statement: 
I couldn’t imagine not getting married and taking my vows in Church because I don’t 
think I would have felt properly married. It’s a beautiful moving service, and until 
you’re actually going through it you don’t realise the huge commitment you are making 
(13Patricia13). 
 
The American psychoanalyst Ethel Person, claims that during latency the girl begins to 
‘separate desire and idealisation from the nuclear family and transfer them to other 
objects’ (Person, 1988:95). That is to say, latency can be a period of development in 
which the core of the personality has already been formed, but the superstructure is less 
complicated than in adults and where the environment becomes generally limited to 
family and school. Oedipal phantasies tend to be linked to problems of masturbation, 
sexual curiosity, and the infantile phantasies regarding the parents’ erotic union. Freud 
suggests that the period of latency ends ‘round about the eleventh year’ (SE9:171), with 
the onset of puberty. Let us now consider the impact of the Oedipus complex during 
puberty and adolescence. 
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Freud views puberty, commencing around ten to twelve years of age (SE17:131), as a 
period which begins to establish ‘the sharp distinction between masculine and feminine 
characteristics’ (SE7:219). Freud suggests that the arrival of puberty marks the second 
phase of sexual ‘efflorescence’ and can bring with it the ‘manifest neurosis’ held over 
by fixations from earlier periods, in a return of the repressed from the latency period 
(SE23:79-80). Freud suggests that during puberty there is ‘a loosening of the girl’s 
relation with her mother as love-object’ because of ‘penis-envy’ (SE19:254). Freud 
argues that the girl also gives up her clitoral masturbation, the reminder of her castrated 
state and under a ‘wave of repression’ replaces her ‘masculine’ active aims with 
‘femininity’, thus the girl adopts passive aims (SE19:255). During puberty the girl also 
is required to relinquish ‘incestuous phantasies that she may have towards the father 
which are to be overcome and repudiated’ (SE7:227). 
 
The American psychiatrist Hélene Deutsch notes that during ‘adolescence, women show 
a definitely stronger tendency to spiritualisation of the sexual instinct’ (Deutsch, 
1944:147). Deutsch argues that ‘primitive religion raised sexuality to the status of a 
divine function’, in contrast to it being considered an instrument of the devil (Deutsch, 
1944:147). Deutsch suggests that during puberty ‘the sexual urge is connected with 
sensory organs such as smell’, during the period before the fulfilment of direct sexual 
gratification (Deutsch, 1944:147). Chasseguet-Smirgel adds that ‘women’s sexuality is 
spiritual…as a result of a process of sublimation’ and ‘is a reaction formation based on 
repression…in other words, in the anal-sadistic component instincts’ (Chasseguet-
Smirgel, 1964:99). Arguably, this ‘spiritualising’ process may have great significance 
for all brides and particularly for those who marry through a religious ceremony76. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See 13Patricia13 statement, cited earlier in the section on The Oedipus complex: features of latency. 
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Freud considers that after puberty the implicit task is in object-choice, ‘that [the girl] 
should find [her] way to the opposite sex’ and this ‘is not accomplished without a 
certain amount of fumbling’ (SE7:229). Characteristic of adolescence is the tendency to 
idealisation. This idealisation may be exemplified by the romantic phantasy of the 
heroine who finds herself in an unhappy situation but because of her goodness she is 
rescued, as in the Cinderella fairy tale of meeting ‘Prince Charming’ in order to secure 
eternal love. The confused adolescent may experience crushes that conflate the desire 
for merger and caretaking with sexual desire, as in the case of ‘eighteen year old Dora’ 
(SE7:18), whom Freud thought expressed ‘affection for her father’ (SE7:57). Late 
adolescence may be a time when social pleasures lead to confusing appropriate from 
non-appropriate relationships. It may be a period where boundaries may be tested. If 
boundaries are confused and violated they may result in guiltily falling in love with a 
close family member, causing ‘an intense state of excitation’ which conflicts ‘with a 
deeply-rooted idea of moral purity’ as Freud describes in Breuer’s case-study of 
‘twenty-one year old Anna O’77 (SE2:210). 
 
The German psychoanalyst Peter Blos claims that:  
Adolescence may be marked by Oedipal conflict during a period of 
detachment from the parents before a non-incestuous object choice can be 
made. Conflicts marked by spite and revenge designed to hurt the parent 
who no longer can satisfy the love needs of the child; these actions signify 
that childhood status still prevails. Many a girl is convinced that she 
understands her father better than her mother does…and is usually aware of 
the negative aspects of her feelings towards the mother. (Blos, 1962:106)  
 
This may suggest that anal-sadistic attacks on the parent enable detachment, however 
these attacks may be accompanied by feelings of guilt. Person suggests that ‘as during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Frl. Anna O., (pseudonym), initially the patient of Joseph Breuer, physician, whose real name was 
Bertha Pappehheim (1859-1936), who, during her father’s illness developed paralysis of her limbs, and 
anaesthesias, as well as disturbances of vision and speech. Breuer noted that she had two alternating 
personality states: one more or less normal, the other that of a naughty child. Symptoms seem to 
disappear after Anna O described her frequent and terrifying hallucinations (SE2:210). 
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the Oedipal stage, desire is triggered through identification, wanting for ourselves the 
same as that which [is idealised]’ (Person, 1988:100, original emphasis). In a similar 
manner the Oedipal task for the adolescent is to transform the idealisation of ‘the wish 
to be like (or to replace) to the wish to be with’ (Person, 1988:100, original emphasis). 
In other words, the task for adolescent libidinal desire is to both transform the desire for 
the partner of one’s best friend, into having one’s own separate relationship. Let us now 
consider how the Oedipus complex may influence adulthood. 
 
American ‘interpretive’, ‘humanistic’ psychoanalytic sociologist and feminist Nancy 
Chodorow, who does not rely on object-relations theory, whose interest lies in 
understanding the dynamics of motherhood, argues that ‘girls enter adulthood with a 
complex layering of affective ties and a rich, ongoing inner object world’, where ‘the 
mother remains a primary internal object’ and ‘heterosexual relationships are based on 
the model of a non-exclusive, second relationship’ (Chodorow, 1989:74). Chodorow 
also suggests that a heterosexual woman bases her relationship with a man on the 
‘idealisation, grown out of a girl’s relation to her father’ (Chodorow, 1989:77). In other 
words the bride may base her relationship with her husband on a displacement of the 
idealised father representation, that is, ‘an unreal relationship to men’ (Chodorow, 
1989:77).  
 
Person suggests that romantic love may be characterised by a ‘leap out of objectivity 
and into subjectivity’…‘sharing in each other’s subjective realities’ thus mitigating the 
profound, painful isolation of the Oedipal phantasy of oneness with the mother (Person, 
1988:14). Person is however aware of the configurations of Oedipal triangulation, 
which may be acted out in at least three ways. First, attempts at resolving unresolved 
Oedipal material may be through: ‘rivalrous triangulation’, where a woman may fall in 
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love with a married man (a father representation) (Person, 1988:220). Second, ‘split-
object triangulation’, where a married woman takes a lover, viewing the dalliance as 
irrelevant (Person, 1988:227). Third, ‘displaced-incestuous’, where the individual 
involves themselves emotionally and erotically with more than one member of the same 
family (Person, 1988:234). The psychoanalyst Kenneth Lewes claims that ‘the 
mechanisms of the Oedipus complex are a series of psychic traumas (including 
homosexuality), and all results of it are neurotic compromise formations’ (Lewes, 
1988:70). That is to suggest, in Freudian terms, there may be a great deal of ‘fumbling’ 
and compromise before securing an acceptable object-choice. 
 
Freud maintains that the Oedipus complex represents the peak of infantile sexuality, 
which, through its after-effects, exercises a decisive influence on the sexuality of adults’ 
(SE7:226n). If Freud’s premise is accepted, that the infant’s Oedipus complex is never 
‘resolved’, it is simply re-worked, and ‘revived’ (SE18:157), at different times and on 
different planes in life, it is possible to interpret the adult bride’s statements in Oedipal 
terms. It can be argued, for example, that the journey to the Church, for the bride, can 
be seen within an Oedipal frame since in the moment arguably three psychological 
processes come to fruition. First, the bride exclusively possesses the father and the 
bride’s unconscious incestuous desires are, in phantasy, fulfilled. Second, the bride’s 
rivalrous feelings towards her mother are repressed and symbolically contained during 
the journey to the Church and the mother is repudiated. Third, the bride’s libido, 
sublimated in favour of the creative process of being a bride regulated by submission to 
the ceremony, later becomes displaced onto the non-incestuous other. I will argue, 
mainly in Part Four, that my investigations illustrate that some bride’s experiences 
reveal that it is possible to suggest that a revisiting of their Oedipal ambitions were 
evident on their wedding day. However, before discussing a social positioning of the 
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bride, let us explore two primal phantasies which are foundational to the infant’s 
development towards ‘normal femininity’. 
 
In the light of Freud’s assertion that ‘the final outcome of sexuality in childhood’ points 
to the ‘definitive form taken by it in the adult’ (SE19:141), I propose to focus on two 
aspects of the girl’s phylogenetically transmitted inheritance which become the 
symbolic structure or schema within which the child frames the Oedipal parental 
representations. First, I will consider the unconscious phantasy of the primal scene, as 
preliminary to the infant girl’s genital strivings and her introduction into the envious 
relationship with the father. Second, I will explore the incestuous world into which the 
infant girl finds herself born and her search for phallic satisfaction. I will explore these 
primal phantasies by asking: what is their impact on the daughter-father relationship and 
then consider the impact on the ‘bride-in-white’?  
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3.2 Seeing and being seen: the veiled bride and the primal scene 
At the Church door, we may observe, the bride peering from behind the blush78, as 
though through a mist, her face being barely seen by others. As her hand rests on her 
father’s arm, her body tensed in anticipation and expectation, her mind alert as she 
imagines what she will see and how she will react to being seen by family and friends. 
Her hair79, maquillage80 and dress81 are immaculate82: she is in a state that has rarely 
been seen before. Preparations for this moment have long been made. This intimate, 
momentary, exclusive relationship with her father, at the Church door, could be 
unsettling or reassuring. It could be argued, this scene touches upon the trajectory of 
infant experience, or a phylogenetic endowment of ‘primal phantasies’ (SE16:371) 
when, in infancy, in ‘real or imagined observation’ she witnessed her parents copulating 
(SE19:120). Freud suggests that in phantasy the infant girl desires to replace her 
mother, in what Klein terms as the ‘combined parental’ imago (Klein, 1932:132).  
 
Meltzer argues that the complex structure of affects, impulses, phantasies and anxieties 
for the infant girl, are modified by the imago of the ‘coital relation of internal parents, 
which is the foundation of a stable psychic structure’ (Meltzer, 1973:68). Meltzer 
suggests that this dependence is based on ‘the mother’s capacity to receive the 
projection of infantile states of mental and physical distress, experienced as persecution 
by bodily contents’ (Meltzer, 1973:68). Meltzer claims that ‘the infant depends on the 
mother’s capacity to return to it parts of the self, which have been then divested of all 
persecutory qualities, by means of the feeding relation to the breast’ (Meltzer, 1973:68). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The ‘blush’, that part of the veil which covers her face. 
79 Her hair may carry associations connected with castration. Long hair may be considered as a penis 
symbol or a symbolic substitute for pubic hair, ambiguously leaving open the question whether or not it 
covers a penis, (Freud, SE7:153; Fenichel, 1945:342). 
80 The art of using cosmetics, make-up. 
81 The dress is required to cover the imperfections in the contours of the body. 
82 On the day of her wedding the bride must appear to be immaculate and perfect in order to avoid 
criticism (Source of this assertion: The Manageress, Harrods of Knightsbridge bridal gown department, 
November 2005). Arguably, the bride’s appearance resonates with Plato’s ideal Form and the epithet 
given to the Virgin Mary that she was Immaculate in every way, as explored in Part One. 
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Meltzer emphasises that the mother is not alone in this process and asserts that ‘the 
functions of the internal mother are dependent upon her relation, in turn, to the internal 
father who is essential for her survival…and a prerequisite for the mother’s generosity 
and benevolence’ (Meltzer, 1973:68). In other words, in Meltzer’s terms, the triangular 
process rests in the effective modification of affects through the relationship of the 
internalised combined couple. The infant girl is dependent upon the mother’s capacity 
to modify the infant girl’s anxieties both bodily and psychically and the mother’s 
dependent relation to the internal father. Freud does not discuss the internalised 
combined couple, but triangularity, which can be located within the Oedipus complex 
with issues concerning rivalry, identification and envy. 
 
For Freud, the phantasy of the ‘combined parental imago’ has its roots in the 
unconscious incestuous ‘wish to be copulated with by [the] father, that is, to be given 
sexual satisfaction in the same way as [the] mother’ (SE17:46). Whereas Freud 
proposes that we all carry a resonant understanding of ‘The Primal Scene’, he also 
emphasises the infant’s awareness and phantasies about actual ‘parental intercourse’ 
(SE17:97). 
 
The question I am addressing here is, what are the implications of the infant girl’s 
phantasy of the primal scene on the bride-in-white’s relationship to her father? This 
question is pertinent because Freud believes that the significance of primal phantasies 
are that they constitute a ‘phylogenetic endowment’ (SE16:371). This enables ‘the 
individual [to] reach beyond [her] own experience into primeval experience’, that is, 
embedded in an ‘archaic heritage’ (SE17:193), a ‘prehistoric truth’ (SE16:371), a kind 
of ‘inheritance’ (SE17:97) of what was actually carried out and which has now become 
psychical reality. For Freud, this primeval experience, this ‘primal phantasy’, facilitates 
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‘fill[ing] the gaps in individual truth’ including ‘seduction’, ‘inflaming sexual 
excitement’, and ‘castration’ (SE16:371). Freud hypothesises that phantasies are ‘an 
unconscious combination of things experienced, heard’ and ‘seen’, and are a ‘psychical 
façade constituted in order to bar the way, and refine memories towards sublimating 
them’ (SE1:248). Freud goes further by suggesting that the primal scene—‘the phantasy 
of watching’, ‘overhearing accidental noise’ or ‘of listening to’ sexual intercourse 
between the parents—is probably part ‘of the unconscious phantasies of all human 
beings’ (SE14:269). In other words, Freud points to the three layers of psychic 
apparatus which mark these primal phantasies: first, the deepest and oldest ones which 
constitute the archaic ‘phylogenetic endowment’; second, the memories and ambitions 
of the combined parental imago; third, the unconscious repressed memories the 
subject’s own pre-history; and sometimes these phantasies merge. 
 
Freud’s understanding of the infant girl’s phantasy of the primal scene is that the child 
interprets the sexual intercourse between the parents as an act of violence on the part of 
the father. Freud asserts that the impact of the ‘real or imagined observation of her 
parents copulating’ (SE19:120) if interpreted by the child as the active, attacking, 
sadistic, giving father and the passive, receptive, masochistic, receiving mother, leaves 
the infant girl feeling overwhelmed and ‘unable to react adequately’ (SE17:45). In other 
words, Freud suggests that ‘a surplus of sexuality in the psyche operates as an inhibition 
of thought’ (SE1:230). For Freud, however, the infant ‘envies her mother’s relation with 
her father’ (SE17:78) and suggests that the child’s evidence is ‘the expression of 
enjoyment which she saw on her mother’s face’ (SE17:45). This observation ‘obliges 
her to recognise that the experience was one of gratification’ and the infant girl is left 
‘longing for sexual satisfaction from her father and realises that castration is a necessary 
condition for it’ (SE17:42). Opposing feelings are also invoked in the infant girl’s 
 201	  
observation of the scene. On the one hand, Freud brings into question the infant girl’s 
feelings of anxiety as the scene becomes interpreted as an ‘act of violence’ (SE17:45). 
On the other hand, the infant girl is left ‘wishing for sexual satisfaction from her 
father…the passive wish to be copulated with by her active father, that is, to be given 
sexual satisfaction in the same way as her mother’ (SE17:46).  
 
Further oppositional aspects are the infant girl’s identification with the parents. 
Identifying with the mother drives her to envy and jealousy. The infant girl is ‘ready to 
give her father a baby’, as her mother ‘has already done so, and would perhaps do so 
again’ (SE17:82), even an ‘excrement-baby’ (SE17:101). Anna Freud proposes that the 
infant girl could be ‘identifying with the aggressor’ as a defence against narcissistic 
mortification (A. Freud, 1936:113): a defence against the penetrating, sadistic, attacking 
father (SE19: 120). It seems that the infant girl desires to go further in her narcissistic 
mortification of passive ‘altruistic surrender’ (‘the rapture of giving’ and ‘conferring of 
happiness on others’) (A. Freud, 1936:134), in this case, in phantasy, upon the father.  
 
Arguably, the phantasy of the primal scene has powerful lasting affects. Freud asserts 
that in phantasy the infant girl ‘wishes (s)he could be back in the womb, not simply in 
order that (s)he might then be re-born, but in order that (s)he might be copulated there 
by her father, might obtain sexual satisfaction from him, and might bear him a child’ 
(SE17:101). Freud appears to suggest that this phantasy may become a fixation, or 
libidinal excitation concerning the father representation, and in becoming a ‘primal 
repression’ will become attached to her libidinal strivings. Freud suggests that as the 
phantasy of the primal scene audible observations of coitus are universal, ‘setting up 
first sexual excitation’, this may ‘act as a starting-point for the child’s whole sexual 
development’ (SE19:250). 
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Let us now consider other thinkers in relation to the unconscious phantasy of the primal 
scene, in order to explore in more detail the impact this may have on the infant girl. In 
discussing the effect of trauma on the development of the personality, the psychoanalyst 
Phyllis Greenacre suggests that the ‘excited expectation of a primal scene’ the girl may 
have feelings of ‘anger at having soft parts instead of a firm penis’ (Greenacre, 
1953:129-30). Greenacre claims that the girl may ‘try to resolve and relieve the guilt of 
forbidden seeing’, thus the effect of ‘repeated exposure’ might be a source of 
overstimulation of infantile aggression…causing neurotic scoptophilia’83 (Greenacre, 
1953:131+173). Greenacre draws on Reich who suggests that this may lead to the 
characteristic of the isolated psychopath (Greenacre, 1953:173). In Greenacre’s 
experience, she believes, repeated primal scenes may influence acting out, claiming 
that:  
heightened visual erotization through participation by looking, but not 
infrequently by its crying excites the anger of the one or the other parent and 
so [the subject] is drawn into active participation: [thereby] increasing both 
the scoptophilic—exhibitionistic elements of the character. (Greenacre, 
1953:214)  
 
The psychiatrist Ralph Greenson suggests that the infant girl’s reaction to the primal 
scene may leave her in a speechless ‘silence’, feeling ‘excluded’, resulting in 
‘unconscious death wishes: jealousy, envy, hostility and resentment’ (Greenson, 
1967:62). Greenson argues that (s)he may also be left struggling with incestuous 
feelings which may develop into guilt, or a denial of feelings leading to ‘depression’ 
and an attempt to make ‘reparation’ (Greenson, 1967:332). Greenson asserts that 
incestuous feelings ‘can be motivated by the ‘longing for fusion and closeness as well 
as by destructive aims’ (Greenson, 1967:407). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Scoptophilia or scopophilia, ‘the act of obtaining sexual pleasure from things seen, e.g. naked bodies 
(Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (1972) p1212). 
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Let us now consider a Kleinian perspective of the primal scene. Klein suggests that 
prior to the parents being considered as separate individuals, ‘it is characteristic of (a) 
young infant’s intense emotions and greed that (s)he should attribute to the parents a 
constant state of mutual gratification of an oral, anal and genital nature’ (Klein, 
1952:219). Klein, in discussing the fundamental changes with the advent of the 
‘depressive position’, recognises the infant’s libidinal organisation as being 
characterised by powerful oral desires involving ‘the frustration experiences in relations 
to the mother, [which] are transferred from the mother’s breast to the father’s penis’ 
(Klein, 1952:218). In this oral context the infant’s phantasies involve what is ‘inside’ 
the mother and herself (Klein, 1952:219). Klein proposes that during the preceding 
‘paranoid-schizoid position’, ‘the infant’s urge to enter the mother’s body, and take 
possession of its contents’ is active (Klein, 1952:219). When genital desires increase, 
the urge ‘is directed more towards the father’s penis (equated to babies and faeces) 
which, (s)he feels, the mother’s body contains’ (Klein, 1952:219). Klein asserts that 
‘these sexual theories are the foundation for combined parent figures such as: the 
mother containing the father’s penis or the whole father; the father containing the 
mother’s breast or the whole mother; the parents fused inseparably in sexual 
intercourse’ (Klein, 1952:219-20). 
 
Heimann recognises that at this pre-genital stage phantasies of ‘true genital aims of 
penetrating or receiving, connected with the wish of creating and possessing children’ 
rouse intense fears (in. Klein 1952:164). Heimann asserts that: 
Incorporation further enters into the infant’s phantasies about the parents’ 
intimacies, so that (s)he believes they incorporate each other and from each 
other. It would appear [that] these notions…account for her intolerance 
towards their union, in that the cannibalistic interpretation of the primal 
scene leads to the fear of the parents’ death, and this would mean her own 
death. Next to this maximal fear there are many other libidinal and 
frightening phantasies…the infant’s desire for the father’s genital. 
(Heimann in. Klein, 1952:164) 
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In other words, in this context, the infant girl’s aggression can be discharged through 
identification with the active sadistic agent being oral or anal. This suggests that 
because of these unconscious phantasies, the infant girl projects intense aggressiveness 
onto the breast or the penis and become sufficiently anxiety-producing for her to be able 
to adopt a passive attitude towards the penis. Certain writers suggest that the parents 
may be able to modify, by their attitude to each other and the infant girl, her sado-
masochistic infantile phantasies during this period. The dyadic relation with the mother 
is the first to change, as the infant girl takes on the active role, penile-anal, 
simultaneously desiring to have a penis. The infant girl is both active and aggressive 
towards her first love object, the mother, whom she would like to possess exclusively, 
but now the father, the separator from maternal rhythm, is experienced as a rival or is at 
least irritating.  
 
In examining the impact of the unconscious phantasy of the primal scene, where the 
scopophilic instinct is in operation, we can turn to the ecclesiastical writer Tertullian, 
who appears to speak in the same register, to the bride-in-white standing at the Church 
door with her father, in De virginibus velandis when Tertullian states that ‘seeing and 
being seen belong to the self-same lust’ (in. Kelly, 2000:91). Kelly interprets that 
Tertullian ‘insists that consecrated virgins must be veiled not only for their own 
protection, but also for the protection of others whose chastity may be imperilled by 
looking’ (Kelly, 2000:91). For Kelly, Tertullian speaks forcefully regarding the female 
virgin: ‘impose a veil externally upon her who has (already) a covering internally,’ is 
making a statement alluding to a ‘metaphorical and/or a very material hymen’ (Kelly, 
2000:91). Kelly suggests that ‘thus a woman’s sartorial veil is made as integral to 
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feminine and virginal identity as her hymeneal ‘veil’ (Kelly, 2000:91)84. It could be 
argued that Kelly, following Tertullian, refers to the infant girl’s phantasy of the primal 
scene and also to the bride-in-white’s veiled appearance at the Church. In other words, 
the infant girl sees, or in unconscious phantasy imagines, the primal scene only from the 
veiled perspective of orality and anality. The bride also sees partially, while being 
protected from the penetrating gaze of the other, as they are from her state of innocence. 
 
I wish to draw upon a poignant case of a woman, whom I shall call Sarah, whose vivid 
childhood recollection may illustrate this part of the discussion. This unmarried woman 
expresses her longing to be securely married, but having experienced in her childhood, 
what Freud describes as the classical phantasy of the primal scene, has become cautious 
of men:  
Sarah recalls, ‘I often heard my parents argue, in the other room where they 
slept. Once, after my father had hit my mother with a shoe she had to have 
stitches at hospital. I was scared for my mother’s safety. This incident 
became a family secret and never talked about. I used to stay awake at night 
and make sure that my mom was safe. In the morning I used to wait outside 
her room until she came out. I grew to hate my father’.  
 
Arguably, as opposed to a positive, loving, facilitating daughter-father experience Sarah 
appears to have introjected a negative dynamic, projecting feelings of mistrust on to 
men. Consequently Sarah feels afraid, suspicious of men’s intentions and anxious about 
what might take place in the ‘other room’, between copulating adults. Alternatively, 
because of her mother’s hospitalisation, Sarah may have experienced her mother’s 
absence in terms of feeling abandoned, excluded or insecure, and being left without 
mother’s presence is left with the father. Sarah’s erotisised experience and phantasy of 
the phallic father may be interpreted in terms of the father’s aggression in a sado-
masochistic relationship, and in turn may provide the basis for Sarah’s powerlessness.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Irigaray, Luce (1974) Speculum of the Other Woman, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York. 
1985 also uses the metaphor ‘the hymen is the veil masking the mystery’ p33n16. 
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Arguably, a positive outcome of the impact of the primal scene on the infant girl’s 
psychosexual development is pivotal. She has either seen or imagined parental sexual 
intercourse, which has aroused excitement but also disappointment that she was not the 
object of her father’s attention and envy for sexual satisfaction from him. 
Simultaneously the infant girl identifies with her mother and is envious of the attention 
she is receiving from the father, but fears the apparent sadistic father’s attack. Envy may 
surmount her fear of the punishing sadistic father in favour of a predominant feeling of 
fusion with him. 
 
It could be argued, therefore, the primal scene is a stage upon which the father contains 
the infant girl’s anxiety, frustration and anger towards him as the attacking rival. The 
father is in a position to facilitate and modify the infant girl’s envious projections, 
counterbalancing them with his own feelings of displacement and rivalry towards his 
daughter. Meltzer, from an object relating perspective, argues that the ‘introjective 
identification with the combined object induces a bond of mutuality and shared 
responsibility…a character that favours monogamy’ (Meltzer, 1973:73). This 
unconscious phantasy will, arguably, pivotally impact on the girl’s interpretation of the 
role she adopts in relation to men. 
 
What I have been exploring in this section is the significance and impact of the phantasy 
of the primal scene on the infant girl who later becomes a bride. In the infant girl’s 
imagination of the primal scene, on the mother’s face is an expression of joy which 
becomes transformed by the infant girl into envy and jealously of the mother’s 
relationship with the father. Because the infant girl is a desiring subject and has been 
excluded from the presence of the object of desire. This compelling primal scene, with 
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these powerful affects, has arguably driven the infant girl, who later becomes a bride, to 
a place of exchange. In phantasy the bride wishes to change places with the mother 
imago and experience a moment of joy, however the bride’s joy cannot be with the 
father imago due to the incest prohibition, which becomes the focus of the next 
discussion. Let us now examine the pith of this investigation and consider how 
unconscious incestuous desires have influenced the girl’s (who later becomes the bride) 
relationship with the father. 
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3.3 A sacred walk with father: Part A - unconscious incestuous desire 
The investigation into the infant girl’s and later the bride’s relationship with the father 
has been divided into two parts. Part A, examines the psychodynamics of the infant girl 
and the father. Part B, in Part Four, explores the adult bride’s reported experience of her 
father on her wedding day. Let us now imagine the scene at the Church on the wedding 
day.  
 
The bride’s left hand rests on her father’s right arm and together they ceremoniously 
process down the relatively restricted, containing, central aisle of the Church. On either 
side of them, friends and family have gathered; the bride’s to their left and the 
bridegroom’s on their right. For a few visually significant minutes, as they process, 
father and daughter share an intimate momentary relationship together. This brings the 
childhood phantasy of an incestuous relationship with the father to an end. A 
relationship which has been subjected to feelings of parricide, ‘jealousy’ (SE1:265), 
‘rivalry’ (SE22:119) and guilt: a relationship that her father has facilitated with restraint 
and prohibition throughout their life together. The infant girl’s desires for the father 
have been barred in order that she will remain spotless, the pure ideal gift, resulting in 
pride for both father and daughter. Throughout their relationship they have negotiated 
their incestuous desires for one another within ecclesiastical and societal prohibition. In 
Freudian terms, their relationship has been restrained or regulated by the superego 
which constructs the ‘no’ of incestuous desire. Now, as bride, repressed Oedipal desires 
of infancy may be revived, as the daughter experiences through affect and enactment 
infant unconscious desire towards her father. Now, they take a sacred walk together in 
search of the Church’s blessing on her union with another man.  
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In examining the daughter-father relationship more closely, with particular focus on the 
unconscious incestuous desires that arguably, both have for each other, I propose to 
address the question: what impact do unconscious incestuous desires have on the bride-
in-white? I will explore this question in various ways: first, by observing how culturally 
and scripturally the incest prohibition is implemented; second, by examining the 
psychodynamics of unconscious incestuous desire; third, by exploring the daughter’s 
unconscious incestuous desire for the father; fourth, by examining the father’s 
unconscious incestuous desire for the daughter; fifth, by asking whether there are any 
benefits from experiencing unconscious incestuous desire for the bride-in-white.  
 
Chasseguet-Smirgel, in understanding Freudian thought suggests that the concept of 
incest focuses on what has been termed ‘the separation principle’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 
1986:136). Chasseguet-Smirgel maintains that the patriarchal dimension, as opposed to 
matriarchal (SE13:144), is founded on the incest prohibition. Chasseguet-Smirgel 
asserts that ‘matriarchal law, represents a fusion between mother and child, and 
excludes the father, the mediator’ (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1986:136). In contrast the 
Freudian ‘father complex’ (SE13:143) and its role as the ‘core complex’ in neurosis, 
religion, and social institutions appears to insist upon father as mediator. Chasseguet-
Smirgel suggests that in The Book of Leviticus, God’s commandments clarify the 
prohibition of relationships with the aim of maintaining ‘the barriers separating one 
thing from another and preserving the very essence of each of them’ (Chasseguet-
Smirgel, 1986:137). Chasseguet-Smirgel emphasises that these ‘Biblical laws are based 
on a principle of division and separation’: a defensive mechanism known as isolation 
(Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1986:137). Let us now examine more closely the origin of these 
Biblical exhortations. 
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As already suggested, the bride and her father attend Church so the bride’s union will be 
sanctified and blessed, arguably a reciprocal arrangement, as the bride and her father 
have complied with scripture’s guiding authority regarding their conduct. We find in the 
earliest records of Biblical text descriptions of incestuous relationships. Genesis 19v36 
records, ‘Lot’s daughters came to be with child by their father’, and Genesis 20v2, 
‘Abraham said his sister Sarah was his wife’. Subsequently, the Old Testament 
scriptural injunction against such relationships is enumerated in The Law of Holiness in 
Leviticus. These observances, addressed to men, come with the injunction: ‘the man 
who keeps them shall have life’ (Leviticus 18v5). Ecclesiastical and societal 
prohibitions are as follows: 
No man shall approach a blood-relation85 for intercourse. 
You shall not bring shame on your father by intercourse with your mother. 
[mother]86 
You shall not have intercourse with your father’s wife: that is to bring 
shame on your father. [mother] 
You shall not have intercourse with your sister, your father’s daughter, or 
your mother’s daughter, whether brought up in the family or in another 
home.  
[sister, or half-sister by either your father or your mother] 
You shall not have intercourse with your son’s daughter or your daughter’s 
daughter. [niece] 
You shall not have intercourse with a daughter of your father’s wife, 
begotten by your father.  [sister] 
You shall not have intercourse with your father’s sister: she is a blood-
relation of your father.  [paternal aunt] 
You shall not have intercourse with your mother’s sister: she is a blood-
relation of your mother. [maternal aunt] 
You shall not bring shame upon your father’s brother by approaching his 
wife: she is your aunt. [aunt by marriage] 
You shall not have intercourse with your daughter-in-law: she is your son’s 
wife.  [daughter-in-law] 
You shall not have intercourse with your brother’s wife: that is to bring 
shame on him. [sister-in-law] 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Incest statute of Alabama (1977) includes: ‘a person known to be legitimately or illegitimately an 
ancestor or descendant by blood or adoption, brother or sister of the whole or half blood, or stepchild or 
stepparent, while the marriage exists, aunt, uncle, nephew or niece of the whole or half blood’ In Herman, 
Judith Lewis (1981) Father-Daughter Incest, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. p221. 
‘Prohibited degrees of relationship’ are inscribed in UK Law 1949, revised 1994, revised 2004. A 
putative marriage: supposed invalid by Canon Law, but entered into in good faith by at least one of the 
parties. 
86 The author’s interpretation of the relationship within square brackets. 
 211	  
These Biblical injunctions appear exclusively addressed to the man, regarding the 
degree of female status which is prohibited. What seems to be implied is that the 
responsibility rests on him. To continue the Levitical injunctions: 
 
You shall not have intercourse with both a woman and her daughter, nor 
shall you take her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter to have 
intercourse with them: they are her blood-relations, and such conduct is 
lewdness. 
You shall not take a woman who is your wife’s sister to make her a rival-
wife, and to have intercourse with her during her sister’s lifetime. 
(Leviticus 18v6-18) 
 
The result of breaking these injunctions was to ‘bring shame upon her, your father, the 
family or yourself, which would result in being ‘cut off from his people’ (Leviticus 
18v29). Primarily the intention of the injunctions were to separate from earlier 
abominable unclean habits and adopt clean habits. 
 
The psychiatrist Judith Herman postulates that these Biblical injunctions ‘are not 
offences against the women…but against the men in whom the rights of ownership, use, 
and exchange are vested’ (Herman, 1981:61). Herman understands that ‘every man is 
expressly forbidden to take the daughters of his kinsmen, but only by implication is he 
forbidden to take his own daughter’ (Herman, 1981:61). Herman interprets this as 
saying that ‘the patriarchal God sees fit to pass over father-daughter incest in silence’ 
(Herman, 1981:61) and hypothesises, validated by her study, father-daughter incest is 
the result of a ‘despotic paternal rule’ (Herman, 1981:63). In other words, a strong 
patriarchal system may lead to the daughter-father relationship becoming blurred and 
incestuous desire being acted out.  
 
Moi’s examination of the Bible leads her to understand that women are ‘divided from 
man’, they are ‘made of that very thing which is lacking in him’ and that ‘she will rarely 
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have a name’ (Moi, 1986:140). Moi observes that as ‘God generally speaks only to 
men’ this precludes the woman’s ‘direct relation with the law of the community and its 
political and religious unity’ (Moi, 1986:140). Moi argues that ‘woman’s knowledge is 
corporal’, her function is the propagation of the race and concerns ‘the body, sex and 
procreation, which permit the existence of the community’ (Moi, 1986:140). Moi 
concludes that while the woman ‘aspires to pleasure’, the man’s concern focuses on 
‘tribal unity’ (Moi, 1986:140). Arguably, therefore, despite the inevitable close 
daughter-father relationship, the father’s concern is situating the family within society. 
 
Freud appears to be well aware of ‘how intensely the individual struggles with the 
temptation to incest and how frequently the barrier is transgressed in phantasy and in 
reality’ (SE7:225n3). Freud suggests that it is during the latency period, when sexual 
maturation is postponed, that time allows the child to develop the restraint and form the 
barrier against incest. Freud recognises that ‘this barrier is essentially a cultural demand 
made by society’ (SE7:225). Arguably, this could be seen as one of the good-enough 
father’s roles to facilitate and maintain this barrier through a process from Eros to 
Agapé, that is, from Greek erotic love to Christian love. The father’s participation 
transforms erotisised love by engendering a sense, as Kristeva interprets, of ‘being 
loved, independently of merits’ (Kristeva, 1987:139) and ‘isn’t stern but familial and 
enlightening’ and ‘without initial reciprocity’ (Kristeva, 1987:141). 
 
Freud acknowledges that incest is evidenced in history and illustrates this by drawing 
on anthropological accounts of the Egyptian Ptolemy’s ‘brother and sister incest’ and 
from Greek mythology where there are ‘examples of love-affairs between fathers and 
daughters’ (SE20:214). Freud attempts to explain, through these ethnographical 
examples, why ‘primitive peoples’ were so scrupulous in avoiding incest, while 
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invoking ‘the most painful’ punishment for its violation (SE13:2). Freud came, 
however, to no real conclusion other than the acknowledgement that the horror of incest 
is essentially universal as it is ‘an infantile feature’ (SE13:17, original emphasis). Freud 
observes that ‘the violation of this prohibition is… avenged by the whole clan, as 
though it were a question of averting some danger that threatens the whole community’ 
(SE13:4). As already explored in Part One in the section on purity, the bride undergoes 
a ritual which involves the whole familial group. Freud understands this in terms of 
‘totemic exogamy, the prohibition of sexual intercourse between members of the same 
clan, appears to be the appropriate means for preventing group incest’ (SE13:7-8). The 
institution of exogamy thus supports and legitimises the incest prohibition by restricting 
both the choice of marriage partner and sexual liberty (SE13:4). An example of the 
incest prohibition may be found in The Book of Common Prayer in ‘A Table of Kindred 
and Affinity’, where for example, it states that ‘a man may not marry his daughter’ 
(Cranmer and Ridley, 1662:608). 
 
Freud comments that there is a ‘tendency on the part of civilisation to restrict sexual 
life…[and] expand the cultural unit’ (SE21:104). Freud suggests that ‘the prohibition 
against an incestuous choice of object…is perhaps the most dramatic mutilation which 
man’s erotic life has in all time experienced’ (SE21:104). In other words, Freud 
understands the incest prohibition as curbing the sexual lusts of adults. This is echoed in 
the introductory passage to The Solemnization of Matrimony which includes the phrase 
‘to satisfy men’s carnal lusts and appetites, like brute beasts that have no understanding’ 
(Cranmer and Ridley, 1662:320). 
 
It is interesting to follow Freud’s recapitulation of his theory of the ‘horror of incest’ 
expounded in Totem and Taboo (SE13:1-17). Freud postulates that the origin of ‘the 
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taboo of incest and the injunction to exogamy’ (SE23:82) is ‘under the domination of a 
powerful male, the lord and father of the entire group’, who enjoys ‘unrestricted power 
which he exercises with violence’ (SE23:81). All females, his wives and daughters and 
some women from other groups, are under his influence. If the sons ‘rouse their father’s 
jealousy they are either killed, castrated or driven out’ (SE23:81). The sons, therefore, 
form small groups, steal wives from other groups and attempt to raise themselves to a 
similar position in their group as their father in his primal group. Freud suggests that 
‘youngest sons, protected by their mother’s love, could take advantage of their father’s 
increasing age and succeed him on his death’, while ‘elder sons, however, were often 
subject to castration or expulsion from the group’ (SE23:81).  
 
Freud continues: ‘the expelled brothers, unite in order to overpower their father, and as 
was their custom, they devoured him raw’ (SE23:81). Through this ‘cannibalistic act’ 
the brothers ‘ensure their identification with and incorporation of the hated, feared and 
honoured father’ (SE23:82). The brothers, still not having settled who was to be the sole 
beneficiary of their father’s status, realised, through their common emotional tie, of 
having been expelled, they had best come to an agreement. A social contract was 
composed comprising three principles: the renunciation of instinct, the recognition of 
mutual obligations, and the introduction of definite inviolable ‘holy’ institutions 
(SE23:82). Morality and justice were born. ‘Each individual renounced his ideal of 
acquiring his father’s position for himself and of possessing his mother and sisters’ 
(SE23:82). Freud asserts that ‘thus the taboo on incest and the injunction to exogamy 
came about’ (SE23:82). A festival was inaugurated by the brothers in remembrance of 
the death and devouring of the primal father. ‘This great festival was a triumphant 
celebration of the combined sons’ victory over their father’ (SE23:83). In other words, 
the group brought pressure to bear and restricted the primal father’s sole possession and 
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use of all the females by cannibalistically introjecting his power and through 
identification with him, the brothers instituted a way to share their inheritance and the 
women. The institution of exogamy was born and the decision not to marry within the 
family group became law. Having considered the origin of the incestuous prohibition on 
the large group, Freud turns to how incest was positioned psychodynamically within the 
Oedipal triangle. 
 
Freud places the context and root for incestuous desire within the Oedipal family group 
(SE4:261-3). Freud regards that ‘a child’s relations to her parents as being dominated by 
incestuous longings’ (SE13:17). Freud recognises that the infant girl’s ‘earliest choice 
of objects for her love is incestuous and those objects are forbidden ones—her father 
and her brother’ (SE7:225ff) and the first love, the mother. Through his experience of 
interpreting dreams, Freud understands how ‘the ego, freed from all ethical bonds, also 
finds itself at one with all the demands of sexual desire’ including forbidden incestuous 
objects, for example ‘a man’s mother and sister…or his own children’ (SE15:142-3). In 
summary, Freud was able to ‘emphasise, [that incestuous desire] is essentially an 
infantile feature’…‘which, as (s)he grows up, (s)he liberates herself from’, or it 
becomes ‘some degree of psychical infantilism’ (SE13:17, original emphasis). Freud 
concludes that ‘incestuous fixations of libido continue to play (or begin once more to 
play) the principal part in her unconscious mental life’ (SE13:17). Freud concludes that 
as ‘a child’s relation to its parents [are] dominated by incestuous longings’ this becomes 
the ‘nuclear complex of neurosis’ (SE13:17). 
 
Incestuous longings appear to follow closely behind the affects the primal scene 
experience has had on the infant girl’s incestuous desire; this earlier psychic sexual 
encounter continues within the innate bisexual and polymorphously perverse 
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dispositions which have yet to be suppressed or ‘repudiated’ (SE7:227). 
Psychodynamically, the infant girl has until now enjoyed an exclusive, omnipotent 
relationship with her mother. The girl now finds herself affected by the loss of this 
exclusivity, due to the intrusion of a third person, her father, as she realises she has been 
born into a family ‘group’ (SE18: 70). This arguably drives her to wish for another 
exclusive relationship and so she turns to her father for satisfaction. The father becomes, 
as the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion describes, her alternative ‘pair’ (Bion, 1961:151). 
 
Freud reminds us that ‘the genitals have already begun playing their part in the process 
of excitation’ (SE17:187-8), with girls ‘the wish to have a child by their father is 
constant; and this in spite of their being completely incapable of forming a clear idea of 
the means for fulfilling these wishes’ (SE17:188). For Freud, when incestuous love 
becomes repressed and unconscious it may regress to a debased lower level. When 
previously the infant girl may have said, ‘My father loves only me’, this is reversed to 
‘My father is beating me’ (SE17:189). Freud interprets this as ‘the sense of guilt and 
sexual love’ converging, in that ‘it is not only the punishment for the forbidden genital 
relation, but also the regressive substitute for that relation’ (SE17:189). Freud insists 
that ‘libidinal excitation from this time forward attaches itself to this regressive 
relational substitute…which finds its outlet in masochistic masturbatory acts’ 
(SE17:188-9). 
 
In order to situate in a broader debate Freud’s assumption that the infant girl finds 
herself born into incestuous relationship I will now return to Judith Herman who argues 
that it is only within a ‘father-dominated family, with a rigid sexual division of labour, 
in which mother’s care for children of both sexes and father’s do not’ that the 
observation of the incest taboo makes sense (Herman, 1981:54). Herman asserts that ‘a 
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patriarchal family structure secures to fathers immense powers over their wives and 
children’ and ‘these powers include an unrestricted right to physical control, 
unrestricted sexual rights to wives (hence rape has no legal meaning within marriage), 
and extensive sexual rights over children’ (Herman, 1981:54). Herman suggests that 
‘fathers have the right to limit the sexual activity of their children, and to determine 
their choice of sexual and marriage partners (hence fathers ‘give away’ daughters in 
marriage)’ while as ‘primary caretakers of children, mothers as well as fathers have 
ample opportunity to act upon their own incestuous wishes’ (Herman, 1981:55). 
Herman concludes that ‘it is the sexual division of labour, with its resultant profound 
differences in male and female socialisation, which determines in mothers a greater 
capacity for self-restraint, and in fathers a greater propensity for sexually exploitative 
behaviour’ (Herman, 1981:55). 
 
Herman applies Freudian theory to her analysis of the girl’s development, initiation into 
the social order, and the role the girl adopts in relation to the mother and father.  Taking 
the case of the daughter, Herman’s analysis of the Oedipal triangle first concerns 
mother, where ‘a girl learns that her mother, is both an inferior and like herself’, and 
‘reacts to this discovery with a rejection of her mother and an attempt to separate from 
her’ (Herman, 1981:56). The girl, however, ‘cannot entirely repudiate her identification 
with her mother, since they are of the same gender’ (Herman, 1981:56). Second, 
Herman in considering the girl’s father claims that ‘the girl’s eroticised interest in her 
father is a reaction to the girl’s discovery that males are everywhere preferred to 
females, and that even her mother chooses men above women, her father and brother 
above herself’ (Herman, 1981:57). Herman conjectures that the girl imagines ‘her father 
has the power to confer the emblem of maleness (penis or phallus) upon her’ thus ‘the 
girl wishes to seduce or be seduced by him’. So by establishing a ‘privileged 
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relationship with her father, the girl seeks to be elevated into the superior company of 
men’ (Herman, 1981:57). 
 
Third, Herman considers the subject herself. Herman summarises that for the girl: 
No threat attends the expression of the girl’s incestuous wishes. If she fears 
her mother’s rivalry, it is because she does not want to lose her mother’s 
love, not because her mother has the power to deprive her of manhood. The 
girl is female; nothing worse can befall her. (Herman, 1981:57)  
 
Herman asserts that there is a reason for the girl’s incestuous desires: 
It is through the consummation of incest that the girl seeks to gain those 
privileges which otherwise must forever be denied to her. Thus the girl has 
infant inducement to overcome her infantile attachment to her father: she 
can be neither rewarded for submitting to the incest taboo nor punished for 
failing to do so. If the girl does renounce her hopes of acquiring male status 
through a special, incestuous relationship, it is only because these hopes are 
ultimately disappointed. The father’s behaviour towards his daughter thus 
assumes immense importance. If the father chooses to eroticise the 
relationship with his daughter, he will encounter little or no resistance. 
(Herman, 1981:57) 
 
Herman postulates that ‘even when the girl does give up her erotic attachment to her 
father, she is encouraged to persist in the fantasy that some other man, like her father, 
will some day take possession of her, raising her above the common lot of womankind’ 
(Herman, 1981:57). The ‘successful attainment of conventional adult heterosexuality 
therefore requires an incomplete resolution of the female Oedipus complex and a 
channelling of female sexuality into submissive relationships with older, stronger, 
richer, more powerful men’ (Herman, 1981:57). Herman, citing the American feminist 
psychotherapist Phyllis Chesler (in. Connell, 1974:76), reiterates that ‘women (in this 
patriarchal society) are encouraged to commit incest as a way of life. As opposed to 
marrying our fathers, we marry men like our fathers…men who are older than us, have 
more money than us, more power than us, are taller than us, are stronger than us…our 
fathers’ (Chesler, 1974:76, in. Herman, 1981:58). 
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In summary, Herman argues that as the girl learns that the mother is inferior she rejects 
her. The girl, however, also identifies with the mother’s capacity to nurture the 
preferred male species. The girl reasons that it is because males are perceived as 
preferred that she desires to turn to the father in the hope he will endow her with 
masculine properties as she envies the superiority of men. Unlike the boy, the girl does 
not fear her incestuous wishes as she fears no castrating outcome. Problematic for the 
girl is the relationship with the father-substitute which becomes a displaced incestuous 
one, as her attachment to the father appears to persist, at least in phantasy. Herman 
contrasts this with the boy, who comes to believe that women are ‘inferior’, including 
his mother and as a consequence ‘suppresses his feminine attitudes’ (Herman, 1981:55). 
Problematic for the boy is that he has to renounce his unconscious incestuous desire, for 
his first love, the mother, as she is the father’s possession, due to his fear of castration, 
in order to become a man’ (Herman, 1981:55-6). Herman concludes that thus the 
‘male’s ability to form affectionate relationships is severely impaired because his 
identification with the person who first cared for him is forever in doubt’ (Herman, 
1981:56). 
 
Unconscious incestuous desire, rudimentarily, centres upon familial relationships both 
of peers and parents, involving the infant’s phantasy of immediate satisfaction. 
Relationships revolving around incestuous desire may include professional and 
therapeutic ones, where authority and trust are crucial ethical factors, in the face of the 
human need to be loved, where love is frustrated and the subject learns to delay 
gratification until such time it is appropriate. Let us now consider how others offer 
different perspectives on the intimate yet appropriate distance which is striven for 
between infant girl and her father. 
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Kristeva, going to the crux of infantile libidinal strivings, follows Freud, by suggesting 
that ‘narcissistic primacy sparks and perhaps dominates psychic life’ (Kristeva, 
1987:21). Kristeva’s hypothesis of Narcissus, suggests that the ‘first threat to Narcissus’ 
omnipotence is the existence of an ‘other’ and for the ‘self’ this becomes problematic. 
Consequently Narcissus sets up a ‘self-deception’, a ‘perpetual illusion’ and which 
dominates the choice of love object. Loving, therefore, according to Kristeva’s 
interpretation, proves satisfying in one of two way’s: first, ‘either through personal 
narcissistic reward’; second, ‘or narcissistic delegation’ (where narcissus is the other). 
In this context we may locate the infant girl’s erotic relationship with her father. The 
living, loving father, not the dead father, enters the girl’s ‘psychic space’ exploding the 
symbiotic reverie she has enjoyed with her mother by introducing the infinite 
transference of ‘lovehate’ (Kristeva, 1987:21). In other words, the father-figure 
penetrates and intrudes upon both the subject’s narcissistic self-deception to reality and 
the infant/mother intimacy, generating ambivalent feelings of loving and hating, and in 
so doing opens up the infant girl’s world to new possibilities. The psychotherapist 
David Mann illuminates the issue of erotic transference and counter-transference, which 
arguably embraces the daughter/father relationship by suggesting that both are ‘sexual 
subjects with passion of his or her own’ (Mann, 1999:76). Mann adds that when the two 
subjects encounter each other’s unconscious incestuous and murderous desires, this ‘can 
become highly transformational’ (Mann, 1999:77), ‘leading to greater authenticity, 
intimacy, expanding the capacity for love and loving’ (Mann, 1999:22). 
 
Arguably, the extremes of love and hate require modification, containment or even 
subjugation. Freud focuses on the adult woman who falls in love with a man who is 
perceived to be in authority. Far from the loving feeling being a transference cure, it 
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becomes ‘an expression of resistance’, in order ‘to assure herself of her irresistibility’, 
‘to destroy his authority’ and ‘to gain all the other promised advantages that are 
attributable to him’ (SE12:163). Freud suggests that if in her endeavour to find love she 
feels ‘humiliation’, ‘she will not fail to take her revenge’ (SE12:164). Freud recognises, 
however, that there is one class of women who are without satisfaction ‘who tolerate no 
surrogates’, those ‘who refuse to accept the psychical in place of the material’ 
(SE12:166-7). Freud asserts that ‘love consists of the repeat of infantile reactions’, in an 
almost ‘compulsive’ manner ‘verging on the pathological’ (SE12:168), and impaired 
only by ‘infantile fixations’ (SE12:169). Freud’s conclusion concerning erotic 
transference, involves the girl, to ‘suppress, renounce or sublimate her instincts’ 
(SE12:164), while the father’s responsibility is to facilitate her through ‘a decisive stage 
in her life’ (SE12:170). Freud argues that: 
she has to learn from him to overcome the pleasure principle, to give up a 
satisfaction which lies to hand but is socially not acceptable, in favour of a 
more distant one, which is perhaps altogether uncertain, but which is both 
psychologically and socially unimpeachable. (SE12:170) 
 
In other words, Freud argues that the extremes of loving and hating, humiliation and 
revenge require transforming, suppressing, renouncing and sublimating and that in the 
girl as these qualities are otherwise, to some degree, socially unacceptable, she is 
required to become ‘socially unimpeachable’ (SE12:170). 
 
The Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels appears to take up Freud’s theme of the 
authoritative man’s involvement when, following the psychoanalyst Harold Searles 
(1959), views the love of the parent of the opposite sex as ‘helping the child acquire 
enough strength to accept the unrealisability of her Oedipal strivings’ (Samuels, 
1985:167). The father may be seen as facilitating a reciprocal transformational process 
where ‘the loved parent returns love and, above all, does see the child as a potential love 
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partner but communicates that, regrettably it cannot be’ (Samuels, 1985:168). Arguably, 
the father contains the child’s stress by understanding her frustration and re-presents her 
incestuous phantasies in a socially acceptable form. 
 
The psychoanalyst Anthony Storr suggests that if ‘sexual impulses find satisfaction 
within the family…the parent-child relationship is damaged’ (Storr, 1960:96). Storr 
reasons that because in a sexual situation the parent ‘abrogates parenthood’ it becomes a 
‘threat to the child’s security’ (Storr, 1960:96-7). Additionally in the ‘marked 
discrepancy of power…the child is not treated as a person [but] as a thing’ (Storr, 
1960:97-8). Storr links, in infant terms, ‘sex is apt to be terrifying’ and understands that 
‘love means chiefly tenderness, protection and security’ (Storr, 1960:97-8). Storr 
concludes that ‘it is not surprising that adult passion is equated with violence, and 
incestuous advances of a parent are felt as a threat rather than as a manifestation of 
affection’ (Storr, 1960:98). Similarly, Storr and Mann recognise that from the 
psychotherapist’s position ‘falling in love with a patient is incestuous due to an abuse of 
power’ (Mann, 1999:22, Storr, 1960:153).  
 
To summarise, the impact of unconscious incestuous desire and the incest prohibition 
have on the bride-in-white may be considered under three headings: 
psychodynamically, anthropologically and therapeutically. Psychodynamically, Freud 
locates unconscious incestuous desire within the Oedipal constellation and within the 
backdrop of oral and anal phases for the infant girl and of every child. Libidinally the 
infant girl finds herself on the cusp of the genital strivings of the phallic phase and in a 
space between the once all providing but now depriving mother. Arguably, the infant 
girl longs for immediate satisfaction, so turns away from the mother and looks for 
phallic satisfaction from the father. The unconscious incestuous desire requires 
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containing as it has an impact on the whole Oedipal constellation: daughter, father, 
mother and other.  
 
Anthropologically, not only the bride but the whole of society appears subject to the 
incest taboo through the implementation of canon and civil law, as society cannot afford 
incest. As the incest taboo is a social construction, the subject internalises the collective 
prohibition: a phylogenetic memory trace of our forebears. Arguably, the public sacred 
walk, father and bride-in-white make in the Church, visually symbolises that neither 
party has acted out on their unconscious incestuous desire. It could be argued that 
having resisted incestuous wishes towards the father, the pure virgin bride, untouched 
by any other and containing no one else’s babies, is to the father a highly valued 
commodity.  
 
Therapeutically, the psychoanalytic perspective cautions, regarding the powerful 
unconscious incestuous desire in the psychotherapeutic room, that, due to a perceived 
imbalance of power there may be an oscillation of unconscious incestuous desire and 
prohibition. This oscillation may be considered a benefit for the therapeutic experience. 
The oscillation may become a learning process in handling feelings of love and 
rejection for the analysand, which arguably parallels the role the daughter takes within 
the Oedipal constellation and in particular within the daughter/father relationship.  
 
As the daughter and father process down the aisle together, he signifies lawful 
prohibition while she is the locus of desire. Her smooth maternal belly signifies there 
are no contents, and the white veil and dress symbolise purity. It could be argued, 
therefore, that the bride-in-white, who found as a infant girl that she was located within 
incestuous family dynamics, now walking with her father, may be considered highly 
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desirable. Arguably, this has transpired for two reasons. First, because the father has 
been the facilitator, negotiator, and mediator as well as prohibiter of conscious and 
unconscious incestuous desire. Second, in this moment, the bride recaptures the 
phantasy of possessing the father, whose representation was an ego-ideal: a once 
unconscious incestuous desire. Now the postponement of this satisfaction, which has 
long been awaited, is nearing fruition in the bride-in-white’s displacement of her desires 
onto a non-incestuous other. Having considered the infant girl’s and later the bride’s 
unconscious incestuous desire for an intimate relationship with the father being met 
with societal prohibition, let us now investigate how the infant and later the bride 
psychologically uses clothes. 
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3.4 How the bride psychologically uses clothes to process change 
Having considered an historical position of clothes in Part One, let us explore some 
psychoanalytical aspects of clothes. Arguably, a central feature for the bride-in-white is 
her dress. But why are clothes so significant especially to women? For example, some 
women may use clothes as a fetish, while others experience clothes as containing, and 
as clothes touch the skin they can unconsciously make a re-connection to the mother, or 
clothes can become social signs. In Part Four, I will explore how, in Winnicottian terms, 
the bride’s wedding dress can be interpreted as a ‘transitional object’. Let us now 
explore the infant’s unconscious relation to clothes by first exploring how clothes may 
be understood in terms of a fetish by them standing in for something else. 
 
The German hypnotherapist and psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1899:517) 
argues that ‘the fetish object originates from an association with the subject’s first 
sexual excitation’ (in. Gamman, 1994:41). Freud in 1905 understands that ‘the normal 
sexual object is replaced by another which bears some relation to it, but is entirely 
unsuited to serve the normal sexual aim’ (SE7:153). In other words, an object takes on 
an ‘overvaluation’ and is ‘connected with an abandonment of the sexual aim’ 
(SE7:153). Freud suggests that the object becomes a symbol for the sexual object and 
can be an inanimate object like a piece of clothing and ‘such substitutes are likened to 
the fetish’ (SE7:153). That is, the process of replacement of a part of the mother’s body 
is made by some inanimate object which becomes erotisised. 
 
Freud by 1909 in directing his attention to women asserts that: 
half of humanity must be classed among the clothes fetishists. All women 
are clothes fetishists…It is a question of the repression of the [libidinal] 
drive, this time however in the passive form of allowing oneself to be seen, 
which is repressed by the clothes, and on account of which clothes are 
raised to a fetish. (Freud, 1909: In Gamman, 1994:41) 
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Thus Freud links fetishism to the repression of the scopophilic instinct ‘to look’, as 
already discussed in Part One. That is to suggest that female clothes fetishists not only 
repress the sight of their mother’s ‘castration’ but also their own. By idealising clothes 
the subject displaces the other’s gaze from the ‘castrated’ state onto the whole covered 
desirable body. Freud postulates that there is a ‘splitting’ process, whereby one aspect 
of the object becomes suppressed, while the other part is idealised. 
 
Freud, in 1927 suggests that ‘the fetish is a substitute for…a particular and quite special 
penis that had been extremely important in early childhood but had later been lost’ 
(SE21:152). In other words, ‘the fetish is a substitute for the woman’s (the mother’s) 
penis that the little boy [and arguably the infant girl] once believed in and does not want 
to give up’ (SE21:152-3). That is, in the infantile theory of sexuality, ‘the fetish stands 
for the missing penis of the woman’, or ‘the fetish achieves…a token of triumph over 
the threat of castration and a protection against it’; ‘the fetish being [her] substitute for a 
genital’ (SE21:154). Freud concludes that ‘one would expect that the objects chosen as 
substitutes for the absent female phallus would be such as appear as symbols of the 
penis in other connections as well’ (SE21:155). Freud is careful to distinguish that this 
process is a ‘disavowal’ of castration, rather than a repression or denial. That is, the 
[girl] retains the belief that she once had a penis and now has ‘lost’ it, hence the need 
for compensation or penis substitute. Freud claims that this oscillation or splitting of the 
ego ‘saves the fetishist from becoming a homosexual (SE21:154). Freud suggests that 
the process of the ‘splitting of the ego in the process of defence’, a ‘disavowal’ 
(SE23:275), is a defence against an incomplete attempt at ‘turning away from reality’ 
(SE23:277). This is illustrated in the persistent co-existing alternating states between the 
girl believing that once she possessed a penis and her reluctant acceptance of reality that 
she ‘lacks’ one, thus a disavowal of castration. 
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The first Russian psychoanalyst Moshe Wulff describes an item of clothing ‘which had 
been worn by the mother’ as being pressed between the hands while the sixteen months 
old infant sucks the thumb during the process of falling asleep (Wulff, 1946:450). Wulff 
suggests that ‘the fetish represents a substitute for the mother’s body and in particular 
her breast’ and that this ‘manifestation is a reaction formation to an inhibited or 
ungratified instinctual impulse’ (Wulff, 1946:450). 
 
As already established, once the girl accepts castration, psychologically she no longer 
fears castration. We might ask then, can the bride or the dress or the relationship to her 
dress be understood in terms of a fetish? Arguably, the visual affect the bride-in-white 
evokes can be interpreted as a triumph over the reality of her castration. Also, the 
idealised image the bride-in-white creates, becomes a compensation for the bride’s 
‘lost’ penis because by wearing the white dress the whole image becomes powerfully 
phallic for herself and in the other’s gaze. 
 
The psychic processing of separation and the amelioration of anxiety arguably continues 
throughout the life cycle. Let us now investigate how the use of apparel, during the 
subject’s attempt to process anxiety, can be understood in psychodynamic terms. 
McDougall, in discussing ‘transitional phenomena’ (Winnicott, 1951a) suggests that: 
If a small child dare not play in the mother’s presence, fearing that mother 
will either withdraw interest from her as she plays or take over the game, 
then any thrust toward creative independence will be fraught with this 
double danger. To create is to claim one’s right to separate existence and 
individual identity. (McDougall, 1995:102, original emphasis)  
 
In other words, in the ‘transitional space’ of playing with mother there is the potential 
for the illusion of her support, but also frustration when the mother expresses her 
opinion.  
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McDougall suggests that clothing can become the locus of affect. McDougall asserts 
that clothes can be ‘invested, rather like ‘transitional object’s’, as they can ‘play the role 
of the environmental mother of early infancy, reassuring…bodily integrity and psychic 
security’ (McDougall, 1995:204). The clothes become reassuring, especially if they are 
forbidden to be washed, as this represents a degree of physical and psychic integrity, in 
that, the subject ‘knows who they are’ (McDougall, 1995:204). In other words, on the 
one hand clothes can be felt as though they ‘keep [the subject] together’, arguably 
experienced as containing for both the body and the psyche. Yet on the other hand, if 
the clothes were ‘ripped off’ then there would be ‘no defence’ against the ‘devouring’ 
gaze of the (m)other. The hope being to confirm one’s existence in the other’s eyes as a 
separate individual, not being ‘devoured’ or ‘seduced’ and defensively not needing to 
devour or seduce but to secure an autonomous, subjective, liberated identity yet while in 
the (m)other’s presence.  
 
Arguably, from McDougall’s position, there seems to be a tension between feeling 
safely contained by the clothes and the risk involved in being seen wearing clothes that 
attract overt or unwarranted attention by a devouring gaze. That is to say, that on the 
one hand in the attempt at confirming one’s existence there appears to be an 
unconscious dynamic between feeling ‘the fear of nothingness’, an ‘inner deadness’, 
and ‘the foreboding of non-existence’ (McDougall, 1995:204). On the other hand there 
becomes the need to ‘give meaning to one’s subjectivity’ (McDougall, 1995:205) and to 
exist in the (m)other’s eyes and receive ‘maternal protection’ (McDougall, 1995:207). 
In conclusion, therefore, wearing clothes may feel physically and psychologically 
integrating while offering reassurance in the face of a penetrating gaze. 
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McDougall also discusses how the shape of clothes that touch the physical body and 
once worn, they and the body ‘melt’ together and how ‘you’re fine inside them’ 
(McDougall, 1982:235). McDougall links the tactile experience of ‘the clothes which 
touch our bodies and envelop us’ (McDougall, 1982:235) with ‘being enveloped in 
[mother’s] arms’ (McDougall, 1982:236), which can resonate with feelings of 
‘closeness’, or ‘disgust’ (McDougall, 1982:236). McDougall emphasises that ‘our 
clothes are a bit like the mothers of our babyhood. Our mothers choose our clothes, put 
them on us when we’re little; and in a way they remain associated with her’ 
(McDougall, 1982:236).  
 
In considering this position, we see that McDougall addresses the internalised and 
external experience of the subject’s relation to clothes both during childhood and into 
adulthood. Another way in which we can interpret how clothes may be used in 
connection with bridging the gap between subjective experience and the maternal world 
is explored by the psychoanalyst Robert Bak (1953) who considers how women’s 
clothes may be unconsciously equated with the ‘vagina or womb, phallus, or the more 
primitive dynamic of mother’s skin’ (Bak in Stoller, 1968:124). Bak argues that clothes 
may ‘recapture the primitive sensuality of having her skin applied against’ the subject’s 
body (Bak in Stoller, 1968:124). And adds that the psychoanalyst Fredrick Worden 
suggests that clothes, being tactile and sensual, can ‘restore the blissful lost closeness 
with the mother’ (Bak in Stoller, 1968:124). Bak (1974) suggests that the term ‘infantile 
fetish is a misnomer for the ‘transitional object’, although the ‘transitional object’ may 
acquire different meanings and functions, such as a fetishistic element, in later 
developmental phase’ (Bak in Hong, 1978:54). Stoller suggests that ‘the infant child 
[can become the] ‘transitional object’ for its mother’, thus setting up in the child a 
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struggle for autonomy, and in the mother a struggle to fill her emptiness (Stoller, 
1968:124). 
 
Feminist and psychotherapist Susie Orbach discusses how some clothes are perceived as 
being endowed with status and offer social cohesion. Orbach discusses the affects 
appertaining to the woman’s relation to clothes and how they can become the conscious 
and unconscious locus of desire, aspiration and value. Orbach asserts that clothes may 
become ‘invested with a power quite beyond their raw material’ such as ‘human values 
of status, power, wealth and sexuality…albeit transitory’ (Orbach, 1986:13). Clothes 
may also ‘become signposts for how to read people…immediate identity badges which 
convey (and at times attempt to conceal) information about class, gender, ethnicity 
(frequently), and style’ and ‘signal the entry into a social group’ (Orbach, 1986:13). 
While Orbach does not express clothes in terms of being ‘transitional’, as Bak, 
McDougall and Winnicott, Orbach demonstrates how some clothes, like other aspects of 
body language, attract attention by being appealing, can be ‘regarded as indulgent’ 
(Orbach, 1986:135) and ‘aesthetically pleasing’ (Orbach, 1986:136). Orbach suggests 
that clothes can also convey inner meanings such as:  
the way the wearer carries herself gives clues to how she feels, [can] be 
soothing [or] fraught with tension [where] many women find it extremely 
hard to spend money on themselves which can be associated with a 
gargantuan indulgence. [Thus] the subsequent hoarding then becomes 
justified as a desperate attempt at some kind of security. (Orbach, 1986:135-
6)  
 
In the light of these analyses it can be argued that wearing clothes can be experienced as 
a defence against narcissistic vulnerability, as clothes may be something to hide behind, 
be covered over with, or used as a means of identification. Arguably, the bride may feel 
contained in a full-length gown of white, which attracts the maximum amount of 
attention, and not only requires the gown’s protection to cover her narcissistic 
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vulnerability by diverting the gaze onto her whole body, but also uses the gown to 
demand confirmation of her existence from the (m)other.  
 
As already explored in Part One, the history of white apparel, if viewed in religious 
terms, suggests that adorning white garments symbolise outward purity and inward 
purity of intention in order to establish the illusion of approval from and be reunited 
with ones creator. In other words wearing the correct clothes relieves anxiety because 
this potentially avoids any sense of disapproval or the others’ rejection. This may be 
illustrated in terms of the Biblical ‘Wedding-Feast’, that when one of the guests came 
‘without their wedding clothes’, resulted in their being ejected from the group 
(Matthew,22v11).  
 
Arguably, approval from the group or ones creator may be considered essential. In 
spiritual terms, the ‘creator’, the one with whom one seeks to be reunited can be 
considered as God, whereas psychodynamically the ‘creator’ can be interpreted as the 
mother. In physical terms, Douglas suggests that publicly working out rituals of purity 
creates social unity and gives meaning to a ‘moral code’ (Douglas, 1966:9-13). In 
psychological terms, Freud argues that fear and hostility predominate in the woman’s 
notions of physical purity versus physical violation, such as defloration and suggests 
these dangers can be averted through ‘acts of atonement and purification’ (SE13:20). 
Thus by wearing the correct clothes during ritual ceremony the wearer receives the 
group’s, the (m)other’s, and God’s approval. 
 
In summary, the use of clothes can be understood in terms of bridging the maternal 
world and the autonomy of the subject. If it is accepted that the bride’s white gown, an 
inanimate object of clothing, which envelops the bride, can be understood as offering a 
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connection with the maternal realm, as well as offering warmth and security during a 
process of uncertainty, and during a time of setting up her own partnership and home, 
then we could view that the wedding dress has the same qualities as a ‘transitional 
object’. In Part Four I will consider how the bride’s statements, referring to the dress, 
can be interpreted psychologically in terms of being a ‘transitional object’. Let us now 
move from examining psychoanalytic theory to explore how the bride-in-white 
experiences the wedding ceremony. 
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PART FOUR 
Interpreting the marriage ceremony  
with reference to the bride-in-white’s ‘felt’ experience 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Part One my aim was to investigate as wide a range of themes as possible applicable 
to the subjective experience of the bride-in-white. Themes included, the history and 
idealisation of female virginity, human rites of passage involving separation and 
integration, issues concerning being found acceptable or excluded from the group in 
Biblical or Oedipal terms, why brides are veiled and considered sacred, how Queen 
Victoria influenced the phenomenon of the bride-in-white, and introducing possible 
psychoanalytic themes relevant to the bride-in-white’s subjective experience. 
 
Building on these possible psychoanalytic themes introduced in Part One, and Part Two, 
Appendix D re-examined these psychoanalytic themes in the light of the grounded 
theory methodology chosen for this qualitative research. Appendix D established that 
emerging from the participants’ data, although several themes were considered, four 
predominant themes emerged. In an attempt to guard against researcher bias, in fitting 
the data to the theory and the theory to the data, further ‘case study’ examinations, 
based on whole interviews, are offered in Appendix E. 
 
Before any close examination of the data could be made in Part Four, key to 
psychoanalytic investigation is that infant experiences can often be repressed and 
emerge in adulthood, so the infant girl’s psychological development was investigated in 
Part Three, with particular attention to the bride-in-white. Thus, being looked at, and 
how clothes are used, was explored along with locating the infant girl in the pre-Oedipal 
attachment to the mother, and the girl’s Oedipal relationship to the father. 
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4.2 Psychoanalytic interpretation 
Participant’s statements have not deliberately been selected in order to prove, 
substantiate or challenge psychoanalytic theory, however by applying a psychodynamic 
lens offers the opportunity to illuminate the bride’s responses in a special way. As 
mentioned in Part One, Freud suggests that aims of interpretation include: ‘filling the 
gaps in the memory of childhood’ (SE15:201), by ‘describing the event in the greatest 
possible detail and putting the affect into words’ (SE2:6-10). Hence in Part Four the 
emphasis focuses on examining the participants’ responses as closely as possible with 
special attention to feelings.  
 
Other ways of understanding the aim of psychoanalytic interpretation include 
‘reactivating the complete reproduction of the Oedipus complex’ (Ferenczi, 1926:267), 
‘to increase self-awareness by making the person conscious of processes within 
themselves of which they were previously unconscious’ (Rycroft, 1968:77). In other 
words, aims of psychodynamic interpretation include making links between the past and 
the present by addressing feelings of sexual desire, rivalry, exclusion from and 
frustration with the parents thus working through problems of separation and of feeling 
separate yet ‘contained’ (Bion, 1962a:90) in the presence of another. The post-Freudian 
theorist Michael Balint, argues that interpretation gives expression to ‘instinctual wishes 
that demand gratification’ by becoming ‘directed towards object-relating’ offering a 
‘New Beginning’ (Balint, 1952:191-2). Donald Winnicott adds that interpretation 
includes ‘ego-strengthening, corresponding to the ego-support of the mother’, the 
loosening up of defences, towards ‘ego-independence’ and to ‘ego-integration, 
autonomy and personal omnipotence’ (Winnicott, 1962:168).  
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Problematic with Freud’s ‘fundamental rule’ of therapeutic technique in the talking and 
listening cure, that of ‘apparently unconstrained conversation’ (SE2:56), or ‘free 
association’, is when to stop. Applicable to both are when the subject stops talking and 
the listener stops listening, but also at the point of intervention, when the interpretation 
is enough. As already mentioned in Part Two, while the bride’s statements are free 
associative, they are also contained within a questionnaire. The précised statements that 
have been selected for closer examination in Part Four, focus on illuminating the 
progression of the bride’s wedding day experience. Thus interpretations however 
exhaustive, have their limitations and arguably are recognised as not being 
inexhaustible. As discussed in Part Two, perhaps interpretation can only be part of the 
truth and never complete or completed. Let us consider how psychoanalytic 
interpretation can be brought to an end. 
 
Freud, when considering Analysis Terminable and Interminable (SE23:211-53) implies 
these positions. James Strachey, editor of the ‘Standard Edition’ points to an air of 
‘pessimism’ by stressing Freud’s acute awareness of psychoanalytic ‘limitations’ 
(SE23:211). Freud, however, following Ferenczi’s insistence, asserts that ‘a requirement 
in every successful analysis’ is that ‘every female patient…must have got rid of her 
masculinity complex and must emotionally accept without a trace of resentment the 
implications of her female role’ (SE23:251)87. Freud maintains that this is in order to 
stave off ‘outbreaks of severe depression’, due to ‘the repudiation of femininity’ 
(SE23:252). In Freudian terms, this implies that when this position is accomplished then 
the analysis can stop. Let us now consider how Winnicott conceptualises uninhibited 
talking.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Freud’s statement may be critiqued for its insistence and heterosexual bias. Feminists and others may 
prefer to say that the aim of a successful analysis concerns the illumination of defences. 
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Winnicott’s understanding of ‘free association’ was related to the infant’s playing. 
Winnicott emphasises that ‘playing is inherently exciting and precarious’ (Winnicott, 
1971:52), and likens playing to the ‘transitional phenomena’ found in ‘a human being’s 
capacity for cultural experience’ (Winnicott, 1971:40). Winnicott argues that playing 
‘belongs to health, facilitates growth, leads to group relationships and can be a form of 
communication’ (Winnicott, 1971:41). Winnicott suggests, however, that when ‘the 
physical excitement of instinctual involvement becomes evident, then playing stops’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:39). In other words, if the free association of, what we may call ‘talk-
play’ is interrupted by physical needs that require acting upon, then the ‘talk-play’ 
relationship fundamentally changes in character demolishing the potential for free 
associative communication. Thus, in Winnicottian terms, interpretation stops due to 
acting out. Let us now consider how Rycroft would accept an interpretation as 
complete. 
 
Charles Rycroft asserts that ‘correct interpretations are those which both explain 
adequately the ‘material’ being interpreted and are formulated in such a way and 
communicated at such a time that they have actuality for, and making sense to, the 
subject’ (Rycroft, 1968:76). In other words, this is to intimate that, when the subject 
considers that sense is made, the interpretation can stop. Arguably, analysis ends when 
some sense has been made of the nonsense of personal non-understanding. Thus we are 
obliged to accept that analysis is never the last word on the matter. 
 
I have aimed to interpret each bride’s personal experience separately in order to 
maintain discrete boundaries and not to conflate more than one bride’s individual 
experience, thus a certain amount of repetition will be inevitable. Let us now turn to the 
process of interpreting the brides’ statements, in connection with their ‘felt’ experience, 
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but first let us consider the frame within which the bride is located and discuss how the 
marriage ritual may offer a sense of order or chaos. 
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4.3 Interpreting the ceremony in Oedipal terms: chaos or order 
Framing the bride-in-white’s experience is the wedding ceremony, ‘The Form of 
Solemnization of Matrimony’, inscribed in The Book of Common Prayer88, in the 
Church [Figure 7]. Currently considered as traditional, this ceremony was formed by 
others prior to it being translated from the thirteenth century Latin Sarum Rite, after the 
break from Rome, into English during the reign of Edward VI, put into printed form in 
1549 and revised in its current form in 1662. The author’s motives for this ceremony are 
enumerated at the outset. The motivations are paraphrased as follows: ‘to signify a 
union between Christ and the Church’, and to attain an ‘honourable’ state among ones 
peers. The ceremony is not to be undertaken ‘lightly…to satisfy carnal lusts’, but for the 
‘procreation of children’, be ‘a remedy against sin and avoid fornication’, for the 
‘mutual help and comfort in prosperity and adversity’ (Cranmer and Ridley, 1662:320). 
In order to understand this ceremony better, let us first explore an anthropological view 
of ritual and second a psychoanalytic interpretation of religious ceremony. 
 
Claude Levi-Strauss argues that ‘ritual’, as discussed in Part One, is not a social game 
of chance but is the dramatisation ‘played’ by a defined set of rules’ (Levi-Strauss, 
1972:30). Levi-Strauss suggests that ritual is ‘played’ between the fertilising agent and 
the fertilised object, a system based on reciprocity, the purpose of which is to establish a 
negotiated alliance’ (Levi-Strauss, 1963:240). Levi-Strauss claims that ‘ritual conjoins, 
as it brings about a union between two initially separate groups. In the case of games the 
symmetry is therefore pre-ordained and it is of the structural kind since it follows from 
the principle that the values are the same for both sides: asymmetry is engendered’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Cranmer, Thomas and Ridley, Nicholas (1662) The Book of Common Prayer and Administration of the 
Sacraments and Other Rites and Ceremonies of The Church of England, Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge: London. ‘Its publication followed the Restoration of the monarchy two years after Charles II 
acceded to the throne. Its aim was to restore English life to the stability known before the Civil War. Its 
purpose was to be an instrument of social control, re-establishing reasonable religion and a wholesome 
and balanced pattern both in family and community life’. (The Right Rev Stephen Platten, Bishop of 
Wakefield, in. The Times 31.03.2012, p95). Revised by the Council, The Archbishops' (2000) Marriage: 
Common Worship, Church House Publishing: London. 
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(Levi-Strauss, 1972:32, original emphasis). In other words, as the British psychoanalyst 
Marion Milner suggests, ‘ritual creates order and coherence, instead of chaos and 
misunderstanding’ (Milner, 1987:84). 
 
Mary Douglas suggests, as already established in Part One, that ‘rituals of purity and 
impurity create unity in experience’ (Douglas, 1966:3). Arguably, the marriage 
ceremony legitimises within their social group the sexual union of two disparate people 
by creating a common experience. Douglas argues that a sacred ceremony is marked out 
by symbolic patterns of public display and private ritual composed of ‘words and signs’ 
(Douglas, 1966:29). Douglas claims that ‘it is impossible to have social relations 
without symbolic acts as ritual provides a frame’ (Douglas, 1966:78). That is, time and 
place are marked off, alerting a special kind of expectancy and creating a mood which 
carries significance. Douglas postulates that: 
framing and limiting experience shuts in desired themes or shuts out 
intruding ones. Thus by framing, the ritual aids in selecting experiences for 
concentrated attention, and is creative at the level of performance. Ritual is 
enhanced with external symbols which aid the co-ordination of brain and 
body as action sharpens the focus of the attention on the wish. (Douglas, 
1966:78) 
 
In other words, mnemonic action stimulates memory by bringing it under control with 
the use of external signs. On the level of performance external actions include the 
ceremonial processing into and out of the Church, the giving and receiving of the bride, 
the words of the ceremony and the vows enunciated. Significant signs for the bride 
include the wedding dress, the wedding ring and the marriage certificate. 
 
Douglas suggests that where restrictions are imposed, they ‘offer certainty where 
otherwise there could be uncertainty, as boundaries and limits are imposed when 
boundaries are threatened’ (Douglas, 1966:118). Douglas suggests that ‘the sacred 
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needs to be continually hedged in with prohibitions’ and therefore rituals are bound to 
be expressions of ‘separation and demarcation and by beliefs in the danger of crossing 
forbidden boundaries’ (Douglas, 1966:27). Douglas recognises that ritual demarcates 
and restricts. Thus by bringing order, disorder is implied and avoided. Douglas suggests 
that ‘ritual draws on powers and truths which cannot be reached by conscious effort’ 
like ‘the disorder of the mind, in dreams, faints and frenzies’ (Douglas, 1966:117). 
Arguably, ritual facilitates difficult transformations including guilt associated with 
repudiations, separation during the task of forming of a new union. Ritual therefore may 
transform the infant’s desire for unending, self-replenishing enjoyment and a refusal to 
face loss and separation. Douglas concludes that the ‘neglect of ritual may lead to 
madness, as ritual conserves sanity and life while separating death from life, and sanity 
is assured if ritual is performed’ (Douglas, 1966:217). Let us now move from an 
anthropological understanding of ritual to consider a psychoanalytic positioning of the 
marriage ceremony. 
 
Freud suggests that ‘the formation of religion seems to be based on the suppression, and 
renunciation of certain instinctual impulses, that are self-seeking, and socially harmful 
but are not without a sexual component’ (SE9:125). Freud claims that religious 
ceremony, like obsessive actions, defends against ‘an unconscious sense of guilt 
associated with prohibitions linked to the idea of punishment, with the internal 
perception of the temptation’ and suggests that ‘what remains unconscious, is the 
connection between the occasion on which this expectant anxiety and the danger which 
it conjures up’ (SE9:123). Freud emphasises that ‘ceremonial actions arise partly as a 
defence against the temptation and partly as a protection against the ill which is 
expected’ (SE9:124). Let us now explore what may be unconsciously defended against 
in the ritual. 
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Freud argues that ‘the libido follows the paths of narcissistic needs and attaches itself to 
the objects which ensure the satisfaction of those needs’ (SE21:24). Freud recognises 
that first the mother satisfies the infant’s hunger and offers protection against anxiety, 
but later the father replaces the mother because he offers stronger protection. Freud 
suggests that ‘from the helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection 
through love which was provided by the father and the recognition that this helplessness 
lasts throughout life, makes it necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this 
time a more powerful one’ (SE21:30). Thus a displacement onto an omnipotent, 
omniscient, omnipresent father figure offers ‘order rather than chaos’ (SE21:34), 
alleviating anxiety and providing security. 
 
Freud argues that civilisation is built on the coercive ‘renunciation of instinct’ (SE21:7) 
through prohibition because of the infant’s polymorphous disposition. Thus when 
exhibiting control over instinctual passions, such as incestuous desire, the subject can 
then be held in high regard. This control, in Freudian terms, is attained through the 
internalisation of a paternal superego, including the command ‘thou shall not kill’, thus 
inculcating narcissistic satisfactions derived from moral values and ideals89. The 
consolation for the ‘renunciation of instinct’ is that the wedding ceremony provides the 
group with the occasion for sharing in the highly valued emotional experiences of the 
bride-in-white’s achievement and ideals of the, until now, ‘renunciation of sexual 
instinct’: all are enriched with narcissistic satisfaction because the bride-in-white 
symbolises being physically unblemished. From this position, in Freudian terms, the 
bride-in-white signifies the perfecting of control of instinct and becomes an object of 
elevation and exaltation. In other words, the wedding ceremony constructs a frame 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 As discussed in Part One, the Virgin Mary, Abbess Ethelburga and Jeanne d’Arc were all extolled for 
their virtue and self-restraint. 
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within which the subject submits to the suppression of guilt-laden unconscious 
instinctual desires, (once given expression during infancy), but now within the frame of 
adulthood, finds acceptability. Having explored some views of the structure and purpose 
of ritualised ceremony, let us now apply Freud’s Oedipal theory to the Church 
ceremony, to which the bride-in-white submits. 
 
Arguably, we cannot directly interpret the bride’s statements in Oedipal terms as the 
ceremony, referred to above, is pre-ordained and therefore the bride responds to the 
ceremony. Let us therefore consider the wedding ceremony in Oedipal terms. The bride-
in-white, like others attending the ceremony, submits to a pre-ordained established 
order, a custom that happens, and what other people like to do. This offers all who are 
present at the ceremony a sense of security and structure. As all who attend, take up a 
pre-determined role, let us consider a psychodynamic overview of the principal 
characters’ role. 
 
The mother, classically, privately clothes and undresses the infant, provides 
nourishment, and a safe environment. The mother, as already established in Part Three, 
also facilitates a symbiotic relationship with the infant where each are dependent upon 
the other and both are part of each other as if they are one. The ceremony casts the 
mother in the role of the prime nurturer. As will be explored in greater depth later in 
Part Four, the mother and daughter may shop together for the dress, and the mother may 
assist her daughter to adorn her white wedding gown and help its later removal after the 
ceremony. The ritual dictates that in the Church the mother passively sits at the front, 
like a bystander, only able to look on without active participation. It could be suggested 
that the mother is eclipsed by the bride-in-white who, as already established in Part 
One, ‘attracts the maximum amount of attention’.  
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In a dramatised manner the father takes an active role by accompanying the bride-to-be 
on her journey away from the familial home to the Church and gives the bride away into 
the safe keeping of another man. The father’s role, in the ceremony, from a Freudian 
perspective can be seen to illustrate the Oedipus complex. The father, as already 
established in Part Three, interrupts the pre-Oedipal exclusive infant-mother attachment 
and the couple’s symbiotic reverie. Like the father of infancy, the father in the 
ceremony becomes the one who separates the daughter from the mother. So when the 
father gives his daughter away on her wedding day, as directed by the marriage 
ceremony, this can be interpreted as containing the Oedipal resonance of intrusion by 
continuing infant experience into adulthood. While the father takes an active, but silent 
role during the ceremony, at the reception the father classically becomes the interlocutor 
by making a speech (Llewelyn, 1993:231), while the bride and the mother remain silent, 
compatible with Freudian theory, that the male plays an active role while the female 
becomes relatively passive.  
 
What is interesting is that Jacques Lacan suggests that the ‘‘Name-of-the-Father’ takes 
the place of the ‘Other’, the signifier of the symbolic triad’ who constitutes the law 
(Lacan, 1966:217). Lacan makes it clear that he is not referring necessarily to the real 
father, or the paternal imago, but to the symbolic father. Lacan argues that, unlike Freud 
who ‘links the Oedipal father to the Oedipus complex in every personal history to the 
Oedipal father’s murder, thus the subject becomes indebted by binding themselves for 
life to the Law’ (Lacan, 1966:199). Lacan maintains that ‘the symbolic father, in so far 
as he signifies this Law, is certainly the dead father’ (Lacan, 1966:199).  
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Arguably, the Church, on the wedding day could be understood in Winnicottian terms 
as providing a socially acceptable, safe, environment within which to transform 
unmanageable separation anxieties and within which to experience an unfamiliar 
solemn ceremony with dignity and gravity. As already discussed in Part One, prohibited 
degrees of affiliation are inscribed in the Biblical injunctions of the Book of Leviticus 
thus exerting the boundaries around who is permitted to marry whom, and subsequently 
establishing who must be ‘given away’ and who can be received. Thus, as concluded in 
Part One, the established Church controls sexual union. The minister performs the 
ceremony, by enunciating each word in the correct sequence, in order to validate the 
ritual of joining two people. The minister pronounces: ‘that they be man and wife 
together, in the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ and then announces the blessing on behalf of 
‘God-the-Father’. Thus through the authority of the minister, the Church declares to the 
group that this new union is acceptable.  
 
The principal role in the ceremony is taken by the bride, (the object of desire). The bride 
submits to the authority of Ecclesiastical Law, and by doing so becomes transformed by 
the ceremony, both of which promote her to relinquish familial ties and adopt the 
passive role of being ‘given away’. The infant girl may have had an exclusive 
relationship with the mother, or had unconscious incestuous desires towards the father, 
but the bride-in-white in the ceremony visually demonstrates that she is a prized 
possession. With this psychodynamic understanding of the mother’s, the father’s, the 
Church’s and the bride’s role during the ceremony, the bride’s statements can be 
interpreted in terms of the ceremony and the bride’s response to these principal roles.  
 
As each participant to this study considers the significance of the Church ceremony, the 
manner in which the bride’s statements indicate the effect that the ceremony had on 
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them seems to fall into five themes: First, that of experiencing a sense of God’s 
presence; Second, offering a sense of continuity; Third, suggesting the gravity of the 
ceremony; Fourth, experiencing the affect of the mood; Fifth that the ceremony is 
influenced by parents. Let us examine, through selective reports, each of these themes 
more closely. It will be noticed that some of the bride’s statements contain overlapping 
themes however the main theme under discussion will predominate during the 
interpretation. I will now consider précised statements given during the interview. 
 
First, the majority of brides who were interviewed report on the experience of sensing 
God’s presence during the ceremony as the following reports illustrate: 
We found our beautiful local Church service formal and rather nice. The minister was 
nice and that was important. He was pleased that we agreed to be married in Church in 
front of God. That was important because my dad had passed away and I felt that he 
was there for me, just like my granddad who had passed away too. Somehow it felt as 
though they are going to be there more. I don’t know if that sounds silly but that’s how I 
felt (01Sue13). 
 
Being married in a Medieval Church means that you’ve got God’s blessing and because 
it makes a connection with my sister who committed suicide and my mum who had died 
(08Resaria). 
 
Arguably, sensing the presence of the other, even though the other is not visible, could 
be interpreted in Winnicottian terms, that the ceremony in Church, like the infant’s 
‘transitional object’, stands in for (m)other, and in this case God seems to bridge the 
void90 between the living and the deceased. Arguably, in Freudian terms, emotional 
reassurance can be introjected when the infant girl senses the (m)other’s presence, or 
that the (m)other’s eyes on her, as the infant girl gradually builds confidence during the 
process of incorporation. Arguably, if the subject ‘knows’ that they are doing 
something, with someone watching, (i.e. ‘in the sight of God’), then God-the-Father, or 
in Lacanian terms, the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ who constitutes the law, who sets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In Part One the Virgin Mary is described as bridging the void between God and man. 
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boundaries and punishes if boundaries are broken, implies approval and therefore any 
sense of guilt is reduced. 
 
By way of illustration, Sue makes the connection between sensing ‘God’s presence’ and 
receiving ‘God’s blessing’, with internalised relationships of the deceased father and 
grandfather. Resaria also draws the connection between sensing ‘God’s presence’ and 
her sister and mother both of whom had died. Arguably, by displacement, the subject’s 
internalised relationships can be interpreted as ‘watching over them from a heavenly 
place’.  
 
Literally, at this juncture in the ceremony, the bride’s father, having completed his role 
of giving the bride away, removes himself from the bride’s side by taking his place with 
the mother. The bride who now stands in front of her parents is literally in the sight of 
her earthly god-like figures of infancy, and unconsciously by displacement ‘in the sight 
of God-the-Father’. Let us now turn to consider the brides’ reported experience in the 
ceremony. 
 
Second, several brides seem to be aware that the marriage ceremony offers a sense of 
life’s continuity, marking time between infancy and death:  
Getting married in Church was the norm, it was the thing that you did. I was christened 
in Church then I was married. It’s a rite of passage, the logical sequence, and when you 
die you’re taken into Church. The significance was of going through these steps 
(14Margaret13). 
 
As discussed earlier, Douglas suggests that rituals are significant life events offering a 
sense of certainty, continuity, unity of experience offering sanity and life-giving 
experience. Arguably, Margaret, indicates that for her the marriage ceremony, marks a 
transitory, ‘logical’, containing stage in life’s development, a moment which offers the 
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opportunity to look back to one’s childhood and forward to one’s future, but not yet 
contemplating one’s death. 
  
Third, many of the bride’s statements indicate that they were aware of the gravity of the 
ceremony:  
It’s a major, and perhaps the most important step in one’s life. I viewed it as life-long 
as I was making vows before God and I was receiving His blessing. It’s important to 
receive God’s blessing because I look on Him as my heavenly Father. It’s important to 
receive the Church’s blessing because the Church is God’s representative on earth 
(17Ros13). 
 
Being aware of the gravity of making a promise in the presence of witnesses, echo’s the 
ceremony’s plea that this step is not undertaken ‘unadvisedly, lightly or wantonly…but 
reverently, discreetly, advisedly, and soberly’ (Cranmer, 1662:320). Taking a vow in 
ear-shot of the mother and the father can also be sobering. For Francis, however, the 
gravity of the ceremony seems onerous. Earlier during the interview Francis states: 
I felt very warm towards my father and honoured by his right to give me away to my 
husband. I associated this with the fact that he’d looked after us, since my mother had a 
very difficult time emotionally and as she’d left home at one point (11Francis10). 
 
So when it came to Francis reflecting on the significance of the Church ceremony, 
Francis states: 
I had a kind of paradox relationship with the Church. I was singing in the choir, but my 
own beliefs at the time were mixed. On one hand, I was very spiritual and on the other I 
felt flexible as to how I saw my spirituality. I was unsure about the relationship between 
God and marriage. I could see the sense of a blessing. I saw marriage as a kind of 
social event of acknowledgement in law. I had seen lots of people get married so it 
wasn’t like a transcendent experience of meeting God and being blessed by God. I knew 
it contained a solemn oath, which I thought I might not be able to keep all my life. So 
there was this duality. Although I’m saying it now, in the marriage service, I asked 
myself, will I live up to the promise as I sensed that I might not be able to. I wasn’t in a 
romantic state, rather I was questioning: what was this about and what am I doing? 
(11Francis13). 
 
Francis, states that although she felt caught in a paradox and unsure in regard to her 
spirituality, Francis, did consider the marriage ceremony to be a legally binding ‘social 
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event’ during which she would be ‘blessed by God’. It seems as though, for Francis, this 
ceremony did not offer a sense of order but confusion as it raised questions about her 
relationships. The gravity of the ‘solemn oath’, vow or promise, not to be undertaken 
‘lightly or wantonly’, seems to have weighed heavily.  
 
If we take a Freudian view and interpret that God and the Church are displaced 
representatives of the father and the mother, then we can interpret Francis statement in 
terms of her insecurity regarding her (spirituality) experience in relation to the 
ceremony. Francis’ experience of a consistent father, but inconsistent mother, may have 
put doubt in her mind as to whether she could keep a promise all her life. Francis 
wished to receive God’s blessing, as she literally did from her ‘warm’ relationship with 
the father whom she felt ‘honoured’ by. The paradox can be interpreted as: does Francis 
identify with the consistent father, or identify with the inconsistent mother figure? 
 
Fourth, several brides seemed to report experiencing the mood created by the ceremony: 
The whole service was lovely. The minister involved us and kept on referring to us as 
bottles of wine. I felt very comfortable and not at all awkward. The minister helped us 
pick the hymns. They were not too religious. It was as if he brought everybody into the 
service. The minister is just the same when you go to see him regarding funerals, he 
makes you feel comfortable (07Elizabeth13). 
 
The Church ambience, the minister’s character, the bride submitting to a patriarchal 
process, the ceremony as a whole with words spoken, hymns sung and with the some 
familiar and some unfamiliar friends and family attending makes for creating the mood 
for symbiotic communication. As in infancy, the mother or holding environment creates 
the mood. If mother is depressed or angry, or if mother is delighted with her new infant 
or with the infant’s behaviour then the infant learns to ‘read’ mother’s expressions and 
interpret her mood as alarming or reassuring. 
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Fifth, some brides indicate that their parents influenced their decision to marry: 
The Church has always played a part in our family’s life from children all the way 
through. I knew that if I had not married in Church it would have upset my parents.  
There is something about Churches that brings out something that is very deep. They 
are very powerful places. So for me to be married in Church felt as though my marriage 
was properly blessed (09Pam13). 
 
Pam’s statement appears to indicate the significant influence that the father and the 
mother have over the daughter’s decision to marry. Like the parent’s of infancy, who 
impose boundaries and punish infringements, the infant learns to survive by avoiding 
the parent’s displeasure and actively pleasing the parents. In psychodynamic terms, the 
infant internalises the pre-Oedipal parental demands, thus imposing a super-ego on the 
subject’s conscience. Pam, avoids feelings of guilt, and in order to please the parents, 
Pam, passively complies with the parents’ wishes. We can also interpret that by 
displacement, Pam unconsciously understands her parental figures as being ‘deeply 
powerful’ in a similar way to ‘Churches’. 
 
Having explored themes relating to the wedding ceremony, in Oedipal terms, that is, by 
way of interpreting the role played by the mother, the father, the Church and the bride, 
and the bride’s response to the ceremony regarding feeling compliant and ordered or 
confused and chaotic, let us, in the next section, discuss in detail the mother’s relation to 
the bride and the bride’s experience of the mother. 
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4.4 The mother’s relation to the bride and the bride’s response to the mother 
There are, arguably, various psychodynamic views on the earliest daughter-mother 
relationship and its immediate and long-term effect on the combined relationship and on 
each individual separately relating to her external and internal mother. The pre-Oedipal 
mother actively attempts to satisfy the infant’s oral, anal, urethral, sado-masochistic 
tendencies, through the regular acts of nursing, dressing, undressing and handling the 
infant. As already established, Freud emphasises that the infant girl’s pre-Oedipal 
‘affectionate attachment to her mother’ is ‘the decisive one for the woman’s future’ 
(SE22:134). Freud postulates that regressions to the pre-Oedipal phase may indicate bi-
sexuality (SE22:131), underlining the importance of the pre-Oedipal phase, that, as 
discussed in Part One during the girl’s transformation of instinct, ‘women (can) remain 
arrested in their original attachment to their mother and never achieve a true change-
over towards men’ (SE21:226). While Freud focuses on the earliest daughter-mother 
relationship Wilfred Bion uses metaphors for this intimate, powerfully intense mother-
infant dyad, by exemplifying the ‘container-contained’ pattern (Bion, 1970:107), thus 
implying how the mother may influence and moderate the infant’s affect. In contrast, 
from the daughter’s perspective, Nancy Chodorow suggests that the mother’s mothering 
of her daughter, both being of the same gender and having been the daughter of a 
mother, will eventually effect the nature of her motherliness and quality of mothering 
(Chodorow, 1978:98), and subsequently how the daughter responds to the mother. 
 
Winnicott adds to these views by describing the subtle changes in reliable ‘maternal 
care’ (Winnicott, 1960:39) as facilitating the infant’s development ‘from absolute 
dependence, through relative dependence, to independence’ (Winnicott, 1960:42). 
Winnicott claims that during this early phase the mother-infant relationship ‘forms a 
unit’ (Winnicott, 1960:39), and a ‘state of being merged with the mother’ (Winnicott, 
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1960:44). This early ‘holding’ stage offers the infant, who is ‘not talking or using word 
symbols’ (Winnicott, 1960:40), a ‘continuity of being’ (Winnicott, 1960:46), where the 
id-forces are modified in the service of the ego. If the ‘continuity of being’ is broken 
then there is ‘reacting’ and the ‘dread of annihilation’ may be experienced (Winnicott, 
1960:47). During this early ‘holding’ stage ‘the father’s function is unknown’ to the 
infant and the infant is not yet responsible for controlling what is good or bad, which 
indicates that narcissistic omnipotence dominates (Winnicott, 1960:43).  
 
As suggested by Winnicott, by studying how the adult reports her experience of her 
mother one can ‘reconstruct the dynamics of infancy through the study of adults’ 
(Winnicott, 1960:39). Thus I will explore how the bride describes her experience with 
her mother during the process of choosing, purchasing, adorning and removing her 
wedding dress. These activities in adulthood can arguably reactivate the 
daughter/mother dyad of early infancy. Of the seventeen participants three brides 
reported not having their mother available on their wedding day. The other brides 
describe how their mothers were involved to different degrees, as illustrated by the 
following selective reports. 
 
Some brides who responded to this project recall how their mothers were or were not 
involved in making, choosing or assisting them to dress prior to or on their wedding 
day. An intimate or distant daughter/mother interaction may be experienced on the 
wedding day during the bride’s process of adornment—a process where her daughter 
becomes transformed in socio-cultural terms, to reflect the ideal image of the bride-in-
white. Having examined all the participant’s reports let us now consider how four brides 
report on the quality of their experience with their mother. Pam experienced her mother 
as not being fully available; Freesia reports not having a mother at her wedding; AnnC 
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reports having a very containing maternal experience; Ros reports feeling marginalised 
by her mother. Let us now consider these brides statements closely: 
 
Pam reports on her own mother’s emotional unavailability on Pam’s wedding day and 
contrasts this with her mother-in-law’s perceived strength: 
My mum didn’t really play a role. As she was too wrapped up in herself to be involved 
(09Pam11), I dressed myself (09Pam03). His mum always had a strong hold over her 
son, and I remember after my wedding going upstairs to the toilet in his mum’s house 
and the confetti falling out from my dress. And instead of picking it up, thinking ‘I’ll 
leave that there because she’ll know that I’ve been and made my mark, and I’ve got her 
son’ (09Pam07). 
 
When taking off her dress Pam reports a ‘strong’ reaction towards her dominant 
mother-in-law (09Pam07). This can be interpreted as being a displaced reaction towards 
her own controlling but not currently sensitively responsive mother. It seems that Pam’s 
mother was not experienced by Pam on her wedding day as having empathy, or 
exhibiting maternal ‘attunement’, that is, ‘our way of being there with one another’ 
(Heidegger, 1995:66, in. Young-Eisendrath, 2000:66). Pam’s response to her experience 
of her mother’s unsupportive role can be interpreted as feeling ambivalent towards her 
own mother and aggressive towards her mother-in-law. 
 
Although Pam reports that she experienced her own mother as vulnerable and 
unsupportive on her wedding day, when it came to Pam’s turn to mother her daughter, 
Pam indicates that she identifies with the idealised mother of her childhood: 
When my daughter married we did everything together. There was lots of talking, 
excitement and I made the thing a lot bigger as it was my daughter’s special day. I 
wanted my daughter to feel really, really special. I suppose through my daughter 
getting married I was probably playing a part that I would have liked my mum to have 
played for me as I wanted it to be perfect for her (09Pam11). I couldn’t wait to go and 
be ‘Mrs. (09Pam09). 
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Pam’s statement can be interpreted as indicating that Pam identified with her mother as 
she ‘couldn’t wait to be Mrs’ and become a mother herself (09Pam09). Interpreted, in 
Oedipal terms, because Pam’s mother was experienced as not taking an active, 
supporting role, Pam’s ‘disappointment’ indicates that her mother was unconsciously 
experienced as passive and castrated, and not nurturing. This disappointment appears to 
have made a lasting impression on Pam who chose to take on an active supporting and 
perhaps controlling role towards her daughter. Arguably a role Pam may have wished 
her own mother to have played for her. Pam’s statement regarding her daughter, can be 
interpreted in idealised terms, since Pam, who seems to have become frustrated with her 
‘castrated’ mother, now overcompensates by ‘making the thing a lot bigger’ by 
idealising her daughter’s experience (09Pam11). Thus Pam’s report indicates that she 
looked after her daughter in the manner she wished her mother had looked after her 
(09Pam11). 
 
Freesia speaks of the effect of her mother’s absence: 
As my mother couldn’t be at my wedding (15Freesia21), my friends helped me to put my 
wedding dress on (15Freesia03). When the time came to take off my dress it felt a bit of 
a let down because it’s only a day and the events leading up to it effect your views of the 
day (15Freesia 07). 
 
Freesia’s statements, interpreted in Winnicottian terms, suggest that Freesia did not feel 
sufficiently ‘held’ as she felt that the day was ‘a bit of a let down’, as Freesia states ‘It’s 
only a day’ (15Freesia07). In Winnicottian terms, Freesia experienced the absence of a 
‘holding’ maternal environment and feeling ‘let down’ suggests a dropping, or break in 
the ‘continuity of being’. Interpreted in Freudian terms Freesia’s idealised expectations 
of adulthood have given way to the reality. This is to suggest that Freesia, as a bride and 
daughter, can have felt disappointed that she was denied the pleasure of being attended 
and dressed by a supportive mother.  
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As AnnC relinquishes her bridal status she experiences her mother as attentive: 
My mum helped me undress. As she looked after my wedding dress for me, it wasn’t 
such a heart-wrenching moment. I didn’t want to get out of it because I wanted my day 
to last forever, as we were having such a laugh with our friends, family and everyone 
you love (16AnnC07). 
 
AnnC’s statement, interpreted in pre-Oedipal terms, indicates that her mother exhibited 
the capacity to be empathic towards her daughter’s state of anxiety and responded by 
being attentive, ‘holding’ and ‘containing’ of her daughter’s potentially ‘heart-
wrenching moment’ as she took off her dress. This seems to reflect an adult phase where 
daughter and mother are no longer rivals, or where the daughter is threatened with a loss 
of her mother’s love or where AnnC feels guilt for repudiating her mother for another, 
thus affection towards the mother can re-emerge. This indicates that AnnC’s mother 
identified with her daughter, as Chodorow suggests, ‘having been a daughter of a 
mother’ (Chodorow, 1978:98), and had the emotional capacity to relinquish her 
daughter AnnC. In Winnicottian terms, this report indicates that AnnC received a 
reliable continuity of maternal care from a mother who responded to her daughter’s 
needs during this transitional phase. 
 
Ros seems to report having experienced her mother as relatively uncontaining: 
My mother helped me choose the pattern and the material of my dress, but apart from 
that I didn’t have any assistance (17Ros04). I was glad my mother approved of my 
marriage, however, I was slightly disconcerted because she said she wasn’t going to 
buy a new outfit and that left me feeling marginalised. As my mother had emotional 
problems I was fairly used to that sort of behaviour (17Ros11).  
 
Ros’s statements suggest that she experienced her mother’s affection as limited, 
unpredictable and reserved. In Oedipal terms while Ros’s mother was experienced as 
‘approving’, it can be interpreted that Ros felt disappointed or hostile towards her 
mother for not putting her fully at the centre of her attention. Thus, in Freudian terms, 
 255	  
indicating that Ros can have phantasised her mother as castrated and consequently 
wished to repudiate her because she did not receive enough love. In Winnicottian terms, 
as Ros experienced her mother as emotionally pre-occupied it can be interpreted that 
Ros did not feel exclusively special to, nor fully ‘held’ by, her mother but felt as though 
she was left on the ‘margin’ of her mother’s attention and therefore somewhat rejected. 
Let us now consider how the bride’s relationship with the mother transforms from 
idealisation to one of identification. 
  
We have seen earlier that Pam experienced her mother as uncontaining and in reaction 
became a containing mother for her daughter. Pam describes how she identified with 
her ‘passive’, unsupportive, ‘castrated’ mother, the mother who had ‘refused her…’; 
refused to give her daughter support, attention, or ‘the penis’. Pam now substitutes 
activity for passivity, by being actively supportive towards her daughter, thus projecting 
onto her daughter a relatively passive position, as already discussed. Let us now 
consider the quality of three other bride’s experience of their mother by considering 
each of the bride’s statements separately: 
 
Rose describes how she seems to identify with her mother’s anxiety: 
I was an only daughter so mum was a bit flappy. I was trying to stay calm because 
every bride’s a bit butterfly’i aren’t they? I had a feeling of anxiety, not only was I 
anxious but everybody else was anxious for me (10Rose03). I was conscious I was 
going to loose part of my identity because I’d not be one, but now half of something 
else. I’d no longer be ‘Miss’…I would be somebody’s wife and hopefully eventually 
somebody’s mother (10Rose07). 
 
Rose seems to link her mother’s sense of being ‘flappy’ with her own sense of ‘anxiety’ 
(10Rose03). It is as if anxiety has been unconsciously assimilated or introjected and 
pervades all the relationships. Rose also seems to contrast her identification of herself as 
‘Miss’ with ‘wife and hopefully mother’, thus indicating Rose’s identification with her 
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mother (10Rose07). This can be interpreted as illustrating the daughters’ desire of 
becoming a mother with parenting capacities. Rose also contrasts the tension of being a 
bride with her conscious awareness of ‘loosing part of her identity’, relinquishing her 
maiden status, repudiating her mother’s love, in favour of becoming a ‘wife’ 
(10Rose07). Rose’s narcissism becomes enhanced when her mother gives her the 
opportunity to feel special and proud of her, thus taking the mother’s place, and 
displacing ‘penis envy’ onto another by becoming ‘somebody’s mother’, thus 
completing the ‘ancient symbolic equation’ (SE22:128). 
 
Ann’s positive identification with her mother can be illustrated by the following 
statements: 
My parents had a very good marriage, so I’d a wonderful role model to follow 
(12Ann18). My mother married when she was twenty-three and they remained together, 
and I married at twenty-two. When my daughter married I looked at her wedding 
photos and thought she looked so like I did at the same age. My daughter married at 
twenty-two as well. There was quite a repeat, I suppose there was a contrast, but also 
similarities (12Ann22). 
 
Ann discusses how there seems to have emerged a strong family tradition, in that three 
generations of women from the same family married between ‘twenty-two’ and ‘twenty-
three’ years old (12Ann22). Ann seems to link this phenomenon with and to an 
enduring ‘good marriage’ (12Ann18). Ann also associates the positive adjective 
‘wonderful’ with her mother’s role (12Ann18). In Oedipal terms this can be interpreted 
that there were successive idealised identifications with the mother over three 
generations, thus establishing the phantasy of an ‘ideal’ for an enduring relationship: 
that is, identification through an ego-ideal. In other words, as established, Chodorow 
emphasises, ‘women, as mothers, produce daughters with mothering capacities and the 
desire to mother’ (Chodorow, 1978:7). 
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Ann reflects on an experience as a passive onlooker of something enacted by two other 
people: 
My saddest memory was my bridesmaids had their dresses made by two different people 
- my mother and the bridesmaid’s mother. They didn’t match because the bridesmaid’s 
mother cut hers off to ankle length, so we had to shorten the other one. I don’t know 
what that was about but it was very important to me (12Ann21).  
 
Although in sociological terms the fact that the two bridesmaids dress lengths were 
different, can be seen psychologically as distressing and visually unacceptable, Ann 
indicates that there was more to her distress than purely conscious. In Ann’s case this 
‘mismatch’ in dress length, the latent content of which, can be interpreted as sabotage 
by a castrating (m)other, and one who frustrates Ann’s search for the penis. Ann reports 
that her ‘saddest memory’ seems to resonate with something almost too unbearable to 
think as she states, ‘I don’t know what that was about’, i.e. an attempt to deny, and 
therefore Ann distances herself from it. This can indicate that Ann was distancing 
herself from feeling inferior, or acknowledging that she too is castrated like her mother. 
This statement, carrying disappointment towards the (m)other can also be interpreted 
that Ann’s mother may have been unconsciously experienced as castrated and unable to 
fulfil Ann’s desire. Alternatively it can be interpreted that there was a Oedipal struggle 
with the mother, where the mother is cut down to size, in importance, thus leaving Ann, 
in identification with the mother, able to take the mother’s place with the father. 
Interestingly, Ann intuitively sensed this was ‘important’, yet she experienced difficulty 
at a level of linguistic articulation, which again can resonate with Ann’s Oedipal rivalry 
and hostility towards her mother being suppressed. The fact that the two bridesmaids 
dresses did not initially match perfectly but one needed to be ‘shortened’ can also be 
interpreted in terms of a loss of the ego ideal. This is where the ego ideal is an 
imperative and where everything needs to be perfect, otherwise the situation becomes 
distressing. 
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For some brides there may have been an irrevocably positive mother figure to emulate, 
but when the mother is experienced as an inadequate container it may prove to be more 
problematic, as was the case for Francis, as reported: 
I did something very strange. I had long hair and as I was playing sport had it cut 
really short about a month before I married. It was a terrible struggle sticking the head-
gear on to this very short sort of boyish hair [laughter] (11Francis04). I remember my 
mother had a very difficult time emotionally and mentally and she’d left home at one 
point (11Francis10). 
 
As established, Freud suggests that identification follows on from the effects of the 
Oedipal conflict, that is in this case with the mother, who is both a love-object and an 
object of rivalry upon whom hostility can be projected. In examining these statements 
we can see that Francis04 had a ‘terrible struggle’ and that her mother ‘had a very 
difficult time’ (11Francis10), thus indicating that Francis identifies with her mother’s 
‘struggle’ (11Francis04). The impact on Francis when her mother ‘left home at one 
point’, arguably can have left Francis feeling abandoned and not nurtured or held, 
unlike the Oedipal infant girl who ‘turns away’ from the mother in favour of the father. 
Thus, in reaction to the mother’s abandonment Francis had a ‘terrible struggle’ to 
identify with the passive mother-figure and cling onto her feminine ‘head-gear’ but 
would rather actively ‘play sport’ (11Francis04). Another way of interpreting the 
‘terrible struggle’, Francis reported having, could be with her ‘boyish’ active instincts, 
as opposed to adopting ‘passive aims’, and an emotional ‘struggle’ with her, at times, 
‘difficult’ not fully containing mother (11Francis10). 
 
Arguably, it can be interpreted that in reaction to identifying with the inadequately 
supportive mother who ‘had a very difficult time emotionally’, Francis ‘substituted 
activity for passivity’ (11Francis10). Rather than identifying with the castrated 
abandoning mother, Francis repressed her hostility and Francis’ reaction was a denial of 
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castration, a ‘flight from womanhood’ (Horney, 1967:54), and a clinging onto 
something familiar from the past, which suggests that there could have been a 
regression to the pre-Oedipal masculine part of herself. This regression to a masculine 
style indicates a level of bisexuality which seems to be confirmed when Francis reports 
that her ‘long hair’ was ‘cut really short’ to a ‘boyish’ length, indicating a masochistic 
castration (11Francis04). This seems to illustrate Freud’s claim that ‘in the course of 
some women’s lives there is a repeated alternation between periods in which 
masculinity or femininity gains the upper hand’ (SE22:131). Let us now consider a third 
way in which the infant girl who becomes a bride-in-white identifies with her mother, 
through the provision of food. 
 
Freud links the oral incorporation and ingestion of food, with the phantasy of an object 
penetrating the body and keeping it ‘inside’. Freud sets up the opposition between the 
‘sexual instinct’ (SE7:135), the ‘instinct of nutrition’ (SE7:135) and ‘self-preservation’ 
(SE18:10), the counterparts being ‘libido’ and ‘hunger’ (SE7:135). Freud also 
understands the opposition between the life and the death instincts, that is, that self-
preservation and the instinct to create and maintain an ever-greater unity is in contrast 
and opposed to death and the tendency towards self and others’ destruction. Freud 
claims that during the oral-sadistic stage there is an ‘erotic mastery over the object 
which coincides with that object’s destruction’ (SE18:54). In other words, during the 
need to sustain life both libidinally and physically there is set up a phantasy of 
penetration and a dialogue concerning the ‘inside’. The infant girl’s dialogue, if not 
modified or transformed by the mother’s capacity to ‘play’ (Winnicott, 1971:54), for 
‘reverie’ (Bion, 1967:116) ‘containment’ (Bion, 1967:141) and to nurture, can cause 
anxiety and arguably symbolic indigestion.  
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Winnicott suggests that ‘anxiety about objects psychically incorporated or physically 
eaten, involves the phantasy about inside’, that is, where the ‘psyche and soma are in 
perpetual dialogue’ concerning ‘what is acceptable and what is not acceptable’ 
(Winnicott, 1936:33). Therefore eating can only be explained with reference to the 
conscious and unconscious phantasies about the inside of the body. Winnicott maintains 
that in the case of anorexia nervosa or bulimia, there can be a hurried letting go as in 
vomiting, or a holding onto as in constipation. There is also greediness, or stealing food, 
all these can be associated with anxiety. The manner in which Winnicott describes the 
subject’s reaction to anxiety is that ‘at one end there is feeding difficulties, at the other 
end are melancholia, drug addiction, hypochondria, and suicide, as appetite becomes 
involved in defence against anxiety and depression’ (Winnicott, 1936:34). Therefore, an 
internal dialogue can be set up, saying that ‘when very hungry I think of robbing and 
even destroying the source of supply and I then feel bad about what I have inside me 
and I think of means of getting it out of me, as quickly as possible and as completely as 
possible’ (Winnicott, 1936:34). Winnicott suggests that ‘this sort of oral phantasy can 
be deduced from observations on the infant’s manner in which they play with an object’ 
(Winnicott, 1936:34), such as with a ‘spatula and bowl’ (Winnicott, 1936:50). Let us 
now consider the quality of three bride’s experience of their mother in relation to food. 
 
Elizabeth reports on being ‘shocked’ but wished the experience with food to be 
‘relaxed’: 
As I entered my wedding reception I felt shocked. I don’t know what I was expecting but 
it was lovely. When I walked in I saw that everybody was happy and they had already 
started tucking in to all the food and was pleased. I wanted it relaxed where everybody 
mixed in together (07Elizabeth20). 
 
Elizabeth’s initial ‘shock’ (07Elizabeth20) can be interpreted as her feeling that her 
digestive system had tensed by the sight of the large gathering of guests and the large 
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amount of food. This ‘shock’ can also be interpreted as a learnt reaction to the mother 
who we have already learnt would have ‘taken over’, made a ‘fuss’ and would have ‘got 
on her nerves’ (07Elizabeth15). This ‘shock’ therefore might have added to a sense of 
‘indigestion’ and could have felt to be invasive, rather than ‘containing’, which could 
have transformed her indigestible emotions. Elizabeth’s initial ‘shock’ seems however 
to have been transformed into ‘pleasure’ when she saw that her guests were ‘happily 
eating’. Elizabeth’s statement seems to suggest that she needed to put others needs 
before her own, which can be interpreted as indicating that Elizabeth had learnt to delay 
her own gratification. This can be interpreted in Freudian terms as Elizabeth adopting 
‘passive aims’, and in Winnicottian terms indicating that she had the capacity to ‘be’. 
What seems important in Elizabeth’s report was that she wanted a ‘relaxed’ occasion 
(07Elizabeth20), which indicates in Winnicott’s terms, that the incorporation of food 
can only take place in the absence of anxiety. That is, the initial feeling of ‘shock’ 
becomes converted into feeling ‘relaxed’. 
 
Francis reports on the tension experienced around her mother’s food provision: 
My mother did the catering on my wedding day, or at least the catering was got from 
somewhere but she rushed about and catered. My mother was always a good caterer. 
So my concerns were that the catering would be good enough for her. I was very 
concerned that if the caterers hadn’t provided the right things, my mother would have 
been upset and could get tense, so I was hoping that at least she could feel supported by 
the caterers (11Francis11). 
 
Francis statement indicates that her mother understood her role to be the prime nurturer, 
as Francis now wished her to be and as she had been during Francis’ infancy, as she 
‘catered’ (11Francis11). Francis seems, however, to empathise with her mother’s 
anxiety, if the food had not been ‘good enough’, and so to compensate, Francis seems to 
have taken on a supportive role by being ‘concerned’ for her mother being ‘upset’ and 
getting ‘tense’ (11Francis11). From this report it is as if Francis’ mother was unable to 
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contain or transform, in her metaphorical pots, pans or kitchen, Francis’ internal 
ingredients of feelings and phantasies and enrich them into manageable thoughts and 
images for her, via speech. In pre-Oedipal terms it can be interpreted that Francis may 
have experienced her mother’s nurturing capacities as affectionate but inconsistent, thus 
invoking a sense of insecurity for Francis as an infant. Now Francis, as an adult, 
continues to express concern for her mother’s nurturing capacities, as if Francis is 
attempting to be a container for her mother’s anxieties. Francis’ indication that she was 
‘concerned’ about her mother, indicates that Francis wished to preserve the ‘good-
enough’ nurturing part of the mother for her own needs, as opposed to destroying the 
mother due to hostility. 
 
Ann reports on how her feelings changed from being relaxed to being disappointed: 
I was pleased with the place we had chosen for our reception and with my college 
friends around it felt more spontaneous, so I became more relaxed. When I looked at 
the food I was slightly disappointed because we had spent ages with the hotel discussing 
what food we were going to have, and when I saw it I thought ‘no’, my mum could have 
done that [laughter] (12Ann20). 
 
Ann’s statement indicates that she was ‘relaxed’ and anticipating the enjoyment of 
sharing with her friends and family the food that had been so meticulously chosen 
(12Ann20). However, imagining the pleasure of her guests turned into ‘disappointment 
with the food’ when Ann compared it with the memory of her mother’s provision 
(12Ann20). Thus Ann preserves an identification with the idealised mother, by 
expressing or displacing her feelings of hostility or disappointment towards the hotel. 
 
Having examined all the participant’s reports, what seems striking, equally from both 
the ‘recent’ and the ‘older’ brides, is the number of mother’s who were experienced as 
not being fully containing, or as someone who could be experienced as ‘dead’, 
depressed or ‘absent’ (Kohon, 1999:86+152). In Freudian terms, as we have seen, the 
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mother can be an idealised central figure as the infant girl’s first love-object. The 
mother then is experienced as a rival for the father’s love and is blamed and hated for 
several grievous, principally narcissistic, disappointments. The mother is consequently 
then repudiated or eclipsed, and in Oedipal terms is symbolically killed in favour of the 
now idealised father figure. Now, the mother may experience feelings of rejection, 
deferring to her infant daughter’s envy of the father. Arguably, due to the bride being 
preoccupied with her search for the penis, which the bride desires from the non-
incestuous other, the bride can overlook the significant contribution made by the 
mother. 
 
As discussed earlier, (09Pam11) appears to have experienced an unsupportive mother 
due to her mother’s vulnerability. Other brides report on the quality of their experience 
of the relationship with their mother in various ways. Debbie reflects on her experience 
of a distant but attentive mother: 
My mum didn’t play a very important role [laughter]. She just turned up, as a guest 
really. She didn’t have anything to do with the organisation or the wedding at all. She 
helped out financially, but she didn’t want to be involved because she lives too far 
away. I think she was very happy to see me get married. She likes [my fiancée]. She was 
very emotional. She enjoyed herself [chuckle]. I’m quite emotional [sad, tearful] 
thinking about it all (06Debbie11). 
 
Debbie initially indicates that her mother’s role was minimal and distantly supportive, 
suggesting that this resonates with Oedipal ambivalence (06Debbie11). Debbie appears 
to link her mother’s ‘very emotional’ state with her own emotional condition, in Oedipal 
terms this can be interpreted as identification with the mother, now recognising that 
both are castrated. In stating that her mother was ‘happy to see me get married’ 
(06Debbie11), can be interpreted, that Debbie had repudiated her mother and that her 
mother had the capacity to relinquish her authority over her daughter. In ‘laughing’ after 
Debbie suggested that her mother ‘didn’t play a very important role’ (06Debbie11), 
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suggests that the laughter may be interpreted as defensive and that perhaps Debbie has 
wished that her mother had played a more important role. This is in the light of 
Debbie’s father’s death and can be linked to Debbie’s sad and tearful emotional 
expressions.  
 
Francis reports on how she experienced closeness with others, as opposed to sharing a 
closeness with her mother: 
As for my mother in the Church I didn’t have feelings about her in the Church at all, 
because I was so engaged in the process, of being a bride, going up the aisle, being 
given to my husband and what I should do next. My mother never went to Church, so 
the people of the Church were closer to me, at that time because I sang in the choir 
(11Francis11). 
 
Francis’ not being aware of her mother’s presence in the Church, can be interpreted in 
Oedipal terms as her mother was eclipsed thus enabling Francis to repudiate her mother. 
Francis reflects upon the other Church members being ‘closer’ and therefore 
experienced as more containing than her mother, thus Francis unconsciously suppresses 
her hostility towards the uncontaining mother (11Francis11). It will also be noted that 
Francis found ‘closeness’ in her association with and belonging to the Church choir, and 
as already mentioned, Hélene Deutsch argues that during the latency period, women’s 
sexuality can be sublimated through a ‘spiritualising’ process (Deutsch, 1944:147). 
 
Ann reports being consciously aware that her mother might be eclipsed: 
I remember wanting my mother to be included because I asked the photographer to take 
a picture of her and myself, as she’d made my dress. So I was very conscious I wanted 
her to be very much part of it all (12Ann11). 
 
Ann’s reaction towards her mother appears to suggest that Ann was compensating for 
her mother’s passivity and Ann’s active response wished to acknowledge her mother’s 
significant role in her life (12Ann11). In pre-Oedipal terms, Ann appears to offer 
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evidence for an affectionate attachment towards her mother suggesting that in Oedipal 
terms hostility had now subdued enabling affection to re-emerge. Ann’s realisation that 
her mother may be eclipsed may reflect a sense of guilt for the earlier hostility towards 
the mother. The sense of hostility enables repudiation to take place, and in 
identification, ‘take her mother’s place’ (SE22:134). 
 
Patricia seems to have admired her mother as practical and containing: 
I can remember my mum looked marvellous but I can’t remember her particularly on 
the day other than being there and being hospitable (13Patricia11). 
 
Patricia appears to emphasise that her experience of her mother was idealised. However, 
in Oedipal terms Patricia, in ‘not remembering her mother particularly on the day’ 
(13Patricia11), can be interpreted that her mother had been repudiated or eclipsed. 
 
Margaret reports of her awareness that her mother supported her father: 
My mother’s role was being supportive of my father. My mother may have done 
something I just can’t remember that in detail (14Margaret11). 
 
Margaret seems to be aware that her mother’s attention no longer focuses on her but that 
her mother’s priority lies with her father (14Margaret11). In Oedipal terms, in Margaret 
acknowledging that her parents belong to each other, brings about the demolition of the 
Oedipus complex, which in turn leads towards Margaret’s repudiation of her parents 
and opens the way to seek satisfaction from a non-incestuous other. 
 
Arguably, although we can imagine that the bride felt disappointed that their mother, at 
this point, did not play a more significant role, there is however no evidence from the 
bride’s statements that they felt overtly ‘hostile’ towards their mother (SE22:121). This 
 266	  
could indicate that the bride’s relationship towards the mother was ambivalent 
containing both disappointment and affection. 
 
We have now touched on the infant girl’s experience of the mother through the 
mother’s handling and dressing of the infant. We have also considered the infant girl’s 
identification with her mother and through the infant girl’s experience of the mother’s 
provision of food by investigating how these infant experiences colour the adult’s 
understanding of their own experience. Let us now consider the bride’s relationship 
with her father. 
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4.5 A sacred walk with father – Part B:  
      turning to the father the bride’s intermediate locus of desire 
 
As already established in Part Three, Freud claims that in phantasy the infant girl ‘seeks 
to get rid of her mother and take her place with her father’ (SE22:134). Freud postulates 
that during this triangular structure the infant girl turns away from her mother and ‘turns 
to her father with the wish for the penis which she now expects from her father’ 
(SE22:128). Juxtaposed with the perceived ‘painful disappointments’ with the mother, 
the infant girl ‘regards herself as what her father loves above all else’ (SE19:173). That 
is to say, not only the father, with his own repressed unconscious, but also the infant 
girl, with her unconscious incestuous desires, abide by the incest prohibition. Thus the 
infant girl becomes transformed through a series of disappointments emanating from 
both the mother and father. 
 
Other post-Freudians offer their view on the quality of the girl’s relationship to the 
father. Chodorow suggests that whereas ‘the mother represents to her daughter 
regression, passivity, dependence, and lack of orientation to reality, the father represents 
progression, activity, independence and reality’ (Chodorow, 1989:64). While Winnicott 
asserts: ‘a father actually on the spot, friendly, strong, understanding, and taking 
responsibility’ and not neglecting, is a requirement for the child (Winnicott, 1958:113), 
The child and adolescent psychotherapist Biddy Youell, who studies the results of 
father negative affect, claims that ‘abusive fathers seriously impair the ability to 
internalise a benign father’ (in.Trowell, 2002:147). In other words the characteristics of 
the father can make a positive or negative, thus decisive, impact on the child’s 
experience. 
 
Having summarised how Freud and others think about the significance of the father let 
us now explore the quality of some participant’s experience of their relationship with 
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their father during their time at home, the public journey [Figure 6] to and processing in 
the Church. Of note, many of the brides report that their most vivid memory of their 
wedding day concerns their experience with their father, therefore an in-depth 
exploration is warranted in order to ascertain the decisive impact the father may have on 
the bride’s experience.  
 
As already established, in early Oedipal terms the father can be experienced as a 
‘troublesome rival’, while in later Oedipal terms the father may be idealised, yet 
evoking prohibition. Pam’s interview reveals the ‘very powerful emotions’ she 
attributes to ‘being left at home with her father’ (09Pam09). Let us now explore another 
of Pam’s experience of her father. 
It was very important to me to be married in Church in a very traditional style and in 
white. There was a lot of pressure on me not to do anything wrong, otherwise my dad 
would never forgive me. If I had had a child out of wedlock, like my sister, my dad 
wouldn’t have been able to give one of his two daughters away in a traditional style. So 
to give my dad that pleasure of giving me away as a bride from all the things that a 
little girl grows up to see this is what happens on your wedding day (09Pam05). 
 
Pam indicates that dressing in white was significant to her and her father by describing 
this in terms of the importance of conforming to ‘tradition’ (09Pam05), as discussed in 
Part One. This conforming may emanate from a collective ideal, which in turn her 
parent’s adopt, and through identification with her parents Pam incorporates into her 
ego-ideal. Pam’s statement indicates that she had internalised the paternal prohibition 
and thus feared her father’s displeasure. That is, through self-observation and the 
formation of an ideal, ‘dominated by a sense of guilt’ (SE9:123). Arguably, Pam wished 
to reduce the conflict set up in the Oedipal struggle between herself and her father 
leaving in its wake limits on familial closeness.  
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Freud claims that the infant girl’s ‘super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so 
independent of its emotional origins as it is in men’ (SE19:257), whereas Janine 
Chasseguet-Smirgel  suggests that a woman’s super-ego ‘constantly changes’, develops 
new aspects and relinquishes old ones ‘according to their sexual partners’ (Chasseguet-
Smirgel, 1964:132). In other words the women’s super-ego seems readily influenced, 
adaptable and not rigid because the girl does not fear castration. Pam states ‘that as a 
little girl’ (09Pam05), indicating that Pam had been aware since childhood of the need 
to please her father, or feared her father’s displeasure. Pam’s childhood dream can be 
understood as resonating with the Oedipal phantasy, that of adopting a feminine 
attitude, wishing to take her mother’s place and ‘to marry daddy’ (SE7:57). In 
exercising her individual autonomy Pam indicates her ambition to be regarded by her 
father differently from her sister, indicates sibling rivalry. Pam’s desire ‘not to do 
anything wrong’ (09Pam05), can be an indication of the internalised paternal super-ego, 
or strength of her ego-ideal, both of which arguably not only aim to please her father but 
also aim to comply with his and the group’s ideals. Let us now consider the quality of 
experience of being with their father that other brides report: 
 
Louise states how her father’s admiration of her felt that it brought them ‘close’: 
That morning my dad said he was so proud of me. Although he never says it usually, he 
said "you look so stunning today", at which moment he cried which made me feel, really 
close to him (02Louise10). 
 
Sis states that her father was ‘proud’ of her, which felt ‘reassuring’: 
I think my dad was very proud of me. He always said he was glad to see the back of me, 
in a nice sort of way. My dad’s a quite thoughtful person. While we were travelling to 
the Church, he said a couple of times "Are you ok?", "You look lovely", which was 
really very nice. When we were sitting at the table in the reception he kept squeezing my 
hand saying "you’ve done well", which was very reassuring. As my dad’s not a big 
talker, for him to say things like that was really nice (04Sis10). 
 
Liz reports feeling ‘relaxed’ during the journey to the Church with her father: 
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As I travelled to the Church, it was a lovely time with my dad giving us the opportunity 
to relax.  I don’t think we talked about anything momentous, we were both happy, it was 
just a really nice peaceful tranquil moment (05Liz09). 
 
Of the ‘older’ group of brides Pam recalls feeling ‘upset’ during the journey to the 
Church: 
I remember my dad saying to me, ‘It isn’t too late, you don’t have to get married’.  
I think I felt that my dad didn’t want to let me go (09Pam09). 
 
Rose reports feeling ‘relaxed’ during the journey to the Church with her father: 
My father seemed to be taking it all in his stride: he was more interested in whether I 
was sure was I doing the right thing, like all father’s probably. He said that I still had 
time to change my mind [laughter] (10Rose03). 
 
Rose’s report reflects her experience of her father as steady (10Rose03). In Oedipal 
terms, Rose’s statement resonates with Rose being under the influence of envy of the 
penis, where the father is experienced as offering a ‘refuge’ as he ‘takes it all in his 
stride’ (10Rose03). In Rose’s father being ‘interested in whether I was doing the right 
thing’ (10Rose03) resonates with the mutual unconscious incestuous desires that 
transfer between daughter and father. 
 
Francis reports on the experience of feeling close to her father: 
My most vivid memory was being in the car with my father on my own. I hadn’t been to 
any important occasions with my father on my own before, as I had always been with 
my sister or my mother. I didn’t know what to say to him because I felt self-conscious 
(11Francis01). I felt very warm towards my father. It was like being honoured by his 
right to give me away. I felt my father was a significant figure. The whole thing was 
very powerful, with a lot of gravitas (11Francis10). 
 
Patricia describes feeling affection towards her father: 
My father master-minded my wedding. I had a huge amount of affection and gratitude 
for him. He was a remarkable, wonderful man. I know he was very fond of me and it 
must have been a big day for him—his daughter getting married. He wasn’t 
sentimental, he was quite a reserved man (13Patricia09+10). 
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Freesia appears to have experienced her father as anxious about her leaving him: 
At first my father had been very much opposed to the marriage but finally he agreed to 
give me away and to me that was everything (15Freesia10). As I was travelling to the 
Church I don’t remember any feelings at all. My father would be in the car. I can’t 
remember anything else at all (15Freesia09). 
 
When, after adorning wedding white, 16AnnC and her father met, 16AnnC recalls: 
My most vivid memory was when my father saw me, for the first time, wearing my dress. 
I felt overwhelmed when he said, "you look lovely". It’s eleven years ago and I’m going 
to cry, just thinking about it [tears] (16AnnC01). I cannot explain what took place 
between me and my father, it was just one of those very emotional things (16AnnC09). 
 
From the above statements we can see how highly significant and memorable the 
father’s presence and words are to the bride-in-white. What appears pre-eminent in the 
quality of the bride’s reported experience of their father is the extent of the ‘powerful’ 
feelings invoked. Pam illuminates this when she states: ‘the emotions involved being 
with my dad on my own were very, very powerful’ (09Pam09). This can be interpreted in 
Freudian terms, when he suggests that the primal ‘horde [was] ruled over despotically 
by a powerful male’ who had few libidinal ties and was ‘masterful, self-confident and 
independent’ (SE18:122-4) and was a ‘jealous father who keeps all the females for 
himself’ (SE13:141).  
 
Arguably, one sense of a ‘powerful’ (09Pam09) feeling that the bride may have 
experienced is the overwhelming power of the ‘primal’ father. This degree of seemingly 
un-associated powerful emotion is also expressed by Rose when her father asked, 
‘whether I was sure, was I doing the right thing’ and ‘that I still had time to change my 
mind’ (10Rose03); by Francis in her use of the word ‘gravitas’ (11Francis10); or by 
Freesia when she states that her father ‘had been very much opposed to the marriage’ 
and that her father’s involvement meant ‘everything’ to her (15Freesia10); or by AnnC 
when some ‘unexplainable’ experience took place between her and her father 
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(16AnnC09). The degree of this experienced powerful emotion can also be interpreted 
in Oedipal terms as indicating an unconscious ‘wish for a baby from the father’ which, 
as mentioned, Freud argues is ‘the most powerful feminine wish’ (SE22:128). 
 
The most frequently remembered phrase, recalled by three participants was that their 
father said: ‘You look lovely’ (02Louise10), (04Sis10), and (16AnnC01). Although we 
can recognise this phrase as one which many fathers would naturally say to their 
daughter, we can interpret this as the bride’s amorous captivation of ‘narcissistic’ 
satisfaction from the father (SE18:257). The father’s statement ‘You look lovely’, 
confirms the bride’s own thinking when she first saw herself in the mirror fully dressed 
in white. This now becomes both an inter-subjective relationship and the internalisation 
of a relationship. Freud has already pointed out that ‘a natural predilection usually sees 
to it that a man tends to spoil his daughter’ (SE4:258). This complimentary phrase 
uttered by the father can also be interpreted in Freudian terms as the woman has a 
‘stronger need to be loved than for them to love’ (SE22:132). A third way of 
interpreting this phrase can be understood, in Freudian terms, as the infant girl’s not 
fearing castration but is susceptible to feeling intimidated and threatened with a ‘loss of 
love’ (SE19:178). Thus hearing this phrase at this moment of separation, the bride 
becomes reassured that she is loved. As the father’s attention is directed exclusively 
towards her his love offers her narcissistic gratification. 
 
In summary; associated with the woman’s narcissism is the pride that the father endows 
upon his daughter as a bride-in-white. (02Lousie10) and (04Sis10) both use the phrase 
‘my dad was so proud of me’ and (13Patricia09+10) states that her father was ‘very fond 
of me’. These statements can be interpreted as having resonance with how the ‘infant 
girl likes to regard herself as what her father loves above all else’ (SE19:173). 
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02Louise10 adds that both when the father said ‘You look stunning’ and that he was 
‘proud’ of her, it seemed to her that that brought them ‘close’. Arguably, close but 
restrained by prohibition because the father belongs to the mother. 
 
The above statements indicate that the bride’s expressed reassurance from and affection 
towards her father is important to her. 04Sis10 states that she felt ‘reassured’ by her 
father’s physical contact; 11Francis10 states that ‘I felt very warm towards my father’; 
and 13Patricia09+10 says that ‘I had a huge amount of affection and gratitude for him’. 
These statements can be interpreted as indicating that the bride is not overly ‘hostile’ or 
‘disappointed’ with the father, rather, in Oedipal terms, she has transformed her sadistic 
or active sexual trends ‘into aim-inhibited trends of an affectionate kind’ (SE19:179). 
Arguably, this can be interpreted as indicating that the bride ‘accepts castration’ and 
takes a passive position in relation to the father (SE22:128). The bride’s statements also 
seem to coincide with an indication of the infant girl’s attachment to the father in 
Oedipal terms.  In other words the father’s approval and his love seem paramount to the 
bride. 
 
Freud claims that the infant girl’s ‘attachment to her father is built upon her affectionate 
object attachments and relation to her mother’ (SE21:231), therefore can we identify the 
same quality of relationship between both parents? Louise states that ‘my dad was 
proud of me…which made me feel close to him’ (02Louise10). Arguably, the same 
closeness to her dad can also be reflected in her experience of her ‘supportive, 
reassuring’ mother (02Louise03). Liz in reporting: I had ‘a lovely time with my dad, it 
gave us the opportunity to relax’ (05Liz09), suggests that Liz’s experience was not 
filled with anxiety, but neither does it convey any passion. Liz also reports that ‘if mum 
had lived closer then I’d probably have asked her to help choose the dress’ (05Liz11), 
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which although refers to a geographical distance can also indicate some emotional 
distance between daughter and mother, which can be understood between Liz and her 
father. In contrast to Pam’s experience of her emotionally unavailable mother, Pam 
reports on a ‘very powerful’ emotional experience with a father who ‘didn’t want to let 
me go’ (09Pam09). Francis states: ‘I felt very warm towards my father…he was a 
significant figure. The whole thing was very powerful’ (11Francis10) and this powerful 
experience with her father can be contrasted with the emotionally less present mother 
figure. Patricia records: ‘my father master-minded my wedding’ (13Patricia09). This can 
be interpreted as being similar to Patricia’s experience of her mother as ‘practical and 
marvellous at doing things’ (13Patricia06). AnnC reports feeling ‘overwhelmed’ and 
supported by his complementary sentiments when she and her father met. This can be 
seen to be similar to AnnC’s experience of her mother who she felt contained her 
anxiety when ‘my mother helped me get undressed… it wasn’t a heart-wrenching 
moment’ (16AnnC07). 
 
To summarise; of the above brides who spoke of their experience with their fathers in 
comparison with their mothers Louise, Liz, Patricia, and AnnC seem to express that the 
relationship built up with the mother parallels that built with the father, thus confirming 
Freud’s hypothesis that the infant girl’s attachment to her father is built upon her 
affectionate attachment to her mother (SE21:231). It is noteworthy that of the brides 
with unsupportive mothers, Pam, Francis, and Freesia, their experience of their fathers 
seems to be expressed not just as supportive but in particularly powerful terms. This can 
be understood as being an indication of a compensation due to a less supportive or 
unavailable mother. Although for some participants their father or their mother had 
died, I am not aware that any of the participants’ parents had divorced. 
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Freud’s Oedipus complex, for the bride, arguably concerns the tension and maintenance 
of appropriate relationship boundaries during the developmental period and the 
oscillation between rivalry and instinctual desire. Both the mother and the father are 
required to maintain a close enough relationship with their daughter as to be good-
enough role models, which in turn the bride is proud enough to emulate, but not overly 
close to precipitate dependency or to cross incestuous boundaries. 
 
Chodorow, in discussing the girl’s orientation towards ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ 
heterosexuality interprets it as a compromise:  
The girl turns to her father not out of libidinal desire but out of narcissistic 
mortification and a wish to possess his penis as her own organ. When she 
finds out that she cannot have it, she still does not want him: rather, she 
wants a baby that will substitute for the penis she cannot have. (Chodorow, 
1994:42) 
 
The evidence offered by the brides’ statements appears to confirm Chodorow’s 
argument. Evidence suggests that some brides feel ‘close’ (02Louise10); ‘warm’ 
(11Francis10); ‘affection’ (13Patricia09), towards their father. Despite Chodorow’s 
suggestion that these kinds of sentiments of affection towards the father are not attached 
to libidinal desire, these statements can be interpreted in terms of the libidinal desire 
that the infant girl may have had towards the father. By the time she is the bride-in-
white these elements of sexual desire have been transformed and displaced onto a non-
incestuous other. Having examined the infant girl’s and the bride’s relationship with the 
mother and then with the father, let us now consider a series of personal transformations 
that the bride undergoes inside the Church. 
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4.6 Transformation inside the Church 
Let us now consider how the bride is transformed by the Church ceremony, as 
mentioned earlier. Classically, the bride-in-white enters the Church wearing a veil 
which covers her face, and where her expression of feelings are bound by decorum. 
Arguably, the bride is not ‘reluctant’, yet she is constrained from a spontaneous ‘release 
of pleasure’ (lustentbindung), ‘release of anxiety’ (angstentbindung), or the release of 
‘sexual excitation’ (sexualentbindung), which indicates the capacity for sublimation. 
Thus the bride comes to the Church in a state of opposing tensions. As Freud 
emphasises, ‘the main purpose of Eros—that of uniting and binding—helps towards 
establishing unity, which is particularly characteristic of the ego’ (SE19:45). In other 
words, the bride’s purpose in privileging heterosexuality is to procure a ‘uniting’. And 
like the Church which privileges obedience and passivity the bride presents as if 
‘bound’ like a gift. As Rose states: 
I thought the words ‘given away’ odd. It’s like being thought of as a gift. Is this why 
they dress you up in all this finery as if you are a present, as though you’re a piece of 
property, rather than flesh and blood? (10Rose15). 
 
Freud suggests that the infantile past of the individual remains forever with us, stating 
that ‘the primitive stages can always be re-established; the primitive mind is, in the 
fullest meaning of the word, imperishable’ (SE14:286). This is to suggest that at times 
of anxiety regression to earlier behavioural patterns can be observed as a defence, and 
the re-emergence of the past in the present can be presented in the unconscious 
‘compulsion to repeat’, as a response to being in a relatively distressing situation. 
Laplanche and Pontalis amplify Freud’s position: ‘the repetition compulsion is never to 
be encountered in a pure state, but is invariably reinforced by factors which are under 
the sway of the pleasure principle’ (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973:79). In other words, the 
bride when experiencing anxiety can repeat what is relatively unpleasurable or even 
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painful, in order to attempt to master excessive tensions during this process of 
separation and transformation. 
 
What appears dramatised during the wedding ceremony is the bride being ‘given away’ 
[Figure 8]. From the bride’s perspective, however, she may be a willing participant 
because she believes that by relinquishing forbidden desires for the parents, that this 
‘compromise’ will compensate (Chodorow, 1994:33-69). As established earlier, at 
puberty the Oedipus complex is revived and resolved when the girl accepts that her 
mother and father belong to each other and the girl is required to make her own object-
choice. Let us consider the process of transition from object identification to the 
internalisation of the incest prohibition. 
 
The American theoretician and psychiatrist Hans Loewald suggests that an important 
task for a workable resolution of the Oedipus complex, involves the relinquishment of 
the external object relationships. Loewald emphasises that object relationships, 
constituted on the level of the Oedipus complex, contain libidinal-aggressive as well as 
identification elements and the process of relinquishment involves the process of 
identification, that is ‘of identification of oneself with’ (Laplanche, 1973:205) becoming 
internalised. Loewald defines identification as ‘erasing the difference between subject 
and object’ and that identification is a step towards internalisation which facilitates ‘an 
emancipation from the object’ (Loewald, 1980:83). 
 
Loewald argues that the process of internalisation transforms object-relations ‘into an 
internal, intrapsychic, depersonified relationship’ (Loewald, 1980:83). Loewald adds 
that this process acts in two ways, it ‘increases and enriches psychic structure’ and ‘the 
identity with the object is renounced’ (Loewald, 1980:83). Loewald emphasises that ‘as 
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a completed process [internalisation] implies an emancipation from the object’ that is 
‘freeing the individual for non-incestuous object-relations’ (Loewald, 1980:83). In other 
words through the process of internalisation both the subject’s and object’s identity 
become redefined. 
 
Having studied the brides’ responses, discrete representative voices have been chosen to 
convey the dominant themes of transformation which fall under five principle headings: 
being veiled; being ‘given away’; speaking the vows; signing the register and change of 
surname, as these represent significant events in the bride’s experience. Due to the 
bride’s sense of disorientation and increased anxiety, arguably, the bride may indicate 
signs of regression. That is, ‘a psychical process which regresses to an earlier state, such 
as past phases of libidinal development, ways of object relating or types of 
identification’ (Laplanche, 1973:386). During the bride’s process of the loosening of 
familial ties, there are examples of: the loss of time; disconnection with reality; loss and 
change of identity; speaking difficulties; issues of obeying; the fear of making a mistake 
when writing; concern for the sequence in the alphabet; and the need to feel secure. 
These will now be explored in turn more closely. 
 
For both the bride and her father a moment of truth has come. In Freudian terms, even 
though the daughter may have had unconscious incestuous desires towards the father, 
and the father towards the daughter, both she and he display their restraint by walking 
between the assembled group in the Church with pride. The bride-in-white, her face 
covered with a veil enters the Church with her father, as though they were a couple, yet 
she keeps herself separate91 from her father and the group by her use of the veil. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Cf. ‘she-who-is-unto-herself’, as discussed in Part One. 
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Arguably, the bride-in-white on the arm of her father symbolically demonstrate to the 
group that they have remained subject to the law of incest prohibition. 
 
Classically, the veiled bride conspicuously presents herself fully adorned in radiant 
white [Figure 5]. As previously established, in Chasseguet-Smirgel’s terms, on being 
veiled, thus totally covered in white, the bride represents the phantasy of the return to an 
original state of perfection, the ‘ideal ego’, and which Loewald describes as ‘a 
recapturing of the original primary-narcissistic, omnipotent perfection of the child by a 
primitive identification with the omnipotent parental figures…an hallucinatory wish 
fulfilment’ (Loewald, 1980:46). Before investigating how the bride experiences the 
above series of transformations, let us consider how the bride’s statements report their 
experience of being veiled. 
 
Rose’s experience of being veiled appears to have been felt as disorientating, including 
a timelessness element: 
While veiled it felt as though I was peering through a fog. I felt relieved when I reached 
the end of the aisle and the vicar put the veil back from over my face. It was like coming 
out of a fog (10Rose14). 
 
The experience of being veiled can be interpreted in pre-Oedipal terms, indicating 
dependency, with nearly non-existent or indistinct boundaries. Loewald asserts that:  
pre-Oedipal reality is pre-objective. Boundaries between subject and 
object…on pre-Oedipal levels are either non-existent, fluid, blurred, so no 
clear or constant distinction between self and object world, between inside 
and outside, is maintained. (Loewald, 1980:81) 
 
While the veil covers the bride’s face, arguably the experience can be interpreted in pre-
Oedipal terms where boundaries appear blurred. As the veil is lifted the bride’s state 
becomes differentiated, with distinct Oedipal parental figures around her. Let us now 
consider other bride’s statements. which seem to fall into four categories:  
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First, Francis expresses how she felt, that by wearing a veil there was a separation: 
I really enjoyed being veiled as there’s something very containing about it. It gave me 
privacy and I felt that I couldn’t belong to anybody while I was veiled (11Francis14). 
 
Second, Margaret considered that the veil was ‘traditional’: 
The tradition in my day was that the bride came in with the veil over her face and went 
out with it back (14Margaret14). 
 
In stating that wearing a veil was ‘traditional’ (14Margaret14), can be interpreted in 
terms of her ego being censored by the function of the superego, while her behaviour 
conforms to the near family and wider social group expectations. Thus by wearing a veil 
Margaret represents an ideal for both herself and the group, defending against any fear 
of ‘loss of love’. 
 
Third, Ann felt trapped behind her veil: 
I didn’t like being veiled or having that barrier between me and the outside world. It 
was put over to walk down the aisle. It felt trapping. I didn’t want to be hidden. I 
wanted everybody to see how radiant I was. Having my face covered was quite 
uncomfortable. I was quite glad to get to the end of the aisle [laughter] when the veil 
could be taken back (12Ann14). 
 
It appears from Ann’s statement that she felt some tension. First, in feeling ‘trapped’ 
can be interpreted as being associated with the bride’s ‘self-blinding’, an ‘anxiety about 
one’s eyes, the fear of going blind’ which Freud links to ‘the punishment of castration’ 
(SE17:231). Arguably, on wearing a veil Ann experiences that her feelings were 
constrained, restricted or bound. Ann seems to be expressing how she felt constrained in 
a castrated body, and how she wished to compensate for an unconscious ‘lack’ through 
her active exhibitionism, as she declares that ‘I wanted everybody to see how radiant I 
was’ (12Ann14). It is as if Ann wished to become the phallic object that ‘everybody’ 
would admire. Second, it seems that Ann acquiesced to wearing a veil, even though she 
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‘didn’t like being veiled’, ‘I didn’t want to be hidden’ (12Ann14). This suggests that for 
Ann there was a tension between ‘passivity’ and ‘activity’, an unconscious struggle 
against relinquishing her masculinity and her independence. 
 
Another aspect of this moment of truth comes when the bride’s face is laid bare in the 
presence of the larger group, and in the intimacy of the smaller group which comprises 
of herself, the minister and her fiancée, as AnnC states that: 
Walking down the aisle with the veil over my face was a bit of a security, because I 
could hide behind my veil [laughter]. When I lifted the veil up, it was like presenting 
myself to my fiancée [laughter] (16AnnC14). 
 
Fourth, two brides from the ‘recent’ group did not wear a veil, but this was not 
elaborated upon: 
No, I didn’t wear a veil (07Elizabeth14). 
 
Let us now consider another facet of the bride’s transformation, that of being ‘given 
away’. However deliberately or willing a subject, being ‘given away’, 
psychodynamically, involves the processes of separation from, and the loss of, love-
objects, that is the gradual relinquishment of Oedipal triangular relationships. Freud 
asserts that: 
people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when 
a substitute is already beckoning to them. This opposition can be so intense 
that a turning away from reality takes place and a change to the object 
through the medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis. (SE14:244) 
 
This is to suggest that even in the face of reality there can be a tendency for denial and a 
clinging to the love-object. The bride, at this juncture, may not only be mourning for the 
loss of herself as a daughter, the loss of familial home, the security but also the 
insecurity it may represent. These feelings of sadness for her loss could also lead to 
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anger towards those who are giving her away, and guilt for leaving the love-objects for 
another. 
 
Loewald suggests that as a defence against these types of losses, transforming processes 
of internalisation are involved, as discussed above. Loewald argues that:  
[If] external love-objects remain present during the resolution of the 
Oedipus complex [they] actively promote the process of internalisation. [If] 
the parents remain present during this period but change their attitude; they 
promote a partial detachment, a decathexis of libidinal-aggressive drives 
from themselves as external objects so that an amount of such drive energy 
is freed for narcissistic recathexis. [Then], some drive energy becomes 
available for eventual recathexis in non-incestuous external relationships; 
parents promote emancipation. (Loewald, 1980:226-7) 
 
Reporting on the experience of being ‘given away’ the bride’s statements appear to 
address six main themes, as follows:  
 
First, some brides experienced being ‘given away’ as supportive and protective: 
It was lovely being ‘given away’ because it brought our two families together. There 
was a joining, we weren’t just a couple we had our families supporting us. When the 
respective parents and the minister joined our hands together, that was very nice 
(01Sue15). 
 
In being ‘given away’ I felt I was being passed from one protective male to another as 
though it was an act of love (17Ros15). 
 
Second, some brides connected feelings of loss with the father: 
Being ‘given away’ was special to me because dad was there (05Liz15). 
 
I think I might have felt emotional because my father was giving me away 
(14Margaret15). 
 
Third, some brides reported feeling ambivalent about being ‘given away’: 
I felt happy being ‘given away’ but mixed with sadness because at the end of the day he 
was my dad (02Louise15). 
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Being ‘given away’ I felt very upset, happy and upset, because I didn’t have my dad 
there (03Lucy15). 
 
Fourth, some brides expressed a sense of denial of the separation between father and 
daughter.  
I felt I had already left home when I went away to college. I don’t think I felt 
particularly ‘given away’ or that my father was giving up his prize possession, even 
though I was his only daughter (14Margaret15). 
 
I didn’t feel as though my father was getting rid of me because I thought we’d still be 
father and daughter (10Rose15). 
 
Fifth, one bride experienced feeling frightened about the finality of separation: 
Being ‘given away’ felt frightening because then I didn’t have my parental home. It 
seemed strange to be going away from what was my home for twenty-one years where I 
knew who people were and was going to be with this person who was virtually a 
stranger, in one sense. It was as if I wanted to stay at home a bit longer. It felt as 
though, perhaps even feeling pushed away [laughter], but I wasn’t allowed back in that 
full way again (11Francis15). 
 
Sixth, one bride appears to have been impatient to separate: 
I couldn’t wait to be given to my husband. I knew that I was going to someone who 
really loved me and that he had something special. I was leaving [pause] a happy 
background, but I was going to where I wanted to be – with my husband. We were 
going to be one complete unit. I couldn’t wait! (09Pam15). 
 
We can see from the above statements the different quality of responses to the process 
of deliberate and intentional separation. From being experienced as supportive, 
acknowledging the loss, expressing ambivalence, denial, to being anxious, or being 
overly willing to separate. 
 
The first theme can be interpreted, that the loss of one relationship can be compensated 
by another of equal value. Sue states that the ‘joining’ seems to apply to both families 
and also the act of being ‘given away’ makes a new couple (01Sue15). Ros reports 
experiencing ‘being passed from one protective male to another’ (17Ros15), indicating 
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that both men were on an equal par. The second theme seems to carry poignancy 
regarding the daughter’s relation to her father. Liz reports that being ‘given away’ felt 
‘special’ because of her father’s presence (05Liz15). Margaret states that it was 
‘emotional’ (14Margaret15) because her father was present. These statements can be 
interpreted as being part of the process of relinquishment of incestuous object relations 
indicating the significance of the father’s role. The third theme can be interpreted as the 
bride possessing both the capacity for sadness, loss and looking back, but also the 
capacity to look to the future. Again it will be noticed that both (02Louise15) and 
(03Lucy15) link the emotions with their father. These statements can be interpreted as 
indicating the close relationship between daughter and father. The fourth theme, 
considering a sense of denial, can be interpreted as being characteristic of a defence 
against anxiety and depression. Denial of reality can be a way of dealing with the reality 
of pain or emotion and can reinforce feelings of isolation, alienation and stigmatisation. 
That is, in denial, the subject defends against being different. The bride can also be in 
denial of castration or passivity—a ‘repudiation of femininity’, as explored in Part One. 
The fifth theme considers how Francis seems acutely aware of feeling ‘frightened’ 
(11Francis15). This degree of acuteness can be interpreted in terms of reluctance, of one 
who ‘clings’ to the past and fears the future with its uncertainty. The sixth theme 
addresses the bride who is impatient as if she is driven fearlessly by some powerful 
force, as reported by (09Pam15). 
 
The triangular Oedipal structure of daughter, mother and father, transposes into father 
daughter and minister as the father gives the bride ‘away’, and then becomes the 
triangular relationship of bride, fiancée and minister, in the construction of a new two-
person relationship. Let us now explore another aspect of the bride’s transformation, 
that of making the vows. 
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The bride, still unmarried, now turns to her right and in so doing turns her back on her 
parents, thus unconsciously ‘repudiating parental authority’, as investigated in Part One. 
The bride, no longer separated or protected by the veil, now becomes aware of the 
group watching her, addresses the bridegroom towards whom she faces. The bride, no 
longer resting her left hand on her father’s arm, now rests her left hand in the 
bridegrooms right hand, consents to ‘have this man…to live together…and forsaking all 
other, keep thee only unto him, so long as ye both shall live’, the bride speaks: ‘I will’. 
As already established in Part One, the bride echoes phrases enunciated by the minister, 
in a legally prescribed sequence, which ends: ‘I give thee my troth’.  
 
Of the few participants who referred to their experience relating to the vows, as a direct 
question concerning the vows was not included in the questionnaire, the statements 
appear to address two main themes.  
 
First, some brides reported on the gravity of making a promise: 
I knew that once I had taken my vows I didn’t want to ever break them and knew I was 
now going to be committed to one man, wholly and entirely and for it to last for a life-
time. A ‘vow’ is a very big word, it means to me that what I said I were going to do; it’s 
an awful commitment (10Rose09). 
 
When my fiancée was saying his vows, I found that emotional, because you don’t often 
hear people talk like that ‘With my body I honour you…’. When you’re there and it’s 
right in front of you and you’re saying it, it takes on a different depth of meaning 
(16AnnC15).  
 
Arguably, within the audible enunciation of vows, there is an element of omnipotent 
control. Within the ritualised potency and power of the spoken word, the vows, like 
pronouncing a spell, exclude all other people (‘forsaking all other’, including the 
father), and exclusively include another person (‘keep thee only unto him’, the 
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bridegroom), as already mentioned, where the minutest error in the incantation requires 
the whole to be repeated. 
 
Freud suggests that there can be an ‘attributing of magical powers to words’ which are 
used by religion (SE22:165). Freud states that there is also ‘the overvaluation of the 
magic of words and the belief that the real events in the world take the course which our 
thinking seeks to impose on them’ (SE22:166). This is to suggest that a grave value can 
be attributed to the words spoken during the vows in the subject’s hope that the 
intention invokes action. 
 
Second, some brides reported that enunciating the vows was a vivid emotional 
experience: 
I was shaking and embarrassed saying my vows out loud in front of a lot of people 
because I was nervous that I was going to get it wrong (01Sue18). 
 
I got very emotional saying my vows. I might loose it completely here…but I managed 
to hang on [laughter]. I didn’t want to be a blubbering wreck as it’s such a big thing! 
Making the biggest vows of your life seems frightening (06Debbie11). 
 
The above statements indicate that speaking the vows became a very emotional 
experience: Sue’s statement seems to be in two parts, first, an extraordinarily intense 
affect laden experience: ‘I was shaking’ (01Sue18), and second, that she feared ‘getting 
it wrong’ (01Sue18), indicating an unconscious fear of a loss of perfection, thus a loss 
of the ego ideal. Debbie’s report ‘I might loose it completely’, ‘I didn’t want to be a 
blubbering wreck’ (06Debbie11) seems to suggest that she had an extraordinarily 
intense tormenting experience, near to the point when something bad might happen and 
loose adult ego control by becoming like a baby. 
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Both in Sue’s and Debbie’s statements we meet an example of the tension within which 
the bride is ‘bound’. That due to decorum the bride continues to be restrained from a 
spontaneous release of affect. Freud asserts that ‘from the outset in anxiety-hysteria the 
mind is constantly at work in the direction of once more psychically binding the anxiety 
which has become liberated’ (SE10:117). This is to suggest that the speaking of vows 
within earshot of the group is a pivotal process in the bride’s transformation because it 
is so laden with affect.  
 
Freud, ‘deeply’ conversant with the Bible from childhood, acknowledges its ‘enduring 
effect’ on him (SE20:8) may well have suggested, at this point in the ceremony, that 
becoming a wife carries with it a two-fold responsibility. First, to facilitate her 
husband’s separation from his father and mother, in the husband’s ‘cleaving unto’ her 
(Genesis 2v24), inferring her capacity to transform separation anxiety. Second, for her 
to ‘be subject to her husband’, (Colossians 3v18), implying the woman’s passivity. Let 
us now examine another moment of personal transformation for the bride that of signing 
the register and changing her surname. 
 
The bride, now married and a wife, concretises her visual and spoken intentions by 
signing her maiden name [Figure 10]. Writing, that is, the bride signing the Church 
register in the presence of witnesses, records her signature for posterity, i.e. ‘a 
communication with the absent’ (Green, 1986:321). The bride signing her familial 
surname, and for some brides for the last time, is the final stage in the vectorisation 
process through a series of transformations, from visualisation, verbalisation, now 
culminating in written textual language. The activities are transformed, connected and 
locked into the paper. Green, drawing on Bion, suggests that the ‘locked in’ and 
‘connected’ elements of the written word can be associated with ‘a process of 
 288	  
imprisonment, of containment’ (Green, 1986:320). Green proposes that ‘the work of 
writing presupposes a wound and a loss, a work of mourning, of which the text is the 
transformation into a fictitious positivity’ (Green, 1986:322). Freud notes that ‘in cases 
of hysterical mutism writing [can] operate vicariously in the place of speech…writing 
more fluently, quicker…than previously’ (SE7:39).  
 
Pam seems to report that she felt irritated and impatient with the process of having to 
sign the register:  
As I was signing the register [laughter] I wished the minister would hurry up [giggle]. I 
wished we could get to the reception as all the paper-work was becoming boring 
(09Pam16). 
 
Pam’s report can be interpreted as indicating that Pam is projecting some hostility that 
she may have felt towards her controlling parents onto the controlling minister. Let us 
now consider how other brides recall their experience of signing the register. The 
participant’s statements appear to address three themes, as follows:  
 
First, some brides felt overwhelmed while writing: 
I was shaking and I couldn’t see properly because of the contact lenses. I felt very 
proud to be signing the register and to have my mother-in-law and father-in-law there 
(07Elizabeth16). 
 
During the signing of the register I remember feeling anxious because I didn’t want to 
make a blot with the pen [laughter] on the register; I wanted to get it right (12Ann16). 
 
It can be interpreted that within this form of non-verbal communication there are 
elements of emotional restraint and somatisation; for Elizabeth she ‘couldn’t see 
properly’ (07Elizabeth16). For Ann she wished to control her hand sufficiently that she 
‘didn’t want to make a blot’ (12Ann16) which indicates the desire for perfection 
constrained by the demands emanating from the ego ideal. 
 
 289	  
Second, some of the brides from the ‘older group’ stated that they could not recall any 
feelings associated while writing: 
I don’t remember having any feelings as I signed the register. It was just something that 
had to be done legally. I suppose it was the last time I would be signing this name. But 
it was new and exciting and nothing upsetting about it (13Patricia16). 
 
I signed on the dotted line, it was as matter of fact. I don’t think it bothered me that that 
was the last time I signed my maiden name (14Margaret16). 
 
It can be interpreted that during the process of signing their name there could be a sense 
of denial of emotional content; for Patricia ‘I don’t remember any feelings’ 
(13Patricia16); and for Margaret ‘it didn’t bother me’ (14Margaret16). 
 
Third, some brides conveyed the experience of being transformed by writing:  
Signing the register is like saying "yes", I’ve done it now! [laughter] and the piece of 
paper to prove that I am married now and that I'm ‘Mrs.’ It felt good that I was ‘Mrs’ 
and not ‘Miss’ (02Louise16).  
 
I felt, in signing the register, that I’d lost a little bit of my identity. I was no longer 
going to be ‘Miss’, I was now going to be ‘Mrs.’, half of a couple, like having a new 
identity (10Rose16). 
 
It can be interpreted that for some brides, signing the Church register was significant as 
it seems that it marked a moment of transformation, that for both (02Louise16) and 
(10Rose16) becoming ‘Mrs’ ‘felt good’, thus indicating an identification with the 
mother. When 10Rose16 speaks of feeling ‘half of a couple’, this can be interpreted in 
terms of Plato’s argument, as discussed in Part One, that individuals search for their 
other half in order to feel complete. 
 
Having examined how the bride reports her experience of signing the Church register, 
another way in which we can understand the manner in which the bride unconsciously 
‘repudiates her parent’s authority’, as examined in Part One, can be illustrated by how 
the bride reports on her experience of surname change. Part of the transformation 
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process during the wedding ceremony, in the privacy of the Church vestry, or in view of 
the group, the bride often changes her surname. Arguably, this change symbolises a 
displacement of authority and allegiance from one paternal name to another, because 
this change will bring her satisfaction, and in Freudian terms the desired penis. The 
bride, relinquishing her familial surname, arguably can be interpreted under six 
psychodynamic themes.  
 
First, as a sign of the strength of patriarchy, indicated by the ‘turning from the mother to 
the father’ (SE23:114). Second, a sign of ‘identification with her mother’ which has ‘the 
intention of substituting activity for passivity’ (SE22:128). Third, a sign of the woman’s 
super-ego conforming to parental and society’s traditional values through identification 
with them and the ‘internalisation of parental prohibitions and demands’ (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1973:436). Fourth, if in wishing to retain the father’s surname this could be a 
sign of penis envy and ‘the wish to get the longed-for penis’ (SE22:125). Fifth, a sign of 
striving for trust and autonomy (Erikson, 1950:272). Sixth, repudiating the parent’s 
authority (SE7:227). Freud in referring to ‘legitimacy and monogamy’, and the 
‘solitary, indissoluble bond between one man and one woman’, discusses the 
compensation sought by the weaker from the stronger as a means of ‘obtaining of some 
measure of security’ (SE21:105). 
 
Let us now discuss the bride’s statements by considering each of the six themes that 
emerged from the statements. First, the majority of brides stated that they changed their 
surname because they wanted to: 
 
Changing your surname was the absolutely accepted system. It was totally accepted 
that you took your husband’s name (15Freesia17). 
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Freesia’s statement can be interpreted in terms of conforming to patriarchal tradition, 
thus indicating that Freesia felt subject to the super-ego and passivity. 
 
Second, some brides felt sad loosing their father’s surname: 
I felt sad that I was loosing my name [laughter], because I was no longer a… and 
because it was my father’s name and my father’s not here any more. I was quite proud 
to carry his name, so I felt quite sad about that (06Debbie16). 
 
Feeling ‘sad’ (06Debbie16) can be interpreted in terms of mourning the loss of the 
paternal tie, while there continues to be a sense of reluctance to leave paternal security. 
 
Third, some brides reported that by changing their surname they felt they now belonged.  
Changing my surname felt good because I felt, now I belong to someone else 
(02Louise17). 
 
In feeling that ‘I belong to someone else’ (02Louise17), indicates a repudiation of 
parental authority and a new measure of trust and security. 
 
Fourth, some brides felt ambivalent about changing their surname: 
I didn’t mind changing my surname, but in a way I am sorry that one has to do that, 
because I feel more affinity to my maiden name than my married name because that was 
the family I belonged to (17Ros17). 
 
On being ambivalent to changing her surname, the bride indicates the tension between 
leaving and not leaving the parental family surname. Arguably, there could also be an 
unconscious sense of guilt for wishing to repudiate parental authority and the struggle to 
accept passivity. 
 
Fifth, some brides thought in spelling and alphabet terms.  
I was very delighted to change my surname, because it was now [laughter] further up 
the alphabet and that seemed wonderful [laughter] (11Francis17). 
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This statement can be interpreted in terms of narcissistic delight that the bride had a new 
and more manageable surname. 
 
Sixth, Liz stated that she did not change her surname:  
I haven’t actually changed my name! It’s not that I am making a big statement because 
when our child was born, it was a ‘no-brainer’ to me that he was going to have his 
father’s surname. I’ve got no problem being called ‘Mrs…’. But it seems an odd 
convention that you change your name.  I can’t see the point of it, given that it’s a great 
deal of hassle, I wouldn’t bother doing it (05Liz16). 
 
Liz’s statement can be interpreted as indicating a strength of patriarchy, as Liz states 
that her son will ‘have his father’s surname’ (05Liz16) and that Liz had ‘no problem 
being called Mrs…’ (05Liz16). While at the same time perhaps, the feminist part of Liz 
wishes to cling onto her father’s surname, which in Oedipal terms can be interpreted as 
indicating ‘penis envy’ (SE22:128). Let us now consider how the bride describes her 
relationship with the non-incestuous other. 
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4.7 On relating to the non-incestuous other 
Although the topic of the bride’s relationship to their husband was not directly 
addressed during the interview, several participants expressed their views. As the bride 
processes up the aisle on the arm of her husband the bride has visually enacted 
separation from the Oedipal love-objects and repudiated their authority, and the bride 
now carries only internalised representations of them as they are left behind. The bride 
has risked the parent’s disapproval, or a sense of guilt, as suggested earlier by 
Chasseguet-Smirgel, of replacing their love with a love from the ‘non-incestuous other’. 
The bride may now feel ecstatically happy as she projects a sense of love onto her 
husband. Feeling special in an exclusive relationship may contain resonance with the 
pre-Oedipal maternal relationship. The bride may feel a sense of insecurity at turning 
her back on her parents, but may be looking to replace the security she had with her 
parents with security provided by her husband. The bride may see her new relationship 
as a means by which she finds liberation from parental ties.  
 
Let us consider three aspects of this moment of separation and union. Freud suggests 
that ‘Eros desires contact because it strives to make the ego and the loved object one, to 
abolish all spatial barriers between them’ (SE20:122). In other words, affects such as 
hostility and disappointment towards the parents are put in the service of Eros, which 
facilitates separation from incestuous desire and brings about close contact with a non-
incestuous object. Freud claims that ‘when [the infant girl] turned from her mother to 
her father, the hostility of her ambivalent relation remained with her mother’ 
(SE22:132-3), however, as the infant girl does not fear castration, but can feel 
intimidated and ‘threatened with a loss of love’ (SE19:178). Loewald asserts that: 
Whether separation from a love object is experienced as deprivation and 
loss or as emancipation and mastery will depend, in part, on the 
achievement of the work of internalisation. In terms of affect, the road leads 
from depression through mourning to elation. (Loewald, 1980:263) 
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That is to say, there seems to be required of the bride the capacity to split her feelings in 
two. To leave any ambivalence and ‘hostility with her mother’, and by displacement and 
in the service of Eros, project loving affects onto her husband. 
 
Let us now examine the quality of the bride’s responses. As we have already seen, Pam 
seemed to need to prize her husband away from his mother’s influence, that is, Pam’s 
mother-in-law. Let us examine this report, made twenty-six years after the event 
expressing the feelings of a nineteen-year-old bride, more closely: 
On the way back from the reception, my husband and I called into his mum’s house to 
take my wedding dress off. His mum always had a very strong hold over her son. I 
remember going to the toilet and the confetti falling out from my dress. Instead of 
picking it up, I thought ‘I’ll leave it there because then she’ll know that I’ve been, made 
my mark and I’ve got her son’. Isn’t that wicked? That’s nasty! (09Pam07). 
 
Psychodynamically, we can see from this report that Pam seems to have felt that she 
experienced a pressure exerted by ‘his mum’, which seemed to precipitate Pam to exert 
a contrary force (09Pam07). Thus we see, as Freud explains, a ‘conflict of opposing 
mental forces…as the outcome of an active struggling on the part of the two psychical 
groupings against each other’ (SE11:26). Karen Horney links the opposition of letting 
go or keeping, with the process undertaken at marriage and suggests that ‘the demand 
for monogamy is closely bound up with anal-sadistic instinctual elements and converts 
the claim of love into an anal-sadistic demand for possession’ (Horney, 1967:93). These 
opposing forces if understood as a struggle can be seen in terms of ‘letting go, or 
keeping’. Once president of the International Psycho-Analytical Association Karl 
Abraham suggests that the anal-sadistic stage of infantile sexual development can be 
interpreted in two parts. The first, is ‘linked to evacuation and the sadistic instinct to the 
destruction of the object’. The second, is connected to ‘retention and the sadistic instinct 
to possessive control’ (Abraham 1924, in. Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973:35). 09Pam07’s 
statement can therefore be interpreted on four psychodynamic levels.  
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The first aspect can be interpreted in anal sadistic terms and seems to be Pam’s sense of 
an overwhelming intrusion and invasion therefore her apparent need for the ‘expulsion’ 
of the mother’s influence, therefore separation has become imperative from this 
apparently intrusive force. Pam seems to ‘identify with the aggressor’ and sadistically 
reciprocates. We learn that Pam desired to ‘make her mark’ and this appears to be 
linked with going ‘to the toilet’ and something ‘falling out’ which seems to be 
associated with ‘his mum’. The whole report seems to be framed in an intense sadistic 
manner, as Pam states: ‘Isn’t that wicked?’, and ‘That’s nasty!’ (09Pam07). 
 
In Pam’s report, the confetti that Pam does not pick up arguably can be equated with the 
faeces which appears in Freud’s ‘symbolic equation: faeces = gift’ (SE17:127-33). On 
this basis, therefore, the confetti/faeces that Pam leaves behind, that are considered 
‘nasty’ and represent a ‘mark’, can be interpreted as a ‘wicked’ sadistic attack by Pam 
on the ‘strong hold’ that her mother-in-law appeared to exert over Pam’s husband 
(09Pam07). Pam’s sadistic attack can also be interpreted in terms of a displacement 
onto her own father who earlier was experienced as having ‘always had that hold over 
me’ (09Pam09). This reaction, can be understood as an expression of Pam’s desire to 
become liberated or emancipated from his ‘hold’. Pam seems to reinforce this need for 
liberation when she states: ‘I couldn’t wait to be Mrs’ (09Pam09) which can be 
interpreted as a sign of mastery over a love-hate object. This sense of liberation from 
the parental ‘hold’ also implies a liberation from Pam’s own mother who ‘was too 
wrapped up in herself to be involved’ (09Pam11). By implication, therefore, the 
experience of the ‘absent mother’ infers that Pam may have felt unheld because her 
mother did not have the capacity to ‘play’ (Winnicott, 1971:54), or was unable to offer 
maternal ‘reverie and containment’ (Bion, 1967:116) or was not fully available to 
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support her and enter into Pam’s celebration. Pam’s attack on those who are 
experienced as having a ‘strong hold’ over her, thus restricting Pam’s unbridled desires, 
can be interpreted as ‘rebellion’, which Loewald suggests ‘maintains the external 
relationship’ rather than facilitates separation from external objects (Loewald, 
1980:263). 
 
The second aspect of Pam’s report seems to suggest that Pam expresses a greedy need 
for possession of her husband. This ‘greedy need’ can be located in the infant’s pre-
Oedipal oral phase, when the need takes the form of an unconscious desire to 
incorporate the mother and the breast in order to have sole possession. As already 
established, the pre-Oedipal infant experiences an exclusive attachment with the 
mother, before desiring to possess the father, both of which end in disappointment. 
Arguably, as a reaction to these disappointments Pam secures exclusive possession over 
her husband as a compensation or compromise for these earlier disappointments. 
 
The third aspect of Pam’s report can be interpreted that Pam’s anxieties could be linked 
to Pam’s introjection of her fear of loosing control and her projection of this fear onto 
another. From this statement it can be interpreted that Pam introjects the feeling that her 
mother-in-law, or her own father, has a ‘strong hold’ over him or her (09Pam07). Freud 
suggests that this introjected feeling can be linked to a ‘paranoid fear of being killed or 
devoured by the mother’ which in turn Freud links to the infant girl’s attachment and 
dependence on the mother (SE21: 227).  
 
The fourth aspect of this report concerns Pam feeling ‘threatened with a loss of love’, 
thus rivalry with her mother-in-law. Pam states that ‘his mother always had a very 
strong hold over her son’, can be interpreted as indicating that Pam felt rivalrous 
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towards her mother-in-law for her son’s love (09Pam07). This can suggest that as an 
infant girl Pam experienced intense Oedipal rivalry with her own mother for possession 
of the father. 
 
Having closely examined the other participant’s statements regarding their relationship 
with their husband four themes appear to emerge, as follows:  
 
First, the bride having suffered disappointments from her parents now looks to her 
husband for happiness: 
My most vivid memory was on entering the Church and my husband-to-be, looking at 
me coming down the aisle. The music was ‘Here Comes The Bride’ and we processed 
out to ‘Oh Perfect Love’. I think that was the most magical moment because it said what 
my dreams and hopes were, that this was going to be perfect and would last forever 
(10Rose01). 
 
Rose’s sense of elation seems to be idealised on the level of a ‘magical’ phantasy where 
the ego ideal dominates and ‘dreams and hopes’ come true and ‘last forever’ 
(10Rose01). As already established, idealistic ‘magical’ thinking can be interpreted as a 
denial of reality or a way of dealing with the pain of separation. Let us now see how 
Ros expresses her feelings towards her husband: 
 
My happiest memory was marrying my husband, making the vows and exchanging rings 
because we were very much in love (17Ros22). 
 
Ros’s elation seems to have had its roots in Ros’s projection of love onto her 
reciprocating husband. In both 10Rose01’s and 17Ros22’s case it can be interpreted that 
the projection of love onto another can be seen to be a defence against the loss of love 
of primary objects. 
 
Second, some brides feel threatened with a loss of love, so snare their husband: 
 298	  
It meant a lot to me that dad gave me away, particularly because I know he’s old 
fashioned and probably didn’t think that having the baby first then getting married was 
the right way round. My dad seemed genuinely happy when we married (05Liz10). My 
happiest memory is about the ceremony which was like ‘electric’, so intense, as I was 
nervous, actually shaking, when I went up the aisle, and my husband-to-be held my 
hand all through the service (05Liz22). 
 
Liz’s statement suggests that she had already secured the love of her partner by ‘having 
a baby first’, but seems to express a sense of relief that her ‘dad seemed genuinely 
happy’, thus indicating that Liz could have felt threatened with a loss of her father’s 
love and approval if she had not married (05Liz10). Liz’s use of the word ‘electric’ to 
describe her heightened state of emotional voltage tension, can be interpreted in terms 
of the warmth that electric power generates, or the ‘accumulations of high-voltage 
electricity that seeks discharge and can lead to the loss of consciousness and 
convulsion’ (Ferro, 2009: 76), which appear to be transformed and were earthed when 
her ‘husband-to-be held my hand’ (05Liz22). Let us consider how another bride reports 
on ‘capturing’ her husband-to-be: 
 
I tried to stay a virgin, but two weeks before we married we had a wopping great row. 
The way we made up was that my husband-to-be insisted we had sex, which I wasn’t 
really keen to do as I was a virgin. So I really had the sex to get married, to make sure 
that he didn’t run away (11Francis05). 
 
Francis’ report indicates that Francis imagined that her husband-to-be might ‘run away’ 
and leave her alone, thus indicating that Francis could have felt intimidated and 
threatened with a loss of his love (11Francis05). 
 
Third, the bride having repudiated her parent’s authority projects a need for security 
onto her husband:  
I think getting married cements relationships, offering security for having a family. 
We’d been together for twelve years and we didn’t know we could have a family but we 
both wanted children, and knew that we wanted to be married before that. Getting 
married made me feel more secure that my husband had made the commitment that he 
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wanted to be with me for the rest of our life. I knew I wanted to be with him [laughter] 
(16AnnC22). 
 
AnnC seems, from her report, to have given the issue of providing security for herself 
and the children through marriage a great deal of thought. Behind this test of time it can 
be interpreted that AnnC felt ‘threatened with a loss of love’, thus testing the 
partnership well before ‘cementing’ the relationship (16AnnC22). 
 
Fourth, some brides seem to struggle for liberation from parents as the following report 
illustrates: 
I had been in something of a struggle because my father had opposed my marriage, not 
because he had anything against my husband-to-be, but because my father felt I ought 
to, in a Victorian way, devote my life to looking after my disabled brother: I said no. He 
felt somehow this was wrong, but he came round to it (15Freesia10). 
 
This report states that Freesia ‘struggled’ against her father’s wishes. This can be 
interpreted as indicating that Freesia struggled to liberate herself from the all powerful 
primal father’s desire for control of all the women. In Freesia’s negation ‘my father had 
opposed my marriage, not because he had anything against my husband-to-be’ 
(15Freesia10), suggests that Freesia suppressed a hostile wish towards the father. This 
hostility can be interpreted that Freesia unconsciously experienced her father as a rival, 
with her husband-to-be, over his daughter’s love.  
 
Arguably, the predominant theme which seems to have emerged from the participant’s 
reports, even though (10Rose01) expresses some idealisation, which can be interpreted 
as a defence against loss and separation, is the brides struggle to separate from the 
parents and the brides struggle to secure a new trusting relationship. The principle frame 
within which this analysis has taken place is the Oedipal complex. It has aimed at 
creating a capacity to generate thought through symbolisation and the ability to 
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transform images through a new narration. Let us now consider how the bride processes 
change with reference to Winnicott with particular emphasis on the bride’s use of her 
wedding dress.  
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4.8 Processing change: separation anxiety and the use of a ‘transitional object’ 
Let us now explore the development of psychoanalytic understanding of the infant’s 
first ‘not me’ possession and the adult’s uses of other ‘not me’ possessions, in the 
psychological use of an object to allay anxiety. First, let us examine the way in which 
Winnicott’s theory of the ‘transitional object’, that is, an object not dissimilar to the 
infant’s ‘comfort blanket’, assists the subject through the transformation from one state 
to another and facilitates the process of separation from the mother. Second, let us apply 
this psychodynamic understanding to the social setting in which the bride finds herself, 
separating from familial ties and particularly from the maternal realm. Arguably the 
bride displaces separation anxiety onto the wedding dress, a vestment of clothing that 
assists change and is worn to help the bride move from one state to another, that is, 
from relative dependency to relative autonomy. 
 
Winnicott recognises Wulff’s description, discussed in Part Three, of an inanimate item 
of mother’s clothing being a ‘soothing’ mechanism in the infant’s aid towards sleeping. 
Wulff seems to describe the item of clothing in terms of a sexual fetish. Winnicott, 
however, desexualises the delusional object, the fetish which stands in for the ‘maternal 
phallus’, and suggests that ‘the illusion of a maternal phallus’ can be understood as 
‘universal and not pathological’ (Winnicott, 1951a:241, original emphasis). In 
Winnicottian terms the relationship with the mother’s ‘lost’ penis seems to be displaced 
onto the fetish, whereas the illusion with which the infant endows the ‘transitional 
object’ represents the lost maternal environment. 
 
The pre-neonate may experience the mother’s endless nourishment, a sense of safety 
and protection in the womb. The neonate, however, becomes dependent upon the 
mother or substitute, due to the infant’s helplessness or anxiety related to feeling 
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insecurely held. Winnicott draws on Freud who asserts: ‘anxiety is about something’, 
that is the experience encapsulated in the body, mind and externally (Winnicott, 
1958:59). Freud suggests, for the infant, once the hallucinatory image of the longed for 
object diminishes ‘the longing turns into anxiety’ (SE20:137). Anxiety resulting from 
separation may take different forms, such as challenging the infant’s sense of survival 
or the ability to build basic trust.  
 
In Winnicottian terms, the infant uses the maternal environment and the breast, to 
continue the illusion of remaining ‘merged’ with the mother (Winnicott, 1971:107). In 
order to alleviate the separation anxiety of birth the infant incorporates and identifies 
with as many parts of the temporarily ‘lost’ object. In other words, while the unborn 
foetus may experience feeling ‘merged’, the new born infant, in phantasy, continues the 
illusion of being merged, because separation from the mother threatens the infant’s 
sense of existence.  
 
Winnicott conceptualises three areas of infant experience: a) ‘inner world’, b) ‘external 
life’, and c) ‘an intermediate area that is not challenged [but] exists as a resting-place 
for the individual engaged in the perpetual human ‘strain’ of keeping inner and outer 
reality separate yet interrelated’ (Winnicott, 1971:2+13). This ‘intermediate area’ 
operates during the infant’s ‘inability and growing ability to recognise and accept 
reality’ (Winnicott, 1971:3), where the mother, through her adaptation enables the 
infant to allow for her failure and become tolerant of frustration (Winnicott, 1971:10). 
 
Winnicott describes the hypothetical yet shared corporal experience between infant and 
mother, taking place within the ‘potential space’, where the infant imagines being 
merged with the object (Winnicott, 1971:107). Winnicott suggests that ‘strain’ is 
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experienced if the mother is not immediately available to be ‘created’, this results in a 
‘defence against depressive anxiety’ (Winnicott, 1971:4). In Winnicottian terms, 
separation anxiety may be processed with the co-operation of the mother whose 
characteristics include being ‘good-enough’ (Winnicott, 1965:145), ‘adaptive’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:11), ‘devoted’ (Winnicott, 1965:148), and ‘preoccupied’ with her 
infant’s requirements (Winnicott, 1965:33). The mother also offers the infant the 
‘illusory experience’ of what the infant imagines, and is already in existence, appears to 
be ‘omnipotently created’ or chosen (Winnicott, 1971:12).  
 
Gradually separation and ‘objectivity’ ensue. The infant’s imperative no longer 
demands that the mother is under his/her ‘magical omnipotent control’ (Winnicott, 
1971:9). From this position, the infant displaces ambivalent anxiety, due to a loss of 
control over the mother, onto an inanimate object which appears to offer some of the 
same qualities the mother had previously offered. This inanimate object, Winnicott 
understands as ‘transitional’ since it unconsciously offers the illusion of bridging the 
gap between the infant and mother during the infant’s experience of separation. That is 
to say, the process of investment by the infant onto an inanimate object ‘is a defence 
against depressive anxiety’ because the object has been ‘chosen’ and is under the 
infant’s control (Winnicott, 1971:4). 
 
Winnicott’s thesis of the infant’s first external ‘not-me’ possession was based on his 
observation, that between the ages of approximately four to twelve months, when 
starting to explore the world, the infant often carries an inanimate object. The object 
may be a piece of material or a toy, which seems to have been endowed with special 
qualities by the infant during the mother’s absence which, as already mentioned, 
Winnicott describes this as ‘transitional’ (Winnicott, 1971:2). Interestingly, Winnicott 
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emphasises that generally it is not the mother nor the breast which become the infant’s 
‘first not-me possession’, instead Winnicott identifies the infant’s independent choice of 
an external object as the agency of autonomy (Winnicott, 1971:6). In Winnicottian 
terms, the object accompanies the child during developing towards ‘integration, 
personalisation and object-relating’ (Winnicott, 1965:223), and helps the infant manage 
the ‘journey from subjectivity to objectivity’ (Winnicott, 1971:6). In facilitating the 
infant’s environment, the mother and the inanimate object, accept the child’s ‘repeated 
destroying or damaging’ during the infant’s states of separation and ‘unthinkable 
anxiety’ (Winnicott, 1965:57). Finally, as the child finds the capacity to tolerate the 
mother’s ‘objectivity’ (Winnicott, 1971:6) and separateness, the mother ‘gradually 
reasserts herself as an independent person’ (Winnicott, 1965:239). In other words, the 
infant moves from a predominantly subjective to a relatively objective experience.  
 
The Korean psychiatrist Michael Hong, while investigating the process of separation-
individuation and establishing a cohesive self, recognises that the ‘transitional object’ 
offers the infant ‘tactile perception of reality until the distance perceptions become 
mature’ and this facilitates ‘the process of illusion-disillusionment and the 
differentiation of ‘me’ - ‘not-me’ in the development of reality testing (Hong, 1978:48). 
Hong asserts that the role of the ‘transitional object’ includes: 
being symbolic of a part object or the mother or reunion with the mother, 
but its actuality and that it stands for the mother are as important as its 
symbolic value; internalise an idealised component of the mother’s soothing 
and anxiety-regulating functions; the child can substitute the attachment 
object for the ‘good enough’ yet not enough mother, by providing ‘contact 
comfort’ and ‘security’; a defence against anxiety. (Hong, 1978:67-8) 
 
Hong compares mothering behaviour and infant going to sleep patterns in Western 
Anglo-Saxon culture with Korean children in Korea and Korean children in America. 
Hong concludes that: 
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the development of the blanket attachment is inversely correlated with the 
quantity and quality of physical contact with the mothering person. 
Therefore, the blanket attachment appears to be a substitute for, or an 
equivalent of, certain components of mothering, especially tactile contact, 
and provides ‘contact comfort’ to the infants, in addition to its other 
important roles in ego development. (Hong, 1978:75) 
 
Thus the ‘transitional object’, which can be experienced as actual with soothing and 
tactile elements may also be envisioned as symbolic or a substitute for the internalised 
mother. Let us now consider how Winnicott’s theory of the ‘transitional object’ can be 
understood in terms of the bride’s experience. 
 
Classically, the bride enacts a process of real and symbolic separation, from the secure 
nurturing environment. In Winnicottian terms, during this process of familial separation 
the bride inhabits an ‘intermediate area of experiencing’ which falls between the 
facilitating maternal environment and ‘the object objectively perceived’ as ‘not-me’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:100). Winnicott suggests that this ‘potential space’, a hypothetical 
area between subject and object, can be experienced during the phase of repudiation, 
and ‘at the end of being merged in with the object’ (Winnicott, 1971:107). Arguably the 
bride, being in transition between a familiar and an unfamiliar relationship, occupies 
this ‘potential space’, during the process of enacting the severing of familial ties. I will 
now focus on some unconscious dynamics of the bride’s relationship between herself 
and a social and cultural item of clothing. Arguably, since Queen Victoria’s wedding 
the white wedding dress has been invested in cultural and social terms.  
 
Madeline Davis and David Wallbridge, child psychologists aiming to illuminate 
Winnicott’s principal concepts suggest that ‘playing’ and the creative use of the 
‘potential space overlaps the inner and outer world’, evoking intense feelings and the 
struggle to feel ‘real’ and to establish a personal identity (Davis, 1981:64). Playing 
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becomes an ‘intermediate area of experience’ often through interaction with another 
(Davis, 1981:63). Davis and Wallbridge point to Winnicott’s suggestion that the manner 
in which the infant plays can be carried over into adult life, i.e., the ‘sophisticated 
adult’s enjoyment of…’, arguably dressing up for a special occasion (Davis, 1981:64). 
Davis and Wallbridge draw attention to Winnicott’s suggestion that in an attempt to feel 
real ‘uniformity can be seen to be important…in such areas as dress’ as the solution 
offers the subject the illusion of not being rejected, but of identifying with and 
belonging to a group, thus feeling real by binding the psyche and soma together (Davis, 
1981:83-4). Arguably, the woman who wears a white dress at her wedding can state not 
only ‘I am a bride’, thus feeling that she has established a personal identity, but also can 
feel that she belongs to a socially identified group of women. 
 
In Winnicottian terms, the bride’s use of her dress, during this process of separation, 
may be interpreted as being an object which accompanies ‘the [subject’s] transition 
from a state of being merged with the mother, to a state of being in relation to the 
mother, as something outside and separate’ (Winnicott, 1971:14-5). Arguably, as the 
bride moves from an experience of merging dependence to emerging relative 
independence the bride uses the dress in three psychodynamic ways: a) to represent the 
attachment to the mother who symbolises the nurturing parental home and who shares 
this reality with her daughter; b) to allay the bride’s anxiety during a time of uncertainty 
and transition; c) becomes a symbol of an affectionate relationship, between herself and 
her parents, and the potential relationship with her future husband. As has been 
established, the dress can be interpreted, in Winnicottian terms, as a ‘not-me’ object 
which can recall the first ‘not me object’ of infancy - the ‘transitional object’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:1-25). 
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Prior to the wedding day detailed preparations are made by the bride-to-be including 
choosing the dress which is often assisted by the mother. The bride’s unconscious use 
of her dress can emerge during the process of the bride-to-be’s choosing her dress, 
which often appears to bring the bride and her mother close together. Joyce McDougall 
discusses how, separation-individuation theorist Margaret Mahler (1968) notes that after 
the conflict of adolescence, the changes of physical and associated idealised body 
image, and finding a degree of separation through autonomous behaviour, it may be 
observed that the daughter may ‘return’ home. Mahler suggests that by returning to 
‘home base’ reassurance is generated from the maternal environment, before finally, or 
setting off again, offering a renewed internalisation of the mother imago (Mahler in. 
McDougall, 1995:196). 
 
Let us now explore how some bride’s statements illuminate how the daughter and her 
mother ‘play’ during the process of choosing the wedding dress. Some brides report not 
having their mother’s support to choose their dress, as reported:  
If mum had lived closer then I’d have asked her to come and help choose the dress.  The 
only reason I didn’t was that it wasn’t practical and as it turned out I didn’t feel I 
particularly needed support. I was happy doing it on my own (05Liz11). 
 
My mother didn’t play much of a role, [laughter], she just turned up, as a guest. She 
didn’t have anything to do with the organisation at all. She helped out financially 
(06Debbie11). 
 
Francis reports on how and why she bought her dress which fitted snugly to her bodily 
contours: 
I bought the dress in a little bit of a haze, not quite a hurry. My wedding dress was full-
length semi-classical, very elegant with long sleeves and tailored to my body, straight 
down to the ground (11Francis02). 
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For Liz, Debbie and Francis their mother’s were not available but arguably this does not 
suggest that these brides may not have wished for their mother’s presence and 
assistance during the choosing of their wedding dress.  
 
Some brides report having their mother’s support in organising their dress, as Ann and 
AnnC report: 
I felt incredibly supported by my mum because she’d made my wedding dress 
(12Ann11).  
 
My mum was there the whole time, the run up to it, the organisation and in the morning 
helping me get ready. She was there every step of the way. I was like a kid even though I 
was thirty (16AnnC11). 
 
One bride reports feeling disconcerted with her mother’s response in connection with 
the clothes her mother was going to wear, which arguably did not leave Ros feeling 
securely held, as Ros reports: 
I was disconcerted because my mum said she wasn’t going to buy a new outfit, which 
left me feeling marginalised. She had emotional problems, so I was used to that sort of 
behaviour (17Ros11). 
 
The bride’s mother can offer her daughter the ‘illusionary experience’ of choosing what 
is desired and is already in existence, as if it is omnipotently created, as reported by 
Margaret:  
I went with my mother to buy my dress. We only went into one shop and I think it was 
the first one I put on and it fitted. My mother paid for it (14Margaret04). 
 
From the above statements we may draw a parallel, in Winnicottian terms, with the 
infant’s experience of being in relationship with an attentive and ‘devoted’ mother who 
shares in her daughter’s experience or a ‘pre-occupied’ mother who seems absent. The 
choice of dress, however, may not be mutually approved of, as Ann states: 
My mother wished she had not gone along with my design—more of a meringue type 
dress [laughter] (12Ann04). 
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Ann’s statement appears to illustrate the struggle for autonomy illustrated by the 
delicate balance between the mutual involvement in considering the dress and one in 
which the bride appears to make her own choice. (12Ann04) also seems to indicate an 
aspect of a sense of guilt in her ‘capacity for concern’ for her mother’s feelings 
(Winnicott, 1965:73).  
 
It may be expected by all who deal with the bride’s dress that it is not selected at 
random, but the bride-to-be requires it to be just the correct colour and hue, adorned 
with the right amount of embellishment, and after extensive and careful deliberation is 
chosen. This deliberation is illustrated by AnnC’s report: 
I remember when I found the dress in the shop, I stood in it for a good hour looking at 
myself from every angle, wondering ‘is it the one?’ I remember people coming in and 
out of the shop and saying ‘are you still stood there?’ I thought ‘it’s got to be right’ 
(16AnnC03). 
 
AnnC’s response reflects a sense of uncertainty, yet also reverie; revelling in the other’s 
gaze and attention, while searching for a sense of reassurance and certainty. In 
Winnicottian terms this can be interpreted as being at the crucial juncture between the 
external object’s capacity to survive (critical judgement), and the gradual internalisation 
of the experience, as AnnC moves in phantasy from object relating to object usage. In 
contrast there are those brides who report their experience as if the dress was waiting for 
them, as for example Elizabeth reports:  
I knew straight away, just by feeling the dress, as soon as it touched my skin, I had to 
have it. I had the same feeling on the wedding day; it felt so right. I don’t know if that 
sounded silly [laughter]. It was like it was waiting for me [laughter] (07Elizabeth05). 
 
In Winnicottian terms, 07Elizabeth05’s statement can be interpreted in terms of an all-
powerful illusion of ‘the experience of omnipotence’ (Winnicott, 1965:180). Part of 
Winnicott’s thesis is that he asks us to accept, without question, the paradox which is 
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the illusion that the healthy infant ‘creates’ the object which ‘is in fact lying around 
waiting to be found’ (Winnicott, 1965:181). Winnicott emphasises that:  
a good object is no good (to the subject) unless created by the 
(subject)…out of need, yet the object must be found in order to be created 
(Winnicott, 1965:181), and to become cathected. (Winnicott, 1971:89) 
 
Winnicott emphasises that this paradox depends upon the mother’s capacity to create, 
through adaptation, a facilitating environment in which the object may be ‘found’, and 
is waiting to be omnipotently ‘created’ and used.  
 
The above interviewees’ reports regarding choosing their wedding dress can be 
interpreted as paralleling the Winnicottian infant’s illusory experience of ‘creating’ a 
‘transitional object’, since it is usually an inanimate object belonging in the world that 
becomes magically invested. At the stage of dependence upon the maternal environment 
and the mother, the process of choosing for oneself may be interpreted as a significant 
move towards independence. I have attempted to illustrate how both the Winnicottian 
infant’s mother, and the bride’s mother, through her ‘devotion’, facilitate their child’s 
illusory experience of independent choice.  
 
Winnicott suggests that one of the developmental processes, for the infant, which needs 
to be accomplished is the maturing interplay between different states of feeling, for 
example, being merged in, in union with, and finally being separate from, the mother. 
This maturing process, facilitated by the ‘transitional object’ also relies on the mother 
being experienced as ‘alive, real and not too persecutory’ (Winnicott, 1971:9). As 
established, through the use of a ‘transitional object’ the infant first maintains the 
illusion of remaining in a merged union with the mother and secondly uses the 
‘transitional object’ to symbolise the union of two separate beings (Winnicott, 1971:96). 
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As Winnicott claims, ‘the ‘transitional object’ is a symbol at the point in time and space 
of the initiation of their state of separateness’ (Winnicott, 1971:97, original emphasis). 
 
If it is accepted that for the infant the ‘transitional object’ ‘stands’ for the mother, the 
‘possession’ can be described as mitigating anxiety. However, when the ‘illusion’ of the 
mother appears to be unavailable, the ‘transitional object’ can be interpreted as not 
being totally sufficient to allay all depressive anxiety. One bride reports how significant 
the mother’s real presence was for her and in the mother’s absence there appears to be a 
sense of feeling uncontained. Lucy reports:  
My saddest memory was although my mum came to the Church she couldn’t get to the 
reception. That was the upsetting part, I missed her all the time [near to tears] 
(03Lucy21). 
 
In this statement Lucy appears to be experiencing a sense of anxiety and disappointment 
which seems to be dependent upon the literal proximity of her mother. In Winnicottian 
terms, Lucy seems to be undergoing the maturing interplay between being in union with 
and separateness from the mother during the process of transition. Lucy’s distress can 
be interpreted in terms of the quality of the internalised mother who may have been 
insufficiently ‘alive’ to allay Lucy’s degree of being ‘upset’ (03Lucy21).  
 
As mentioned above, for many brides their mother is an important figure on this 
significant occasion. During the mother’s absence, however, the bride’s feelings could 
be intensified if the feelings touch on early infant anxiety when the mother was 
unavailable. The quality of the internalised mother becomes dependent on the infant’s 
ability to adapt, but also on the good-enough mothers’ ability to be a source of 
confidence and not failure. Gradually, the bride displaces separation anxiety onto the 
dress used as a ‘transitional object’ and now the bride may be in a position to recognise 
the mother and all that she represents as separate. The bride’s use of her dress can be 
 312	  
interpreted as pivotal. The experience of separating from the mother may be 
counterbalanced with a longing to retain the feeling of union with the nurturing 
environment.  
 
In Winnicottian terms, the moment the bride disrobes, she relinquishes the comfort that 
the ‘transitional object’ affords which, until now, has kept her reassured. Disrobing 
becomes a visual enactment of separating from the transitional experience and from the 
maternal realm. One bride reports how she wished to remain in the ‘intermediate area of 
experiencing’, which can be interpreted as a defence against facing the reality of 
separation, as Elizabeth reports: 
As I stepped out of my wedding dress I didn’t want to take it off at all, I wanted this 
feeling to last forever, because I felt really good in it (07Elizabeth07). 
 
After the bride has disrobed she ceases to be endowed with bridal status. The bride 
seems to experience the strain of leaving behind the dress which has acted as an 
intermediary, modifying, containing object and all that it may symbolise. In instigating 
a separation from the family home the bride leaves behind the safety of the maternal 
environment in order to create an environment of her own with her partner.  
 
07Elizabeth07’s statement that she wished these ‘feelings to last forever’ can be 
interpreted in Winnicottian terms as three interrelated dynamics. First, as the 
appreciation and struggle towards emotional maturity of the properties of time 
(Winnicott, 1945b:149). Second, the ‘illusion of omnipotence’ resulting from the 
mother’s capacity for cumulative adaptation, where the infant enjoys the illusion of 
having ‘created the object’ through need, resulting in feeling all-powerful (Winnicott, 
1971:11-12). Third, in the interpsychic/intrapsychic dynamics of the subject’s journey 
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towards the capacity to symbolise and to distinguish the ‘me’ from the ‘not-me’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:3-4). 
 
Let us now consider the enduring value of the dress as a ‘transitional object’. Winnicott 
suggests that the infant’s ‘transitional object’ is never ‘forgotten, nor mourned, but loses 
its meaning…its fate is to be gradually decathected’ (Winnicott, 1971:5). On the one 
hand this argument seems to suggest a denial of separation. On the other hand Winnicott 
states: ‘the ‘transitional object’ does not ‘go inside’ nor ‘does the feeling about it 
necessarily undergo repression’ (Winnicott, 1971:5). Again, we return to the expression 
of an eternal feeling. In expressing the wish for a feeling to last forever suggests that 
there may be a need to acquire a perpetual insurance against both lack of affection and 
the dangers of helplessness or from loosing the maternal facilitator.  
 
My research reveals that many brides retain their wedding dress, that is, they seem 
unable to relinquish their ‘transitional object’. Let us now examine potential 
unconscious motivations as to why the bride’s attachment to her dress can be so 
significant. In Winnicottian terms, if the infant’s aggression is directed towards the 
mother, it is imperative that the mother does not retaliate but survives. During times of 
aggression the infant attempts to destroy the object and place it ‘out in the world’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:91). Alternatively, the infant learns to displace strong ambivalent 
emotions onto a ‘transitional object’. The infant seems to intuit that the ‘transitional 
object’ will forever offer ‘love’, never abandon nor retaliate. Winnicott emphasises that 
for the infant ‘the object goes on being important’ (Winnicott, 1971:4), and ‘must never 
change, unless changed’ by the subject (Winnicott, 1971:5). In other words, not only is 
the mother required not to retaliate, but also the ‘transitional object’, endowed with 
special qualities, is required to ‘continue’ being important. Winnicott suggests that the 
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‘transitional object’ ‘goes on being important even when it gets dirty and smelly and 
that by washing it may break the continuity in the infant’s experience and destroy its 
meaning and value’ (Winnicott, 1971:4). Winnicott suggests that despite a sense of 
having ‘destroyed’ (by aggression), the ‘object survives destruction by the subject’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:90) and the loved object goes on being. In the light of Winnicott’s 
thesis I will now interpret the bride’s experience of her wedding dress, after it has been 
worn. 
 
The bride’s dress may not appear to be overtly ‘hated’, however as the dress has been 
worn, torn or stained it can be interpreted as having been ‘destroyed’. Interestingly these 
qualities seem to have been expressed by Pam concerning her dress becoming dirty, as 
Pam states: 
It’s twenty-six years since I wore my wedding dress and I’ve still got it wrapped up with 
bits of cake stuck on it (09Pam06). 
 
Pam’s statement suggests that although the dress has been ‘used’ by being soiled and its 
radiant, pristine, perfect state is spoilt, the dress in this condition remains valued. It 
seems that in keeping the dress in a ‘destroyed’ state, the dress will never loose its 
endowed meaning. The bride, having now separated from being once merged in with 
the object, by the use of some ‘aggression’, but not having destroyed the object entirely, 
the object can continue to have value92.  
 
In the light of Winnicott’s theory concerning the actively adaptive good-enough 
mother’s continuing involvement in her daughter’s psychical processing of separation 
anxiety, one participant appears to express feelings of anxiety incurred during the final 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 This sentence is deliberately ambiguous, as the ‘object’ can refer equally to the dress or the mother. 
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process of separation from the symbol that represents the facilitating environment, as 
AnnC reports: 
My mum helped me get undressed, she boxed it up and put it away, so it wasn’t a heart-
wrenching moment (16AnnC07). 
 
AnnC’s statement can be interpreted that if an attentive mother assists her daughter in 
taking off her wedding dress, the anxiety of separation from both the mother and the 
‘transitional object’ may be reduced because of the mother’s presence. Within this 
statement, AnnC also seems to express a desire to secure for posterity a symbol of the 
rite of passage, the process of separation and the ‘good-enough mother’, to have control 
over, and thus to be able to keep the object-relating as an inner reality forever. In 
AnnC’s statement not only does the mother appear to continue to be actively adaptive 
towards her daughter’s stress, but also there seems to be a primary identification in the 
merging of both objects, that is, the real mother and the symbol of maternal experience. 
 
One ‘recent’ bride, however, states that on taking off her dress her immediate wish was 
to return it to its pristine, unaltered, idealised state and expresses the dress’s value in 
terms of continuity and being retained in perpetuity, as Sis states:  
It’s only a few weeks ago since I took it off. The dress has done its job and now its going 
to be dry-cleaned and put into storage. It’s always going to be there and I’ll never get 
rid of it (04Sis07). 
 
Sis’s statement that she wished her dress to be returned to its original phantasised 
unused state can be interpreted as a denial of separation. Sis reports, however, that the 
dress will not loose its meaning, nor be ‘forgotten’, but will continue to carry 
significance for its original wearer (04Sis07). Even though Winnicott suggests, the 
‘transitional object’ does not ‘go inside’, there appears to be expressed in Sis’s 
statement an unconscious attempt to restore, maintain, and keep safe a real external 
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symbol of the internalised ‘good-enough’ nurturing object both at the moment of 
separation but also as an enduring legacy. 
 
Interestingly some participants to this study indicate that their dress signifies an 
intergenerational ‘transitional object’ witnessed by and offered to the next generation, 
as the following selective statement by Freesia suggests: 
Its forty-six years since my wedding and I still have my dress, if my daughter had 
wanted to wear it she could have (15Freesia06). 
 
One interpretation can be that this statement was made out of frugality, but the question 
raised is what unconscious desires are present in this statement? The dress appears in 
this case not to have become ‘meaningless’ but has retained all of its original values. In 
Winnicottian terms, in the case of the bride who retains her dress, the dress may 
represent a sense of proof, a perpetual reality-testing, and mastery over the object and 
the environment. Another possible unconscious desire that 15Freesia06 may have had 
for thinking of offering her dress to her daughter, is that the dress stands for a symbolic 
(re)union with the mother. What seems significant is that Freesia’s saddest memory was 
of her absent mother: 
My saddest memory was that my mother couldn’t be there (15Freesia21). 
 
It can be seen from Freesia’s earlier statement that her dress could have been offered to 
her daughter (15Freesia06). This mother/daughter imago may equally refer to her own 
mother and herself as the daughter. Arguably the result of a degree of maternal failure, 
as reported by Freesia, can be one interpretation for the retention of the dress as a 
‘transitional object’ (15Freesia21). Freesia’s report that ‘It’s forty-six years since my 
wedding and I still have my dress’ (15Freesia06) can be interpreted that Freesia’s 
wedding dress continues to remain significant to her. Another interpretation can be 
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related to the psychic management of separation, the loss of the maternal environment 
and the reassuring qualities that a ‘transitional object’ can offer, as, for example AnnC 
reports: 
My dress symbolises my wedding day and everything that it stood for (16AnnC22). 
 
Arguably, in retaining the wedding dress in perpetuity there is also a sense of triumph. 
Triumph over the anxiety of separation and being dependent upon the parental 
environment, can be interpreted as a triumphant step towards relative independence. 
There may be, however, triumphant elation over separation but there is also loss and 
mourning. 
 
The dress, seen as a ‘transitional object’, has been used by the bride during her 
transformation from daughter status, through a spiritual, mysterious ritual, to the status 
of wife. As Debbie stepped out of her wedding dress she reports: 
I felt sad when I took my dress off because it reminds me of what a lovely day it was and 
how happy we are and the commitment we made to each other (06Debbie07). 
 
Debbie’s statement can be interpreted in terms of the ambivalent feelings that run 
concurrently. Debbie’s language moves from the past tense to the present, then alludes 
to the future. Debbie first speaks of the ‘I’, then of the ‘we’ (06Debbie07). During this 
process of transition arguably there are many ambitions mixed with uncertainties. It 
seems that the bride’s use of her dress has enabled her to facilitate a variety of 
transforming objectives. The bride moves from unmarried to married status; tolerating 
feelings of disappointment and the ability and maturity to achieve her desire. The bride 
can now conceive of the possibility of becoming a mother and have the capacity to face 
an uncertain future with the demands of conjugal life. Other brides’ statements allude to 
an acknowledgement of sadness, mourning for the loss of daughter status, having 
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experienced pleasurable self-gratifying, narcissistic feelings of being the centre of 
attention, of feeling beautiful and facing reality. Immediate happiness of the certainty of 
ritual can give way to a fear of uncertainty in the future commitment to a new 
affectionate object-relationship. As the bride disrobes, repudiation of dependency on the 
facilitating environment becomes symbolically complete, and in Winnicott’s terms the 
bride mourns ‘the end of being merged in with the object’ (Winnicott, 1971:107). 
Mourning is part of the brides’ experience, however, there can also be a sense of 
triumph.  
 
McDougall suggests that there is a need to ‘triumph over internal persecutions: terror of 
the phallic mother, or a belief that there was no right to separate from her; fear of 
becoming confused with the mother and thus loosing a sense of identity’ (McDougall, 
1995:211). Pam triumphantly stakes her claim, over her powerful mother-in-law’s claim 
to her son, as Pam asserts her new position as wife:  
 
I’ve been and got her son (09Pam07). 
 
Pam’s sense of triumph, if interpreted in Freudian terms, can be understood as displaced 
Oedipal rivalry, with her own mother over her own father. Pam’s triumph can also be 
understood as a defence against the experience of mourning, and perhaps mourning for 
the loss of her own mother, as experiencing sadness facilitates separation. Interpreted in 
Winnicottian terms, Pam can be seen as moving from object relating, that being the 
internalisation of the experience of the object having psychically survived, to object 
usage. 
 
In returning to the main theme, let us now consider how the process of separation has 
been managed in relation to the ‘transitional object’. Evidence from the theory and the 
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bride’s statements appears to indicate that there is no final resolution to the process of 
mourning and feelings associated with separation anxiety. Arguably, therefore, the way 
in which separation anxiety can be managed can be interpreted in three ways: first, by 
denial; second, by displacement; third, the use of a new animate object. Let us consider 
these three aspects in closer detail. 
 
First, could the retaining of the bride’s dress be a denial of separation? During the 
impossibility of separation, it can be argued that the bride’s retention of her wedding 
dress, in Winnicottian terms, offers a gradual ‘separating-out of the world of objects 
from the self [which] is achieved only through the absence of a space between’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:108). In other words, the dress fills the space between the mother and 
the self, during the movement of ‘separating-out the not-me from the me’ (Winnicott, 
1971:109). Winnicott claims that ‘separation is avoided with the use of symbols’ 
(Winnicott, 1971:109). That is to say, the dress signifies a valuable living cultural 
experience which links past, present and future which becomes located in time and 
space. Winnicott suggests that ‘there can be no separation, only a threat of separation’ 
and this threat is ‘maximally or minimally traumatic according to the experience of the 
first separatings’ (Winnicott, 1971:108). Second, if separation anxiety is displaced onto 
a significant socially and culturally pre-invested external inanimate object, such as the 
wedding dress, ring or photograph album, then the object, if seen as a ‘transitional 
object’, may be understood as a benign mechanism in the subject’s attempt to retrieve or 
maintain a psychic connection with the lost object, while also maintaining a level of 
autonomy. Third, if separation anxiety is displaced onto an external inanimate object, 
the object may be a forerunner in facilitating further displacement onto a whole loved 
object. As Freud claims, the distress experienced during the process of separation may 
be alleviated by a ‘displacement onto a new object’ (SE14:252-3). In Winnicott’s terms 
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the subject moves from predominantly a subjective position to a more objective 
experience and from ‘relative dependence’ to relative autonomy (Winnicott, 1971:139). 
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that, in the Western economy, during sacred rites of 
human passage, predominant occasions when white apparel can be considered as being 
used as a ‘transitional object’, that is having attributes of the maternal environment, 
white clothes can be interpreted as contributing to allaying separation anxiety. As 
established in Part One, other significant transformational apparel are the infant’s 
christening robe, the girl’s confirmation or first communion dress, the bride’s dress, and 
at death when the body becomes wrapped in white in readiness for returning to ‘mother 
earth’. As we have heard, the bride’s dress can be kept for the next generation to be 
worn in the same manner as originally envisaged, or transformed into a christening 
gown or funeral shroud. On each significant occasion, although the apparel is only worn 
once, generally the item of clothing cannot be given away. The wearer may keep the 
clothes after the ceremony, however, paradoxically the apparel, if seen as a ‘not-me’ 
object, does not belong to them rather it belongs to the ceremony.  
 
Other occasions when clothes can be considered as being endowed with transitional 
qualities may include the graduation gown and the wearing of uniforms, which visually 
signify validity and the attainment of status and offer social cohesion. On each 
transitional occasion the wearing of significant apparel facilitates separation from the 
former status and alleviates anxieties associated with moving into the new status. 
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4.9 Summary of Part Four 
In investigating the literature Freud suggests that religious ceremony is based on 
obsessive actions which defend against unconscious guilt, prohibitions and danger. In 
Part One we discovered that the bride becomes symbolically sacred for the group. In 
Part Three we discover that Freud argues that the daughter may have unconscious 
incestuous desires for the father, thus setting up the tension between desire and 
prohibition. Therefore it can be argued the words and actions of the marriage ceremony 
defend against the bride’s guilt associated with the danger of unconscious incestuous 
desires which are prohibited.  
 
In Part Four we investigate a range of brides’ individual experience of the marriage 
ceremony in Oedipal terms. We see how if the mother is attentive then AnnC’s 
experience is not ‘heart-wrenching’, if the mother is ‘flappy’ so is Rose, if the mother is 
absent Freesia felt let down and not held, or for Ann the mother can become a 
wonderful role model. However containing the mother’s nurturing environment may be 
experienced, the mother can be experienced as relatively passive, and the bride may feel 
that the mother is at risk of being eclipsed leaving Ann feeling guilty for leaving her 
mother for another. Whereas the mother may represent regression, in contrast the father 
may represent independence if the father is not abusive. 
 
In Part Three we learn that the Oedipal father dominates the group (Freud). In Part Four 
we discover by investigating the bride’s experience that often the most vivid memory of 
the wedding day is associated with the father. Pam experienced pressure to please her 
father thus avoiding feelings of guilt. Patricia’s father was experienced as affectionate, 
Freesia’s father initially opposed her marriage. AnnC experienced a very close 
connection with the father indicating unconscious incestuous desires. Ultimately, as 
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Margaret recognises the mother belongs to the father, thus the daughter mourns the loss 
of the primary carers, and by way of compensation seeks the love of another.  
 
Thus the bride submits to being dressed up, gift-wrapped (Rose) and ‘given-away’. On 
one hand the bride may desire to be ‘given-away’, but unconscious incestuous desire 
and separation anxiety exert their forces. While being ‘given-away’ may assist in the 
bride relinquishing desires for the parents, psychoanalysis indicates that identification 
with the parents needs to be transformed as internalisation leads to an emancipation 
from old objects, freeing the subject for new relations. 
 
As the bride draws close to the Church a state of heightened anxiety may lead to signs 
of regression. The bride appears immaculately dressed in white, appearing like a virgin 
as explored in Part One. The bride presents herself veiled, as explored in Part One 
where pre-Oedipal boundaries blur (Rose), feel containing (Francis), or which feel 
trapped between masculine and feminine, active and passive aims (Ann). The bride on 
being ‘given-away’ requires the maturity to mourn the loss of familial ties. Whereas 
some brides felt this process as supportive (Sue), for others there was a sense of denial 
(Rose), that it was rather final (Francis), or that it was experienced as both a happy and 
sad occasion (Louise). 
 
Pivotal to the marriage ceremony are two acts, enunciating the vows and signing the 
register. Being unused to public speaking and more significantly to swearing a vow, 
saying their vows many brides found it a vivid (Debbie) and memorable experience, one 
full of gravity (Rose). Whereas some brides experienced signing the register in a rather 
matter of fact way (Patricia), some found it overwhelming (Elizabeth), and others 
understood it as a transforming process from daughter to Mrs. (Louise). Thus, as 
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explored in Part One, the process of repudiating parental authority and the 
transformation of instinct to become a mother are complete, or are they? Some brides 
expressed their wish to change their surname (Freesia), but Debbie felt sad at losing her 
father’s surname, while Louise felt that she now belonged to another, but Liz didn’t 
change her surname, indicating an unconsciously strong attachment to the father. Thus 
the triangular Oedipal structure undergoes a metamorphosis, there is now the bridal 
couple, in relation to the bride’s mother and father and the groom’s mother and father. 
 
Although the bride may enter the ceremony voluntarily, driven by ego ideals and 
idealisation as explored in Part One, and repudiating familial authority in an endeavour 
to find liberation and emancipation, monogamous heterosexual union can be 
experienced as a compromise as Chodorow suggests. While Pam seemed to prize her 
husband away from his mother, in Pam’s anal-sadistic greedy demand for possession 
and emancipation from her own father’s the strong hold over her. Rose in experiencing 
disappointment with her parents, seeks compensation through idealising happiness with 
her husband. Threatened with the loss of love, Liz and Francis secure their husbands. In 
conclusion, this process, composed of separation from parents and securing a new 
relationship can be understood as a compulsion to repeat the Oedipal struggles of 
infancy. 
 
Another way of understanding the brides experience is through the use of the dress. As 
already explored in Part One, the bride may use the dress in exhibitionist terms to attract 
attention as a compensation for castration. The dress, worn at the time when the bride is 
in transition, being made of tactile material may evoke memories of the infants comfort 
blanket, a desexualised tactile item which Winnicott argues facilitates infant separation 
and survival from the threatened loss of the physical mother and the nurturing 
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environment. Thus it is argued in Part Four that the bride’s dress represents a 
transitional object operating in an intermediate area of experiencing, between an 
attachment to the mother and the detachment from the mother. Thus the dress allays the 
bride’s separation anxiety during this process of uncertainty. 
 
We discover that some mothers did not help to choose the dress nor cloth the bride 
(Debbie), some mothers helped organise the dress (Ann), while some mothers seemed 
preoccupied (Ros). Thus mothers could be experienced as either devoted, and ‘good-
enough’, or preoccupied in a similar manner to the infant’s experience. 
 
After the ceremony, exciting to discover, is the bride’s retention of the wedding dress. 
Elizabeth steps out of her dress reluctantly because she wants the experience to last 
forever. Pam reports that she still has her wedding dress with it’s wedding-day marks. 
AnnC felt that her mother’s presence helped her not to feel that stepping out of her dress 
was heart-wrenching. Sis wished to retain a spotless dress in perpetuity which can 
indicate an unconscious denial of separation. Freesia thought that her dress may become 
intergenerational. Thus whether the dress became a triumphant symbol over separation, 
retaining the dress can be seen as a perpetual defence against mourning. In conclusion, 
although the ‘transitional object’ allays separation anxiety from the maternal 
environment, the dress cannot be given away because it belongs to the ceremony and 
represents the mother in perpetuity. 
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PART FIVE 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section I draw on Parts One to Four seeking conclusions to the dominant themes 
that emerged during this research, which illuminate the bride-in-white’s subjective 
experience of marrying in an Anglican Church. Let us reflect for a moment on two 
participants’ recollections, as key to psychoanalytic interpretation is the link between 
childhood memory and adult experience. 
 
As Sis reflected on the moment that she was fully dressed in white on her wedding day 
she linked this with feeling ‘really special’. Sis acknowledged that to describe this 
feeling precisely was difficult, but suggested that it was encapsulated in something that 
she ‘as a little girl had dreamt of’, that of ‘getting married in white’, yet fearing ‘it 
might never happen’. Thus there appears in Sis’s statement doubt that her childhood 
desire would ever come to fruition. In contrast, there seems assurance for Ros when she 
stated that ‘there’s something romantic about wearing a white dress. It was what I 
dreamt of as little girl’. Ros added, ‘I remember as a child playing at weddings then 
playing mothers and fathers’. 
 
These adult recollections of childhood experience demonstrate that from an early age 
the girl’s memory appears to contain dreams, some of which required enactment. It also 
appears that the child grows to understand that both she and her objects are important in 
a special manner. It is not easy to interpret accurately how a young girl perceives the 
significance of her dream or the enactment in her mind, and in relationship with others 
while dreaming or playing ‘mothers and fathers’. It could be suggested, however, that 
these dreams and enactments, drawn from fairy-tales or images from actual experience, 
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form a mental sequence of events. But why do they become part of a girl’s childhood 
experience? The psychoanalyst might conclude that as a child they are attempting to 
‘make sense’ of their lives.  
 
Similarly, this project has asked, how can we make sense of the subjective experience 
of the bride-in-white? To answer this question I approached this study by taking an 
historical, religious and psychoanalytical stance. The psychoanalytic aspect being based 
on Freudian and post-Freudian theory. That is, being conversant with the development 
from infancy to adulthood, including relationships with the mother and the father, with 
particular emphasis on examining the reported personal experience, by utilising a 
number of significant psychoanalytic concepts. I am aware that this Freudian position 
will have influenced the outcome and particularly the mode of language. It can be 
concluded that if a different group of psychoanalytic texts, such as expounded by Jung 
or Lacan, then there is a possibility that the findings may have been framed differently. 
 
In Part One, the literature relevant to the bride-in-white’s experience points towards the 
historic and contemporary importance of female virginity. It can be concluded that as 
for the Virgin Mary of Biblical origin, King Henry VIII’s search for a son, and for the 
contemporary bride, the bride’s virginity ensures that the progeny becomes the heir to 
the father’s title. It can be concluded that as in historical times, the bride-in-white being, 
or appearing to be a virgin, satisfies the group’s need for a legitimate heir. 
 
In Part One I explored how the phenomenon of the bride-in-white emerged by 
investigating a range of historical, religious and social themes concerning the wearing 
of white clothes throughout the life cycle, the ethical nature of purity and the physical 
status of virginity, within a Christian context. Historically, religiously, and socially the 
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wedding ceremony concerns the bride who attends Church in order to receive God’s 
blessing on her union, and where the group share in her joy. It can be concluded that the 
Church offers an ideal environment in which to perform a privately experienced rite of 
passage linked to a public ritual where the wearing of white clothes, and the quality of 
female purity, internalised since Biblical times, indicates that these dynamics are both 
conscious and unconscious.  
 
In Part One, Mary Douglas argued that abiding by the Biblical ‘Laws of Holiness’, 
where the sacred is separated from the profane, the moral from the immoral, the subject 
can feel ‘complete’ as they conform. Douglas also suggested that in a ritualised sacred 
form of community worship, conformity acts by bringing about social integration and 
can be marked by a sense of ‘completeness’. Evident in one bride’s response is ‘being 
the centre of attention, getting married and having a wonderful day all centred around 
us, makes us complete’. It could be concluded that conforming to these requirements 
psychodynamically brought both a sense of completeness not only to herself, but also to 
the Church, the group and her husband. It may also be concluded, if the opposite were 
true, that if there were less pressure to conform to Christian, social or familial, ethical 
laws, then there may be less desire to wear a white wedding dress or be married in 
Church. 
 
Part Two offered the opportunity to study the methodology that I would apply, the form 
my research might take and what may constitute a satisfactory result. My research 
established that qualitative research into personal feelings and experience builds 
hypotheses on an accumulation of supporting interpretations. After examining the 
interviews I concluded that there could be some common psychodynamic themes, but 
that these need not be the only ones which aid later interpretation. I concluded that the 
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limitations of this study include sample size, participant selection bias, questionnaire 
formulation, the personal experience of only seventeen European white British brides 
who married during the second half of the twentieth century, and the academic limits set 
on this project. As this study was grounded in the participants’ statements I also 
concluded that their views are not necessarily representative of all brides-in-white who 
marry in Church. Investigating brides of other ethnic origins and class may be explored 
during further research. 
 
In Part Two, having investigated different research approaches that would facilitate 
‘truth’ and knowledge production, including discussing ontology, epistemology, 
methodology and method, it was concluded that grounded theory would best suit the 
investigation of human experience from a limited group of participants. Previously I 
had attempted a pilot conversation interview and reflected on how this could be 
analysed. Having addressed ethical issues of anonymity by using pseudonyms and 
gaining signed consent, the recorded interviews transcribed provided the data. Despite 
my initial fear of data overload but reassurance that the semi-structured questionnaire 
would facilitate data comparison, I gradually began to trust the process.  
 
Having immersed myself in the data and allowed the data to speak for itself, gradually I 
began to conclude that grounded theory methodology could be trusted to produce 
themes. The collected data was examined from different angles and at different times 
during the research process with the aid of the hermeneutic circle of enquiry. In 
Appendix D a detailed analysis using six interviews, three from each group of ‘recent’ 
and ‘older’ brides enabled a variety of themes to emerge. Gradually, trying not to be 
influenced by earlier speculation in Part One as to possible themes, from the data 
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predominant themes emerged, which both confirmed earlier speculation but was now 
rooted in how the participants spoke. 
 
In Part Three, central to Freudian theory, Oedipal conflicts with the mother and the 
father were explored. This offered the opportunity to examine the psychoanalytic model 
of the infant girl’s development towards the attainment of female genitality. My 
research established that the infant girl’s pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother becomes 
the decisive factor upon which all other relationships are built. The infant girl, after a 
period of idealisation of the mother, later identifies with the mother, the possessor of the 
father. It could be concluded that if the mother is unavailable to provide either infant 
idealisation or identification, then the daughter could be deprived of a role model and 
may therefore not become a bride-in-white.  
 Part One established that Freud considered marriage between a man and a woman to be 
the basic building block upon which civilisation is founded, and as the Church 
promotes, for the procreation of children within a stable family unit in which to have 
legitimate sexual relations. As explored in Part Three, the infant experiences both pre-
Oedipal female symbiotic attachment and Oedipal male desire, and through processes of 
identification and idealisation becomes gendered and heterosexual. It can be concluded 
that, although children may be brought up in a homosexual or single-parent unit, there 
may be an imbalance in psychological development.  
 
Having explored in Part One the wearing of white clothes during a rite of passage, in 
Part Three I also investigated psychoanalytically how it can be understood that women 
use clothes to allay castration anxiety. This was linked in Part Four to the bride’s 
statements and the prospect that the wedding dress can be interpreted, in Winnicottian 
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terms, as a ‘transitional object’, allaying separation anxiety from the maternal 
environment. It can be concluded that the ‘classical’ white wedding dress can represent 
something timeless, and fixed by the occasion. 
 
In the light of Freud’s argument in Part Three, that humans are born innately bisexual, 
polymorphously perverse, and the daughter has unconscious incestuous desire towards 
the father, we can conclude, with Chodorow, that a monogamous heterosexual union is 
a ‘compromise formation’ reflecting society’s values and psychological taboos. We can 
conclude that if the innate dispositions, and sexuality remain unrestrained, then 
boundaries of human sexuality would be undefined, therefore the ‘compromise’ leads to 
social cohesion but becomes the tension. That original innateness is brought under 
restraint by religious, societal and familial laws of exogamy and consanguinity. 
 
From the research in Part Four, it can concluded that if the father becomes absent during 
the infant girl’s psychological development, or there is no father figure upon whom to 
project her unconscious incestuous desire, then there may be no reciprocal paternal 
prohibition experienced by the infant girl. The daughter’s unconscious incestuous desire 
may therefore never be fully displaced. This conclusion draws into sharp focus the 
importance of the father’s role in the infant girl’s, and later the bride’s unconscious 
dynamic between desire and restraint. As explored in Part Three, developmentally, the 
daughter’s unconscious incestuous desire towards the father becomes restrained by the 
mother who possesses the father, and upon the father by the incest prohibition. The 
quality of the infant girl’s desire and relationship with the father when restrained 
becomes transformed into a socially acceptable desire displaced onto a non-incestuous 
other. It can be concluded that the father’s responsibility appears to be to restrain the 
infant girl’s desire for instant gratification.  
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Following the investigation in Part One, the literature linked the value of virginity and 
sexual purity with the wearing of white. This led me in Part Four to consider, through 
the bride’s own experience, the continued restraints that are involved in maintaining a 
state of purity until the daughter becomes a bride-in-white. Further, that on the bride’s 
arrival at Church as she ‘peers’ through her veil and reciprocally observed by the group, 
this psychodynamically sets up a tension between desire and restraint. To favour 
delayed gratification and to be socially unimpeachable is illustrated, in Part One, by the 
sixteen-year old Queen Victoria’s insistence that ‘she could never marry a man who had 
loved another woman’. It can be concluded that brides since Queen Victoria’s wedding, 
consciously or unconsciously, have identified with her, wishing to become ‘a princess 
for a day’, thus the phenomenon of the bride-in-white has become socially installed.  
 
In Part Four, this research established, through the examination of the bride’s responses, 
that within her conscious desire to marry, there are a number of both conscious and 
unconscious tensions. I conclude that there appears to be no such thing as a ‘normal’ 
pattern of behaviour, as there are many equally valid experiences. I will now discuss 
how the overarching psychoanalytic themes that were tentatively introduced in Part 
One, established in Appendix D, and used during this project can now be understood 
differently. 
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5.2 The ego ideal: purity, perfection and faultlessness in practice  
Research in Part One indicated that the bride-in-white epitomises the physical virgin, 
where the hymen remains intact, that is the unconscious phantasy of the ideal state. 
Although a question was not asked, as to the bride’s physical state, some participants 
nevertheless referred to it. Research into the participant’s statements revealed that 
virtually equal numbers in both the ‘recent’ and ‘older’ group of brides fell into the 
categories of being virgins and not virgins on their wedding day. Of the brides who 
stated that they were virgins one bride said that it was because of ‘parental pressure’, 
while another reported that it was because of ‘strongly held Christian beliefs’, thus 
indicating the internalisation of Oedipal parental prohibition. Of the brides who stated 
that they were not virgins, one bride recognised that ideally she should have been a 
‘virgin bride’ in order to wear white and be married in Church, while another bride 
seemed unconcerned that she was not a ‘virginal pure bride’. There was a second 
category; one bride revealed that she was not a virgin but had ‘tried to stay a virgin’ and 
so felt that because of her intention, she considered herself to be one. While another 
bride was ‘urged by her husband to wear white because he felt that she was pure’. From 
the statements of those brides who were not virgins, it could be concluded that there 
seems to be a need to appear pure, like a virgin, even if this was not a physical reality. 
While some participants indicated that wearing a white dress was a sign of purity, they 
did not suggest necessarily that it was a sign of a physical purity. It could be concluded, 
therefore, there is an indication that many brides see their wedding in idealised terms, 
that is, in terms of a narcissistic ego-ideal. 
 
In Part One and Four, evidence indicated that the bride-in-white, in appearing perfect or 
sacred at Church, desires, from both the group and God, to be found to be acceptable. 
Some brides considered it was important to be married in Church because they felt that 
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‘Churches are powerful places’, where the bride ‘receives God’s blessing’, as ‘the eyes 
of God’ are upon them, and it ‘felt that you were properly married’, thus ideal to God. 
Some brides stated that they were particularly concerned that their husband-to-be found 
them beautiful. It could be concluded, therefore, that the bride-in-white, if not found 
perfectly acceptable, may fear feelings of shame, loss of love and rejection from the 
group.  
 
5.3 Wearing wedding white as an ideal 
The desire for narcissistic perfection is illustrated by the fact that all the brides in this 
study chose to wear a white dress [Figure 5]. Some brides felt that they were subject to 
the ideal of restraint from having children before they married, indicating that they had 
the capacity to postpone sexual gratification, which could have been due to a fear of the 
loss of parental love and the collective ideal. Other brides considered that they could 
wear a white dress after having had children. Both of these positions were evidenced in 
both ‘recent’ and ‘older’ brides’ statements. A conclusion may therefore be drawn, from 
this group of participants, that an imperative becomes the striving for perfection even 
though it can never be achieved, therefore, to wear a white dress serves the ego-ideal. 
Wearing a white dress also, psychodynamically, symbolises the bride’s desire to appear 
to the group as faultless. 
 
In Part Two, I established that in over two decades twenty-nine per cent of all brides 
married in Church. This research does not address the other brides who did not wear a 
white dress, as this would entail a separate project. It is possible to conclude that for 
many brides marrying in Church the outward sign of wearing a white wedding dress 
becomes important, as it has become socially inscribed. In Part Four the reasons that the 
participants to this project gave for wearing wedding white seem to fall into four 
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sections. First, the wearing of wedding white seems to be for ‘traditional’ reasons. This 
seems to emanate from a social pressure, thus indicating an internalised social and 
collective ideal influenced by the super-ego. Second, the wearing of wedding white 
seems to be associated with exhibitionist needs, thus psychodynamically indicating the 
development of genitality with the intersubjective interplay with the other. Third, the 
wearing of wedding white could be understood as a symbol of purity and virginity, thus 
indicating that the bride may be driven by the desire of a primary ideal. Fourth, even 
though sexual intercourse had been admitted, there still seemed to be a need to appear 
pure. Thus for some brides there seemed to be no fear of castration associated with the 
super-ego. It could be concluded, therefore, that the bride who wears wedding white is 
subject to her ego ideal and that psychodynamically as the white wedding dress is 
socially inscribed, this indicates a social dynamic emanating from parents, relatives, 
friends and Church. 
 
5.4 On being the centre of attention: exhibitionism 
Whilst it was tentatively suggested in Part One, and established in Part Two, that the 
woman has a level of exhibitionism, that is, to enjoy being the ‘centre of attention’, 
there was little evidence in the bride’s statements to suggest that the participants had an 
overwhelming narcissistic need to feel real by being looked at. When the bride, fully 
adorned in white, is seen at Church by the group it can be concluded that the bride 
evokes a strong reaction from the onlooker as a defence against her unconscious 
phantasy of lack, or a ‘defence against the fear of loss of identity’, and that by wearing 
wedding white satisfies narcissistic needs. 
 
In Part Three by discussing the girl’s psychological development, the girl’s need to be 
seen, the girl’s special relationship with the father, and the girl’s relationship to clothes, 
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it can be concluded that collectively they point towards Freud’s theory of female 
castration. The infant girl may identify with the passive mother, and may envy the 
mother’s relationship with the father in the primal scene. The infant girl may envy the 
father’s phallic active power, and may, because of unconscious incestuous desire or 
wish to give the father a baby. The girl may use clothes as a narcissistic defence, 
drawing the gaze onto her whole body, thus avoiding feelings of castration. The bride 
may use her white wedding dress to attract the maximum pleasure and attention from 
being looked at by the whole group, thus evoking the gaze as a compensation for a 
sense of castration. We may conclude that legitimate female exhibitionism, as Rycroft 
suggests, compensates for female penis envy and castration. 
 
5.5 Striking out to form a new union: repudiation 
In Part Three, it was established that during psychological development the infant girl 
undertakes a series of repudiations, including detaching from the pre-Oedipal mother 
due to a series of disappointments, and her emotional tie with the father due to the incest 
prohibition. Thus the girl oscillates between identifying with the mother, then with the 
father, returning again to the mother, in the girl’s struggle to find a sense of femininity. 
This developmental process culminates in the repudiation of parental authority in the 
course of emancipation, which in turn facilitates separation, thus freeing the girl to 
make a non-incestuous object-choice.  
 
Poignant throughout the interviewing process was the quality of emotional expression 
in connection with the severing of familial ties. Strikingly, many brides shed tears as 
they recalled either their recent or distant wedding-day experiences in relation to 
‘leaving’ their parents. The sadness which they expressed, concerned both fathers and 
mothers. In Part Four I established that for a number of brides it was important for them 
 336	  
to know that they received their father’s blessing before moving to the next stage in 
their lives. There were a number of brides who reported deep disappointment 
concerning their mothers who seemed to them to be pre-occupied. In conclusion, 
repudiation could be understood psychodynamically as a two-way process. On the one 
hand there is the bride’s desire to repudiate parental ties in order to achieve a new 
union, while on the other, the parents are required to facilitate her repudiation by 
relinquishing their ties over their daughter. It could also be concluded that during the 
bride’s process of repudiation, if the parent is not available to be repudiated, this 
process could remain unfinished. The brides who did not have their mother at their 
wedding seem to have expressed a sense of numbness. 
 
5.6 The transformation into ‘passive aims’ 
The fourth theme introduced in Part One and established in Part Two was that of the 
transformation of instinct. Research in Part Three indicates that the attainment of female 
genitality is partly accomplished when the instincts are transformed by libidinal desire. 
In Freudian terms, when the girl acquiesces to specifically feminine ‘passive aims’, can 
be an indication of the attainment of femininity.  
 
Part Four, drawing on the work in Part Three, indicated that visually, the process of 
transformation of instinct into ‘passive aims’ can be illustrated by the veiled bride being 
escorted into Church, being ‘given away’, by being the ‘centre of attention’ and also the 
recipient of the group’s gaze. In conclusion, therefore, transformation into ‘passive 
aims’ needs to be of benefit to the bride, in order for her to desire to achieve this 
change. In psychoanalytic terms the main benefit would be to transform her ‘envy for 
the penis’ into a wish to become a mother to a baby, and dependence upon ‘being 
loved’.  
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5.7 The ‘transitional object’: an aide-mémoire and the use of illusion 
In my research into Winnicottian theory, in Part Four, I concluded that there is an 
indication for the need to use illusion. I have argued that the bride’s dress can function 
as an equivalent to the ‘transitional object’ of infancy. In Part Four I established that 
after being carefully chosen, majestically worn and observed by the group, the bride’s 
wedding dress, as evidenced by some participants’ reports, after having been taken off, 
is often preserved in its used state. The dress, while being worn, becomes a sign both to 
the wearer and the group that this woman is a bride. The dress offers both subjective 
and objective proof of the reality that the wearer appears to be psychologically 
transformed from daughter, through a sacred rite of passage, and endowed with the new 
status of wife. The dress, like other ‘transitional objects’ such as the wedding rings 
[Figure 11], photograph album and marriage certificate, becomes a constant means of 
reality-testing and reality-acceptance of the woman’s new status. In conclusion, 
physical proof seems to be required in the face of disbelief and as the memory recedes, 
thus drawing reassurance from the ‘transitional object’ that the transforming event was 
not an illusion. So although the dress may never be worn again, just knowing that it 
exists seems to allay uncertainty and anxiety during the extended period of gradual 
transition from illusion towards reality. Let us now summarise these four overarching 
themes differently. 
 
In summary, from a psychoanalytic perspective, the bride-in-white’s experience appears 
to involve four elements. First, being driven by the ego ideal in search of narcissistic 
perfection and a return to the ideal state. That is, in topographical terms, being 
‘dominated by the super-ego’, and in economic terms having the capacity to ‘postpone 
immediate libidinal satisfaction’. Second, being driven by the desire for a degree of 
exhibitionism and a need to be seen to be acceptable. That is, in economic terms 
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‘regulated by the pleasure-unpleasure principle’, and in topographical terms being 
‘modified by the influence of the external world’. Third, having the desire and capacity 
to repudiate parental authority in order to form a new union. That is, in dynamic terms, 
coming under the influence of Eros, ‘which strives for an ever closer union’. And 
fourth, desiring the transformation of aggressive instinct into ‘passive aims’. That is, in 
dynamic terms, the capacity to modify aggression, and in economic terms transforming 
unconscious free energy into preconscious bound energy, and in topographical terms the 
modification of ‘id’ instincts.  
 
These four overarching concepts can be understood in libidinal developmental terms. 
Under the influence of the ego ideal the bride regresses to the earliest wish for an ideal 
state, through narcissism to exhibitionism, and towards autonomy through the 
repudiation of parental authority, and the wish to be transformed into a wife with a non-
incestuous object-love. The bride-in-white appears to have been compelled, consciously 
or unconsciously, to take into account the social structure which prohibits incest and 
regulates libidinal investment in an non-incestuous object choice.  
 
In Part Four, having established that key to psychoanalytic investigation into how we 
develop, experience emotions, others, and gender through the reconstruction of the felt 
past in the present, selected statements were examined. Themes under scrutiny included 
interpreting the ceremony in Oedipal terms, that is of repudiating the mother’s love, 
acknowledging unconscious incestuous desire held under restraint, taking a sacred walk 
with father, and the bride’s desire to leave familial authority and become a wife with a 
non-incestuous other and a mother. Having explored these themes we can conclude that 
psychoanalysis and the four overarching themes of ego ideal and idealisation, 
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exhibitionism, repudiation and transformation, illuminate the bride-in-white’s 
subjective experience. 
 
Although it can be concluded that the above four overarching themes dominate the 
illumination of the bride-in-white’s experience, Appendix E offers a space to explore in 
an unstructured way psychoanalytic interpretations on five bride’s whole interviews, 
and offers a creative space for the reader to reflect and make their own interpretation. 
While Sue’s experience was mixed with deep sadness over the recent death of her 
father, Rose seemed to idealise the whole experience perhaps as a defence against the 
reality of leaving home. Francis on the other hand seemed to look for a warmth that had 
not been found at home, while Freesia ‘struggled’ to leave the familial home. We can 
conclude that Liz, who was already in a relationship and had a baby son needed to 
appear a virgin and marry in white and in Church in order to legitimise her union and 
her heir within the familial group. We can conclude that the familial group’s presence 
becomes paramount to the bride-in-white’s experience [Figure 12]. We can see the 
importance of the familial group’s support in [Figure 4] depicting Queen Victoria’s 
wedding and the frontispiece ‘throwing confetti’ image. Thus I have set out to discover 
a link between the phenomenon of the bride-in-white and hitherto conceptually 
unconnected psychoanalytic concepts and themes. 
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Figure 12  -  The group blesses the new union. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE BRIDE’S VOICE 
An investigation into the feelings of the bride-in-white 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
I understand, Gavin Williams’s research into ‘The Bride’s Voice: an investigation into 
the feelings of the bride-in-white’ will be submitted to the Goldsmiths College, London 
University, as part of his PhD thesis. This work may also be published in specialist 
journals and used in conference presentations. In all reports, the identities of the brides 
interviewed will remain confidential and anonymous: brides will be allowed to choose a 
pseudonym (a false name which I can use to refer to you in my reports) for themselves 
for use in research reports. 
 
I agree to take part in an interview for this study and consent to a tape recorder being 
used. I understand, I may be asked to take part in further interviews in the future, but 
that I have the right to refuse. In addition, I am free to withdraw as a participant of this 
research project at any time. 
 
I am aware, I will be given the transcripts and analysis of any interviews I take part in, 
and I will be free to make changes if I wish to do so. I agree to allow quotes from 
transcripts to be used in Gavin Williams’s PhD thesis, journal articles, other 
publications and conference presentations. 
 
 
Chosen Pseudonym . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
 
Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (participant)      Date. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
 
Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (researcher)       Date. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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APPENDIX B 
The Bride’s Voice: investigation into the feelings of the Bride-In-White 
Research by Gavin Williams, as part of his PhD thesis. 
 
Bridal Questionnaire   Pseudonym ……………..…………. 
Date Int’viewd…………………….  Wedding Date……………..………. 
Bride’s age on her wedding day …..  Wedding location …………………. 
 
Being a Bride dressed in white, and marrying in an Anglican Church, on your wedding 
day, is arguably a very emotional time. It is the memory of these emotions I would like 
to explore with you. 
 
1. What was the most vivid memory of your wedding day? 
2. What are the feelings you can recall: When you were putting on your white wedding 
dress? 
3. What are the feelings you can recall: Towards the people assisting you dress? 
4. What are the feelings you can recall: When you saw yourself fully dressed in white? 
5. What are the feelings you can recall: About why you chose to wear a white dress? 
6. What are the feelings you can recall: About your white dress becoming dirty? 
7. What are the feelings you can recall: As you stepped out of your wedding dress? 
8. What ideas and feelings do you associate with white and purity? 
9. What are the feelings you can recall: While travelling to the church? 
10. What are the feelings you can recall: About the role your father played? 
11. What are the feelings you can recall: About the role your mother played? 
12. There is a sense in which brides are beautiful. I wonder what is it, for a bride to feel 
beautiful? 
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 What are the feelings you can recall:   in the Church 
13. What are the feelings you can recall: What was the significance to you of the 
Anglican Church service? 
14. What are the feelings you can recall: Of what it was like to be veiled? 
15. What are the feelings you can recall: About being given away? 
16. What are the feelings you can recall: As you signed the register? 
17. What are the feelings you can recall: About changing your surname? 
18. What are the feelings you can recall: As you processed down the aisle on leaving the 
church? 
 
What are the feelings you can recall:   outside the Church 
19. What are the feelings you can recall: About being photographed? 
20. What are the feelings you can recall: About entering your wedding reception? 
 
Reflecting on the day you were the bride-in-white:  
21. What was your saddest memory?  
22. What was your happiest memory, about being a bride-in-white? 
 344	  
APPENDIX C — Sample original data taken from 12Ann’s interview 
Being a Bride dressed in White, on your wedding day, is arguably a very emotional 
time. It is the memory of these emotions I would like to explore with you. 
 
What was the most vivid memory of your wedding day? 
In terms of an event opening of the front door of my parent’s house and seeing a horse 
standing in front of the gateway and realising my father and mother had hired a horse 
and carriage to take me to the church. And I was erm, just amazed, that, quite amazed 
and very overwhelmed, that well, because it had come about some years before, just as 
an off the cuff remark really when I said ‘Oh when I get married I’d love to go to 
Church in a horse and carriage. And they had actually done hired this for me. I was 
quite overwhelmed by it. (12Ann01) 
 
What were the feelings you can recall: About why you chose to wear a white dress? 
Whether they’re the feelings or not I don’t know: the thinking was, I was still a virgin 
and that I’d never had sex with anybody. And I’d never had sex with my husband-to-be 
and erm. And very strongly held Christian beliefs at that stage so to have worn a 
different colour which again I think is probably cultural as well, because if you’d worn 
an off-white dress, or whatever, you were making a statement that actually you were not 
a virgin. In contrast to my daughter up there, who wore an off-white dress but as far as I 
am aware had not had sex with her partner-to-be as far as I was aware. But I think there 
was a strong cultural… Certainly within my church there was, you know that virgins 
wore white and that’s what you did. So I don’t know whether that’s the feelings. It’s not 
the feelings. I think that there was also a very strong element in me to yeah to... I might 
have wanted to do something different but wouldn’t have done something different, I 
was very compliant in that respect. So that’s not the feelings, I know it’s not the feelings 
but… I was probably quite happy to just to go along with ‘this is what you did and 
that’s what you going to do’. So I think that I was quite accepting. (12Ann05) 
 
What were the feelings you can recall:   While you were travelling in the HORSE 
AND CARRIAGE on the way to the Church? 
Delight. A slight embarrassment that I was on view to everybody, although enjoying 
that as well. 
I certainly wasn’t the blushing bride that didn’t want to be seen. And so probably by the 
time we were 200 yards down the road and past the garage, I was probably [a great deal 
of laughter] relaxed into this thing, this horse and carriage and we were going very 
slowly and so everybody could see us and I enjoyed the occasion. Erm, I must certainly, 
I’m sure I was anxious about it, but it wasn’t a sort of apprehensiveness, it was the kind 
of height of anxiety and excitement about it all, was my overwhelming feeling about the 
day the wasn’t that I was kind of terrified about it all, I was just waiting to get on with it 
and really enjoying it.  
I think that I was concerned with my father as he wasn’t particularly well. And he was 
the one who was rather strung up with his nerves as to whether it was all going to work. 
I was probably just revelling in the day. (12Ann09) 
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APPENDIX D 
Searching for themes and establishing themes 
 
2.6 Theory and practice of theme analysis 
Having discussed mainly theory relating to the methodology, methods of data 
collection, choice of participants and data validity in Part Two, let us now examine how 
the collected data can be analysed in practice by using interpretative methods in the 
search for an understanding of the phenomenon. We will explore three complimentary 
methods of understanding data: first, psychoanalytic interpretation, second, the 
hermeneutic circle of enquiry, and third, phenomenological analysis. 
 
2.6.1 The science of psychoanalytic interpretation 
Before proceeding with any data analysis, let us consider the researcher 
/psychoanalyst’s task when listening to the participant/client’s narrative to better 
understand how themes can emerge through psychoanalytic interpretation. The 
American training psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, whose focus was on human 
development, describes the psychoanalyst’s task as ‘listening to the patient’s complaint, 
eliciting its history, and making, testing, and delivering interpretations of the patient’s 
data’ (Erikson, 1958:74). Arguably, the researcher’s task is similar in relation to 
interviewing the participant and the narrative produced. Problematic for both the 
psychoanalyst and researcher, concerns the reliability of the interpretation. In other 
words, how can the psychoanalyst/researcher make their own perceptions and thoughts 
reliable, given the participant’s semi-(un)structured free associations. 
 
For Erikson, the interpretation is not a matter of objective knowledge but ‘disciplined 
subjectivity’ (Erikson, 1958:75). The interpretation derives from a reciprocal obligation, 
where the patient/participant is asked to ‘free associate’ within a semi-structured area of 
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thought. While the analyst/researcher, in order to discover the patient’s/participant’s 
unconscious processes, refrains from imposing their own unconscious assumptions, 
listens in a special way. The analyst/researcher listens attentively to the manifest 
narrative and for the gradual emergence of latent patterns and themes, which signal the 
patient/participant’s message. The patient/participant’s story can be understood as 
uniquely individual, as ‘a universe of one’ (Erikson, 1958:74), and who has unique life 
experiences. Therefore, the analyst is required to set aside all preconceptions, listening 
afresh and testing the explanations as they arise.  
 
As interpretations emerge, they are first tested for their plausibility and then for their 
utility in intervention. Erikson argues that the psychoanalyst:  
has no right to test their reconstructions until their trial formulations have 
combined into a comprehensive interpretation which feels right to them, and 
which promises, when appropriately verbalised, to feel right to the patient. 
(Erikson, 1958:83) 
 
Then, and only then: 
the psychoanalyst, usually finds themselves compelled to speak, in order to 
help the patient in verbalising their affects and images in a more 
communicative manner, and to communicate their own impressions. 
(Erikson, 1958:87) 
 
The correctness of an interpretation does not always lie in the patient’s ‘immediate 
assent’, but rather: 
in the way in which communication between the patient and psychoanalyst 
‘keeps moving’, leading to new and surprising insights and to the patient’s 
greater assumption of responsibility for themselves. (Erikson, 1958:79) 
 
Erikson gives a special place in the testing of interpretations to the phenomenon of 
transference. What seems important about the transference is, that through the 
phenomenon of it, the patient/participant brings meanings, unconscious motivations, 
and strategies of behaviour, which can be surfaced and examined in an endeavour to 
discover patterns of behaviour of repeating the past in the present (Erikson, 1958:80). 
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This can also be understood by Freud’s concept of the ‘compulsion to repeat’ 
(SE18:62).  
 
The American social scientist, industrial consultant and urban planner, Donald Schön 
seems faced with a crisis of confidence in the kinds of professional knowledge that 
indicate academic competence, due to a particular epistemology which appears to foster 
selective inattention, intuition and self-knowledge, as opposed to hard knowledge and 
practical competence. Schön draws on Erikson who provides a new guide to analytic 
techniques for unique and non-standard problems that ‘are not in the book’, but where 
objective knowledge may be gained through ‘disciplined subjectivity’ (Schön, 
1983:138). While we can see that ‘reflective thinking’ connects Schön and Erikson, the 
difference between these two writers are that Schön is used to solving problems by 
relying on practical competence, but accepts that some problems appear unsolvable 
because he has no previous experience on which to rely. In contrast Erikson believes in 
his ability to see through the surface problem of scattered bits of information, to 
discover indications to a solution of the dilemma, not by relying on intuition but by 
understanding the process undertaken during ‘reflection in action’ (Schön, 1983:138). 
Erikson emphasises the importance of the practitioners’ ‘repertoire’. The 
researcher/psychoanalyst’s repertoire includes patients seen, case studies read, types of 
symptoms examined, psychodynamic patterns associated with them, interventions used, 
tried, and patients’ responses to them. The repertoire includes the whole of their 
experience insofar as it is accessible to them for understanding and action (Schön, 
1983:138). 
 
Schön suggests that when the practitioner makes sense of a situation he perceives to be 
unique, he sees it as something already present in his repertoire. Schön, drawing on 
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Wittgenstein’s use of ‘seeing as’ with reference to examples such as ‘seeing the figure 
as a box’, as discussed in Part Two, thus ‘seeing-as’ is at once and ambiguously, a 
process of seeing and thinking (Schön, 1983:138). Schön argues that to see this as that 
one does not need to subsume the first under a familiar category. Rather, one may see 
the unfamiliar, unique situation as both similar to and different from the familiar one, 
without first being able to say similar or different with respect to what (Schön, 
1983:138).  
 
Schön, drawing on Erikson, believes that the researcher/psychoanalyst’s investigation 
moves gradually through a chain of inferences, grounding each partial interpretation in a 
piece of evidence drawn from the patient/participant’s story/data. The gradual 
construction of an interpretation proceeds, perhaps with two alternatives. Both of these 
explanations going together may offer a new synthesis. In order to decide between these 
alternatives the process needs to be repeated, looking for signs of one or the other 
developing in the patient/participant’s story. So rather than colluding with the storyline 
the researcher/psychoanalyst maintains objectivity by testing and retesting the 
interpretive inference loosely but always grounded in the story/data of the 
patient/participant’s experience until the hypothesis becomes compelling, and even then 
the researcher/therapist maintains an open mind (Schön, 1983:121-122). Schön argues 
that this process demonstrates ‘reflective’ thinking (Schön, 1983:124), or ‘reflection-in-
action’ (Schön, 1983:126), by being guided by the repertoire of case studies, 
interpretive explanations and psychodynamic patterns. 
 
By selective acts of attention by the researcher/psychoanalyst the experienced situation 
of the patient/participant will be subjected to interpretive inquiry. The interview as a 
whole will hold some features constant, while transient events, widely separated in time, 
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will be held steady and juxtaposed with one another to permit exploration of such 
phenomena. Some stories can be ignored, or reduced to outlines, while others are 
expanded and elaborated. By attending to a few features which can be considered 
central, the main thread of the story can be isolated from the surrounding features which 
can be considered as noise. By giving particular attention to some story/data the 
researcher/psychoanalyst experiments with interpretation. Trying now one 
interpretation, now another, and allowing experimental moves to be reversible, thus 
designing learning sequences. One advantage the researcher has over the psychoanalyst 
in the session, is that the researcher has the opportunity of slowing down phenomena 
which may otherwise be lost to reflection during the therapy session (Schön, 1983:160). 
 
Schön suggests that the researcher/psychoanalyst constructs, through their immersion in 
the story/data, a virtual world which represents the reported experience of the 
patient/participant, as storytelling represents and substitutes for first-hand experience 
(Schön, 1983:160). The reliability of constructing this virtual world, however, has its 
limits. The researcher/psychoanalyst can only guess, but cannot know, cannot be sure of 
all the patient/participant’s total world, outside the interview. The 
researcher/psychoanalyst can only test such inferences against material/repertoire 
already known and be open to new ways of thinking and behaving that may be peculiar 
to this particular patient/participant (Schön, 1983:161). Schön suggests that these virtual 
worlds are contexts for experiment. The researcher/therapist can suspend or control 
some of the everyday impediments to rigorous ‘reflection-in-action’. These are 
representative worlds in practice, in the construction, maintenance, and use of virtual 
worlds. The researcher/psychoanalyst can develop the capacity for ‘reflection-in-action’ 
which Schön describes as ‘artistry’ (Schön, 1983:162). 
 
 350	  
Having begun to consider how the data can be handled using techniques of 
psychoanalytic interpretation advocated by Erikson, and reflection-in-action promoted 
by Schön,	   let us now discuss how the participants’ narrative may be enhanced by the 
application of hermeneutics. 
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2.6.2 The hermeneutic circle of enquiry 
The etymological roots of hermeneutics can be traced to the Greek god Hermes who is 
depicted wearing winged sandals, a travelling hat, and holding a magic septa or 
caduceus (Pinsent, 1969:61). Hermes’ role being ‘messenger of the god’s’, mediator 
between the gods, between the gods and humanity, and to escort or ‘conduct the souls to 
the underworld’ (Pinsent, 1969:39). Attributed to Hermes is the invention of language, 
speech and interpretation, together with characteristics of the liar, thief and trickster. He 
would ‘plan with sheer guile in his heart, to deceive with false inferences’, but was also 
‘concerned with literal truth’ (Pinsent, 1969:39-40). In other words, language can reveal 
or conceal, indicate truth, falsehood or ambiguity, and invoke an uneasiness in the 
recipient. Biblical characters who interpreted others’ message, include Joseph’s 
interpretation of the chief butler’s dream (Genesis,40v12), and Jesus when he ‘opened 
their minds to understand the Scriptures’ (Luke,24v46).  
 
During the twentieth century, the three philosophers, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty, developed their own concepts of understanding human behaviour. In developing 
a concept which includes the whole but detailed experience of everyday existence by 
the individual, the German existential philosopher, Martin Heidegger, while 
investigating what do we mean by ‘Being’, developed the concept of the ‘Hermeneutic 
Circle’ (Heidegger, 1927). The ‘hermeneutic circle of inquiry’ involves:  
building up an interpretation, through moving back and forth between the 
part and the whole. This involves: gaining a sense of the meaning of the 
whole text, and then using that as a framework for understanding fragments 
of the text; carrying out micro-analysis of the possible meanings of small 
sections of text, and using these to challenge or re-interpret the overall sense 
of the total text’. (McLeod, 2001:27) 
 
In other words, central to the principle of the application of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ is 
that, the meaning of an individual action, experience or statement is accessed only by 
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relating it to the whole discourse, world-view or originating context. The ‘hermeneutic 
circle’ relates the whole to the part and the part to the whole by moving back and forth 
between the two positions. 
 
From a sociologist perspective, McLeod claims that the ‘circle’ embraces both 
ontological and epistemological principles, in that the ‘circle’ aims towards 
‘understanding the basic nature of the persons’ core being’, and epistemologically, by 
‘the way in which people gain knowledge about the(ir) world’ (McLeod, 2001:28). 
Limitations to the hermeneutic circle, Spence cautions, are that the interpretations and 
‘discoveries’ may be ‘little more than [the researcher/psychoanalyst’s] projections’ 
(Spence, 1993:7). Caution is consequently required to ensure that the interpretation 
becomes firmly grounded in the data. In that the data and the researcher’s interpretation 
are open for public scrutiny. And that the method is sufficiently flexible to allow for 
novel material to emerge.  
 
McLeod clarifies two positions relating to case study material and the rigours of 
research.  McLeod suggests that ‘the psychoanalytic clinical case study, based on the 
psychoanalyst’s selective recall of sessions, would not be viewed as research’. On the 
other hand, ‘where the original sources are open to re-analysis by others, may be viewed 
as research’ (McLeod, 2001:137). Hence, as much data as possible is included in the 
following case studies. 
 
Let us consider further ways of understanding hermeneutics. From a meta-scientist’s 
perspective, Gerard Radnitzky claims that hermeneutic objectives focus on ‘the practice 
of life’, ‘norms of being-in-the-world’, and what is ‘the communication of the living 
with past generations through the transmission and mediation of traditions’ (Radnitzky, 
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1970:22, in McLeod 2001:22). In taking a philosophical approach, Charles Taylor 
suggests that hermeneutic interpretation endeavours to make meaning which is 
otherwise ‘confused, incomplete, seemingly contradictory…or unclear’ (Taylor, 1971 in 
McLeod 2001:22). From an existential philosophical position, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
claims that hermeneutic interpretation emanates ‘from a perspective, takes place from a 
position within history, [and] requires sensitivity to the use of language’. Gadamer also 
suggests that there may be ‘moments of insight and transformation for the interpreter’, 
but for the interpreter it is the ‘act of continuing and deepening, or enriching, the 
cultural-historical tradition’ that is significant (Gadamer, 1975:290, in McLeod 
2001:22). From a psychoanalytic psychologist’s perspective, Jean Laplanche describes 
the ‘hermeneutics of the message’ as the process ‘from a message to its understanding. 
This is a translation that is not necessarily between languages (interlingual) but between 
sign systems (intersemiotic—Jakobson)’ (Laplanche, 2002-3:28).  
 
In other words, hermeneutics, a science of interpretation, facilitates deciphering and 
interpreting the story through language about signs (Laplanche, 2002-3:28), and 
‘bring(s) to light an underlying coherence or sense within the actions, behaviour or 
utterances of a person or group’ (McLeod, 2001:22). A hermeneutic understanding also 
leads towards a ‘cultural-historical’ context which embraces the ‘tradition of the 
researcher’, and, where a ‘tradition-informed’ interpretation is made. Hermeneutics is 
therefore a form of cultural inquiry which is not linear but circular. Having first 
discussed the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation which suspends all pre-
conceptions before drawing on a ‘repertoire’ of experience, and second by using the 
hermeneutic circle of enquiry to contextualise and move within the data, let us now 
consider a third method of understanding data where again the suspension of all 
previous suppositions is emphasised. 
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2.6.3 Theory and practice of phenomenological analysis 
The etymological roots of phenomenology stem from the ideas promoted by three 
philosophers. In the study of essences, the Austrian empiricist philosopher, Edmund 
Husserl (1859-1938) believes that experience is the source of all knowledge, and by 
applying ‘phenomenological reduction’, that, being free of presuppositions in our 
approach to the world, the essence becomes revealed when we turn ‘to the things 
themselves’ and describe our experiences of them (Husserl, 1936). The German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger (1927), emphasises that ‘being in the world’ requires a 
socio-historical or cultural context. And the French philosopher, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1962), who argues that perception plays a significant part in our understanding 
of the world as well as our engaging with the world. Significantly, phenomenology does 
not set out to test theory, rather working from ‘bottom up’, initially the researcher 
generates themes from the data in order to develop new insight. 
 
McLeod asserts that by following the Duquesne school of empirical phenomenology93, 
whose ultimate goal is to elucidate the sense of the phenomenon as it exists in the 
participants’ concrete experience, researchers are required to follow six steps and apply 
eight principles. The six steps are as follows: 
Step 1. Collect the verbal data describing the experience. 
Step 2. Read the data thoroughly, getting a sense of the whole. 
Step 3. Extract significant statements. 
Step 4. Eliminate irrelevant repetition, by discarding irrelevant statements. 
Step 5. Identify central themes or implicit meanings. 
Step 6. Integrate meanings into a single exhaustive description. 
 
In applying this phenomenological approach, McLeod emphasises that the researcher is 
also required to apply eight principles: 
1. Develop an open attitude of wonderment.  
2. Strive to bracket off assumptions: known as phenomenological reduction.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 The Department of Psychology at the Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. 
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3. Adhere to the principle of horizontality, where no one meaning is considered more 
    important than any other. 
4. Engage in imaginative variation, i.e. ask: What would need to change to make this 
    phenomenon different? Ask: What are the limits of this phenomenon?  
   Thus, distinguishing essential from inessential features of the phenomenon. 
5. Develop an empathic presence to the described situation. The researcher uses the 
    description to enter and immerse themselves in the situation just as it was lived by the 
    participant. 
6. Slow down and patiently dwell on the topic. The researcher spends time lingering ‘in’  
    the described situation. 
7. Magnify, amplify and pay special attention to detail, by allowing each detail of the 
    situation to be fully contacted, to loom large for their consideration.  
8. Turn from objects to immanent meanings, by attunement to the meaning of objects 
    and events as they are lived by the participant.  
    (McLeod, 2001:41-42, see Colaizzi 1978:59, Wertz 1984) 
 
The psychological researcher, J.W. Osborne (1994), argues that in human science, 
phenomenology is one of the basic tools of qualitative research identified by Husserl 
whose philosophical agenda was to ‘find a method of arriving at ultimate truth’, and a 
‘search for radical certitude’ (Natanson, 1973:5 in McLeod 2001:36). The 
phenomenological approach emphasises six steps and eight principles, as cited above, in 
an ‘almost meditative withdrawal from the world’ (McLeod, 2001:50). The social 
scientists Bogdan and Taylor emphasise that the phenomenologically inclined 
researcher needs to ‘see things from [a participant’s] point of view (Bogdan, 1975:14, in 
Silverman 1997:64). Of particular interest to this project is that McLeod suggests that 
this ‘circle’ also involves the use of empathy towards ‘the person(s) who generated the 
text’, and ‘encompasses all aspects of the text’ including the researcher who ‘is a 
member of that community or tradition’ who will ‘expand and enrich’ that tradition by 
making ‘a genuine act of discovery’ by ‘extending its meaning’, and where ‘both text 
and researcher are changed’ (McLeod, 2001:28). Having considered some core 
phenomenological principles let us explore some advantages and disadvantages to this 
approach. 
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Of the usefulness of the phenomenological approach, McLeod argues that it enables the 
‘discovery of how personal and social worlds are constructed’ (McLeod, 2001:52). In 
other words, characteristic of the phenomenological approach, distinct from other 
approaches, are its combination of psychological, interpretive and ideographic or case 
study components. The main aim being to illuminate and make sense of the human 
experience, in a given context, such as a major life event. Thus balancing 
phenomenological description of the participants’ lived experience, with the 
researcher’s insightful interpretation who acknowledges their personal beliefs and 
standpoint, and anchored in the participants’ data. 
 
Of the drawbacks to the phenomenological approach McLeod argues that ‘there is an 
absence of cumulative knowledge within the philosophical phenomenological 
literature’, due to the existence of ‘one-off studies’ and the approach being 
‘marginalized in North American social science’ (McLeod, 2001:51). A second 
disadvantage McLeod argues, is that the analysis of phenomenology ‘makes it hard for 
future researchers to know the extent to which they agree or disagree’ with the findings 
(McLeod, 2001:51). A third disadvantage to this approach, de Rivera argues, is that it 
relies ‘on the personal qualities of the researcher’ (de Rivera, 1981:13, in McLeod 
2001:50). 
 
While appreciating the advantages and disadvantages of the phenomenological 
approach, an Australian social researcher, Michael Crotty, argues that there are two 
phenomenologies. The ‘mainstream’ approach advocated by Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty, and a ‘new’ empirical approach which has lost the radical Husserlian tradition. 
Crotty argues that the ‘new’ approach falls short of ‘problematising’ the phenomenon 
and critically ‘calling into question ‘what might be’ the structure of the phenomenon, 
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and not merely describing ‘what is’ (Crotty, 1996:7, in McLeod 2001:52). In other 
words, Crotty challenges the researcher not only to describe the phenomenon but also to 
critically ‘problematise’ it. Empirical phenomenology, as discussed above and in Part 
Two, is now applied using the Duquesne protocol. Let us now consider how, step one of 
the protocol: ‘collecting the verbal data describing the experience’, can be implemented 
in practice. 
 
After the interviewing process and consulting the researcher’s notes, as discussed in 
Part Two, with the help of both the transference and counter-transference the 
researcher/psychoanalyst gains insight from revealed thoughts and feelings, thus 
creating the virtual world of the participant/patient and a method of enquiry and a 
strategy of intervention (Schön, 1983:161). 
 
Inevitably, certain expectations are brought to the study. First, that the questions 
formulated would be appropriate. Second, that the selected questions were sufficiently 
open to allow the participant to explore that aspect. Third, that the chosen participants 
would have at least some clear understanding of their own feelings and would be able to 
articulate them. Most striking, therefore, was the degree of difficulty experienced by the 
participants in finding words that were sufficiently adequate to describe their feelings, 
as feelings and emotions are vital to human survival. Having discussed the interviewing 
process of data collection let us now consider the character of the data and how data 
may be understood. 
 
Using a social scientist perspective, Elliot Mishler suggests that ‘transcribing tape-
recorded interviews is complex, tedious, and time-consuming work that demands 
careful listening and relistening’ (Mishler, 1986:47). Mishler cautions that: 
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[a transcript] is only a partial representation of speech. Each representation 
is also a transformation (in that it) rearranges the flow of speech into lines of 
text within the limits of a page. Some features of speech, such as rapid 
changes in pitch, stress, volume, and rate seem almost impossible to 
represent adequately… (Other complexities include) non-linguistic 
features…such as gestures, facial expressions (and) body movements. 
(Mishler, 1986:48) 
 
 
Appendix C comprises a sample of transcribed original data in terms of ‘speech into 
lines of text’, with indications of some non-verbal communication. After the 
transcribing process, step two and the first principle of the phenomenological protocol 
is applied to begin the search for themes. This requires the data to be read through 
thoroughly several times and ‘carefully in order to get a sense of the whole’ experience 
of all the participants, as well as each separate focus question, while the researcher 
‘adopts an openness and wonderment in relation to the phenomenon’ (McLeod, 
2001:41). The third and fourth steps take the search for themes further by ‘extracting 
significant statements’ and ‘eliminating irrelevant repetition’. The second principle 
involves the researcher reflecting on and ‘bracketing off’ their personal assumptions, a 
process known as phenomenological ‘reduction’ (McLeod, 2001:41). At the same time 
the researcher applies the third principle of horizontality, that is, to consider that ‘no one 
meaning is more important than any other’, while adopting the fourth principle of 
‘engaging in imaginative variation’ (McLeod, 2001:41). Having précised interviews as 
a-typical, the fifth step is to submit the data to grouping into concepts and ‘identify 
central themes or implicit meanings’ (McLeod, 2001:41). Each theme leading to the 
participants’ narrative, and linking to the question. This process involves the separating 
and amalgamating of some data groupings, and the occasional alteration of conceptual 
labels, until each category is satisfactory, reflecting only the data. The sixth step is to 
examine the relationship between these themes and ‘integrate them into a single 
exhaustive description of the phenomenon’ (McLeod, 2001:41), and then sort the 
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themes into overarching themes, under the core category of the subject’s ‘felt’ 
experience.  
 
The results of a phenomenological study are multifaceted and are dependent on the 
analytic and interpretive stance of the researcher. Although the researcher’s approach, 
during this project, principally takes a Freudian psychoanalytic perspective, the 
researcher also leaves space for other approaches to have a voice. The themes and 
overarching domains are designed to stay close to the narrative language of the subjects. 
These broad categorisations serving to provide a coherent structure for the experience of 
each participant, allowing for their experiences within each category to be deeply 
personal, and where variants of the theme can be identified. As speech events, narrative 
accounts provide temporal sequences, have a social dimension, and communicate 
meaning through story telling.  
 
Drawing on grounded theory principles, McLeod asserts that ‘checking categories and 
emerging themes against any and all available sources is essential’ (McLeod, 
2001:188). Michael Bloor states that ‘validation techniques are not tests, but 
opportunities for reflection’ (Bloor, 1997:49), and Glaser calls for ‘constant 
comparison’ as part of the actual process of the research (Glaser, 1967 in McLeod 
2001:188). The themes which emerge, with their sub-themes, provide a useful start for 
developing a non-hierarchical taxonomy for the participant experience. Thus themes 
may not necessarily be entirely discrete but may overlap each other, combining related 
themes. As was anticipated, new questions arose, such as ‘why didn’t you ask about my 
husband’?  
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Before proceeding further, let us consider the researcher’s own cultural and historical 
context. The researcher can be described as, a white British middle-class Christian male, 
growing up in England during the mid to late 20th century. The researcher’s parents held 
Christian beliefs and values, living in harmony until they died. A keen interest lead to 
becoming a wedding photographer. Reflecting on this project, the researcher believes 
that these studies continue to deeply inform on-going psychotherapeutic practice, which 
in turn enriches the client/therapist encounter. 
 
Emerging from a keen interest in family history, handed down from previous 
generations, I became deeply interested in my ancestral roots. This interest took me to 
the Isles of Scilly to discover that some of my ancestors had sailed around the world 
looking for treasure during the Gold rush. This interest also took me to Australia during 
which time I honed my photographic skills. I enlarged my photographic interest into 
classical portraiture and the wedding event. Gradually my academic interests grew into 
investigating why I am the way I am and why other people behave the way they do. An 
early curiosity about my family roots had grown into an academic investigation into the 
main protagonist at a wedding - the bride-in-white. 
 
As an NHS GP practice psychotherapist, in a multicultural, deprived area of South 
London, I see a wide variety of neurotic behaviour. Although all patients have been 
referred to the counselling service by their GP, some patients do not attend, most are 
able to engage to some degree, and others engage and benefit greatly.  
 
I believe that short-term psychodynamic therapy, conducted in the GP practice, requires 
selective attention to the patient’s immediate distress, while there seems little time for 
‘working through’. As such, I consider my academic task is to apply both 
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phenomenology and hermeneutics, quickly identifying themes within family dynamics, 
both current and from infancy, at work, and in the social context, looking for common 
themes; i.e., indications for unconscious defences or where ‘acting out’ has become 
problematic. The therapeutic task consists of an empathically drawing the patient’s 
attention to their defences in order that they can be unpacked, looked at differently, and 
made sense of, so that the patient better understands themselves and can make new 
choices. That is, in practice, I am both a researcher and a therapist. For example:  
 
My sadness turns towards a man who does not know the name of his father. Can he 
possibly live with not knowing, or is his distress going to persist into a lifetime of 
longing, searching and feeling rejected? Thus impacting on his self-esteem. 
 
I feel the sadness of the lady who was given away at birth, and now as an adult struggles 
with suicidal ideation, as she feels that life is not worth living. Empathising with her 
struggle to live, I work with a hope for her continued survival. Thus there seems to be a 
struggle between the so-called life and death instincts. 
 
Confronted by the man who grew up with parents who constantly verbally fought with 
each another and with their children. Now as an adult this patient has learnt to defend 
himself from the real, or symbolic, attack of the father by becoming addicted to training 
in self-defence. He struggles, however, to regulate his anger towards his partner. 
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2.6.4 Applying phenomenological analysis: early searches for general themes 
Taking a stance of ‘open wonderment’, the researcher proposes to work from the 
general to the particular, ‘to get a sense of the whole’ (McLeod, 2001:41). Having 
‘extracted significant statements’ (step three), and ‘eliminated irrelevant repetition’ 
(step four), the phenomenological protocol requires the ‘identification of central themes 
or implicit meanings’ from the whole of the data (step five). Drawing on the above 
discussion and applying the fifth step of the phenomenological protocol, as discussed 
above, some general themes that emerge from studying the whole data include:  
 
Historical themes: the country and era in which the ceremony takes place, traditions, 
Victorian values. 
Cultural themes: social and cultural traditions or cultural convention of wearing white, 
processing to the Church, being seen by family and friends, significance of mother’s 
and father’s role, pleasing father, public pride in wearing white, given away, patriarchal 
exchange, uniting two families, identifying as Miss, Mrs, wife or mother, finding a 
husband, leaving home, pride, promising, love and marriage, being a woman, love, my 
destiny, ambition of a nuclear family, implied hetero-normativity. 
Aesthetic themes: feeling beautiful, perfection, being seen as a rewarding experience, 
purity. 
Religious themes: Book of Common Prayer, role model of Virgin Mary, Church 
building and location, God’s presence, God’s blessing, Minister’s role, father’s role, 
bride’s role, husband’s role, ritualised ceremony, importance of wearing white in 
Church, speaking vows, signing the register, complying with religious tradition, 
monogamy, consanguinity, hymns, processing, Christian belief, not being an Anglican. 
Personal themes: physical virginity, wearing a white dress, rites of passage, being seen. 
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Psychodynamic themes: childhood dreams and desires, the subject’s experience of 
themselves, identification with mother, bride’s subjective experience of mother and 
father, father’s active role, mother’s non-visual role, bride’s passive role, change of 
status from Miss to Mrs and potentially of becoming a mother, separation from the 
familial unit, being seen, father/daughter special relationship, super-ego, incestuous 
ideation, the object of desire, libidinal desire, memories, being seen. Feeling honoured, 
reassured, anxious, awkward, close, beautiful, emotional, proud, sad, not forgiven, 
happy, frightened, worried, embarrassed, eager, willing, compliant, tearful, doubt, 
disbelief, dependent, belonging, in love, passive. 
 
Thus a great number of general themes could be said to have emerged through adopting 
an attitude of ‘openness and wonderment’ from the researcher’s emersion in the whole 
data. In order to implement step six of the protocol, by ‘integrating central themes and 
implicit meanings into a single exhaustive description of the phenomenon’ the 
researcher, with ‘openness and wonderment’, ‘bracketing off’ personal assumptions, 
and ‘giving weight to each statement equally’, again becomes immersed in all the 
collected data. Macro reading the data the researcher forms a detailed description of the 
subjective experience in the present first person, as if the researcher is the participant 
recording their live experience. This process assists composing a ‘general condensation’ 
of the subjective experience. This process also aids the clarification and identification of 
‘essential meanings’ (Fischer, 1979:31, in McLeod 2001:43). Let us now consider a 
‘general condensation’ of the lived experience of the bride-in-white by drawing directly 
from the whole data: 
 
A once in a lifetime experience that I had so longed and waited for, was getting married 
in Church in God’s eyes, in a traditional style white wedding. I felt a sense of disbelief 
about actually getting married. During my childhood, I dreamt of marrying in Church, 
dressed in white, just as my parents had. Consequently, my mother and father have been 
like a role model for me. I knew that my parents had kept their vows.  
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Earlier, I had been shopping with my mother to choose and buy the dress. I thought it 
was going to be a difficult process but I fell in love with the first dress I put on. On the 
wedding day itself, after my mother and the bridesmaids had helped me with my hair, 
makeup and dress, they left for the Church. When I saw myself in the mirror, I thought 
‘the white dress looks beautiful’, and I felt special, beautiful, happy and blessed.  
 
I then came downstairs and when my father saw me, he said, with a tear in his eye, ‘You 
look stunning’, and at that moment, I felt really close to him, because he was proud of 
me. My father always put me on a pedestal. He was a remarkable, wonderful man. I was 
very close to my father when I was a small child. During my journey to the Church, I 
loved showing myself off to the neighbours, but in the car there was a kind of 
awkwardness between my father and me. I suppose I was not used to being so 
exclusively with him, and perhaps he too felt anxious about his forthcoming role of 
giving his daughter away. It seemed as though he wanted me to reassure him that I was 
doing the right thing. 
 
When we arrived at the Church that was when it hit me, I felt a sense of disbelief that I 
was going to be married. I heard the organ music playing. As my face was covered with 
the veil, I couldn’t see very clearly, so being on the arm of my father felt as though I 
was dependent on him as we processed down the aisle. I was very proud to be on his 
arm. Peering through the veil I saw a sea of faces filling the Church belonging to my 
family and friends.  
 
I remember, the moment we arrived in front of the Minister, my husband-to-be 
whispered to me: ‘You look lovely’, which felt reassuring. After my father had helped 
me lift my veil, he continued standing by my side. The Church ceremony was very 
significant to me. I felt that wearing white symbolises respecting being in Church and 
able to receive God’s blessing. If I had not married in white and in Church, my father 
would never have forgiven me, but that was not the case he was very proud of me. 
During the ceremony itself, we had chosen some beautiful hymns, such as ‘O Perfect 
Love’ and ‘Love Divine’.  
 
I felt really emotional when I was being given away by my father. I felt honoured, 
frightened, and happy mixed with sadness. In one way, I couldn’t wait to get away. 
While I felt good about it, it was nice to be handed over, as I knew I was going doing 
the right thing. It was like an act of love and I felt that it brought our families together. I 
couldn’t see my mother because she was sitting behind me. 
 
What was particularly worrying at that moment was not making a mess of my vows. 
Promises are so important to me, I don’t promise many things, and especially I don’t 
want to make a mistake. I find it embarrassing talking in front of a large group of 
people. As was the custom at the time, I vowed to ‘honour and obey’, because I was 
pleased to. I was promising to be with someone for the rest of my life. I thought, this is 
going to be perfect and last forever because the vows are life-long and before God.  
 
When it came to exchanging our rings I couldn’t wait to put it on and become ‘Mrs’. It 
felt as though it was my destiny since my childhood. It was as if I had left half of myself 
behind with my parents and found the other half with my husband. I felt that being 
married in Church, in front of God, and in God’s eyes, we received God’s blessing. 
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When it came to signing the register, I complied with the tradition of the day quite 
willingly. It was then, when I signed my maiden name for the last time, that I realised I 
was no longer ‘Miss’ but ‘Mrs’, with the potential of becoming a mother. 
 
As part of this new couple, we processed out between a Church full of smiling faces, 
and I feel very proud to be on the arm of my husband. During the time when the 
photographs were being taken, I didn’t feel at all embarrassed, rather it was a very 
rewarding experience, and I felt I was beautiful and the centre of everyone’s attention. I 
haven’t felt like that before. 
 
Again, I loved showing myself off to the passers-by as we processed to the reception. 
People everywhere saw me, it was hugely supporting. In my white dress everyone knew 
I was the bride. People saw me all day, so happy in my dress. The funny thing is, I can’t 
explain it, but, after all this time I still have my wedding dress with all of its memorable 
marks on it, in just the same state as it was on my wedding day. 
 
By adopting an attitude of ‘openness and wonderment’, (first principle), on reflection, 
the above synopsis of the subjective experience can be read in a number of ways, such 
as, aesthetic, cultural, religious and psychodynamic. As seen above, each reading 
generating a different group of themes. If either of these areas of investigation are 
exclusively adopted then the subjective ‘felt’ experience of the bride (the phenomenon 
of the bride-in-white) could be seen differently, (fourth principle). Whereas marriage 
may be considered central to many cultures world-wide, the ‘limits’ (fourth principle), 
to the phenomenon of ‘the bride-in-white’ seem to be restricted to the Christian 
tradition. The ‘essential features’, (fourth principle), of this phenomenon are that the 
phenomenon under investigation are experienced by women, and usually transacted 
during adulthood. 
 
It seems that several methods produce themes of equal validity. As this project 
principally uses a psychoanalytic lens, rather than a cultural or religious interpretation, 
the researcher chooses to focus on aspects of unconscious processes over others, for the 
purpose of this study. This is not to suggest that any of the other categories are less 
valid or will be discarded, but less emphasis will be placed on them. This begins the 
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process of narrowing down potential themes. Let us now consider another method of 
establishing phenomenological themes, by case study. 
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2.6.5 Case Studies 
By adopting an attitude of openness and curiosity, the researcher selects six 
representative interviews for analysis by listening carefully and responding differently 
according to how the interview leads, in the search for similarities and differences. In 
other words the researcher attempts to become objective by detaching from pre-
conceptions as to what the analysis will reveal. McLeod draws attention to one of the 
ethical limitations to this approach which stems potentially from the researcher’s guilt. 
During psychoanalytic practice, the analyst offers the client an interpretation knowing 
that they can respond. In formulating these case studies, however, each participant’s 
opportunity of responding has not been available. Thus, the researcher can feel that they 
have gone publically behind each participant’s back without any course for responding. 
In other words, the researcher can feel like an intruder or betrayer of each participant’s 
secrets, however well their identities have been concealed with the use of a pseudonym 
for others, yet the participant as reader, may feel exposed (McLeod, 2001:198). 
 
Having earlier presented a ‘general condensation’ or composite reading from all the 
participants’ narrative, let us now consider six general readings of individual brides’ 
experience, three taken from the ‘recent’ cohort of brides, and three from the ‘older’ 
cohort. Let us first consider Sue’s narrative using a hybrid process of inductive and 
deductive analysis to interpret the data, thus integrating data with theory based on the 
tenets of phenomenological analysis which provides both a philosophical framework 
and a method which is descriptive and interpretive of subjective experience.  
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A general reading of the data supplied by Sue 
On listening to Sue’s interview as a whole what seemed to emerge was what a deeply 
emotional time Sue had recalling her wedding day. What seems most prominent was 
that Sue’s father couldn’t be there to see her marry, as Sue states that: ‘My father 
recently died’ (Sue10). Sue states that: ‘When I looked in the mirror and saw myself 
fully dressed in white I thought: I wish my dad could see me, he would have been proud 
of me [tears]. Sorry. [tears]... I just closed my eyes and thought of my dad standing 
next to me [tears]…’ (Sue04).  ‘He would have been proud of me’ [by being married in 
white], can be interpreted as Sue complying, with her father’s expectations of marrying, 
and cultural expectations of heteronormativity, thus indicating Sue’s unconscious ego 
ideal and the group’s unconscious collective idealisation of heterosexual marriage. 
 
What seems also striking is the apparent importance to Sue of marrying in Church. 
Although Sue married in an Anglican Church, this was not significant, ‘because I’m a 
Catholic’ (Sue13). Arguably, ‘marrying in Church’ could seem to offer Sue an 
unconscious sense of drawing closer to her recently deceased father, and that being 
married ‘in front of God’ (Sue13), her heavenly father, could also symbolise being 
married in the presence of her deceased earthly father. 
 
Due to Sue’s dad having recently died, Sue appears to break with tradition, that 
although she could have ‘asked her brother’ to give her away, she chose her mum 
because ‘My mum’s next in line for me, from my dad (Sue11). Arguably, these 
statements imply that for Sue her mum represented the parent closest to her dad, thus 
indicating that dad’s authority was invoked and symbolically he gave her away. Sue’s 
statements seem to indicate Sue’s conscious and unconscious need to feel close to her 
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father but also imply a mourning process for the loss of her dad and thus an unconscious 
loss of the ego ideal. 
 
Sue states: ‘My saddest memory was my dad not being there to share the day, in person, 
was the hardest thing’ (Sue21). This statement can be interpreted that Sue may have 
idealised her father. In other words, Sue could have said, ‘Ideally I would have wished 
my dad could have been around to share in my day, but now I have to bear this loss and 
find a substitute’. 
 
Sue states that: ‘Speaking in front of everybody and saying our vows, it means that were 
are going to be together. Because you’re making a promise to each other, and I don’t 
ever promise anything. I try my best but I’m not going to promise. But this is a promise 
that you’re going to try and keep. I think that when you’re married you’ve got to try and 
work at the relationship instead of saying, I’ll give up if anything goes wrong’ (Sue01). 
These statements can be interpreted in terms of an expression of an unconscious ego 
ideal. In other words, Sue could have said, ‘Promises, like vows, are ideals. I am going 
to try my hardest to keep them because we’ve made them to each other in front of 
everybody’.  
 
Sue suggests that there is ‘not a lot of connection between white and purity’ (Sue08). 
‘White does not relate to purity any more’ rather it relates to the ‘person inside being 
either good or not good’ (Sue08). This statement can be interpreted in Kleinian terms, 
as indicating an unconscious splitting, where issues may be starkly experienced. Sue 
states: ‘One of my friends recently married in white, and now they are no longer 
together. Society has changed quite a lot’ (Sue08). While referring to one of her 
‘friends’, Sue reveals her assumption that by the bride wearing a white dress carries 
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weight both externally and internally. This can also be interpreted in terms of an 
expression of both an unconscious ego ideal and a loss of an ego ideal. In other words, 
Sue could have said, ‘Ideally there could be a connection between wearing a white dress 
and being pure, but in reality it’s the person’s intension that ideally counts’. 
 
Sue states that: ‘Choosing to wear a white dress I thought it’s traditional and you feel 
more special in a dress that’s white. It feels like you’re the centre of attention. It’s 
you’re day, everyone’s thinking about you and caring for you. When everyone is 
looking at you and saying ‘Oh you look really nice’, it’s lovely. It’s quite nice actually 
[laughter], but I was a bit embarrassed because everyone’s looking at me’ (Sue05). ‘I 
didn't like being veiled because I felt shielded from everyone’ (Sue14). ‘I’m only going 
to wear the dress once, so you want to show it off’ (Sue06). ‘My happiest memory was 
walking down the aisle processing and just enjoying being the bride’ (Sue22). Now it’s 
all over when you take the dress off but you’ve got the memories’ (Sue07). Sue’s 
statements can be interpreted in terms of an expression of exhibitionism. We can hear in 
Sue’s statements that her sense for exhibitionism falls predominantly between the joy of 
feeling ‘special’, being visible and being the centre of attention, but also feeling a little 
‘embarrassed’. Feeling ‘embarrassed’ can be interpreted in terms of feeling 
unconsciously castrated. Thus, Sue’s sense of feeling the ‘centre of attention’ can be 
interpreted as a compensation for her embarrassment. In other words, unconscious 
exhibitionism compensates for unconscious castration. 
 
In separating from my twin sister (Sue17), and being given away by my mum (Sue10), 
contrasts with how my husband and I are now ‘together forever’ (Sue07) with the same 
surname (Sue17). ‘We knew from the start that we were meant to be together, and I 
think that we will always be together’ (Sue07). These statements relating to her husband 
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can be interpreted, that Sue seems to have found her Platonic ‘other half’. It seems that 
Sue expresses that the unconscious process of repudiation has taken place not only from 
her twin but also from her parents’ authority by giving her allegiance to her husband. 
And when Sue states: ‘When we entered the reception and everybody clapped, I felt as 
though we were being welcomed into our family’ (Sue20). This can be interpreted that 
Sue has chosen to symbolically turn her back on her old familial ties and enter into a 
new family system. 
 
Sue states that: ‘Now I am married and I’m Mrs… (Sue07), we’ve come together, we 
are now only there for one another and we showed everyone that we’re there to be 
together, together forever’ (Sue07). In this public expression of transformation from 
Miss to Mrs, we can also hear how significant it seems to Sue to ‘belong’. This can be 
interpreted as indicating Sue’s strong need for attachment, in reaction to the loss of her 
father and twin, and perhaps also Sue’s ability to imagine remaining attached. This 
indicates an identification with, or idealisation of, her parent’s relationship and the type 
of relationship Sue has with her twin. 
 
Sue states that: ‘When you’re getting prepared and you’ve got your make-up on, and 
your hair done, it doesn’t seem real ‘til you put on the dress’ and the veil, and that’s 
when it hit me that I was actually going to get married (Sue03). This form of external 
transformation can be interpreted as indicating a sense of exhibitionism but also 
splitting between illusion and reality. For Sue, the reality of being a bride-in-white only 
becomes ‘concrete’ when the full external transformation is complete. It seems as if 
there are two different realities, one familiar, while the unfamiliar reality is of being a 
bride. ‘Now as twins our two families are not together, it’s quite strange’ (Sue17). But 
‘at the reception we felt welcomed into the larger combined family (Sue20). These 
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statements can be interpreted, that Sue seems to have found a new ‘containing’, ‘secure 
base’, in the form of the larger family group. 
 
If we argue, as in Part Two, that the transference is ubiquitous and is in everything that 
is articulated, then for Sue what may be considered to have been unconsciously 
transferred from past experience may be encompassed by considering two issues: the 
significance of the vows, and ‘being together’, both being interpreted in terms of ‘rites 
of incorporation’, or in psychodynamic terms ‘separation anxiety’. 
 
Sue states that ‘I found it quite embarrassing saying my vows out loud in front of 
everybody, as saying our vows means that we are going to be together’ (Sue01). 
Usually, ‘I don’t ever promise anything, I try my best but I’m not going to promise’ 
(Sue01). ‘I think that when you’re married you’ve got to try and work out a relationship 
instead of giving up when anything goes wrong’ (Sue01). It seems as though Sue 
endows the vows with the significance of ‘we’re going to be together’ (Sue01).  
 
Belonging and ‘being together’ seem to be an enduring theme throughout Sue’s 
interview. In contrast, Sue seems sad and disappointed that her friend’s marriage has 
broken down. Sue states that ‘My friend married five months ago and she wore a white 
dress, they were together for three months and now they are not together. He wasn’t that 
committed when they married, but they still went ahead with the marriage. Society has 
changed quite a lot’ (Sue08). This statement can be interpreted in psychodynamic terms 
as an expression of an unconscious loss of the ego ideal. This statement can also be 
interpreted as alluding to a woman’s need to marry, and to conform to society’s implicit 
expectation, thus implying a social conscience or collective unconscious super-ego. In 
other words, Sue could have said, ‘I would have believed that getting married in white 
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would have counted for something significant, but it’s sad that in some cases these days 
it doesn’t seem to count for anything’. 
 
Finally, on reflection the researcher suggests that, Sue may unconsciously need to feel 
‘together’ predominantly for two reasons. First, that Sue was one of twins. Second, as 
Sue’s dad had recently died and her friend’s marriage had broken down Sue was all too 
consciously aware of loss and that significant people can leave. Let us now consider 
another ‘recent’ bride’s experience, by exploring the interview with Sis. 
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A general reading of the interview with Sis 
What seems to emerge from this interview is Sis’s relationship with her wedding dress. 
Sis states that: ‘I chose to wear a white dress because I wanted to stay with tradition. I 
wouldn’t have married in any other colour than white. That’s always been the colour 
that brides wear in a Church wedding’ (Sis05). In choosing to wear a white wedding 
dress, Sis appears to have been influenced by both cultural tradition and respect for 
Church tradition, both representing safe, conforming choices, thus avoiding cultural or 
religious criticism, stigma or loss of reputation. 
 
Sis states that: ‘Feeling special is difficult to describe. When you’re a little girl you 
dream of getting married in a white dress. I am 38 now, and I thought, a few years ago, 
“I can’t see it ever happening”. I think because I’m an older bride, wearing a white 
dress makes it extra special (laughter)’ (Sis04). When Sis states that: ‘It was an 
expensive dress’ (Sis06) Sis appears to link it to how it had transformed her into feeling 
‘special’ and ‘beautiful like a bride’, in a way that she’d ‘never felt before and she will 
never feel again, like a princess, very lovely’ (Sis12). This sense of feeling ‘special’ can 
be interpreted as a narcissistic ego ideal. Even though the dress became dirty and ‘each 
mark on it tells its own story’ (Sis06), thus Sis bears the loss of the ego ideal. By 
adorning her expensive wedding dress Sis experiences a new way of feeling. ‘I’ve never 
felt like this before and never will again’, arguably Sis by adorning exhibitionist 
clothing becomes transformed from feeling castrated. 
 
As Sis stepped out of her wedding dress Sis becomes conscious that she will ‘only wear 
her dress once’ (Sis06), and ‘never wear it again, because it’s done its job of making her 
feel special’ (Sis07). And now the dress with all of its marks will be put into storage’ 
and ‘it’s always going to be there, I’m never going to get rid of it’ (Sis07). In ‘never 
 375	  
going to get rid of it’ indicates the bride’s long term relationship to her wedding dress 
thus it can be interpreted that the dress represents a transitional object. 
 
Another item of clothing that seems significant for Sis was her veil. Sis states that: ‘The 
veil, although it was not right over my face felt like a protective shield around me’ 
(Sis14). The veil became a ‘barrier and protection’ between me and the rest of the 
Church congregation (Sis14). I felt the veil was reassuring when it was just ‘the bride, 
the groom and the vicar, just the three of us’ (Sis14 and Sis22). I felt that the Anglican 
Church ‘felt peaceful and reassuring’, while the service and words were ‘nice’, and the 
minister ‘had a calming voice’ (Sis13). By wearing a veil which ‘felt like a protective 
shield’, and experiencing the Church as ‘peaceful and reassuring’, and the minister’s 
‘calming voice’, arguably these three facets can be interpreted as symbols or metaphors 
for ‘containing’ Sis’s anxieties. 
 
Referring to her father Sis states that: ‘I think my dad was very proud of me, he was 
glad to see the back of me in a funny, nice way, he always said that. My dad’s not a big 
talker, a quite, thoughtful person, but while we were travelling to the church he said a 
couple of times “are you ok?”, “You look lovely”, which was really very nice. When we 
were sitting at the table in the reception my dad kept squeezing my hand and saying 
“you’ve done well”, which was really nice, and reassuring’ (Sis10). In Sis stating that 
she experienced her dad as ‘a very thoughtful person’, who was ‘proud’ of her and 
‘reassuring’ and who said: “You look lovely” (Sis10), the closeness between the father 
and the daughter can be interpreted in Oedipal terms. The daughter’s close relationship 
to the father, indicating unconscious incestuous desire. Sis, however, seems to 
emphasise her father’s ‘peaceful and reassuring’ qualities, which can be understood in 
contrast with her mother’s ‘energy’. 
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Sis states that: ‘My mum’s good at ‘organising everything and everybody’. ‘I don’t 
know where she got her energy from’ (Sis11). This remark indicates that Sis’s mum’s 
‘energy’ can be understood as being transferred into other aspects of this interview 
(Sis11). This may be illustrated by 04Sis’ most vivid memory being: ‘Everybody being 
happy, smiling and the feeling that everybody was enjoying themselves’ (Sis01). 
 
Sis states that: ‘We were living together before we got married’ (Sis08), and therefore 
there seems to be no immediate or traumatic severing of parental ties on the marriage 
day. Thus Sis’ interview does not appear to illustrate a strong repudiation of parental 
authority.  
 
One way of eliciting themes is to ‘compare and contrast’ one participant’s experience 
with another, that is to find similar or different variations of the experience. Strauss and 
Corbin refer to ‘making theoretical comparisons’, for raising questions and discovering 
properties that may be in the data, especially when doing analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998:67). Let us now consider an overall view of the interview with Liz, holding in 
mind other participants’ experience, in order to compare this interview with others. 
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A general reading of Liz’s narrative 
Not all ‘recent’ brides conformed to traditional expectations. Liz, aged 40, recalls her 
experience of being a ‘bride-in-white’ in the presence of her mother, one month after 
her wedding day in 2005. 
 
On confirming the research parameters, that the participant wore a ‘white’ dress and 
married in an Anglican Church, on reflection, it seems that the researcher may have 
started the interview with Liz poorly. The researcher was under the misnomer that 
describing the colour of the wedding dress as ‘white’ could include ‘off white’, ‘ivory’ 
or ‘cream’. Liz insisted: ‘I’d call it cream’, while the researcher responds ‘for all intents 
and purposes I’d still call it white essentially’. 
 
On considering why Liz chose to wear a ‘white’ dress, it seems as though staying with 
‘tradition’ plays an important part in Liz’s decision-making. Liz uses phrases such as: 
‘it felt like a traditional location, and so it seemed appropriate to wear ‘white’, but it 
wasn’t white, it was ‘cream’ (Liz05). In choosing to wear a ‘cream’ dress, as her mother 
did, indicates a conscious or unconscious identification with the mother, and in 
traditional terms an unconscious identification with past generations (Liz05). 
 
Liz suggests that the important issue concerning her wedding dress was that ‘you buy 
the dress, the one you really want, and it’s so special and you’ve chosen it, you’ve 
thought about it, you really want it to look good all day’, and ‘I remember being a bit 
bothered when it got slightly dirty’ (Liz06).  
 
In choosing the item of clothing that will transform Liz into a bride, and transport her 
through the day, it seems as though Liz endows the dress with the ‘special’ quality of 
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making her ‘look good all day’. This can be interpreted as indicating an unconscious 
ego ideal, in that ‘it had to look good’, thus the dress endows the wearer with qualities 
of ‘looking good’. Also ‘looking good’ can be an indication of unconscious 
exhibitionism. But when the dress ‘got slightly dirty’, Liz only became ‘a bit bothered’, 
or unconsciously able to tolerate some loss of the ego ideal. 
 
When the time came for Liz to step out of her dress Liz felt ‘freezing cold, I’ve never 
been so cold in all my life’, indicating that the ‘adrenaline rush’ no longer kept Liz from 
feeling cold. Liz linked this feeding cold to a lack of ‘a mixture of anticipation and 
excitement’ that Liz’s mother had felt on her wedding night. Liz’s reason for this was 
‘because we had a little boy and he was asleep in his cot in the room we were in’, ‘but 
again, you do have this sense of the wedding night being special. Perhaps I was more 
thoughtful about the day, it felt quite strange (Liz07). Having ‘had a little boy’, can be 
interpreted as unconscious penis envy having been acted out. Liz also felt ‘at the time, 
almost disappointed actually, because you have such high expectations of your wedding 
day but nothing can possibly live up to them, a bit of a let down’, thus indicating an 
unconscious loss of the ego ideal. 
 
It can be argued that Liz’s choice of a cream dress unconsciously symbolises that Liz 
had had sexual intercourse before marriage and that the ‘coldness’ Liz felt indicates a 
lack of delayed gratification, thus saving ‘a mixture of anticipation and excitement’ for 
her wedding night. So when Liz’s wedding night was not so ‘special’, it seems that Liz 
replaces instinctual libidinal desire with ‘thoughtfulness’, which ‘felt strange’ and 
arguably unexpected. The ideal ‘special’ wedding night feeling did not happen, thus 
indicating an unconscious loss of the ego ideal. 
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Prior to the wedding day Liz states that: ‘If Mum had lived closer then I’d probably 
have asked her to help me choose the dress, the flowers and things like that. The only 
reason I didn’t was that it wasn’t practical and as it turned out I didn’t feel I particularly 
needed support. In fact, I was happy doing it on my own (Liz11). 
 
Again, on the wedding day itself, Liz states that: ‘After you had dropped dad off, I was 
on my own briefly. I was expecting you, mum, to come in and say hello and when you 
didn’t, I understood you had gone to the Church. I would have been very happy if you 
had wanted to have a chat before you had gone’ (Liz11). In response to her mother’s 
gesture, Liz states that: ‘it didn’t matter, I didn’t mind, you could have if you’d wanted 
to…no I wasn’t offended’ (Liz11).  
 
It seems that Liz rationalises her mother’s absence and expresses a desire for a closer 
relationship with her mother. Arguably, Liz seems to be unconsciously defending 
against the loss of the mother. It may be noted that Liz’s mother’s mother was not at her 
mother’s wedding, thus Liz’s mother had no first-hand experience to follow, no 
maternal role model, and thus arguably Liz’s mother unconsciously transferred her own 
wedding day experience onto her daughter, Liz. 
 
Liz states that: ‘whether or not it was an Anglican Church wasn’t an issue. Mum and 
dad had brought me up as an Anglican, so if I was going to have a religious ceremony 
then it would have to be in an Anglican Church. The significance was getting married in 
Church because I’m a Christian. I see being a Christian as a commitment. The whole 
point of getting married is through religious ceremony, and a civil ceremony would 
have seemed pointless. Marriage is about committing to a partner in front of all your 
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friends and family, a public commitment’ (Liz13). My most vivid memory was ‘making 
the vow’ (Liz01). ‘It’s also about evolving relationships (Liz13). 
 
It can be interpreted that Liz consciously or unconsciously identifies with her parents in 
choosing to marry in an Anglican Church, unconsciously passively compling with her 
parent’s and cultural tradition, of making a ‘public commitment’, ‘through religious 
ceremony’. On a personal and cultural level Liz ‘evolves’, or is transformed, publicly 
from daughter to wife. Arguably Liz is also aware of ‘evolving relationships’. That 
‘through religious ceremony’ the family group becomes enlarged by officially 
accommodating Liz’s husband’s family, and unconsciously Liz feels safe to make these 
changes with the assistance of a containing Anglican ceremony, presided over by a 
Minister. In contrast, arguably the civil ceremony would not have carried the same 
gravitas, and thus ‘would have seemed pointless’. 
 
In describing what it is to feel beautiful Liz states that: ‘I didn’t think I had a sense of 
how I looked. In fact, at times it felt quite strange because people were taking 
photographs of me all the day’ (Liz12). It can be interpreted that Liz may have 
unconsciously felt detached or disembodied, and consequently did not need to be an 
exhibitionist. 
 
Liz suggests that in contrast to her mother, who wore a veil because it was traditional in 
1959, ‘I thought the veil was optional. I chose to wear one because I felt a bit shy. In a 
Church full of people it felt quite overwhelming, so I could hide behind it a little bit. I 
also wanted to focus on the ceremony and didn’t want to be too distracted’ (Liz14). 
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On leaving the Church, after the ceremony, Liz’s veil no longer hid her face, Liz states 
that: ‘everywhere I looked there was a sea of faces of people who I knew and cared 
about, that was smashing, lovely, just this huge support was everywhere’ (Liz18). 
During the time when we were being photographed, Liz states that: ‘I found it got a bit 
intrusive, it seemed to take over, I just wanted it to finish (Liz19). 
 
Linking Liz’s statement describing how she felt ‘beautiful’ (Liz12) and ‘supported’ 
(Liz18) with how Liz describes wearing a veil because Liz felt ‘shy’ (Liz14), we begin 
to get a sense of how Liz does not seem to be an overt exhibitionist. Perhaps Liz felt 
confident in her own skin, or did Liz have a sense of feeling detached, but when Liz 
becomes the main player in the large group Liz feels ‘shy, overwhelmed’, wants to 
‘hide’ (Liz14) and wants the photography to ‘finish’ (Liz19). Wanting to ‘hide’ can be 
interpreted as unconsciously feeling castrated. 
 
While describing the significance of the Church ceremony, Liz, links this with 
‘evolving relationships’ (Liz13). So, what seems interesting is when Liz describes what 
she can recall about signing the register, Liz’s first reaction is: ‘I don’t remember’. This 
directly mimics her mother’s response. Liz then states that: ‘It won’t be the last time I 
sign my maiden name, I haven’t changed my surname, I can’t see the point of it’ 
(Liz16). 
 
It can be interpreted, that although Liz was aware of ‘evolving relationships’, some 
relationships however Liz seems to resist change and wants some things to remain 
unchanged. Psychodynamically, this can be interpreted that in retaining her father’s 
surname Liz maintains an identification with the father, thus unconsciously defending 
against the repudiation of his authority, or publicly signifying by symbolically 
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submitting to her husband’s authority by taking his surname. Wishing to retain her 
maiden name, or her father’s surname, can be interpreted as the daughter’s unconscious 
incestuous desire towards the father. If Liz resists changing her surname it can be 
interpreted as not only an identification with the father, but also as unconscious 
castration finding compensation through identification with the phallic father. Having 
considered three interviews from the ‘recent’ cohort, let us now consider three 
interviews from the ‘older’ cohort. 
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The use of metaphor in an overview reading of Rose’s interview 
Becoming aware of metaphors in discourse can convey ‘naturally occurring talk’ 
(Madill, 1997), or rhetorical analogies that convey a ‘primitive response syndrome’ 
(Brown, 1999:31, in McLeod 2001:102). An American psychological anthropologist, in 
analysing personality and culture, and focusing on marriage, Naomi Quinn, (1997) 
suggests that cultural metaphors become indicators of ‘widely shared understanding’ 
and claims that these fall under the principal themes of ‘gaining motivational force’, 
‘durability’, and a constellation that coalesce around ‘powerful hopes and expectations 
about marriage’ (Strauss and Quinn, 1997:138). From the hundreds of metaphors for 
marriage Quinn suggests there are eight overarching themes which represent 
‘lastingness’, ‘sharedness’, ‘mutual benefit’, ‘compatibility’, ‘difficulty’, ‘effort’, 
‘success or failure’, and ‘risk’ (Strauss and Quinn, 1997:142). Let us consider 
metaphors in Rose’s interview. 
 
Rose states that: ‘The most vivid memory of my wedding day, over 40 years ago, was 
on entering the Church and processing down the aisle to the music of ‘O Perfect Love’, 
it felt magical, as though everything would be perfect and that the marriage would last 
forever’ (Rose01). Rose states that: ‘I was very proud to be on my father’s arm that day 
and to know that my parents were still together and had not divorced’ (Rose10). Rose’s 
sense of perfection can be interpreted in terms of her unconscious ego ideal, an idea that 
she held in front of her, or an expectation that she held for herself following 
identification with her parents. Rose’s ideal of her ‘marriage lasting forever’, may also 
be interpreted in a cultural or religious expectation at the time of her wedding and that 
divorce was socially frowned upon. By Rose using the word ‘proud’, indicates that 
pride is an important feeling, thus implying the avoidance of shame. Feeling ‘proud to 
be on my father’s arm’ indicates that culturally Rose felt she was being seen, by all who 
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had gathered in the Church, to be doing the right thing, thus this can be interpreted in 
terms of Rose complying with the collective unconscious. 
 
Rose states that: ‘When I had put my wedding dress on, I started worrying, what would 
my fiancée think about how I looked, and what would other people think about how I 
looked? (Rose02), and when I looked at myself in the mirror I thought, I looked really 
good, the bees knees, like I’d never looked before and I’m never going to look like this 
ever again. All my dreams have come true’ (Rose04). Rose also states that: ‘My 
happiest moment was after I had processed into the Church, and my husband-to-be 
whispered, ‘You look lovely, you look beautiful’ (Rose22). Afterwards, when we had 
the photographs, ‘I loved having my photograph taken, I was never camera shy, I’d 
always been told that I was photogenic’ (Rose19). 
 
‘Bees knees’ can be associated with rhyming nonsense, perhaps indicating, in the 
transference, that Rose readily uses phrases that her parents, siblings, or social group 
may have used, such as ‘the cat’s whiskers’, to mean excellence and of the highest-
quality. In Rose worrying how she looked and how other’s would think of how she 
looked, indicates an unconscious process of the scopophilic instinct associated with 
exhibitionism. This worrying, may be associated with a lack of self-confidence, or of 
earlier critical voices. Rose, however, reassures herself by believing she looked ‘the 
bees knees’ or perfect, thus indicating an unconscious compensation for feeling worried 
or castrated. In Rose being able to reassure herself, also indicates an internalised ego 
strength and therefore Rose does not feel totally castrated. 
 
Rose states that: ‘I wanted to be given away, but at the same time it was a struggle to 
leave my father’s protection. I thought I was always going to be his daughter and he was 
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always going to be my father, so to me “being given away” seemed a funny expression’ 
(Rose15). The word ‘funny’ seems to imply that Rose felt uncomfortable, thus Rose 
seems to be expressing a close bond with her father which she wished to retain, thus this 
can be interpreted in Oedipal terms as unconscious incestuous desire. Rose appears to 
suggest that she experienced a tension, where, on the one hand, wishing to be ‘given 
away’, while on the other hand, not wanting to leave her father’s protection, but 
eternally maintaining a submissive relationship towards her father. This can be 
interpreted as the ‘special’ father/daughter relationship which becomes acted out in the 
unconscious tension associated with the repudiation of parental authority. 
 
Rose states that: ‘I was very conscious of that I’d no longer be Miss, I was going to be 
somebody’s wife and eventually hopefully somebody’s mother’ (Rose07). Rose’s wish 
indicates an unconscious process of transformation of instinct from an active to a 
passive position. If we link this with the previous statement in relation to her father, 
Rose reinforces and maintains a passive position and an unconscious identification with 
her mother. 
 
Rose states that: ‘My mom was a bit flappy’ (Rose03). ‘As I was putting on my 
wedding dress I had butterflies in my stomach’ (Rose02). ‘While I was putting on my 
dress, my father seemed to be taking it all in his stride’, whereas ‘not only was I anxious 
but everyone else was anxious for me’ (Rose03). These statements can be interpreted 
that anxiety can become infectious and be transferred into others, indicating that 
mother’s ‘flappy’ anxiety was converted into Rose’s stomach butterflies. Notably, in 
contrast, Rose expresses her wish that her relationship with her father continues, father 
being the phallic, steady person who ‘takes it all in his stride’ (Rose03). 
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We can see not only metaphor in use in Rose’s interview where Rose wishes for 
perfection and dreams coming true, and the marriage to last forever, but also themes of 
pride and shame, worry and separation anxiety, identification with mother and a close 
relationship with father. Let us now consider another method of exploring the data, by 
looking for what may have been implied. 
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Investigating data by asking ‘what was not said’: an overview of Francis’ interview 
Another way of being sensitive to the narrative is to wonder what could have been said 
differently, what was not said, and what may be missing from the conversation. 
Ethnographer, James Spradley notes that people can assume, when telling their story, 
that the listener ‘already knows’ (Spradley, 1979:314). While generally expecting, in 
Western culture, that love precedes marriage, contrary to a forced marriage, shotgun 
marriage, arranged marriage, or marriage of convenience, Francis’ interview seems to 
offer a discrepant story, as it may imply that she married someone who she did not love. 
 
After reviewing Francis’ interview as a whole, one theme that seemed to emerge was a 
sense of negative exhibitionism. Francis states that: ‘I wasn’t keen to wear a lavish 
dress, rather, it was classical and tailored’ (Francis02). This statement may be 
interpreted as implying that Francis may have felt a sense of guilt, modesty or 
disempowerment. In Freudian terms, this statement can be interpreted as indicating a 
sense of castration. Expressed in other words, Francis could have said, ‘I was keen to 
wear an elegant classic dress which was not over embellished’, which may have implied 
feeling more empowered. 
 
On the other hand, Francis seems to experience a sense of positive exhibitionism. As 
Francis states that: ‘When I had put on my wedding dress I realised that I looked pretty 
good in it, as I’d never worn anything as elegant as that before’ (Francis02). ‘In the 
Church, I realised that I hadn’t had that kind of attention on my own, I’d never been in 
the centre of attention like that before. I was now the central player. Previously, I’d 
always been with my sister, now all these people were smiling at me, and it felt 
enormously gratifying and very rewarding. Now I was having this for myself’ 
(Francis18). By Francis stating that she enjoyed being ‘the centre of attention’ can be 
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interpreted as indicating that at this point Francis enjoyed a sense of legitimate 
exhibitionism, which implies the opposite of feeling disempowered or castrated. Hence 
it can be argued that unconscious exhibitionism compensates for castration.  
 
Francis also states that: ‘After the ceremony, I like being photographed outside the 
Church’ (Francis19). Although this statement can be interpreted as indicating a sense of 
exhibitionism, ‘being photographed’ can also be interpreted, in the transference, as 
taking Francis back to a childhood memory and reminding Francis of her ‘uncle who 
was an artist and took photographs of her when she was a child’ (Francis21). 
 
Another theme that seems to emerge from Francis’ interview is that of ambivalence. It 
may be conjectured that Francis’ ambivalence may have its roots in an earlier traumatic 
experience, as Francis states that: ‘My mother had a very difficult time emotionally and 
had left home at one point’ (Francis10). Thus during the Church service when Francis 
states that: ‘I wasn’t in a romantic state, and although I took a solemn oath, I thought 
that I might not manage to keep it all my life’ (Francis13), can be interpreted as 
indicating ambivalence or uncertainty and without any sense of conviction, as if, love 
for the husband-to-be had not preceded marriage. 
 
Francis states that: ‘I had tried to stay a virgin, and this is what I had intended’ 
(Francis05). This statement can be interpreted as indicating that Francis projected an 
unconscious ego ideal. On the one hand, this statement does not seem to indicate a very 
strongly held ideal, especially in the light that Francis states: ‘technically … I thought, I 
felt that I’d lost my virginity, not quite willingly’ (Francis05). And further, Francis 
states that: ‘I had sex with my husband-to-be just prior to being ‘married to make sure 
he didn’t run away’ (Francis05). These statements can now be interpreted, in the 
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transference, as indicating, that Francis feared that her husband-to-be may run away, 
like her mother had ‘left home at one point’ (Francis10). It could be interpreted that 
Francis compromised her ego ideal of remaining a virgin until after marriage, in favour 
of a more dominant fear, that of fearing being abandoned. 
 
Francis states that: ‘As I processed out of the Church all my family and friends were 
smiling at me’ (Francis18). This statement can be interpreted in terms of Francis feeling 
idealised by the group. The group of family and friends, representing Francis’ social 
group, showed a collective approval of what Francis had achieved in being married. 
 
Francis states that: ‘As I processed out, up the aisle, my veil was up and I felt as though 
I was the centre of attention, it felt enormously gratifying’ (Francis18). ‘Feeling 
beautiful on my wedding day was empowering. There is nowhere in your life that you 
have waited for so much, especially when I felt as though I have got no power’ 
(Francis12). It seems from these statements that ordinarily Francis felt disempowered, 
however being given the opportunity to feel beautiful and the centre of so many 
people’s attention became hugely empowering. These statements can be interpreted as 
indicating that Francis ordinarily unconsciously identified with her castrated mother and 
felt castrated or disempowered herself. Whereas Francis’ exhibitionist instincts seem to 
have transformed her from feeling castrated, to feeling phallic and empowered on her 
wedding day. Again, we are arguing that unconscious exhibitionism becomes a 
compensation for feeling castrated. 
 
Francis states that: ‘I didn’t want to keep my maiden name. It seemed right to me that I 
should take my husband’s name. I felt pragmatic about it’ (Francis17). Francis seems 
confident and assured when she states: ‘I didn’t want to keep my maiden name’ 
 390	  
(Francis17). In not wishing to keep her maiden name, Francis’ statement can be 
interpreted as indicating the unconscious process of repudiation of parental authority. It 
is as though Francis felt compliant, with the cultural tradition of the day, as she states 
that: ‘I should take my husband’s name’. Francis in stating that she felt ‘pragmatic’, can 
suggest that she felt neutral about this matter. Francis may also have felt distant and 
unconnected when she says ‘I felt pragmatic’ (Francis17). This statement can be 
interpreted as indicating that Francis felt compliant, passive and castrated and not driven 
by the ‘romantic state’ of falling madly in love. 
 
Francis states that: ‘I had been running around with people since I was 16, now I 
realised that I was 21 and it was time I settled down and get married’ (Francis21). 
Francis’ statement, if interpreted in terms of the transformation of instinct, illustrates 
Francis’ desire to make a meaningful contact with somebody since her late adolescence, 
and now as an adult to make a meaningful contract. However, in stating ‘now I realised 
that I was 21 and it was time I settled down and get married’ (Francis21), seems to 
suggest some uncertainty or ambivalence. This statement could therefore be interpreted 
that Francis married, in part, to follow the cultural tradition of ‘getting married’ and in 
order to safely sever familial ties within a containing publically approved ritual. Having 
considered two of the three interviews from the ‘older’ cohort, let us now consider a 
third general reading before we explore a closer reading of the same interview in order 
to compare outcomes. 
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Patterns of behaviour during a general reading of Ann’s interview 
The overall feeling that emerged during Ann’s interview seems to be one of her needing 
to be in control. During Ann’s youth and adult development (Ann13) the Church 
through its teaching, and also culturally, Ann received strong messages that sex before 
marriage was wrong (Ann05). Ann’s mother also, through her teaching, created an 
atmosphere at home that sex before marriage was disapproved of (Ann08). Thus 
through Ann’s conscious or unconscious internalisation of what may be considered as 
good or bad practice, or what may be considered as her avoiding personal or social 
shame, Ann seems to have passively complied with the social norms of her day. 
 
Being in control of her libidinal desire seems to have been important to Ann. Ann, since 
becoming engaged did wait, ‘I was still a virgin’ (Ann05), while at the same time Ann 
states that: ‘I couldn’t wait to be married to my husband’ (Ann23). As we have already 
seen above, Ann’s physical state of being a virgin seems to be reflected in her conscious 
or unconscious internalisation of a super-ego, or idealisation of her mother’s, society’s 
and the Church’s teachings on sexual conduct. 
 
Other aspects of Ann’s need to be in control are illustrated as follows: Ann could not 
control the food at the reception, she said she was rather ‘disappointed’ (Ann20) 
because ‘my mother could have done that’ (Ann20). Ann couldn’t control the 
bridesmaids’ dress length as two different people made each of the bridesmaids dresses 
and Ann remarks ‘my mother would have done them as I wanted’ (Ann21). These 
statements seem to suggest that Ann believed that her mother would have controlled 
these matters better. Thus we can interpret that Ann thinks highly of, or idealises her 
mother. 
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Another aspect of Ann’s need to be in control is illustrated when Ann wished to control 
the photographer, when she ‘asked him to take a photograph of herself and her mother 
together’ (Ann11). Ann also had a sense of control when she consciously ‘did not wait 
for her father to give her away, but took her husband-to-be’s hand as soon as she had 
processed down the aisle’ (Ann23). This dominant need to feel in control suggests that 
Ann’s anxiety, if she did not feel as if she were in control, may be overwhelming. If 
interpreted in the transference, Ann as an adult, seems to exhibit an infant-like need of 
omnipotence in the same way as Ann had internalised her mother’s omnipotence.  
 
Other aspects of Ann’s interview can be interpreted in a similar manner to previously, 
that: Ann’s statement ‘I remained a virgin’ (Ann05) as ‘there was a lot of teaching from 
the Church and from my mother, not to have sex before marriage’ (Ann08) can be 
interpreted as indicating Ann’s conscious or unconscious internalisation of an ego ideal. 
That, the Church, mother and culturally all idealised virginity in 1969 (Ann08), can be 
interpreted as indicating the process of personal and collective idealisation. Also when 
Ann states that: ‘My mother could have done that….’  Referring to the making the food 
(Ann20), and making the bridesmaid’s dresses the way Ann had wanted (Ann21), can 
be interpreted as indicating that Ann seems to have idealised her mother and perhaps in 
an unconscious way expected to be idealised by others. 
 
When Ann states that: ‘I think I did look really beautiful, and I felt as though I 
blossomed being the centre of attention’, while that the same time ‘there’s something 
slightly illegitimate about being the centre of attention’ (Ann12). Also Ann states that: 
‘I didn’t like being veiled because it felt as though I was trapped’, ‘I wanted everyone to 
see how radiant I was’ (Ann14). Ann’s statement seems to contain a paradox. On the 
one hand Ann seems proud to be the centre of attention, thus this could be interpreted as 
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a sense of exhibitionism – the need to be seen. On the other hand, however, Ann senses 
an illegitimacy about demanding attention. It could be argued, therefore, that being the 
centre of attention although enjoyed was an unfamiliar state, thus in psychoanalytic 
terms, inferring an enduring sense of castration was more familiar. It can be appreciated 
that being a bride-in-white on her wedding day is an unfamiliar state, but not necessarily 
evoking feeling ‘illegitimate’. 
 
When Ann states that: ‘With my strong feminist tendencies’ (Ann15), ‘I didn’t wait to 
that part of the Church service ‘Who gives this woman…’ I actually let go of my 
father’s arm as soon as I got to the front of the Church and took my husband-to-be’s 
hand. I wasn’t waiting to be given away I was choosing to be joined to someone else’ 
(Ann23). This process, if interpreted as the unconscious repudiation of parental 
authority, does not appear to hold much anxiety for Ann. As it would be described by 
Plato, Ann seems to have ‘found her other half’ and was eager to join him. Ann seems 
to have more than willingly and symbolically turned her back on her parental ties. 
 
Ann states that: ‘I might have wanted to wear a different wedding dress, but I was 
compliant, quite happy to go along with ‘this is what you did and this is what you’re 
going to do. I was quite excepting’ (Ann05). It is interesting to consider in the light of 
the immediate forgoing interpretations that while Ann’s unconscious inferences seem to 
suggest a need for control, here in this statement Ann uses words such as ‘compliant’ 
and ‘excepting’ in connection with the colour of her wedding dress. This statement can 
be interpreted as Ann being ‘passive’ due to social, Church and parental prohibitions 
and demands, thus again indicating a super-ego censoring in the formation and 
transformation of Ann’s ideals. 
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What seems to have been transferred from an earlier period, to Ann’s current reported 
behaviour, thus via unconscious process, seems to have been her mother’s need to 
control. Ann’s mother’s need to control may be illustrated when Ann states that: ‘My 
mother was very supportive, and very involved and being very much a part of 
everything that happened’ (Ann11). ‘My mother had made my dress, made her own 
outfit, and one of the bridesmaids dresses. My mother had also done a lot of the 
arranging, and done the Church flowers’ (Ann11). As we have already seen, Ann seems 
to repeat her mother’s need to control in that, Ann ‘remained a virgin (Ann05), ‘did not 
wait for her father to give her away’ (Ann23), and ‘I chose to be joined to someone 
else’ (Ann23). Let us pause for a moment in the search for phenomenological themes to 
consider what has emerged. 
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2.6.6 Analysis, so far… 
In adopting the phenomenological method of analysis in Part Two, and implementing 
this method in the case studies above, what seems to have emerged are that each bride 
has a unique set of experiences even though all may have been assumed to be a 
homogenous group, as already discussed in Part Two. In considering emerging themes 
from the above general readings of the bride-in-white’s described experience, it can be 
argued that twelve themes together with their associated sub-themes are emerging, such 
as:  
 
One: the importance of the father’s role in ‘giving the bride-in-white away’.  
Culturally, the father’s role can be interpreted anthropologically in terms of the 
‘patriarchal system of exchange’, where the father pays the bride-price or dowry. 
In religious terms, the father may be endowed with the right and responsibility to ensure 
that his daughter is in the safe hands of another man. 
Psychodynamically, the adult bride voluntarily chooses to repudiate parental authority, 
in a similar manner to her experience of severing ties during infancy. 
 
Two: the bride-in-white’s pride in ‘doing the right thing’, as opposed to bringing shame 
upon herself and the family.  
Culturally, ‘doing the right thing’ the bride-in-white conforms to cultural traditional 
ideals. 
Psychodynamically ‘doing the right thing’ can be interpreted as a personal ego-ideal 
formed under the pressure of the super-ego and parental and cultural prohibition. 
 
Three: the bride-in-white’s contract, saying vows, in the presence of others.  
Culturally, a public legal and binding contract witnessed by family and friends who 
imply their agreement to the couple’s exclusive union.  
In religious terms, vows can be interpreted as a public rite of passage, conducted in a 
special dedicated place.  
Psychodynamically, the adult contract enunciated by the vows implies offering a sense 
of security, and enduringness to the relationship: an ego ideal. This may be likened to 
the implied binding contract the infant projects onto the mother during the infant’s 
dependency. 
 
Four: the importance to the bride-in-white to appear perfect and acceptable.  
Aesthetically, the bride appears youthful, beautiful and perfect.  
Culturally, appearing perfect can be interpreted as being seen as acceptable within one’s 
social group.  
In religious terms, appearing perfect gives respect to the Church and God.  
Psychodynamically, appearing perfectly acceptable can be interpreted as a personal ego-
ideal and collective idealisation. 
 
Five: the bride-in-white’s central role in the presence of others.  
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Culturally, the bride may be recognised as a means by which the social group is 
maintained.  
In religious terms, the Church ceremony conveys the bride safely through a rite of 
passage in the midst of supporting family and friends.  
Psychodynamically, being the central player can be interpreted in terms of 
exhibitionism. In infancy, being the central player, in phantasy, may reflect the 
interaction of the mother-infant dyad. 
 
Six: the bride-in-white’s desire to become Mrs., wife or a mother.  
Culturally, and biologically this can be interpreted as a young women’s expectation.  
In religious terms, the Church ceremony endows the bride with the new status of wife. 
Psychodynamically, this change of status can be interpreted in terms of the 
transformation of instinct from active to passive, through identification with the mother. 
 
Seven: the mother’s active role in preparation before and after, but not during the 
ceremony.  
Culturally, mother defers to the father’s patriarchal active dominant role.  
In religious terms, the woman may be idealised, as the Virgin Mary, but does not take 
an active part. 
Psychodynamically, the castrated mother defers to the phallic father.  
 
Eight: the significance to the bride-in-white of wearing a white wedding dress: it’s 
choice, it’s hue, it’s wearing, it’s getting dirty, and it’s later retention.  
Culturally, the white dress symbolises conformity to tradition, purity of body, and 
pureness of intention.  
In religious terms, wearing a white dress in Church offers respect to the Church. 
Psychodynamically, the white dress symbolises both an individual ego ideal and 
idealisation in the form of a collective ideal. In the dress’s retention by the bride, the 
dress becomes a transitional object.  
 
Nine: the bride-in-white’s physical state of being a virgin.  
Culturally, an ideal as in previous generations being a virgin bride ensured legitimacy 
and rights of inheritance, but less important post-modernity.  
In religious terms, being a virgin, represented by Virgin Mary iconography indicates a 
collective idealisation. 
Psychodynamically, being a virgin bride can be interpreted both as a personal ego ideal 
and collective idealisation, and subject to the internalisation of super-ego prohibitions.  
 
Ten: the bride-in-white’s ‘special relationship’ with the father.  
Psychodynamically, this ‘special relationship’ can be interpreted in Oedipal terms as the 
adult’s regression to the infant’s projection of unconscious incestuous desire onto the 
phallic father.  
 
Eleven: the importance to the bride-in-white of being married in Church and in God’s 
eyes.  
Culturally, the bride submits to collective approval, where the group overtly and 
implicitly give their blessing on the new union, thus reinforcing heteronormativity.  
In religious terms, a rite of passage, endows the bride with God’s blessing. 
Psychodynamically, the bride unconsciously acknowledges an omnipotent other, an 
adult regression to the infant’s projection onto the omnipotent father. 
 
Twelve: the bride-in-white’s need to secure a lasting relationship. 
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Culturally, the couple require a secure lasting relationship in order to offer security to 
their children and avoid the social stigma of divorce.  
In religious terms, the bride’s need for a lasting relationship reinforces monogamy. 
Psychodynamically, the bride’s need to secure a lasting relationship can be interpreted 
as a personal ego ideal, collective idealisation, and as a defence against separation 
anxiety. In infancy, the need to secure a lasting relationship may be understood as the 
phantasy of the idealised mother-infant relationship prior to separation, now being 
reflected in adulthood. 
 
From the above analysis, the principle psychodynamic themes which seem to have 
emerged, include, from ‘one’ repudiation; from ‘two’ ego-ideal and idealisation; from 
‘three’ ego-ideal; from ‘four’ ego-ideal and idealisation; from ‘five’ exhibitionism; from 
‘six’ transformation; from ‘seven’ castration, and the phallic father; from ‘eight’ ego-
ideal and idealisation, and the transitional object; from ‘nine’ ego-ideal and idealisation, 
and internalisation of super-ego; from ‘ten’ the projection of unconscious incestuous 
desire; from ‘eleven’ the projection onto the omnipotent other; from ‘twelve’ the ego 
ideal and idealisation, and separation anxiety. From this analysis it can be established 
that the psychodynamic concept of the ‘ego-ideal and idealisation’ dominate the themes 
in ‘two’, ‘three’, ‘four’, ‘eight’, ‘nine’, and ‘twelve’. A second theme, illustrated in 
‘five’, which all brides-in-white will be subject to, during the process of marriage, 
included in the above is, by wearing a white dress the bride-in-white becomes the 
‘central player’, thus will be an exhibitionist to a certain extent. A third theme, 
illustrated in ‘one’, which all brides-in-white enact, during the process of marriage, is 
‘being given away’, thus the concept of repudiation of parental authority is evoked. A 
fourth theme, illustrated in ‘six’, which all brides-in-white desire, during the process of 
marriage, is ‘to become a wife’, thus the psychodynamic concept of transformation of 
instinct encompasses this process. 
 
From the above six general overview readings several different and individualised 
themes seem to emerge: 
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For Sue, the vows and being together, seem to have been significant themes. 
For Sis, the importance of the wedding dress, and the severing of parental ties seem 
dominant themes. 
For Liz, not wearing white, not being a virgin, not changing her surname, were 
important themes. 
For Rose, there was a sense of perfection, where the marriage was to last forever, and 
her desire to become a mother was significant. 
For Francis, being the centre of attention, but with modesty, and wishing to be a virgin, 
but not quite in reality, emerged as significant themes. 
For Ann, there seemed a need to be in control versus the letting go of familial ties, were 
important themes. 
 
Drawing on the above work and the themes that have begun to emerge, and before 
concluding which themes dominate, let us review some themes in a quantitative manner 
by subjecting the whole data to a process of indexing. 
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2.6.7 Data analysis generated by indexing the whole data 
Emerging from the above general overview readings there appears to be words, 
concepts and phrases repeatedly used by different brides. These words may be used 
implying a common meaning, or may infer different meanings. Strauss and Corbin 
suggest that word, phrase, sentence or key-words-in-contexts analysis ‘can bring into 
awareness assumptions about what is being said or observed and demonstrate other 
possible meanings and interpretations’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:92). Let us therefore 
compare how keywords and phrases used by the participants to describe their 
experience may have both diffuse and common themes, extracted from the whole data 
by using an indexing method:  
 
acceptable to each family, 12Ann, 74 
 
beautiful, 'as I put my dress on I felt special and beautiful' 16AnnC02, 104 
beautiful 'knowing I was special, genuinely loved,  I felt as though I glowed' 09Pam12, 49 
beautiful, 'comes from outside qualities as well as inner qualities of feeling special' 02Louise12, 9 
beautiful, 'feeling beautiful is exhilarating,  I was the centre of attention' 17Ros12, 115 
beautiful, 'I bought a very beautiful elegant dress and I looked pretty good in it' 11Francis02, 62 
beautiful, 'I don't know about how I looked, I was just happy' 05Liz12, 24 
beautiful, 'I ensured I had a nice dress, but more important was that I felt happy' 15Freesia12, 100 
beautiful, 'I felt a sense of empowerment and feeling special wearing my beautiful dress' 11Francis12, 65 
beautiful, 'I felt like a princess, special' 04Sis12, 17 
beautiful, 'I felt pretty and special' 01Sue12, 5 
beautiful, 'I felt radiant, happy, I felt beautiful from within, happy within, 10Rose12, 58 
beautiful, 'I felt special as someone had asked me to marry them, I'd lost weight, and bought a beautiful dress, I felt 
special' 16AnnC12, 108 
beautiful, 'I hadn't felt so beautiful in my life' 02Lousie02, 8 
beautiful, 'I looked a beautiful bride when I was dressed in white, I felt proud' 07Elizabeth04, 33 
beautiful, 'I looked good and was proud of myself, I was a different person' 03Lucy12, 12 
beautiful, 'I looked quite good' 01Sue12, 4 
beautiful, 'I never knew that I could look so beautiful' 02Louise03, 8 
beautiful, 'I never thought I could be so beautiful, but I was delighted' 07Elizabeth12, 35 
beautiful, 'I no longer looked so beautiful after I had taken off my dress, that was sad' 12Ann07, 76 
beautiful, 'I think I did look beautiful, radiant, sparkling' 12Ann12, 73 
beautiful, 'It was a beautiful magical day with the spotlight on me' 12Ann19, 75 
beautiful, 'it was beautiful having the photos done with my friends, I felt proud' 03Lucy19, 13 
beautiful, 'it was beautiful to have my M there because I didn't have my dad' 03Lucy11, 12 
beautiful, 'like I'd never done before in my whole life' 02Louise22, 10 
beautiful, 'my friends cried when they saw I looked so beautiful' 06Debbie03, 28 
beautiful, 'my husband thought I was beautiful and everybody looked beautiful and happy' 06Debbie12, 30 
beautiful, 'my mother never knew I could look so beautiful' 02Louise11, 9 
beautiful, 'the crowning moment was when my husband said 'You look beautiful' 10Rose22, 61 
beautiful, 'the white dress is beautiful 02Louise05, 8 
beautiful, 'we had a beautiful day, I felt happy and blessed' 14Margaret19, 94 
beautiful, 'we had a beautiful day' 14Margaret06, 87 
beautiful, 'wearing the white dress and walking down the aisle, felt beautiful' 03Lucy20, 13 
beautiful, 'wearing the white dress I felt special and beautiful' 04Sis21, 19 
beautiful, 'when my dad said 'You look stunning' I felt close to him' 02Louise10, 9 
beautiful, 'when my F saw me and said how beautiful I looked, I felt grown up' 16AnnC09, 107 
beautiful, 'women look beautiful while men look smart, and people tell you, you look lovely and you feel special' 
14Margaret12, 91 
beautiful, 'you probably take more trouble looking your best than on any other occasion' 13Patricia12, 83 
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beautiful, when I saw myself fully dressed in white, I knew I was beautiful' 02Louise04, 8 
 
being given away brought our two families together, 01Sue15, 6 
being given away by F was as if I was a present, 10Rose15, 59 
being given away by my F felt important, 11Francis, 64 
being given away by my F would have been more emotional, 06Debbie15, 31 
being given away felt frightening, 11Francis, 66 
being given away felt supportive, one family to another, 12Ann, 74 
being given away is nice as you're handed over, 04Sis, 18 
being given away was an act of love, 17Ros, 116 
being given away was emotional, 07Elizabeth, 35 
being given away was sad as F had died, 06Debbie, 30 
being given away was special because F was there, 05Liz, 24 
being given away was upsetting because my F wasn't there, 03Lucy, 12 
being given away, happy mixed with sadness, 02Louise, 10 
being given away, I chose to be given, 12Ann, 78 
being given away, I couldn't wait, 09Pam, 49 
being given away, I felt that I'd already left home, 14Margaret, 92 
being given away, I knew I was doing the right thing, 13Patricia15, 84 
being given away, I'd given myself away before that, 05Liz, 25 
being given away, I'd left home some time before, 16AnnC, 109 
 
centre of attention, 01Sue19, 7 
centre of attention, 06Debbie, 32 
centre of attention, 11Francis, 63 
centre of attention, 09Pam, 46 
centre of attention, 10Rose, 56 
centre of attention, 05Liz18, 25 
centre of attention, 12Ann10, 72 
centre of attention, 12Ann12, 73 
centre of attention, 13Patricia12, 83 
centre of attention, 12Ann, 73 
centre of attention, 16AnnC, 110 
centre of attention, 11Francis, 67 
centre of attention, 02Louise, 10 
centre of attention, 14Margaret, 94 
centre of attention, 17Ros, 115 
centre of attention, 04Sis, 16 
centre of attention, 01Sue, 2 
 
change of surname, 01Sue, 6 
change of surname, 04Sis, 18 
changed surname, 13Patricia16, 84 
changed surname, 12Ann, 75 
changed surname, 16AnnC, 109 
changed surname, 06Debbie, 31 
changed surname, 11Francis, 67 
changed surname, 02Louise, 10 
changed surname, 14Margaret, 93 
changed surname, NOT, 05Liz, 25 
changed surname, 09Pam, 50 
changed surname, 17Ros, 116 
changed surname, 10Rose, 59 
changing surname, 07Elizabeth, 36 
 
cream dress, 16AnnC05, 105 
cream dress, 15Freesia, 21 
cream dress, 05Liz, 20, 97 
 
daughter, no longer, 09Pam20, 50 
defensive concerning sad memories, 13Patricia21, 85 
 
father and daughter, 10Rose15, 59 
father and daughter, 17Ros10, 115 
 
God, married in front of, 01Sue, 5 
God's blessing, 11Francis13, 66 
God's blessing, 08Resaria, 39 
God's blessing, 17Ros, 115 
God's bride, 10Rose, 56 
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God's eyes, 12Ann, 73 
God's eyes, 06Debbie, 31 
God's eyes, 17Ros, 115 
God's eyes, 10Rose, 56, 58 
 
ideal world, 17Ros01, 112 
 
journey, as exhibitionism, 11Francis, 69 
 
mother and daughter are probably, or more usually closer (than father and daughter).17Ros10, 114 
mother didn’t get married in white in the 1920’s no 1930’s.17Ros22, 118 
mother had a very difficult time emotionally and mentally and, she’d left home at one point, 11Francis, 64 
mother had helped me choose the pattern and the material. 17Ros04, 113 
mother had managed to get the piece of mud out of my dress 13Patricia06, 82 
mother had psychological problems which left me feeling a very insecure person.17Ros10, 115 
mother looked marvellous on the day, and being hospitable 13Patricia11, 83 
mother may have done something, I just cant remember 14Margaret11, 91 
mother never went to church, 11Francis, 65 
mother was born in the 1890s and I am sure women were regarded as inferior to men but my mother was a very 
strong character she was a much stronger character than my father. 14Margaret16, 93 
mother was only 23 when she got married 12Ann, 79 
mother was practical. Marvellous in doing practical things. If the dress hadn’t been right she’d been able to sort that 
out straight away.13Patricia11, 83 
mother would have done them as I wanted them. 12Ann21, 77 
mother, Because my mother was a very strong character and my father less so and probably I am more like my father 
than my mother, 14Margaret10, 90 
mother, become somebody's 10Rose07, 57 
mother, did the catering, or at least the catering was got from somewhere but she rushed about and catered. And she 
was always a good caterer, 11Francis, 65 
mother, didn’t play much of a role at all really, [laughter]. She just turned up, 06Debbie11, 30 
mother, had collared my husband-to-be and had said ‘Now you will look after her won’t you?’ 12Ann15, 74 
mother, I had always been with my sister or my mother and it suddenly felt very surprising to be in the car with my 
father. 11Francis01, 62 
mother, I wanted mum there because I didn’t have my dad. 03Lucy11, 12 
mother, I was glad that my mother hadn’t cried or been unhappy as any mother would in any formal 
situation.17Ros20, 117 
mother, I was glad that she approved of my marriage.17Ros11, 115 
mother, I went with my mother to buy my dress 14Margaret04, 86 
mother, I’m glad that my mother said that she would give me away 01Sue11, 4 
mother, If mum had lived closer to me then I’d probably have asked her to come and help me choose the dress, help 
me choose the flowers 05Liz11, 23 
mother, married in white 16AnnC05, 105 
mother, my mother did have a hard time really because we didn’t have a lot of money and she had to make ends 
meet, so she worked hard. 14Margaret10, 89 
mother, my mother had died before I married. 07Elizabeth11, 34 
mother, my mother helped me to get dressed, 02Louise03, 8 
mother, my mother must have said something because my mother always had to say what she felt, she was lovely, but 
she’d always have to say what she felt, the sort of person who would stand up and just say, she was very forthright 
14Margaret10, 89 
mother, my mother was really pleased, that I was getting married,01Sue03, 2 
mother, my mother wasn’t married in white, but in a beige dress with a beige hat 14Margaret05, 86 
mother, my mother would have said that I’d never been camera-shy. 10Rose19, 60 
mother, my mum didn’t really play a role, neither of my parents actually… although they paid for the wedding and it 
became their day, they were never really involved. 09Pam11, 48 
mother, my mum was absolutely fantastic. 04Sis11, 17 
mother, my Saddest memory was that my mother couldn’t be there. 15Freesia21, 26 
mother, my saddest memory was that my mother couldn’t be there.15Freesia21, 103 
mother, she’d been very supportive, very involved with my dress and one of the bridesmaids dresses. She’d done a 
lot of arranging 12Ann11, 73 
mother, there was a lot of teaching from my mother who was particular about not having sex before marriage 
12Ann08, 72 
mother, was there the whole time. The run up to it, the organisation, in the morning, helping me get ready, even to 
picking us up in the morning to take us to the airport again. She was there every step of the way.16AnnC11, 108 
mother, was very amusing. A very complex character my mother. 14Margetet10, 90 
mother, was worried. Emotional as well 02Louise11, 9 
mother, when I was younger, and my mother was in hospital suffering from cancer, my youngest sister committed 
suicide before my mum died. 08Resaria, 40 
mother’s role was being supportive of my father14Margaret11, 91 
 
my father and I drove to the church, 13Patricia01, 81 
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my father and I had a strong bond, 14Margaret10, 90 
my father and I were close, 14Margaret10, 90 
my father and I were more attached, 14Margaret10, 90 
my father and I were on our own, 11Francis01, 62 
my father and I were very close when I was a small child, 14Margaret10, 89 
my father and I were very close, 13Patricia09, 83 
my father and mother hired a horse & carriage, 12Ann01, 71 
my father cried because he was proud of me, 02Louise10, 9 
my father cried, 14Margaret09, 88 
my father did not think of me as his prized possession, 14Margaret15, 92 
my father did what was expected of him, 14Margaret09, 88 
my father gave me away, 10Rose15, 59 
my father gave me away, 14Margaret01, 85 
my father gave me away, 14Margaret09, 88 
my father gave me away, I was emotional, 14Margaret15, 92 
my father gave me away, it meant a lot to me, 05Liz10, 23 
my father had died, 06Debbie10, 30 
my father has always put me on a pedestal, 09Pam10, 48 
my father helped to unveil me, 11Francis14, 66 
my father is really nice and reassuring, 04Sis10, 17 
my father kept his vows, 10Rose10, 58 
my father knew someone, 11Francis20, 68 
my father literally clung to me and wept, 14Margaret21, 95 
my father master-minded the wedding, 13Patricia09, 83 
my father not sitting at the top table was my saddest memory, 06Debbie21, 32 
my father recently died, 01Sue10, 4 
my father rolled up the train, 12Ann19, 76 
my father said you look stunning, I felt really close to him, 02Louise10, 9 
my father spoke to me on the way to the church, 13Patricia09, 82 
my father thought more of me, than I meant to him, 14Margaret09, 89 
my father wanted to know if I was sure I was doing the right thing, 10Rose03, 55 
my father was a bit soft, 14Margaret10, 90 
my father was a remarkable, wonderful man, 13Patricia10, 83 
my father was dying of cancer, 14Margaret01, 85 
my father was in business, 14Margaret10, 89 
my father was in the car, but I can't remember anything else, 15Freesia09, 22 
my father was pleased how I looked, 13Patricia04, 81 
my father was proud to give his only daughter away, 14Margaret09, 89 
my father was supported by my mother, 14Margaret11, 91 
my father was very fond of me, 13Patricia10, 83 
my father was very proud of me, 04Sis10, 17 
my father wasn't awkward, 11Francis09, 64 
my father wasn't well, 12Ann10, 72 
my father would have been proud to give me away, 06Debbie10, 30 
my father wouldn't forgive me if I'd had a child out of wedlock, 09Pam05, 47 
my father, 11Francis01, 62 
my father, at first, was opposed to my marriage, 15Freezia10, 23 
my father, being self conscious with, 11Francis09, 64 
my father, I felt very warm towards him, 11Francis10, 64 
my father, I had a huge amount of affection for, 13Patricia10, 83 
my father, I hoped was proud of me, 10Rose10, 57 
my father, I was very proud to be on his arm, 10Rose10, 58 
my father, if he couldn't give me away, my brother, 14Margaret09, 88 
my father, was a significant figure 11Francis10, 64 
my father's arm I let go as soon as possible, 12Ann, 78 
my father's blessing is bestowed by him giving me away, 08Resaria, 40 
my father's name I was proud to carry, 06Debbie16, 31 
 
my parents exchanged words, 14Margaret10, 89 
my parents were faithful to each other, 14Margaret10, 90 
my parents were very good parents, 13Patricia15, 84 
 
patriarchal, being given from one man to another man, 12Ann, 74 
patriarchal, 11Francis, 66 
patriarchal, given from one man to another, 17Ros, 116 
 
people could see us, 12Ann11, 72 
people everywhere saw me, it was hugely supporting, 05Liz18, 25 
people saw me all day in my dress, 03Lucy20, 14 
people saw me so happy, 07Elizabeth, 38 
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people saw me, 10Rose16, 60 
people saw me, a sea of faces, 16AnnC18, 109 
people saw me, so many people, 07Elizabeth01, 33 
people saw that I was the bride, 04Sis05, 16 	  
retained/considered retaining maiden name, 11Freesia, 101 
retained/considered retaining maiden name, 09Pam, 49 
retained maiden name, 05Liz, 25 
 
surname changed, 15Freezia, 102 
 
tears as my F had died and couldn't see me dressed in white, 01Sue, 2 
tears as my mum wasn't well, 03Lucy21, 14 
tears associated with F giving me away 10yrs before, 16AnnC, 107 
tears associated with family members who had died, 07Elizabeth, 35 
tears from my sister when she saw me dressed in white, 07Elizabeth, 33 
tears of friends when they saw me dressed in white, 06Debbie03, 28 
tears of happiness from husband when he saw me, 04Sis, 19 
tears of joy from F, 08Resaria, 40 
tears of joy seeing smiley happy faces, 07Elizabeth, 33 
tears thinking about my M being there, 06Debbie, 30 
 
the 'father' at Church was nice, 01Sue13, 5 
 
tradition, 4, 16, 29, 53, 86, 105, 108 
tradition, 16AnnC05, 105 
traditional, 21, 24, 29, 52, 53, 88, 98, 101, 108 
traditional, 01Sue, 2 
traditional, 09Pam05, 47 
traditional, 17Ros22, 118 
traditional, 17Ros, 113 
traditionally, 114 
 
transitional object, 09Pam06, 47 
transitional object, 16AnnC, 111 
transitional object, 06Debbie, 29 
transitional object, 15Freesia, 21, 98 
transitional object, 13Patricia, 82 
transitional object, 04Sis, 15 
 
usually, a wedding can be likened to a scene from Sense and Sensibility, 12Ann, 77 
usually, the bride hangs onto her father, 12Ann, 78 
 
veil, As soon as I got my dress on and hair done and veil and once you get your dress on I thought, Oh my God! I’m 
actually going to get married. 
Veil, 01Sue03, 2 
veil 
As soon as I got my dress on and hair done and veil and once you get your dress on I thought, Oh my God! I’m 
actually going to get married.01Sue04, 2 
I didn’t want one at all. And my mum said ‘Oh you got to, got to, got to’, so I had one. In a way it helped me 
going up the aisle because I had a bit of a shield, you know, from everybody staring at me, but I didn’t really 
like it too much. 01Sue14, 5 
veil, A church wedding, would have assumed that a veil was worn. 13Patricia05, 82 
veil, Although I didn’t wear the veil right over my face the veil felt like a bit of a protective shield around me, 
because I was worried about standing at the front and getting very, very nervous and very hot and flustered. 
04Sis14, 18 
veil, As I’d gone down the aisle veiled, as I said, it was like walking through mist 10Rose16, 60 
veil, Because I wasn’t veiled and I was facing the people and they could all see me. 12nn17, 75 
veil, even though there were over a hundred people behind, because you had your backs to them and because of the 
veil.  It felt like there was a protective shield there, and there were just three of you, and that was nice as well and 
we knew the vicar. 04Sis22, 19 
veil, I associated wearing a veil with purity. 06Debbie14, 31 
veil, I didn’t wear a veil of course, like I had the first time; I just wore some flowers on my hair. 17Rose02, 113 
veil, I didn’t wear my veil over my face 09Pam14, 49 
veil, I don’t think that I liked being veiled. 12Ann14, 74 
veil, I had a very simple head sort of veil thing and head dress a circle of flowers and very simple. 11Francis03, 62 
veil, I liked being veiled. I really enjoyed being veiled. 11Francis14, 66 
veil, I sort of stuck my veil on in the car (laughter), hoping it wouldn’t fall off and dad said it looked ok. 05Liz12, 24 
veil, I thought the veil was optional, I chose to wear one I think because I felt a bit shy, in a church full of people, that 
was quite overwhelming. 05Liz14, 24 
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veil, My Cousin had very deft fingers and she got it and the veil on my head and...13Patricia02, 81 
veil, my daughter and I were having this discussion about the significance of veils and I think in her service the vicar 
referred to the necessity to pull the veil back to ensure [laughter] that the true person was behind it 
[laughter].13Patricia14, 83 
veil, my hair had all been done. My veil had been put on 10Rose04, 56 
veil, My veil was up and I felt such the centre of attention 11Francis18, 67 
veil, No, I didn’t have a veil. I had a tiara. 03Lucy14, 12 
veil, No, I didn’t wear a veil. 07Elizabeth14, 35 
veil, The first time, I though it was slightly ludicrous and outdated. But then it was the custom or the fashion so I 
went along with it. 17Rose14, 116 
veil, the veil was over the front of the face. 10Rose14, 59 
veil, walking down the aisle with the veil on – it was a bit of a security actually, because you can hide behind your 
veil (laughter). I don’t know, again it is something that I did because it was tradition 16AnnC14, 108 
veil, wearing a veil was a traditional 15Freesia14, 101 
veil, with the veil and the tiara and... It was amazing, with all my make up on and I just loved it. 06Debbie02, 28 
veil, with, the white dress, the veil and nice shoes. 16AnnC04, 105 
veil, You don’t try it on all together really, the veil, the tiara until the morning of the wedding day. 06Debbie04, 28 
veil, You had a veil and a headdress you wore your veil over your face when you arrived in church and it was s full 
length dress it came very close to the neck line and all the way down to the ground. 14Margaret05, 87 
veil: It felt really nice under the veil. I felt that I was underneath the veil so that no-one could see my face, or my hair. 
I felt really special. 02Louise20, 9 
 
virgin, I was not, 06Debbie, 29 
virgin, I was not, 17Ros22, 118 
virgin, I was not, 16AnnC, 106 
virgin, I was not, 07Elizabeth, 34 
virgin, I was not, 11Francis, 63 
virgin, I was, 09Pam05, 47 
virgin, I was, 12Ann, 72 
 
vivid memory, being left at home with my dad and leaving his security, 09Pam01, 46 
vivid memory, being overwhelmed that my parents had remembered my wish for a horse and carriage, 12Ann01, 71 
vivid memory, being with my father on my own, 11Francis01, 62 
vivid memory, disbelief about actually getting married, 02Louise01, 7 
vivid memory, driving to the church with my father, 13Patricia01, 81 
vivid memory, everybody looking at me, 06Debbie01, 28 
vivid memory, everybody smiling, 04Sis01, 14 
vivid memory, making the vows, 05Liz01, 20 
vivid memory, my dad seeing me in my wedding dress, 16AnnC01, 104 
vivid memory, my father being able to give me away, 14Margaret01, 85 
vivid memory, seeing everybody, I was happy, 07Elizabeth01, 33 
vivid memory, the car not turning up, 17Ros01, 112 
vivid memory, this was going to be perfect and last forever, 10Rose01, 55 
vivid memory, vows in church, 01Sue01, 1 
vivid memory, when the rings went on, 03Lucy01, 11 
 
vows liked to marrying in church, 13Patricia13, 83 
vows taken seriously, 10Rose07, 57 
vows, are the most important, 08Resaria, 42 
vows, as life-long + before God, 17Ros, 115 
vows, happiest memory, 17Ros22, 117 
vows, happiest memory, 09Pam, 51 
vows, linked to marrying in church, 06Debbie02, 28 
vows, made by husband, 16AnnC, 109 
vows, most vivid memory, 01Sue01, 1 
vows, most vivid memory, 16AnnC, 104 
vows, most vivid memory, 05Liz, 97 
vows, ok without 'obey' 14Margaret, 93 
 
white dress best dress, 17Ros, 113 
white dress feels special, 01Sue, 2 
white dress felt beautiful, 02Louise, 8 
white dress felt beautiful, 03Lucy, 13 
white dress linked with dreams, 17Ros, 114 
white dress linked with purity, 17Ros02, 113 
white dress linked with purity, 12Ann, 72 
white dress linked with purity, 07Elizabeth, 34 
white dress, linked with virginity, 17Ros08, 113 
white dress, I looked good in it and it was traditional, 17Ros05, 113 
white dress, looked lovely, 02Louise01, 7 
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white dress, brides always wear white in Church, 04Sis05, 16 
white dress, as a little girl I dreamed, 04Sis04, 15 
white dress, the colour white doesn't suit me, so I wore cream, 05Liz05, 21 
white dress, felt lovely, 06Debbie02, 28 
white dress, I felt special, 02Louise08, 56 
white dress, I always dreamed, 16AnnC05, 105 
white dress, I don't remember looking at myself fully dressed in white, 09Pam04, 46 
white dress, when I saw myself fully dressed in white it was as if all my dreams had come true, it was a magical 
feeling, 10Rose04, 56 
white dress, I felt beautiful, 08Resaria, 41 
white dress, As I was putting on my wedding dress I felt emotional, 03Lucy02, 11 
white dress, I felt special, 8, 11, 46 
white dress, I wouldn't have married in cream, because it was important to be married in white and in Church, 
09Pam04, 46 
white dress, I'd never worn a white dress before, 02Louise05, 8 
white dress, I've always dreamed of being married in white, 03Lucy05, 11 
white dress, likened to anniversaries, 10Rose02, 55 
white dress, linked to being a virgin and marrying in Church, 09Pam05, 47 
white dress, linked to Church, 09Pam05, 47 
white dress, linked to marrying in Church, 13Patricia05, 82 
white dress, linked to purity and marrying in Church, 10Rose02, 55 
white dress, linked with happiness, 17Ros21, 117 
white dress, linked with purity, 63, 82 
white dress, linked with purity, 17Ros22, 118 
white dress, as I put on my white wedding dress I never knew I could look so beautiful, 02Louise02, 8 
white dress, my mother married in white, 16AnnC05, 105 
white dress, not worn often, 16AnnC04, 105 
white dress, pure colour, 10Rose05, 56 
white dress, seemed to be extravagant, 14Margaret05, 87 
white dress, traditional 14Margaret09, 88 
white dress, traditional, 01Sue05, 2 
white dress, worn in Church, 06Debbie05, 29 
 
white dress, not represents purity, 01Sue08, 3 
white, no link between white and purity, 02Louise08, 8 
white dress, you can't wear if you're pregnant, 03Lucy09, 11 
white dress, not linked to purity, 16Annc08 ,106 
 
wife, I became, I liked that, 16AnnC, 111 
wife, I was going to be somebody's 09Pam02, 46 
wife, I was going to be somebody's 09Pam17, 50 
wife, I was going to be somebody's 09Pam20, 50 
wife, I was going to be somebody's 09Pam22, 51 
wife, I was going to be somebody's 10Rose07, 57 
wife, I was going to be somebody's 16AnnC, 111 
 
Words, themes and sub-themes most frequently used in the same or in different contexts 
are identified from a word analysis of the whole of the data, the following words or 
concepts most frequently used in order of usage are, with frequency in brackets:  
father (58); white dress (46); mother (44); beautiful (38); veil (30); being given away 
(19); centre of attention (17); vivid memory (16); surname changed (14); vows (12); 
tears (10); God (9); saw me (8); tradition (8); wife (7); virgin (7); retaining wedding 
dress (6); patriarchal (3); parents (3); cream dress (3); retained maiden name (3); father 
and daughter (2); the Minister (1). 
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From this analysis, if we compare these themes with the twelve themes cited earlier, we 
can see that many of the themes emerge again. Arguably, we may conjecture the 
following themes. First, this seems to reflect the importance of the father’s role, first in 
his relationship to his daughter, and second in giving the bride away. This may 
encompass the father’s patriarchal right and the bride’s separation or repudiation of 
parental authority. Second, the importance of the ‘white dress’ may reflect the 
significance of both a personal ego ideal and collective idealisation, and a means by 
which the daughter/bride becomes transformed into a wife, through an unconscious 
process of exhibitionism and illustrated by being the ‘centre of attention’. Third, the 
significance of the supportive mother’s role, may psychodynamically indicate the 
bride’s identification with the ‘castrated’ mother. Again, these themes encompass four 
principle themes of repudiation, ego ideal and idealisation, transformation and 
exhibitionism.  
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2.6.8 Data, analysis and the emergence of overarching themes 
After general overview reading six interviews, as a-typical profiles, as the interviews 
appear to expand on the themes under investigation, the next stage was to submit the 
data to phenomenological thematic concepts. The concepts are subsequently sorted into 
categories. Each concept leads to the pertinent data, and linking the semi-structured 
question are the participants who originated the data. This process involves the 
separating and amalgamating of some data groupings, and the occasional alteration of 
themes, until each theme is satisfactory, reflecting only the data. The next task was to 
examine the relationship between these themes and then sort them into overarching 
themes, under the core category of the subject’s dynamic ‘felt’ experience, within the 
ritual process of marriage. Marriage per say, however, not being the main focus under 
investigation, but forms a contextual frame within which the bride’s experiences are 
investigated with the principle aim of elucidating indications of unconscious processes. 
 
Let us examine how overarching themes are established in practice. Having completed 
the sorting of themes, as suggested by the questions asked during the interview, the next 
step is to consider each theme in turn and compare the data with psychoanalytic theory. 
The purpose of this process is to find support for statements made by the participants, 
and conversely to give additional weight to theoretical points discovered in the 
literature. Additionally, it is possible that ideas already put forward might be developed, 
or even that completely novel material may emerge. At this point the data, globally or 
individually, is not being analysed. 
 
Initially, some themes are anticipated, for instance during the formulation of the open-
ended questionnaire that provides the structure of the interview. For example: 
investigating whether the participant may link the wearing of a white dress with a sense 
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of purity, or asking the participant to speak about their relationship with their father, or 
wishing to explore any significance to them of marrying in Church. There were also 
questions that probed the participant’s happiest and saddest memories, as well as views 
concerning being seen, speaking the vows, and disrobing. 
 
Immediately, after Pam’s interview, for example relating to question five, which 
concerned why Pam chose to wear a white dress, my initial notes were as follows: 
There seems to be a strong connection in Pam’s mind between getting 
married in Church and wearing a white dress. And by wearing a white dress 
Pam gave her father pleasure and pride and gave herself pride while 
simultaneously avoiding shame and guilt. 
 
Later when I had listened to the interview again, I wrote some notes, as follows: 
Q5. Pam: Why you chose to wear white 
The style of the wedding had to be white 
I think it’s supposed to be a virgin to be wearing a [chuckle] white dress in those 
days 
not true white wedding 
lot of pressure put on me not to do anything wrong, to be a very good girl 
father would never forgive me if the same… if I had had a child out of wedlock 
father wouldn’t have been able to give me away in a traditional style 
give my dad that pleasure of giving me away as a bride 
that a little girl grows up to see that this is what happens on your wedding day 
important that I got married in church, more so than what I actually wore 
 
Researcher’s interpretation 
imperative to be white 
white signified a virgin 
being not a virgin, to wear white in church, was lying about your virgin status 
parental pressure to uphold family high moral standard 
unforgiving father, bringing shame to him and the family 
father’s pride was at stake, upholding tradition 
empathy towards father’s feelings 
pride in herself that she had given pleasure to her father 
childhood dreams becoming fulfilled 
white was a part of making a true wedding 
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Recognising that much of the investigation may be considered as pre-empting the 
spontaneity of the research, initially through the composition of original questions, there 
was also a gradual process of considering how the responses may be later analysed. 
Having examined Pam’s response, to question five, for example, and comparing my 
notes with psychoanalytic theory, as this project is exploring the possible connections 
between conscious decisions and unconscious motivations, I chose to make the 
overarching theme that was most pertinent, but also wide ranging and that seemed to 
best fit this topic. Pam’s responses to this topic include avoiding shame by ‘upholding 
high moral standards’, evoking both her father’s and her own pride, and the symbolic 
need to link the wearing of white to a ‘true’ wedding, and the imperative of being a 
virgin, all point towards the Freudian concepts of a personal ego ideal and collective 
idealisation. This psychoanalytic concept can be seen as being both very personal, and 
also wide ranging, as all the participants, in principal, wore a white dress. 
 
The process of searching for appropriate overarching phenomenological themes 
continued to proceed in the following manner. The researcher noticed that much of the 
bride’s time, while she wears a white dress, is taken up in moving from one place to 
another and being overtly seen. Fourteen of the seventeen participants (82%) expressed 
their feelings concerning being the ‘centre of attention’, for example 01Sue:  
 
During the interview with Sue I became aware that this bride’s father had recently died. 
However, as we discussed how she felt wearing a white wedding dress her face lit up 
and she was delighted to talk of the experience. 
 
Sue05’s response to why she chose a white dress 
It’s traditional to wear white. 
Wearing white makes you feel special, slightly embarrassed. 
Everyone is looking at you. 
But it’s nice and lovely. 
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Researcher’s interpretation 
An importance of adhering to tradition. 
‘Special’ feels like you’re the centre of attention, grabbing the limelight, demanding 
attention. 
May be, there is a need to be seen and adored, despite feeling embarrassed. 
 
Thus, a pertinent psychoanalytic concept that appeared to fit globally for all the 
participants seemed to be that of exhibitionism. Although this concept was chosen, it 
may be emphasised that the researcher did not fully understand its psychological 
implications at the outset. 
 
As already mentioned, feelings of loss were evident from the outset of the interviewing 
process. Loss, as understood in terms of mourning the death of a significant other, 
seems not directly to be under current investigation in this project, however it may 
become an integral part. Some degree of loss, however, was clearly experienced by all 
seventeen participants, (100%), when they are publically ‘given away’. Thus, some 
psychoanalytic concept was necessary to apply to this subtle process of a ‘living loss’, 
which could embrace both the father’s loss and the bride’s deliberate choice to leave, as 
for example Francis’ response to being given away: 
 
Researcher’s initial observations: 
This person appears to have experienced a lot of losses during her life 
Powerful relationship with father 
 
Francis15 response to being given away 
a warm close relationship with her father 
bride being honoured by father’s right to give his daughter away 
frightened due to a change of circumstances 
first time leaving parental security 
almost felt like being pushed away 
finality 
 
Researcher’s interpretation 
daughter’s close relationship with father 
afraid, uncertain, insecure,  
feelings of rejection, yet not rejection 
not returning home as daughter, not the same status 
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Although ‘repudiation’ is not considered as a classical Freudian psychoanalytic concept 
by Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) or in this context, the idea of repudiation seems to 
make a best general fit leaving room for each participant to express their separate view. 
 
While being a bride, arguably there are many changes that are undertaken. One aspect 
of being a bride may be understood as changing from daughter to wife and potentially 
into being a mother, as illustrated by Rose07’s response to thoughts associated with 
stepping out of her wedding dress:  
Researcher’s initial impressions: 
This interview seemed chaotic, as there was so much data. 
 
Rose07’s response emphasises:  
She would never be seen like this again. 
Vows were taken seriously. 
I’d no longer be Miss, but now wife and later mother. 
Sad at loosing part of my identity, but happy being half of something else. 
Wedding dress could be cut down for a Christening. 
 
Researcher’s initial interpretation: 
Being seen seems to be important. 
Taking her vows seriously. 
Changing roles from daughter, to wife, to mother. 
Change of identity incurring both sadness and happiness. 
The capacity to bear loss. 
A close connection between weddings and christenings, intergenerational continuity. 
 
Other changes often include a change of surname, a change of status, and a change of 
family structure. As this project focuses on potential unconscious change, the 
psychoanalytic concept of ‘transformation’ was considered as being pertinent and 
global to this investigation as this may throw new light onto the manner in which these 
changes are experienced and incorporated. 
 
Emerging from the above process of identifying themes, the following four overarching 
psychoanalytic concepts came to prominence: 
Ego-Ideal and Idealisation 
Exhibitionism 
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Repudiation 
 Transformation 
 
The structure of this discussion will now proceed based on the four principle 
overarching themes listed above. In each case I have nominated to explore the 
respective psychoanalytic theme primarily from a Freudian perspective, adding other 
relevant or contrasting opinions, followed by a brief summary based on Ann’s interview 
in order to frame the investigation, as all the interviews will be analysed together in Part 
Four. As psychoanalytic concepts embrace an understanding of human development 
from infancy to adulthood an emphasis on the Freudian stages of oral, anal and phallic 
and mental processes described by Freud as dynamic, economic and topographical will 
be utilised. The psychoanalytic approach is favoured above other approaches as it 
enables links to be made between the adult’s narrative and unconscious processes, that 
is, feelings that have often been repressed and now appear to put pressure on the 
instincts to seek satisfaction. The psychodynamic approach also facilitates connections 
to be made between the subject’s inner representations and outer realities of 
unconscious relationship dynamics. Let us now consider Ann’s interview using a closer 
reading of the data, in the form of a trial analysis, testing the four principle 
psychoanalytic concepts which have been chosen. 
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Interview with Ann – a closer reading and trial analysis 
Having completed the sorting of themes, the next step is to consider each theme in turn 
and compare the data with the theory. The purpose of this process is to find support for 
statements made by the participants, and conversely to give additional weight to 
theoretical points discovered in the literature. Additionally, it is possible that ideas 
already put forward might be developed, or even that completely novel material may 
emerge. At this point the data, globally or individually, is not being analysed. 
 
By free floating attention some cultural themes that may be found in the participant’s 
narrative may include: the importance of being a virgin on the wedding day; the bride’s 
feeling accepted by the husband’s family; the bride’s feeling that she is acceptable by 
her husband; the importance of marrying in Church, the significance of wearing a white 
dress; feeling beautiful. Emanating from psychoanalytic theory, the themes that may 
emerge include: the mother’s role; the father’s role; bride’s relationship with mother; 
bride’s relationship with father; the bride’s sense of being passive and accepting; would 
penis envy be detected in the data? 
 
Having argued, in Part Two, that the semi-structured questionnaire is apposite to be an 
interviewing frame, let us now consider how the collected narrative may be usefully 
understood within this system by doing a mico-reading of Ann’s interview which has 
been subjected to the ‘elimination of irrelevant repetition’, (step four of the 
phenomenological protocol), by ‘magnifying, amplifying and paying special attention to 
the detail’, (seventh principle of the phenomenological protocol), of the four 
overarching themes as a ‘trial analysis’. 
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Applying concepts in practice 
Having initially explored in Part One, and more closely in this Appendix D the four 
principle psychoanalytic concepts that may be applied to the bride’s experience let us 
examine how these concepts can be interpreted in Ann’s data. 
 
Let us consider the psychoanalytic concepts of ego ideal and idealisation, exhibitionism, 
repudiation, and transformation, as discussed above and in Part One, with Ann’s 
statements in order to illustrate how the different concepts may be interpreted. The 
selection of Ann’s interview is not intended to be a representative voice, but was 
selected because of the comprehensive content of the answers. Let us first examine the 
concept of the ego-ideal and how it may be understood in its five elements. First, Ann’s 
own narcissistic idealisation can be seen when she states. ‘certainly [I] had talked about 
becoming a bride quite a lot. I’m sure it was a phantasy from years before’. I believed, 
‘it was my destiny’ as ‘my parents had a very good marriage and so I’d got a wonderful 
role model to follow’94. For Ann, the sense of being an ideal object, in Freud’s terms, 
the idealisation of the ego-libido, appears to last the whole day, as she says: as I stepped 
out of my wedding dress ‘I did think it made me look quite beautiful’95. Ann’s sense of 
herself being an ideal object seems to be all pervading as she reflects on her sense of 
being beautiful, and desiring everything about herself to be perfect without spot or 
blemish. Being aesthetically and visually beautiful also translates into body image, as 
Ann says: ‘I had lost quite a lot of weight’ and my ‘height and slimness were 
accentuated…but looking at myself immediately having dressed’ the image I portrayed 
I thought ‘its gorgeous, lovely, I looked good’96. As Ann, continuing to reflect upon her 
own bodily and sexual ideal state speaks about why she chose to wear white: I knew ‘I 
was still a virgin and I’d never had sex with anybody’ and I knew ‘virgins wore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Question 18: dreaming about becoming a bride. 
95 Question 21: stepping out of my wedding dress. 
96 Question 4: when I saw myself fully dressed. 
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white’97. Ann now appears to associate appearance with feelings, as she links, it ‘wasn’t 
an unknown feeling’, with ‘stepping out onto the stage with all the lights on, being the 
centre of attention. I felt it was a blossoming feeling. I enjoyed sparkling, glowing, 
feeling radiant and beautiful’98. Ann also appears ‘very concerned’ when her father 
rolled up her train, exclaiming ‘it was pristine…when it started off’99, alluding to a need 
to remain in a perfect state. Ann’s sense of perfection is reinforced when she says: I 
remember as I signed the register being ‘anxious that I wasn’t going to make a blot with 
the pen and anxious about getting it right’100.  
 
Second, Ann’s interview illustrates a dichotomy and polarisation of the ideal when she 
uses words like ‘irritation’ towards the people assisting her to dress101 ‘disappointed’ 
with herself102 ‘anxious’, ‘apprehensive’, ‘terrified’ as she described her own feelings103 
‘trapped’, ‘uncomfortable’ as she considered being veiled while walking down the 
aisle104; ‘out of control’ while being photographed105 ‘concerned’ about her state of 
perfection106 ‘sad’, ‘spoilt’ as she considered her degree of beauty107. 
 
Third, Ann’s identification with her parents, and in particular her mother’s ideal, can be 
seen as she considers the connection between white and purity. Ann’s states that this 
‘was quite strong within my family…there was a lot of teaching from my 
mother…about not having sex before marriage’108. This also illustrates Ann’s 
identification with the ideals and social norms of the day. Ann’s identification with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Question 5: why I chose to wear white. 
98 Question 9: feeling beautiful. 
99 Question 19: Dress becoming dirty. 
100 Question 14: as you signed the register. 
101 Question 3: people assisting you to dress. 
102 Question 4: seeing yourself dressed. 
103 Question 7: travelling to the church. 
104 Question 11: being veiled. 
105 Question 17: being photographed. 
106 Question 19: dress becoming dirty. 
107 Question 22: saddest memory. 
108 Question 6: white and purity. 
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collective ideal is illustrated in her statement: ‘within my Church, which was my 
spiritual home, there was, a strong culture, virgins wore white and that’s what I did…[I 
had] very strongly held Christian beliefs, I was still a virgin…I’d never had sex with 
anybody’109. Arguably, the notions of ‘God’, ‘spiritual home’, and ‘Christian beliefs’ 
represent collective ideals with which Ann identifies.  
 
Idealisation also embraces parental and authority representations whose ‘qualities are 
elevated towards the point of perfection’, and their introjective identification 
‘contributes to the formation and elaboration of the subject’s so-called ideal agencies’ 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, (1973:202). This appears to be illustrated when Ann says: ‘I 
was quite overwhelmed’ to ‘realise my father and mother had’ taken notice of my ‘off 
the cuff remark’ and ‘hired a horse and carriage to take me to the Church’ ‘and they had 
actually done this for me’110. Ann speaks of her parents and the Church in an idealised 
manner when she, as already cited, states: ‘within my family there was quite a strong 
teaching from my mother and the Church about not having sex before marriage’111. Ann 
again refers to her parents in an idealised way when she says that ‘my parents had a 
very good marriage and so I’d got a wonderful role model to follow’112. Ann also 
appears to take her mother as an idealised object when she says that ‘my mother was 
incredibly supportive, involved with my dress, did a lot of the arranging, made her own 
outfit, arranged the Church flowers, so I wanted her to be very much part and included 
in the day’113.  
 
Fourth, idealisation, as Freud posits, notably in the sphere of love is ‘the sexual 
overvaluation of an object’ (SE14:94), and for Klein idealisation aims at ‘unlimited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Question 5: wearing a white dress. 
110 Question 1: most vivid memory. 
111 Question 6: connection between white and purity. 
112 Question 18: dreaming of becoming a bride. 
113 Question 8: the role your mother played. 
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gratification’ (M. Klein, 1946:7). In this study, the independent non-incestuous object 
of the husband appears to be idealised, as Ann recalls: ‘I was delighted to [walk] down 
the aisle to join him…and to [actively take] my husband-to-be’s hand’. Ann adds that 
my ‘happiest memory of the day was actually in the landau with my husband…[and 
being] on view to the whole hospital’114. ‘I was delighted with him, with the day and 
with everything’. 
 
Fifth, we can hear Ann’s sadness when she experiences less than her anticipated ideal, 
when she remarks that ‘we had spent ages with the hotel about the food we were going 
to have’ and I ended up ‘slightly disappointed’ because ‘when I actually saw it I thought 
no: my mum could have done that’115. Ann’s own sense of herself, appearing less than 
the ideal object, appears challenged when she reflects upon being photographed: there 
was a leaf on my train, ‘I wanted to bend down and take it off but the photographer 
wouldn’t take it off’, I felt ‘out of control’, ‘very uncomfortable’, even though ‘it was a 
beautiful’, ‘magical’, ‘blue sky’, ‘warm’, ‘wonderful’ day116. And again, Ann says: I 
wished ‘that my mother had made [both bridesmaids dresses], because my mother 
would have done them as I wanted them’117. 
 
Arguably, the mechanism of idealisation and its overvaluation of the object appears to 
compensate, bridge the gap, or become a defence for the Freudian lost narcissism and 
sense of control, for the Kleinian ‘bad breast’, and for Wollheim’s ‘anxiety’. In other 
words, it appears striking that, Ann found it necessary through idealisation, to some 
degree, to endow or overvalue many facets throughout the whole interview, arguably as 
a defence against the symbolic enactment of separation in order to transform frustration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Question 23: happiest memory. 
115 Question 20: wedding reception. 
116 Question 17: being photographed. 
117 Question 22: the saddest memory. 
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into something tolerable. Let us now consider from a psychodynamic perspective why 
the woman, and particularly the bride-in-white, may have a need to be seen. 
 
Let us consider how these elements of exhibitionism may be reflected in Ann’s 
responses. We may see in Ann’s interview how she understands the effect of 
exhibitionism when she states: My mother and father…had listened to my ‘off the cuff 
remark…years before’ and on ‘seeing the horse and carriage…I was amazed and quite 
overwhelmed’118. As Ann embraces the opportunity to be on show, Ann appears not to 
need to put her anxieties into others, by ‘teasing’ and arousing excitement in the other, 
when she says: I ‘didn’t want to be hidden’ I ‘wanted everybody to see how radiant I 
was’119. Ann seems to find her sense of identity in the collective other, as she says ‘I 
was delighted…I was on view to everybody…I wanted to be seen’120. Ann’s sense of 
her own beauty seems to embrace her whole person as she says, I felt ‘illegitimate about 
being the centre of attention’ but realised ‘this is my day and this is ok’, hence her sense 
of legitimacy and identity was confirmed by her feeling ‘really beautiful’ and ‘enjoying 
being the centre of attention’121. Let us now examine the infant girl’s need to repudiate 
the mother’s love in favour of the father before she repudiates both parents’ authority in 
preparation for a relationship with the non-incestuous other. 
 
Let us now consider how a series of repudiations, can be applied in practice and 
interpreted, by taking the same sequence as already explored in Part One and applying 
them to Ann’s statements. Ann’s interview illustrates how repudiation is used as a 
mechanism. First, Ann’s statement ‘I wanted [my mother] to be included in the day’122, 
may appear out of context, until we consider that the infant girl is required to repudiate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Question 1: Most vivid memory. 
119 Question 11: Being veiled. 
120 Question 7: Travelling to the Church. 
121 Question 9: Feeling beautiful. 
122 Question 8: the role mother played. 
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her love for her mother as a prior requisite for her psychic turning away from the 
mother in favour of the father. Arguably, Ann’s repressed guilt, and therefore 
unconscious, in the form of the infant’s repudiation of the mother’s love, seems to 
return in an adult form as a compensation. Second, her father facilitates his daughter’s 
repudiation of parental authority when he visually and symbolically ‘gives her away’. 
The bride proclaims her repudiation when she takes her vows; signs the register; and 
acknowledges her husband. In Ann’s interview she did not refer to the significance of 
taking the vows, but only to the ‘huge significance of Christian marriage’123. Third, Ann 
by saying ‘I was probably quite happy to just go along with ‘this is what you did…’ and 
‘so I think I was quite accepting’124, appears to express a ‘passive attitude’ and therefore 
not in any way repudiating her femininity. Ann acknowledges that her and her husband 
are harnessed together as she says to him ‘of course you can [have a ride] in the 
landau’125. Arguably, Ann repudiates her parent’s authority, through enactment, 
enunciation, and concretely by signing her maiden name for the last time, and in her 
acknowledgement of a new authority. Again thirdly, Ann preferred to understand that 
she was not to be ‘treated as the property of one man to be given to another’, but to be 
transferred ‘out of the protection of one family to another person [because of] ‘my 
feminist tendencies’126. Ann appears to be expressing her ‘spirited’ independence, 
separate from men. Fifth, Ann is clearly not repudiating men out of fear. Sixth, Ann, 
when recalling her feelings of being beautiful Ann stated emphatically, ‘Yes, I actually 
think that I looked really beautiful’127, appears to embrace her narcissistic feelings 
towards her femininity, self-esteem and confidence in the world ahead. Let us now 
explore the various vicissitudes of transformation that the infant girl has to accomplish 
in her development on her way to becoming a bride. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Question 10: significance of the Anglican Church service. 
124 Question 5: feelings about wearing a white dress. 
125 Question 15: processing down the aisle + Question 23: happiest memory. 
126 Question 12: being given away. 
127 Question 9: about feeling beautiful. 
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Let us return to Ann’s statements to see how these states of transformation may be 
understood. Ann’s interview illustrates the transformation of the sexual instinct in the 
following ways. First, in the transformation of an idea into affect, Ann illustrates this 
abundantly as she uses the words to describe her feelings of being ‘overwhelmed’128, 
‘irritation’129, ‘disappointment’130, ‘terrified’, ‘excitement’ and ‘embarrassment’131,  
‘uncomfortable’132, ‘anxious’133, ‘delighted and thrilled’134, ‘irritated’135, 
‘disappointed’136, ‘sad’137, ‘spoilt’138. Second, the transformation of scopophilia into 
exhibitionism may be illustrated when Ann states: ‘I enjoyed being in the 
limelight…sparkling, blossoming, glowing, radiant, and being the centre of 
attention’139. Third, the tension of the transformation of sadism into masochism or 
activity into passivity can be understood when Ann describes herself as having ‘feminist 
tendencies’140 but contrasts this by saying: ‘I was very compliant…accepting’141, and 
‘this is what my destiny was’142. Fourth, the intense attachment to her mother in the 
transformation of love into disappointment may be illustrated when Ann says ‘my mum 
could have done that’143, and ‘my mother would have done them as I wanted’144. Fifth, 
the transformation of loving into being loved is seen when Ann states ‘my mother was 
concerned that he would look after me and love me, this felt supportive’145, and ‘the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Question 1 + 2: most vivid, + putting on her dress. 
129 Question 3: assisted to dress. 
130 Question 4: seeing yourself dressed. 
131 Question 7: travelling to the church. 
132 Question 11: being veiled. 
133 Question 14: signing the register. 
134 Question 15: processing down aisle. 
135 Question 17: being photographed. 
136 Question 20: entering reception. 
137 Question 21: stepping out of dress. 
138 Question 22: saddest memory. 
139 Question 9: about feeling beautiful. 
140 Question12: being given away. 
141 Question 5: choosing a white dress. 
142 Question 18: dreaming about becoming a bride. 
143 Question 20: wedding reception. 
144 Question 22: saddest memory. 
145 Question 12: being given away. 
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happiest memory was being with my husband and we were on view’146. Sixth, 
transformation at puberty involves feeling both attractive and sensual, this may be 
illustrated when Ann saw herself fully dressed ‘I thought that I looked gorgeous, lovely, 
good’147; ‘I felt as though I was blossoming, sparkling, glowing, radiant, yes, I looked 
really beautiful’148; ‘I think [the dress] made me look quite beautiful’149.  
 
The above closer reading of Ann’s interview, conveys how with careful selection of the 
participant’s statements, the overarching themes are convincingly substantiated. This 
exploration does not attempt to be exhaustive of every different method of analysis, but 
offers a sufficient number of methods to be persuasive. In summary: emerging from the 
phenomenological research method the following four overarching psychoanalytic 
concepts are established: Ego Ideal and Idealisation; Exhibitionism; Repudiation; and 
Transformation. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Question 23: happiest memory. 
147 Question 4: being fully dressed. 
148 Question 9: feeling beautiful. 
149 Question 21: stepping out of the dress. 
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APPENDIX E 
Whole interview and interpretation 
 
1. Interview and interpretation - Sue 
As mentioned in Part Two, in an attempt to guard against the researcher’s interpretation 
bias of fitting the theory to the statements and fitting the statements to the theory, 
further psychoanalytic ‘case study’ interpretations are explored in Appendix E. I would 
like to introduce an interview conducted with Sue, a ‘recent’ bride. 
 
My most vivid memory was saying our vows in a church. Speaking to all your friends 
and family that we’re going to be together. I find speaking out loud in front of 
everybody embarrassing. But saying our vows means that were are going to be together, 
and are significant because you’re making a promise to each other. I don’t usually 
promise anything, I try my best. But a vow is a promise that you’re going to try and 
keep. I think that when you’re married you’ve got to try and work at the relationship 
instead of saying, “I’ll give up if anything goes wrong”. 01Sue01 
 
As I was putting on my white wedding dress my mum asked me if she could help. 
When I looked at myself in the mirror I thought, ‘wow’ this looks really special. It’s a 
special day and I thought I chose the right dress. When I walked down the stairs, 
everyone was really impressed with what I chose and what I looked like, which was 
really nice. For me, I wanted the dress to be plain but special, so I chose one that 
sparkled gold and silver around the top and the bottom. It wasn’t a modern dress but it 
was the first dress I saw. I tried on lots of other dresses before returning to this one. 
01Sue02 
 
My mother was the person assisting me to dress. She was really pleased and excited, 
that I was getting married, that I looked nice, that everything was just right and we were 
both happy. You’ve done your make-up, your hair and put the veil on and that’s when, 
you think, it doesn’t seem real ‘til you put on the dress. Initially, I didn’t feel nervous, 
or that anything was different. But as soon as I got my dress on and hair done and veil I 
thought, Oh my God! I’m actually going to get married. It hits you then. 01Sue03 
 
When I saw myself fully dressed I thought, I wished my dad, who had passed away, 
could see me now. He would have been so proud of me. So as I looked at myself in the 
mirror I shed TEARS…   Sorry. TEARS…,   I just closed my eyes and thought of my 
dad standing next to me. TEARS… 01Sue04 
 
I chose to wear a white dress because I thought it’s traditional and white makes me look 
brown (laughter). When I went into the shop, you see purple and gold dresses, but I 
thought, it’s a wedding, and I think you feel more special in a white dress. That’s how it 
should be really. ‘Special’, to me, feels like you’re the centre of attention. It’s you’re 
day, everyone’s thinking about you and nobody else is wearing a big white dress. The 
bridesmaids had gold dresses, so they blended in. 
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It’s nice to be the centre of attention (laughter). Initially I was embarrassed, well 
everyone’s looking at you. But when you get comments like, ‘Oh you look really nice’, 
it’s lovely. 01Sue05 
 
Yes, I was concerned about my dress becoming dirty because someone spilt a whole 
glass of red wine down the front of my dress (laughter). I thought, oh, no, what am I 
going to do? I’ve just got here. Help! Luckily the groom’s mum poured a whole bottle 
of white wine down the dress and it vanished. I was so relieved. My heart sank when I 
saw the stain, and my face was burning, but when it vanished I just didn’t care any 
more. It was gone, now I could carry on with the rest of the day. The dress had quite a 
big train and I thought that I’m going to leave it out for everyone to see. I wasn’t really 
worried about the dress becoming dirty round the hem as I thought I am going to wear it 
once, and I’m not going to wear it again, and so if it gets a bit dirty it doesn’t really 
matter. You pay all that money for a nice dress you want to show it off (laughter). 
01Sue06 
 
As I stepped out of my wedding dress I thought, it’s over. All the planning and 
organising that you’ve done just for one day, and you take your dress off and that’s 
over, but obviously you have your memories. This new situation is going to take a bit of 
getting used to. (In a whisper): I shouldn’t be saying that really, should I? I’m ‘Mrs.’ 
Mm… I’m ‘Mrs…’, which is really nice, because you feel more together. More… you 
come together, it’s a nice feeling. ‘Coming together’, for me means that you’re always 
going to be there for one another, which we would have been anyway, even if we 
weren’t married. But I think it’s more, showing everybody that you’re committing 
yourselves to one another. We hadn’t been going out for very long before we were 
engaged. And I think quite a lot of people found that quite strange. As the groom said in 
his speech, we knew from the start that we were meant to be together, which was true, 
and I think that we will always be together. That was it, that we we’re together forever 
(laughter). 01Sue07 
 
I don’t really make a connection between white and purity because for me the white 
dress doesn’t really relate to purity. I don’t think it does because you are a person 
inside, and you might not be good, but you could still wear a white dress. I don’t think it 
matters. My friend got married in August and she wore a white dress and they are not 
now together. They were together three months after their wedding and it wasn’t… well 
he wasn’t really that committed when they married. But they still went ahead with it. 
So, to me, you could have cheated on your husband to be and still wear a white dress. 
Society’s changed a lot, hasn’t it? 01Sue08 
 
Travelling to the church wasn’t a very long distance [laughter] but as I thought about it, 
what really hits you is, I’m really going to get married, and the butterflies started and 
my heart was pounding, that was quite a nice feeling to get excited about. Because the 
last few months have been quite sad for me, and the excitement again, it was brilliant, 
and an uplift to me. It was sad in the same way because my dad wasn’t there but, and 
that you know it was exciting and it was good. 01Sue09 
 
This question was not asked because we already knew that Sue’s father had died. 
01Sue10 
 
I’m glad my mother gave me away, as she thought I would ask my brother. Oh, not me! 
I thought, she’s next in line from my dad. She brought me up; she’d seen me grow into 
the person I am; she made me that person, so to me it was very special that she gave me 
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away. Even though my brother is special to me. My mum helped to organise everything. 
She said, don’t worry I’ll sort it. She made sure that I didn’t have anything to worry 
about. She said: “have a good day and enjoy it”, which was nice. 01Sue11 
 
I don’t know about feeling ‘beautiful’, but, I did think I looked quite good [laughter]. 
Because all the planning and for the hair, I wanted everything just so and … well, I was 
quite concerned with my own make up. I had someone to come and do my make-up but 
was not sure I liked it, so I fiddled and fiddled with it. I thought I can do it better 
myself. And looking at the photos I’m glad I did. I’d prepared myself for weeks, having 
this beauty plan for my face and spray tan to match…, and my nails done. So you do 
feel special. And everyone says how nice you look, and you think I do look quite nice. 
One of my friends said: “it’s a fairy tale wedding, you look lovely, everything’s 
perfect”, which was a very nice thing to say. Although the friends’ comments made you 
feel pretty and special, my fiancé said: “you look lovely”, as long as he thinks you look 
nice [laughter], you don’t care about… well I’d like everybody’s comments, but that’s 
the main thing... 01Sue12 
 
There wasn’t any significance of the Anglican Church service, to be honest, because I 
am a Catholic. My fiancé hasn’t got a religion, he hasn’t been christened either. I don’t 
practice as a Catholic, so we went along to one of the services at our local Anglican 
church and found it was quite formal but nice. The ‘Father’ who married us didn’t mind 
that we weren’t from the church. He was grateful that we were going to get married in 
Church in front of God. This was particularly important now that dad has passed away, 
because I felt that he was there for me and if I’d got married in a register office, or 
whatever…, I think you think they are going to be there more. I don’t know if that 
sounds silly but.., that’s how I felt. 01Sue13 
 
I didn’t like being veiled to be honest [laughter]. I didn’t want one at all. But mum said 
‘Oh you got to, got to, got to’, so I did. In a way it helped me going up the aisle because 
I had a bit of a shield from everybody staring at me, but I didn’t really like it.  I don’t 
think it made me feel special. I did take it off at the reception [laughter]. 01Sue14:  
 
It was nice being given away because it brought his family and my family together. My 
mum said to my fiancée, ‘here she is’, and my fiancée’s parents did the same for him. I 
thought that was lovely, there was joining, we weren’t just a couple we had our two 
families supporting us. That was nice. And when the respective parents and the minister 
joined our hands together, I thought that was very nice. 01Sue15 
 
As I signed the register I felt that I was no longer a ‘P’ [laughter] my surname had 
changed, which felt a bit strange. It was as if you were signing yourself to one-another. 
01Sue16 
 
Changing my surname was quite sad really. Now I don’t sign my old surname. As a 
twin we were always known as the ‘P’ twins, and we are no longer the ‘P’ twins 
because, I’ve got a different surname. So we both have different surnames, which is 
quite strange. We were always known together, and now we’re not together all the time, 
because we now live in separate houses, it’s quite strange. It feels as if we are a long 
way away emotionally, even though she’s five minutes down the road. We’ve lived 
together for nineteen years and haven’t been apart from one another except for school 
and we’d always go out together. 01Sue17 
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As I processed down the aisle on leaving the church it felt ‘phew’, we’ve done it now. I 
was embarrassed and shaking when we were saying our vows but once we came down, 
whuu…, we can go and enjoy the rest of our day together with everybody and celebrate 
with our families. 
It wasn’t that I was embarrassed at making the vows, rather, I was embarrassed about 
talking loudly in front of a lot of people. We hadn’t practiced what we had to say, out 
loud. So I was just nervous that I was going to get it wrong, rather than embarrassed. 
01Sue18 
 
Because it was windy and cold we did the photography inside. At first I couldn’t relax, 
partly because I felt self-conscious as I don’t like showing my teeth. You hope that 
you’re smiling looks natural. Although I felt the centre of attention, everybody at that 
point was joining together in that attention as well. So they felt that they were special as 
well. 01Sue19 
 
When everybody had sat down I entered the wedding reception and was clapped in. It 
felt like both families saying ‘welcome to our family’. That was nice. 01Sue20 
 
My saddest memory was my dad not being there to share the day in person. That was 
the hardest thing. 01Sue21 
 
There’s quite a few happy memories about being a bride-in-white. Coming into the 
church, processing down the aisle–both coming in and walking out, going to the 
reception. And having a husband after, that’s a really nice feeling. 01Sue22 
 
 
A psychodynamic interpretation 
We learn from Sue’s interview that Sue had a twin sister. Yet Sue suggests that she was 
prepared to be separated from, change her surname, and now live separately from her 
twin after nineteen years (01Sue17), and be welcomed into a new family (01Sue20). 
Sue suggests that she now wants to work at the new relationship (01Sue01), at a time 
after Sue’s dad had died (01Sue04). Because Sue wished to become ‘Mrs.’ (01Sue07), 
this indicates a transformation of instinct away from a mother attachment to a father 
idealisation. Because being married felt ‘that you’re always going to be there for one 
another’ 01Sue07), and because Sue and her husband-to-be ‘knew from the start that 
they were meant to be together’ (01Sue07), and Sue reinforced her belief that ‘we will 
always be together forever’ (01Sue07), may indicate that Sue did not have any difficulty 
in repudiating parental authority. 
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Although we do not learn the exact chronological sequence of events regarding Sue’s 
father’s death, Sue’s subsequent engagement and marriage, we may conjecture on Sue’s 
transferring a strong anaclitic leaning from a father attachment to a husband attachment. 
We learn that Sue’s most vivid memory concerns ‘saying the vows in Church’ 
(01Sue01), which Sue connects with feeling close to her now deceased father 
(01Sue13), being ‘welcomed into a family’ (01Sue20), ‘having a husband’ (01Sue22), 
and that they were ‘going to be together… try to keep it going… and not give up on the 
relationship’ (01Sue01). These sentiments indicate Sue’s ability to envisage an anaclitic 
attachment, containing compromise. 
 
That although Sue expresses a wish to feel beautiful, and have ‘everything perfect’ 
(01Sue12), Sue also speaks in terms of ‘looking quite good’, and ‘looking quite nice’ 
(01Sue12), ‘pretty and special’ (01Sue12), Sue does not appear to overemphasise her 
narcissism. This seems to be illustrated when Sue refers to her wearing her white 
wedding dress; that although Sue felt ‘special’ and ‘the centre of everyone’s attention’, 
for Sue ‘its nice’ and rather ‘embarrassing’ (01Sue05). It could also be suggested that 
Sue indicates a rather self-effacing characteristic when she says ‘although I felt the 
centre of attention, everyone everybody was joining together in that attention as well’ 
(01Sue19), indicating that Sue was not overly exhibitionist or narcissistic.  
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2. Interview and interpretation - Rose 
Let us now consider an interview conducted with Rose who recalls her wedding day 
experience from over ten years previously. 
 
The most vivid memory of my wedding day was entering the Church and seeing all the 
guests and my husband-to-be standing at the bottom, turning round looking at me 
coming down the aisle. I was aware of the music we had chosen which, instead of going 
down to the ‘Here Comes The Bride’, was ‘Oh Perfect Love’. That was the most 
magical moment because it was what my dreams and hopes were, that this was going to 
be perfect and would last forever. 10Rose01 
 
As I was putting on my wedding dress it felt as though I had butterflies in my stomach. 
I was concerned, would my fiancée like the style of dress I’d chosen? Would he think 
the same as me? In 1961 there wasn’t really a choice, other than white. White was 
chosen as being significant in church, with its association with confirmation, as it 
represented purity. When I’d put my dress on I thought I looked the ‘bees knees’, but 
would everybody else think that? I also realised that symbolically I was going to give up 
my single identity. By going to church I was going to come out a married woman, 
which would change my whole life. 10Rose02 
 
A friend of my husband’s made my wedding dress and she was there on the day to help 
me dress. I hoped that I would do it justice, because of all the hard work she put into it. 
I was the only daughter and the first to get married, so mum was a bit flappy, and was 
saying ‘calm down’, because every bride’s a bit butterfly’i aren’t they? My father 
seemed to be taking it all in his stride. He was more interested in whether I was sure: 
‘was I doing the right thing?’ He said I still had time to change my mind [laughter]. 
There was a general feeling of anxiety. I suppose mum thought I was ‘right’ for him. 
The two bridesmaids were excited about how they and I looked. Mum offered me a 
glass of sherry while the dress-maker was concerned I didn’t spill it down her lovely 
[laughter] work. There was also a feeling of joy throughout the household. 10Rose03 
 
When I saw myself fully dressed in white I thought that I looked really good: the ‘bees 
knees’. I wondered, is this really me? My hair had been done and veil was on, and the 
dress was sticking out like a meringue. I felt like a fairy on the top of a Christmas tree 
[laughter]. I thought, everyone’s going to be looking at me and I look and feel really 
good. I realised that I’d never looked like this before. It was quite magical really. I 
wasn’t trying on an ordinary dress. I thought this is going to be a one-off, a very special 
day, in a special dress. It was as if all my dreams had come true, now I look like other 
brides. It’s a very magical feeling. 10Rose04 
 
I chose to wear a white dress because it symbolised everything about getting married in 
Church. It was the only colour to wear. At Sunday school anniversaries little girls were 
always dressed in white. White seemed to be the colour chosen by God, a very pure 
colour. White hadn’t been dyed, is a very natural, pure colour, and symbolises purity. 
You were saying you were pure, in the eyes of God. Other churches use the expression 
‘Bride’s of God’ when you commit yourself to church life in Communion. 10Rose05 
 
I didn’t think that my dress got very dirty because we didn’t have wet weather. But as 
the dress dragged on the floor at the back I was very anxious that I should change out of 
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it as soon as possible, because I wasn’t sure whether I was going to keep it in tissue 
paper as an heir-loom, or if I had a daughter she might wear it, or the material might be 
used for a Christening robe, or be worn again for somebody else’s wedding where again 
there would be happiness. 10Rose06 
 
As I stepped out of my white wedding dress I thought that I’d never be wearing another 
dress again like this. As I took those vows it was a very conscious decision that I’d no 
longer be ‘Miss’, I was going into something where I would now be somebody’s wife 
and hopefully somebody’s mother. It felt as though I’d lost part of my identity, because 
I’d united. I was not one any longer, but half of something else. So, quite sad really. 
10Rose07 
 
I associate purity with being unspoilt, unmarred, untouched and saved. 10Rose08 
 
While I was travelling to the church I felt as if butterflies were in the stomach. It was a 
big life-changing thing. I knew that once I had taken my vows I didn’t want to ever 
break them. It was an awful lot to take on board. You were now going to be committed 
to one man, wholly and entirely. It was going to last a life-time. I was hoping that I was 
going to keep my vows. I took this very seriously, but who knows what life is going to 
bring. And how was I going to feel if one day I did want to break my vows and perhaps 
go off, have an affair, get divorced, not look after my husband if he was sick. ‘Vow’ is a 
very big word. It means you are going to do what you said and you’re not going to let 
anything stop you. It’s a very big commitment in life. Also, would my husband keep his 
vows? What if he didn’t keep them? It’s an awful commitment. So I felt very serious on 
the way to church, thinking it’s not a bit of fun. You’re not going to be able to change 
your mind tomorrow. This is a big thing you’re going into. 10Rose09 
 
I hoped my father would feel proud of the way I looked. He would have liked to think 
that everybody was looking at me, thinking that I was looking good, and I had chosen 
the right person and was happy with that choice. Perhaps he was looking forward to 
another generation, as I was his eldest child. I was very proud to have a father who had 
kept his vows, and been married a very long time. He looked smart in his suit. I felt 
very proud of being on my father’s arm that day. He’d brought me up for twenty-one 
years and now he was going to give me away to a man that he’d hoped would look after 
me, the same as he’d looked after me. I hoped I could follow in his footsteps, so that 
he’d be as proud of me as I was of him. 10Rose10 
 
I was very conscious that both my parents were together, and hadn’t divorced. It was a 
very nice feeling to have both sets of parents there to see what was probably the biggest 
day of your life, and for them to witness the changing from being an individual to 
becoming half of something, and united. I was very proud that my mum looked very 
smart in her suit and hat. And proud of what my parents had done for me. 10Rose11 
 
I think a bride feels beautiful and radiant because you’re happy within. It’s what little 
girl’s dream of from when they are very little, being like a princess [laughter]. 
10Rose12 
 
I’d always been a church-goer from very young. I trained as a Sunday-School teacher 
and been confirmed in the Anglican church. So for me getting married in church was 
right because I wanted to get married in the eyes of God. Although God is present 
everywhere the church is God’s house. To have been married in a register office without 
the hymns ‘Oh Perfect Love’, I don’t think I would have felt married. It wasn’t for the 
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confetti throwing or the pomp and glory, it was for the actual church service to feel 
married, in the eyes of God. To have sung the hymns we wanted; ‘Oh Perfect Love’, 
‘Love Divine’, and ‘The Lord’s prayer’, were all very significant to me. My husband 
had been a church-goer, and an alter boy, so church played a significant part for us both. 
10Rose13 
 
When the veil was over the front of the face it felt rather funny. So there was a sense of 
relief when I reached the end of the church aisle and the vicar put the veil back. It was 
like coming out of a fog, then you could see clearly again. 10Rose14 
 
I thought ‘being given away’ was an odd, strange choice of words. It’s like being 
thought of like a gift. It’s as if this is why they dress you up in all this finery as they are 
giving you away as a present. I was still going to be my father’s daughter, things 
wouldn’t change, and he would still be my father so why do they use the words ‘Give 
Away’, as though you’re a piece of property, more so than flesh and blood. I didn’t feel 
that my father was getting rid of me. I thought we’d still be father and daughter as we’d 
always been before I got married. 10Rose15 
 
As I signed the register I felt as though I’d lost a little bit of identity. I was no longer 
going to be ‘Miss’, but be ‘Mrs’, half of a couple. You know, are you going to be a half 
and not a whole now? It felt very strange to be writing a different name after twenty-one 
years and all of a sudden you’ve lost that old surname. I’d got a new identity. How 
would old friends find me now because I’d got a new surname? 10Rose16 
 
I found the new surname was a much shorter [laughter] than my maiden name. I 
wouldn’t have to tell people how to spell it any more. During the years of growing up 
I’d been teased. Now I’d probably get some different ribbing [laughter]. 10Rose17 
 
As I’d processed down the aisle veiled, like walking through mist, on the way back you 
could actually look and pick out all the people. Oh, there’s Aunty, and there’s my 
friend. Checking up on the guest list, in a way [laughter]. Seeing a sea of faces you 
hadn’t seen for years. And also people who weren’t guests had turned up to see you get 
married. As you processed out of the church, I felt I’m a married woman, [laughter]. 
Life’s going to change. I’m going to have somebody else to think about. It won’t be, 
what do I fancy for tea, rather, what does he fancy for tea? 10Rose18 
 
My mother would probably say: “she really enjoyed being photographed because, she’d 
never been camera-shy and if she thought that she looked good, they would get a good 
photograph. Both my husband and I had belonged to a photographic club, so the 
wedding photographs were taken by a friend. So I was very comfortable in front of him. 
I certainly wasn’t camera-shy. So being photographed didn’t bother me at all. The more 
photographs the better. The photographic club had always said that I was photogenic. I 
could have been photographed all day; posed, unposed, or natural. 10Rose19 
 
On entering the wedding reception I thought how nice the hall looked, the tables, laden 
with food was done by friends of my mother’s. Because I was twenty-one the day 
before I got married, my mother had provided a birthday cake as a surprise. I thought I 
was going to have a three-tier wedding cake and wondered why there was an odd tier on 
the side. The lady’s had put little black outfits with white pinny’s on. They all looked 
very professional. I was very pleased with the effort that everybody had made. And I 
hoped that all the guests were going to enjoy it. 10Rose20 
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My saddest memory was when it was all over and the group played ‘The Last Waltz’. It 
had all gone very quickly and smoothly. I would like to go back, and do it all over 
again. It didn’t seem to last long enough. Everybody had enjoyed themselves. But 
saying good-bye to aunts and uncles that you didn’t see very often was sad. It’s also sad 
that it takes something like this to get everybody together as we can so easily loose 
touch. Sad because all this effort, all the tables had been cleared, and the balloons burst. 
Sad that it was all over, but mixed with happiness as well at how nice everything had 
been, and happiness that you’re going onto a new phase of life, a new life, a different 
life. A mixture of sadness and happiness really. 10Rose21 
 
My happiest memory about being a bride-in-white was, as I stood at the front, having 
processed down the aisle, my husband-to-be whispered out of the corner of his mouth 
[whispered] ‘you look beautiful’. That would have to be the crowning moment. 
10Rose22 
 
 
A psychoanalytic interpretation 
From learning that Rose, after putting on her white wedding dress felt like the ‘bees 
knees’ (10Rose04), was the ‘only daughter’, so perhaps felt that she had been treated 
specially, and had ‘never been camera shy’, we find an indication of narcissism, 
exhibitionism and not fearing castration. 
 
Rose’s interview indicates that Rose’s projects a narcissistic romantic dream onto her 
new relationship which Rose hopes will be endowed with ‘Perfect Love’ (01Rose01). 
However, Rose by being concerned that she will now have to compromise her 
narcissism by becoming ‘half of something else’ (10Rose07), indicates that she is 
prepared to sacrifice part of her narcissism for an anaclitic attachment. 
 
We learn from Rose’s interview that Rose’s mother was a bit ‘flappy’ and how there 
was a heightened sense of anxiety, but also of joy, throughout the house while Rose was 
putting on her wedding dress (10Rose03). In contrast to Rose’s mother’s anxiety, 
Rose’s father seemed to be a different character, ‘taking it all in his stride’ (10Rose03). 
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We sense that Rose was in a dream-like state influenced by the phantasy of ‘Perfect 
Love’, the ideal of wearing a white dress which represents purity, and looking like the 
‘bees knees’. In contrast to this idealised state we learn of Rose’s serious side. For Rose, 
the ‘vow is a very big word, a big commitment’ (10Rose09), and that through 
identification with her parents, Rose wished her new relationship to stay together and 
not divorce (10Rose11). 
 
We also find in Rose’s interview, a sense of a struggle to leave home. It seems as if 
Rose resists the repudiation of parental authority when Rose indicates that she felt 
strange being given away because she ‘was still going to be her father’s daughter and 
things wouldn’t change’ (10Rose15). This indicates that Rose seems very attached to 
her father and wishes his influence over to continue. 
 
From Rose’s interview we gain a glimpse of Rose’s family situation. Rose being ‘the 
only daughter’ and ‘the first to get married’ (10Rose03) and Rose felt ‘anxious’ 
(10Rose03).  
Mother was experienced as ‘flappy’ (10Rose03) but thought Rose ‘was doing the right 
thing’, while father was experienced as ‘taking it all in his stride’ (10Rose03) but father 
seemed concerned, ‘was Rose doing the right thing?’ (10Rose03). 
 
We don’t learn that Rose’s mother helped to choose Roses dress (10Rose05), help Rose 
to dress on her wedding day (10Rose03), or to assist Rose taking her dress off 
(10Rose07). It seems as though Rose at this point in her life was relatively independent 
from parental dependency. What seemed to concern Rose in these matters was 
principally her husband-to-be’s and others’ response. Rose states ‘I hoped that my 
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husband’s friend thought I was doing the dress justice ‘10 Rose03). ‘I was concerned, 
with my fiancé likes the style of dress I’ve chosen (10Rose02). 
 
Mother was experienced as approving Rose’s choice of husband (10Rose03), while 
Rose’s father checked that Rose felt comfortable with her choice of a husband 
(10Rose03). 
 
Idealisation 
Throughout Rose’s interview we can detect indications that Rose idealised her wedding 
day experience. Rose uses phrases such as, ‘we chose the music to Oh Perfect Love’ (10 
Rose01) for me to enter the Church. After dressing Rose thought that she looked ‘the 
bees knees’ (10Rose02) and (10Rose04). When Rose chose her white wedding dress 
because it was a colour chosen by God (10Rose05) and ‘associates purity with being 
unspoiled’ (10Rose08), her first reaction to the idea that address could have become 
dirty was of denial; ‘I don’t think my dress got very dirty’ (10Rose06), and anyway ‘I 
was anxious to change out of it as soon as possible’ and perhaps ‘keep it as an heir-
loom’ (10Rose06). 
 435	  
3. Interview and interpretation – Francis 
I would now like to introduce an interview conducted with Francis who recalls her 
wedding day experience from over ten years previously. 
 
My most vivid memory was being with my father on my own in the car while travelling 
to the wedding because I realised I hadn’t been to any important occasions with my 
father on my own before. I had always been with my sister or my mother and it 
suddenly felt very surprising. Also I didn’t know what to say to him because I felt self-
conscious. 11Francis01 
 
I bought my wedding dress in a bit of a haze. I didn’t want it to be lavish. It was tailored 
to my body, straight down, a full-length dress to the ground with long sleeves. I thought 
it was elegant and beautiful, and as I hadn’t worn anything as elegant as that before I 
realised that I looked pretty good in it. It was classical in any era. So when I put my 
white wedding dress on in the shop, I thought it would do. Until I put it on I couldn’t 
envisage myself in it. 11Francis02 
 
I didn’t have much assistance putting on my dress. My sister helped, but it was a simple 
dress, being tailored. I had a simple veil, and the head-dress was a circle of flowers, 
nothing fussy. Once I put it on it just did the thing. 11Francis03 
 
Once I saw myself fully dressed I was eager for it to happen. I felt transformed into 
something very special. I did something very strange. I had my long hair cut really short 
about a month before I got married. It was a terrible struggle sticking the head-gear on 
to this short, sort of, boyish hair. I knew that my hair shouldn’t have been cut 
[laughter]. I realised that my short hair did well because I was playing a lot of sport, but 
it wasn’t the kind of hair that went with the dress, a bit too boyish. 11Francis04 
 
I chose to wear a white wedding dress because I was a virgin. The question of virginity 
was a big one, because people in the 1960’s would have quite a sensual relationship, but 
as long as they hadn’t had penetration they were a virgin. So I thought the virginal 
marriage was one where you hadn’t touched each other too much or had had 
penetration. But in some senses the whole thing about who was and who wasn’t a virgin 
was in question.  
 
I hadn’t intended to have full sex before marriage. I’d tried to stay a virgin, but was not 
quite. So there was a paradox. I didn’t feel that I wasn’t a virgin. About two weeks 
before we married we had a row. The way we made up was my husband-to-be insisted 
we had sex, which I wasn’t keen to do as I was a virgin. So I really had the sex to get 
married, and to make sure that he didn’t run away. Technically I felt that I’d lost my 
virginity, but not willingly. As it was a bit of a mistake, I decided that I was a virgin, 
but I wasn’t quite. I felt that the white dress was important because that was what I was 
intending, but at the same time there was a bit of cheating going on. 11Francis05 
 
My white dress didn’t become dirty in my view. I wore it just for that day and we didn’t 
go out into the garden, so it remained pristine. We came out of the Church and straight 
indoors because it was cold. 11Francis06 
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The difficulty about changing out of my wedding dress was that the whole thing didn’t 
last long enough because I felt so good in my wedding dress, having all the attention the 
whole day. I hadn’t had that kind of attention on my own before as I had always been 
with my sister and others around me if it was a special occasion. I hadn’t been the 
centre of attention like that before and it was very rewarding. So I felt very sad that I 
hadn’t worn it long enough. 11Francis07 
 
I had learnt that if you didn’t get married in white, in the 1960’s, the tendency was there 
was a question about your virginity. I was also in the church choir so there was a kind 
of religious question there… robed in white, so white and purity went hand in hand. 
11Francis08 
 
While travelling to the church I felt I was in a very unusual place, a bit estranged, like 
not sure what was happening. I felt self-conscious being with my father because I didn’t 
know how you talked about your own wedding. I had always talked about other 
people’s weddings. There’s no conversation because you’re in a transition space. 
You’ve left the family home and everybody else has got there, and there you are waiting 
in a place where you’re neither at home..., neither married or unmarried at that 
[laughter] stage, but in your dress. You’re half-way. That’s why I went silent because I 
didn’t know what... It wasn’t that my father was awkward. He was a careful gentle man. 
He might have said something about something, but I was in a different space. I was 
about to get married. 11Francis09 
 
I felt warm towards my father and honoured by his right to give me away. It seemed 
very important to be going down the aisle and be given to my husband by him. I felt 
he’d looked after us, particularly as my mother had a very difficult time emotionally and 
mentally, and had left home at one point. So father was a significant figure and now he 
was giving the job to somebody else. There seemed a lot of gravitas, very powerful. 
11Francis10 
 
Mother’s role was to supervise the catering. Mother bought in the catering from people 
who catered for weddings at home. My concerns were for her, because if they hadn’t 
provided the right things she would have been upset because she could get tense about 
catering, and I hoped that she could feel supported by the catering.  
 
I didn’t have feelings about mother in the Church at all, because I was engaged in the 
process, of going up the aisle, being given to my husband, and what I should do next. I 
knew the vicar and the choir so I was so engaged with the church. My mother never 
went to church. I had sung in the choir at other people’s weddings, now the choir was 
there for me and that was powerful. 11Francis11 
 
I think feeling beautiful… it’s the dress that made the difference, the solemn aspect of 
the occasion, and you’re the central player. There’s no way in your life that you have 
waited for so much. At that age when you haven’t got power the dress makes a sense of 
empowerment, feeling very special, and feeling very beautiful. 11Francis12 
 
As far as the Anglican Church service was concerned, although I sang in the church 
choir, my own beliefs were rather mixed. On one hand I felt very spiritual, while on the 
other hand feeling quite flexible. So I was unsure about the relationship between God 
and marriage because men married people. I could see the sense of a blessing, but I saw 
marriage as a social event acknowledged in law. I think I was quite sophisticated in my 
view of marriage then because I had seen lots of people get married. So, for me, it 
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wasn’t a transcendent experience of meeting God and being blessed by God. I thought 
of it in terms of a solemn oath, which I did think I might not be able to keep all my life. 
I’m saying the vow now but will I live up to the promise? I had a sense I might not be 
able to live up to the promises I was making. So I wasn’t in a romantic state, rather in a 
questioning state of mind. Like, what am I doing? 11Francis13 
 
I really appreciated being veiled because it was unusual and it gave me some privacy. I 
think that was one of the nicest parts. There’s something very containing about being 
veiled. It felt as though while I was veiled I couldn’t belong to anybody. 11Francis14 
 
I felt frightened about being given away because it seemed a huge change of gear. It 
seemed conventional, leaving my parental home for the first time after twenty-one 
years, getting married, being given away, then living in my new home. I felt anxious 
leaving home, where I knew people, and wondered what to do with my husband-to-be 
who was virtually a stranger, who I hadn’t been with for more than a day and hadn’t 
stayed with him overnight. So as I took my dress off I felt reluctant because I wanted to 
stay at home a bit longer, but realized that I couldn’t. I wasn’t being pushed [laughter] 
away really, but felt that I wasn’t allowed back in that full way again. There was a 
finality about being given away. 11Francis15 
 
It seemed quite pleasant signing the register because I knew the vicar, he was a little bit 
humorous and chatty and made it seem relaxed. I knew everything had gone well, the 
choir, and my responses. I didn’t see the signatures as terribly important. I didn’t see it 
as a signature of law, which it is. I saw the law to be the issue, the actual blessing and 
the service, that was the law for me. The signature was a bureaucratic necessity. 
11Francis16 
 
I was very delighted to change my surname, because it moved up the alphabet 
[laughter] which seemed wonderful [laughter]. I didn’t want to keep my maiden name. 
It seemed that if you married you should change your name and take your husband’s. I 
was conventional in that respect. I didn’t wish to hold onto my maiden name as I didn’t 
have a feminist perspective. 11Francis17 
 
I loved processing down the aisle. It felt wonderful. My veil was up and I felt 
legitimately the centre of attention. Everybody was smiling. I hadn’t had that many 
people smile at me all at once before. It was enormously gratifying [laughter]. I had not 
had that sort of warmth… acknowledged in a singular way before. 11Francis18 
 
I was very keen to be photographed because I wanted it to be documented. I remember 
one photograph being taken with the rather old patriarchal vicar with his arms around 
both of us giving us a blessing. I liked being photographed. It was a modest wedding so 
we didn’t have an enormous number of photographs. It was done carefully. Not endless 
photographs. 11Francis19 
 
The wedding reception was at home in two downstairs rooms, as the house was not that 
big. It was just very nice, everybody smiling, welcoming and fussing over me. Very 
warm. I didn’t feel terribly on show, I thought I was amongst friends and family, and it 
was cosy. 11Francis20 
 
My saddest memories concern my mother’s family who were not there to support her. 
While I was a teenager, there were close relatives who died. I expected my very loved 
grandmother to die because she’d lived a long life. But my brother, my favourite Uncle 
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who took photographs of me as a child, and my Aunt who took her own life, had also 
died. So I felt that my mother was rather marooned. 11Francis21 
 
The two most enduring memories are: the journey in the car, although it was an unusual 
and very serious moment, became one of my best memories. And the vicar putting his 
arms around both of us recorded in the photograph. 11Francis22 
 
P.S. I married because since I was sixteen I’d been running around with people. I was 
now twenty-one, my sister married the year before and I thought it was my turn next. 
My husband and I amicably divorced, however. But while my ex-husband remains alive 
I feel there continues to be a subliminal emotional attachment, because I still feel 
married to him. 
 
 
A psychodynamic interpretation 
Francis states that her mother ‘left home at one point’ (11Francis10), indicating that 
Francis may have experienced the trauma of feeling ‘marooned’ (11Francis22), 
abandoned, insecurely held or uncontained, unloved or unlovable. Thus in Francis’ 
unconscious we may find indications of her reaction through compensation. 
Compensations for feeling abandoned or insecure, may be seen when Francis states: 
‘since I was sixteen I’d been running around with people’ (11Francis22), as if Francis 
was looking for something, someone, or maybe, as discussed in Part One in a Platonic 
way, her ‘other half’ to offer her a sense of security.  
 
That Francis too was playing a lot of sport (11Francis04) can be understood as 
controlling the body, an unconscious compensation when Francis couldn’t control her 
mother’s leaving. But Francis could control the length of her own hair by having it cut 
‘really short’ (11Francis04). Francis also tried to control her state of virginity, but 
‘couldn’t quite’ (11Francis05). Francis gave in to having sex in order to get married and 
to ensure ‘he didn’t run away’ (11Francis05). In other words this seems to be an 
indication of an unconscious attempt to control the ‘other’ (husband, mother or herself). 
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Control becomes an issue again when Francis states: ‘the difficulty was that the whole 
thing didn’t last long enough’ (11Francis07). It seems interesting that Francis’ saddest 
memory (11Francis21), relates to a number of people who had died, as if Francis 
empathised with her mother’s losses, as if they were her own, relating to people’s lives 
who had abandoned mother and Francis, people who neither Francis nor her mother 
could have any control over.  
 
Francis did not feel ‘in control’ while travelling to the Church, as Francis states: ‘I felt a 
bit estranged, like not sure what’s happening…I didn’t know what to say to my father, 
so I went silent (11Francis09), as if silence controlled any potential ‘awkwardness’ 
(11Francis09). For Francis, the journey to the Church with her father (11Francis01), 
although may have felt ‘awkward’ (11Francis09), and ‘powerful’ (11Francis10), 
arguably Francis may have felt ‘contained’ by the car and by her father. In contrast, one 
of the most enduring of Francis’ memories was feeling ‘contained’ by the patriarchal 
figure of the vicar who ‘put his (‘containing’) arms around us both’ (11Francis22) 
[Figure 9]. 
 
What seems interesting from Francis’ interview is how she seems to have made the 
Church choir and the vicar into the people who were ‘there for me’ (11Francis11). In 
contrast Francis states: ‘my mother never went church’ (11Francis11).  
 
As discussed in Part Three, Freud suggests that we may develop an anaclitic attachment 
based on ‘loving the one who feeds, cares for, and protects, the infant within a 
contained maternal environment, where sadistic-anal impulses do not destroy the object 
and the infant is able to pursue erotic loving feelings. This is in contradistinction to a 
self-centred, ideal ego, narcissistic object-choice (SE14: 88). 
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That although Francis’ mother and father lived together at of time of Francis’ wedding, 
the type of attachment Francis indicates having with her husband can be described as 
not very anaclitic. Francis states: ‘I was not in a romantic state’ (11Francis13), ‘I bought 
my dress and a bit of a haze’ (11Francis02), as if Francis was preoccupied with other 
matters. It is as if Francis’ ‘questioning state of mind’ (11Francis13) prevented her from 
feeling romantic, or wishing to be committed and ‘keep her vows all her life’ 
(11Francis13), but rather ‘feeling quite flexible’ (11Francis13). Nor did Francis ‘see the 
signatures in the Church register as terribly important’ (11Francis16). In contrast, 
Francis knew that she did not want to keep her maiden name but become ‘attached’ to a 
husband through the use of his surname (11Francis17). 
 
What seems interesting is that Francis’ mode of coping with this anxiety appears more 
turned towards herself in a masochistic manner, but not enough to prevent her 
envisaging or achieving a new relationship. As opposed to being sadistically attacking 
or becoming angry towards the mother or ‘other’, Francis becomes empathic, towards 
the mother in ‘my concern that my mother’s family were not there to support her’ 
(11Francis21) and ‘amicably divorces’ the husband (11Francis22). 
 
What seems particularly interesting is that in Part Three we discuss ‘the Oedipal infant 
girl who ‘turns away’ from the mother in favour of the father’. If this turning is 
juxtaposed with Francis’ empathy towards her mother (11Francis21), with a ‘boyish’ 
hair cut (11Francis04), we may interpret this as Francis turning towards the mother, 
more than turning away from the mother. In other words Francis becomes the ‘boyish’ 
for the mother, and doesn’t make a full ‘turn’ in favor of the father, as an Oedipal sense 
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of hostility towards the mother enables the process of repudiation of the mothers love, 
to be transferred onto another. 
 
Through identification with her parents, sister and others Francis thought that getting 
married was the right thing to do at that time in her life. We can interpret from a 
sociological perspective that Francis ‘had seen lots of people get married’ (11Francis13) 
and Francis thought: ‘I was now twenty-one, my sister married the year before and I 
thought it was my turn next’ (11Francis22), as if Francis felt a degree of social pressure 
to get married.  
 
If we take a sociological and religious perspective and seek from Francis’ statements 
why Francis became a bride-in-white and married in an Anglican Church, we may 
learn: ‘I chose to wear a white wedding dress because I was a virgin’ (11Francis05). 
And also because it symbolised that I was ‘pure’ both physically and spiritually 
(11Francis08). I chose to marry in an Anglican Church, because ‘I felt very spiritual’ 
(11Francis13), and because ‘I sang in the choir and I knew the vicar, so I was engaged 
with the Church’, and ‘now the choir was there for me and that was powerful’ 
(11Francis11). 
 
If we consider some psychoanalytic aspects concerning Francis’ statements there seems 
little indication that Francis strongly held ego ideals as she states: ‘I didn’t want my 
wedding dress to be lavish’ (11Francis02), it was a simple dress’ (11Francis03). ‘I 
thought it would do’ (11Francis02) and ‘once I put it on it just did the thing’ 
(11Francis03). Yet Francis wished her dress to appear ‘classical in any era’ 
(11Francis02), as if Francis was concerned with timeless perfection which could be 
associated with the ideal ego. 
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There is little indication of ‘penis envy’ as Francis does not speak about a longing to 
become a mother. 
 
There seems some indication for exhibitionism, when Francis states that she did feel 
that her dress was ‘elegant and beautiful and realised that she looked pretty good in it’ 
(11Francis02), which may go someway to suggest that Francis held narcissistic 
tendencies, or that Francis was seeking a sense of being ‘warmly’ held in others’ regard, 
as a compensation for a sense of castration and not feeling fully held by her mother. 
 
There seems to be good indications that Francis desired to become transformed, when 
she saw herself fully dressed and states: ‘I felt transformed into something very special’ 
(11Francis04). Arguably, Francis also felt transformed by taking on her husband’s 
surname (11Francis17). But as for Francis’ transformation of instinct towards passivity, 
Francis emphasises that she was actively ‘playing a lot of sport’ (11Francis04), 
indicating a sense that she was narcissistically pre-occupied with herself, and thus too 
busy to settle down and have a family. Thus arguably Francis obviates a strong anaclitic 
attachment. 
 
Repudiation of parental authority seems problematic for Francis. As Francis states: ‘my 
mother left home at one point’, arguably leaving Francis feeling insecure. Juxtaposing 
this sense of insecurity is Francis’ feeling ‘warm towards my father’ (11Francis10). 
This indicates that Francis had repudiated her love for her mother and transferred her 
attachment towards her father, but there seems some ambivalence towards leaving home 
as Francis wanted to stay in her dress a little longer (11Francis07). 
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Narcissism or exhibitionism 
Francis states that she ‘chose a white wedding dress because she considered herself to 
be a virgin’ (11Francis05), and considered that her dress ‘remained pristine’ 
11Francis06). Although Francis states that she thought her wedding dress ‘was elegant 
and beautiful’ (11Francis02), that in wearing it she ‘felt transformed into something 
very special’ (11Francis04), where there was ‘a sense of empowerment and feeling very 
beautiful’ (11Francis12), Francis also states ‘it was a simple dress’ (11Francis03), that 
‘it would do’ (11Francis02), ‘nothing fussy’ (11Francis03). 
 
In wearing a white wedding dress Francis felt ‘good’ because she ‘had all the attention 
the whole day’, and had ‘been the centre of attention’ which ‘was very rewarding’ 
(11Francis07). Francis also states that she ‘liked being photographed (11Francis19), but 
seems to link it with being a ‘modest wedding’ (11Francis 19). 
 
While Francis’ statements indicate that she felt ‘elegant’, ‘beautiful’, and ‘transformed’, 
which arguably felt narcissistically ‘empowering’, there seems little indication that 
Francis was overtly exhibitionist or narcissistic. Arguably, Francis felt that ‘everyone 
was smiling, welcoming and fussing over her and being very warm’ (11Francis20) 
because the group found what Francis was doing, that of confirming her 
heteronormativity by getting married, and the manner in which he was doing it, that of 
wearing wedding white indicating that she was a virgin, was acceptable to them. In a 
similar manner to the neophyte, as discussed in Part One, who trains for three years and 
when purged from his sin becomes baptised and emerges dressed in white. Arguably, 
heteronormativity and marriage may be a ‘compromise’ as discussed by Chodorow in 
Part One, and a form of religious and social control, but if there was no control, we 
might have, like Hesiod’s sense of incestuous and moral irresponsibility. 
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As we have seen in Part One, while exploring the idealisation of the Virgin Mary, as a 
reaction to this idealisation arguably has resulted and a huge amount of pressure put on 
some contemporary woman to remain a virgin prior to marriage. We might ask: How 
might young women react to this conscious or unconscious pressure? 
 
With passive conformity? With ‘altruistic surrender’ as Anna Freud suggests, being 
delighted to be a virgin bride and bring happiness upon the earthly and heavenly father, 
and the group? Is the bride looking for ‘acceptance’, as opposed to a fear of rejection 
and loss of love by the father or the group as in Eve’s rejection from the Garden of Eden 
due to her disobedience and her loss of the ideal environment?  
 
In sales terms, we can ask what is the bride’s pay-off or benefit for remaining or 
appearing to be a virgin bride-in-white? From Francis’ statements, she received an 
enormous amount of ‘warmth’ (11Francis18) from being the ‘centre of attention’ 
(11Francis07). Arguably this state of narcissism and exhibitionism can appear to heal 
narcissistic wounds and any sense of castration. The pay-off for getting married in 
Church arguably, as van Gennep in Part One argues is that separation anxiety and 
repudiation is contained by the Church and the group, and the new union is legitimised 
in a collective rite of passage. And transformation from daughter to wife is legitimised 
by the father publicly giving his daughter away. 
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4. Interview and interpretation – Liz and Freesia 
I would now like to present a combined interview with mother (15Freesia), and 
daughter (05Liz), which may also illustrate some of the differences and similarities 
between the two groups of brides interviewed, that of a ‘recent’ and one who had been 
married over ten years previously.  
 
 
My most vivid experience was making the vow. 05Liz01 
 
 
As I was putting on my wedding dress I was concerned ‘do I look alright?’ (both 
laugh). As you dress you feel as though you’re getting your mind ready as well as your 
appearance.  Because I had my friend and my bridesmaid there, there was a social 
dimension about it, which was very nice.  I can recall that it was difficult to put on. 
(laughs). 05Liz02 
 
Yes, that was true, it was difficult to put on, I had a lots of buttons on my dress to 
fasten. (laughs). 15Freesia02 
 
 
Good friends of mine assisted me to dress and get ready on my wedding day which was 
very nice. 15Freesia03 
 
Yes, same again. My friend supported me as she had been married a few years before 
and was sharing some of that experience.  Her daughter was my bridesmaid, obviously 
it was all new for her and as she was getting dressed everything was a really big deal, so 
it was nice to share that with her. It was one of those moments during the day when we 
had some time, later on it all got busy and rushed. So that beginning period, where we 
were getting ready was much more measured - you could chat and spend time together. 
05Liz03 
 
 
When I saw myself fully dressed I thought, it doesn’t look like me. I think I was a 
purist. [laughs]. I don’t know what it was but it was a nice feeling. 15Freesia04 
 
Yes. 05Liz04 
 
 
I chose to wear a white dress because it was very traditional and I was a bride. As I have 
fair skin white doesn’t suit me and realised that cream was an option, so I chose cream. 
15Freesia05 
 
I thought about wearing something different than white, but I chose to wear a ‘white’ 
dress because it felt like a traditional occasion and it seemed appropriate some how and 
when I tried on dresses and thought about it. I thought practically, because we had a big 
wedding with lots of guests, any other colour wouldn’t have stood out in quite the same 
way. I thought, because the church ceremony was traditional and I had traditional 
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feelings about it, therefore it seemed appropriate to wear, no I didn’t wear white either, I 
wore a cream coloured dress. 05Liz05 
 
 
I hoped that my dress wouldn’t get dirty, but I knew that that was irrational because I 
didn’t ever think I would ever wear it again, sell it or give it away. I wanted it to look 
nice all day.  I remember being a bit bothered when it did get slightly dirty, but it wasn’t 
a problem. You buy the dress, the one you really want, it’s so special, you’ve chosen it 
and you’ve thought about it, you really want it to look good. I just thought I am going to 
wear this all day, ‘til the very end and after that it doesn’t matter. 05Liz06 
 
I still have my dress. I just wanted to look nice. I didn’t think about it getting dirty.  If 
Liz had wanted to wear it she could have, if it had fitted. She’s a bit taller than me, so it 
probably wouldn’t… 15Freesia06 
 
Researcher: How did you feel as you were stepping out of your wedding dress? I 
mustn’t tell you that! [both laugh]. When I married in 1959, times were different. When 
‘S’ and I changed and I stepped out of my wedding dress it was the first time he had 
seen me. I felt, ohhhh… [laughs], there was a mixture of anticipation, and excitement 
[laughs]. People can’t understand that now, because it was a different world. 
15Freesia07 
 
It was obviously a lot different for me in 2005, because we had a little boy and he was 
asleep in his cot in the room we were in. I was also freezing cold [both laugh]. I’ve 
never been so cold in all my life. But again, you do have this sense of the whole day and 
the wedding night being special. Perhaps I was more thoughtful about the day, it felt 
quite strange. 05Liz07 
 
‘P’ said it felt strange, and really weird, too. 15Freesia07 
 
I didn’t feel quite the way he described, I felt almost disappointed actually. 05Liz07 
 
Oh, that’s a shame. 15Freesia07 
Yes, because maybe you have such high expectations of your wedding day that nothing 
can possibly live up to them, and therefore afterwards. I don’t feel that now looking 
back on that, I felt it at the time.  Maybe its just all that emotional tension and build up 
that at the end of it its like, bluh… 05Liz07 
 
A bit of a let down? 15Freesia07 
 
Yes. 05Liz07 
 
Because it’s only a day. 15Freesia07 
Yes, that’s right, you’ve spent months preparing for it, disproportionate almost. 
05Liz07 
 
Yes, and I suppose the events leading up to it, effect your views of the day. ‘S’ and I, 
had to be very determined that that was what we wanted to do. ‘S’ almost gave up at 
one stage, then he realised that once I had set my hand to the plough… 15Freesia07 
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I don’t recall anything at all while I was travelling to the church, except my father 
would be in the car. 15Freesia09 
 
For me, it was a lovely time with dad. We were driven very slowly to the Church, which 
gave us the opportunity to be relaxed. We didn’t talked about anything momentous it 
was just a really peaceful time. I was happy and he was happy. It was a lovely tranquil 
moment. 05Liz09 
 
 
At first I had been in something of a struggle because my father had very much opposed 
the marriage, not because he had anything against my husband-to-be, but because he felt 
I ought to, the Victorian way, devote my life to looking after my disabled brother, and I 
said no. My father felt that somehow this was wrong, but he came round to it, agreed to 
give me away and to me that was everything. 15Freesia10 
 
I had it cushy didn’t I? It meant a lot to me that dad gave me away particularly because I 
know he’s old fashioned. Old fashioned in his views and probably didn’t think that the 
way we did things, having the baby first then getting married was the right way round. 
But he was very sweet about it and very sweet to me and seemed genuinely very happy 
when we got married. He gave a lovely speech and seemed to enjoy the day and that 
was special, that was lovely. I really appreciated that. 05Liz10 
 
 
My mother didn’t play a role. If Mum had lived closer then I’d probably have asked her 
to help me choose the dress, flowers and things like that. The reason I didn’t was that it 
wasn’t practical and I didn’t feel I particularly needed support. I was happy doing it on 
my own. On the day, it was very special to have my family there because we’re a tiny 
family and it was really nice to have our family together. Them being part of it was very 
important to me. The only thing was when you mum, dropped dad off, I was briefly on 
my own in the house, and I expected you to come in and say hello, but when you didn’t, 
I understood you had gone to the church. I would have been very happy if you had 
wanted to come in and have a chat before you had gone. 05Liz11 
 
It was just one of those things. 15Freesia11 
 
It didn’t matter, I didn’t mind, you could have done so if you’d wanted to. 05Liz11 
I imagined you there with two or three bridesmaids around you. 15Freesia11 
No, I wasn’t offended, I didn’t mind, nice hat… 05Liz11 
 
 
For a bride to feel beautiful they make a very great effort to ensure they’ve a nice dress. 
But I think the most important thing is happiness. 15Freesia12 
 
I don’t think I had a sense of how I looked. At times it felt quite strange because people 
were taking photographs of me all day, and I thought, I don’t quite know what I look 
like. Obviously I looked in the mirror before I left, and stuck my veil on in the car 
(laughter), hoping it wouldn’t fall off, dad said it looked ok. There aren’t mirrors 
around are there?  But when I look at the photographs, I look quite happy, I agree with 
what mum says. 05Liz12:  
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Until about 18 months before we were married ‘S’ was very, very definitely an 
Anglican, but I never became a member of the congregation. 15Freesia13 
 
Whether or not it was Anglican wasn’t an issue because mum and dad brought me up as 
an Anglican so if I was going to have a religious ceremony then it would have been in 
an Anglican church. The significance of marrying in church, was because I am Christian 
and the whole point of getting married is through religious ceremony. A civil ceremony 
would have seemed pointless because I am a Christian. I see marriage as a commitment.  
It’s partly about making a public commitment to a partner in front of your friends and 
family, and its also about evolving relationships. 05Liz13 
 
 
I considered that being veiled was traditional and part of the traditional service. 
15Freesia14 
 
I thought the veil was optional, but I chose to wear one because I felt a bit shy, in a 
church full of people, that was quite overwhelming. I wanted to focus on the ceremony, 
and I didn’t want to be distracted, worried or nervous about being surrounded by so 
many people. It was nice to hide behind a veil. 05Liz14 
 
I can understand that. 15Freesia14 
 
 
It was special that dad was there to give me away, and particularly to have his moral 
support. It’s scary when you are about to walk up the aisle, and it’s all just about to 
happen, so it was nice to have dad there. 05Liz15 
 
You had to hold each other up. 15Freesia15 
 
No, we didn’t hold each other up at all, as far as being given away goes, we’d been 
together a long time and had a little boy and it didn’t have the same significance it 
probably had for you mum. 05Liz15 
 
 
I can’t remember any feelings while I signed the register. 15Freesia16 
We escaped for a minute to sign the register. I thought it was funny because the priest 
kept saying: ‘this is the last time you’ll sign your maiden name’. But I haven’t bothered 
to change my surname! It’s not that I am making a big statement because when our 
child was born, it was a ‘no brainer’ that he was going to have his father’s surname. I’ve 
no problem being called ‘Mrs H’. It seems an odd convention that you change your 
surname. I can’t see the point of it given that it’s a great deal of hassle, I wouldn’t 
bother doing it.  I don’t understand the convention. 05Liz16 
 
 
Changing my surname was the absolutely accepted system in the 1950’s when I 
married. It was very unusual indeed not to do so. It was totally accepted that you took 
your husband’s surname, and that was it. The general morés have changed, the general 
attitude towards women. I was very fortunate, my husband has always felt that we were 
as good as men. But the vast majority of men felt that we were not as good. I was very 
lucky, that when I went to work, before I was married, I was treated perfectly, never 
harassed, or treated as though I was inferior. I think that these days that’s a rarity. 
15Freesia17 
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I think, as I processed down the aisle it was the first time I had seen how many people 
there were, and everywhere I looked there was a sea of people’s faces who I knew and 
cared about, that was a lovely, lovely feeling, just this huge support was everywhere. 
05Liz18 
 
 
When we were married we didn’t have the tremendous number of photographs that you 
have now. 15Freesia19 
 
My thought of the mementoes was that it would be nice to have this as a keepsake but I 
found it became intrusive having so many pictures, it seemed to take over for a while. 
There were times when I wanted the photography to finish so we could get on, but I also 
wanted to have them. The most important thing was making sure everybody was 
photographed because I wanted to have memories of everybody who was there. 
05Liz19 
 
Yes, it was jolly nice to have some photographs. My parents’ wedding, in 1929, never 
had a photograph because they didn’t come out. But I have my mum’s wedding shoes 
size 2, to 2-and-a-half and a piece of her floral pattern wedding dress material and that’s 
nice. 15Freesia19 
 
 
On entering my wedding reception I was keen to greet and talk to people. 15Freesia20 
 
 
My Saddest memory was that my mother couldn’t be there. 15Freesia21 
I think my saddest feeling relates to the people that weren’t able to come. My closest 
family were there, but there were a few people who I’d expected to be there because 
they said they were going to come and they didn’t appear and I still don’t know why. 
And my Uncle who sadly died before I married, it would have been lovely if he had 
been able to be there. 05Liz21 
 
My happiest memory was being married to my husband (laughs) because with all his 
problems he’s a good egg! [all laugh]. 15Freesia22 
 
My happiest memory concerns the ceremony, which was electric. It was intense and I 
was nervous and shaking when I went up the aisle, then my husband-to-be took hold of 
my hand and held it all through the service. 05Liz22 
 
 
A psychodynamic interpretation 
This combined interview is interesting for two reasons. It was conducted with mother 
and daughter together who married forty-six years apart, but arguably had similar 
cultural values. And secondly, although mother appears to have conformed to the social 
mores of her era, perhaps although Liz did not initially meet with her father’s approval, 
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may have reflected the social mores of a different era. But arguably Liz points to 
significant reasons for becoming a bride-in-white and marrying in Church, including a 
public commitment and public approval, as on one level Liz did not need to get married 
at all because she already had an established partnership (05Liz15) and had a baby son 
(05Liz15+16). 
 
Mother / daughter relationship 
During the interaction between mother and daughter, Freesia and Liz, regarding 
stepping out of their wedding dress, we can see indications of embarrassment when they 
both laugh and Freesia states that ‘I mustn’t tell you that!’ (15Freesia07), but there 
seems no indication of guilt. While Liz seems mostly ready to passively agree with her 
mother, Freesia throughout the conversation indicates attunement and empathy towards 
her daughter Liz felt in the moment. Liz having had high expectations and made 
‘disproportionate preparations’ as Freesia states ‘it’s only a day’ (15Freesia07), Liz felt 
‘almost disappointed’, a bit let down, cold and strange (05Liz07). Thus indicating that 
there was no rivalry between daughter and mother, perhaps because they both were 
secure in their separate relationships. 
 
 
 
Wearing the dress: exhibitionism 
We know that Freesia chose to wear a cream coloured dress because she felt that white 
was too stark against the colour of her skin (15Freesia05). We also know that Liz was 
emphatic that her dress was not white but cream. But we don’t know overtly why Liz 
chose cream (05Liz05). We may interpret that it was because Liz unconsciously thought 
‘I don’t deserve to wear a pristine white dress as I’ve already had a baby son’. We may 
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also interpret that Liz may have identified with her mother’s own choice thus offering 
an indication of unconscious mirroring or copying of mother by daughter. 
 
Bride’s struggle to repudiate familial ties 
We know that Freesia had a ‘struggle’ to leave father and the familial home because her 
father wanted her to stay (15Freesia09). We also know that Liz didn’t wait to be ‘given 
away’ before she co-habited and had a baby son (05Liz10), thus indicating that Liz 
experienced unconscious ‘penis envy’. 
 
It is as if Liz unconsciously carried the ‘struggle’ that her mother had had leaving home 
and her father, by unconsciously braking away from familial ties and exerting her 
independence. We can take into account that Liz lives in a different economic era or in a 
more sexually liberated society, but we know that both Freesia and Liz were 
professionally independent women who felt as though they were treated as equals and 
did not feel demeaned or castrated by men (15Freesia17). However, we also know that 
both Freesia and Liz really appreciated that their father gave them away (15Freesia10) 
(05Liz10), thus indicating that both women allowed themselves to be subject to the 
patriarchal law of exchange. 
 
Bride’s motivation to marry 
Arguably something drove Liz to marry and make an almost ‘disproportionate’ amount 
of preparation (05Liz07). We know that Liz and her partner had been together for some 
time and they already had a baby son (05Liz07). So why did Liz get married in church? 
We know that Liz married in Church ‘because she was a Christian’ and that a register 
office ceremony would be ‘pointless’ (05Liz13). So why did Liz marry at all?  
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To please her father and allow him to give her away in a public ceremony (05Liz15)? 
Liz states that ‘it meant a lot to me that dad gave me away…he seemed genuinely very 
happy when we got married’ (05Liz10). This sentiment is also reflected by Freesia 
when she states: ‘My father agreed to give me away and to me that was everything’ 
(15Freesia10). This illustrates the ‘special’ relationship that the daughter has with their 
father, and indicates unconscious incestuous desire. 
 
To make her partnership secure as marriage is a ‘commitment’ (05Liz13)? This 
argument seems  less likely, as Liz states that she ‘wouldn’t bother’ (05Liz16) changing 
her surname to her husbands. Thus indicating and reinforcing that Liz seems to appear 
to be a independent agent, an emancipated women, but it also indicates an unconscious 
incestuous desire to remain her father’s daughter. 
 
Or to have the relationship recognised as legitimate within the familial group? Liz states 
that although she thought of choosing a different coloured dress, she chose a cream 
dress because it stood out, and on processing out of the Church Liz realised ‘there was a 
sea of people’s faces who I knew and cared about, that was a lovely feeling, just this 
huge support was everywhere’ (05Liz18). Thus this ‘warmth’ from family and friends 
seems to indicate a powerful group acceptance. Liz seems to have complied with 
society’s and parent’s expectations of conforming or compromising to societal pressure, 
indicating society’s critical voice or super-ego. 
 
Freesia, perhaps may be understood as the passive ‘traditionalist’ (15Freesia05), 
‘accepting’ (15Freesia17), ‘purest’ and idealist (15Freesia04), person but also as a 
determined person despite a ‘struggle’ (15Freesia10) with her father. It seems that 
Freesia was not afraid to have this struggle with her father thus arguably Freesia was not 
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castrated, did not fear castration, or fear loss of love although she may have done so and 
similarly Liz seems not afraid to have gone against what might be considered as 
traditional mores by her father. 
 
In a ‘feminist’ manner, Liz indicates that she did not need a mothers support (05Liz11), 
not be constricted, feel castrated by social ‘convention’ (05Liz16), or symbolically 
owned by her husband by changing her surname to his, as it seems as though, like her 
mother before her (05Liz17), Liz desires parity, equality in her relationship. Liz 
recognises however that her child will carry their father’s surname (05Liz16), therefore 
symbolically be under his authority. This arguably results in a splitting, or a paradox to 
be conceptualised by the child. This interpretation raises an important question. Could 
this interpretation, made by a male researcher, be considered comparable to Freud’s 
view of patriarchy, male superiority and female misogyny. Arguably, if a feminist were 
to interpret Liz’s statement regarding this name change, she may congratulate Liz for 
making a stand against patriarchy. So how important could it be to the bride, Liz, to 
retain her maiden identity? 
 
Despite Liz knowing that her father was ‘old-fashioned in his views’ regarding ‘having 
a baby first then getting married’ (05Liz10), indicates that Liz’s penis envy was 
stronger than her superego attached to the father. This also begs the question as to the 
ultimate authority that Liz is subject to, and that influenced her to get married? Perhaps, 
God and the Church represented authority, because Liz was ‘a Christian’ (05Liz13)? 
Perhaps, Liz’s father represented authority, because Liz did marry and attempted to put 
it ‘the right way round’ (05Liz10) with her father, thus meeting with his approval as he 
‘seemed genuinely very happy when we got married (05Liz10). Perhaps, because Liz 
now had a child and she wanted the sacred ‘vow’ in Church (05Liz01) to act as a 
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symbol of security for her and her child, and in an endeavour to ensure that her ‘man’ 
would not abandon them, but would be part of the ‘commitment’ to the ‘evolved 
relationship’ (05Liz13). 
 
A broader question may be, that although Liz, in a feminist manner, looks for parity 
with men, like her mother, if it can be established that Liz has submitted to Church 
authority, and her father’s authority, then arguably Liz lives in a patriarchal world. This 
in turn indicates that Liz unconsciously may suffer from a sense of penis envy and 
feelings of castration. 
 
In conclusion, the above précised interviews go some way to illustrate how, by applying 
a psychoanalytic lens to the participants’ statements, a rich, in-depth, understanding of a 
subjective experience of wearing white can be elucidated. 
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